Polish AF: preparing for 1939

[Glider]

What date is the earliest Hawkers could deliver Hurricanes to the Poles and would the Air Ministry allow any delays to RAF deliveries to equip the Polish AF. Also just the Hurricanes arriving in Poland doesnt mean they could go straight into service did the Poles have the time to get Pilots and ground crew trained for a useful number of Hurricanes into service.

Belgium received some in 1939 and even Latvia paid for some in 1939 but they couldn't get delivered. It seems clear that they were in production and cleared for delivery in the right timescale.


Your comments about training pilots and ground crew on the Hurricane are absolutely valid, but would apply to any type, even a home grown one. To ease this there were other benefits iro the Hurricane, it was famously easy to fly and being largely based on older technology, easy to maintain as well as being robust for operations from all types of airfield. I would suggest that a better choice for Poland in 1939 would be almost impossible to find.

If a 'Plan B' is allowed then buy the P36, the French Hawks did well in the Battle of France but they were slower, with less firepower than the Hurricane

 

[kool kitty89]

Given the delays in getting new Bristol engines to Poland in a timely manner, I rather doubt Hurricanes with their Merlins would be any more expedient.

Though that made me realize something else: French, German, and even Italian liquid cooled V-12 engines have been addressed, but British ones have not. I'd forgotten that Rolls Royce had both the Kestrel and Buzzard running in the mid/late 1920s and at least the former in production. The Buzzard was never put into large scale production, but I believe that was mainly due to lack of interest than any technical problems.

The Kestrel was in a similar weight and power class to the Mercury engines the Poles used in the early 1930s (though heavier with the radiator included) and around early enough to consider importing or acquiring a manufacturing license instead of the Mercury license.

I'm not sure if the Buzzard would have been compelling. Larger and heavier than the Kestrel (but lighter than the later Merlin by a good amount) but if the altitude performance was close, the added power of the Buzzard might be interesting to consider. I'm not sure if the lack of interest British aircraft developers showed in the engine would have made Rolls Royce any more likely to offer a manufacturing license, but that might have been a useful factor as well.

 

[Shortround6]

There may have been a different design philosophy in the the early 30s (not universal) that saw fighters as light and agile and large/heavy engines, even though powerful, being more suited to bombers/flying boats) than to fighters.
The Buzzard was several hundred pounds heavier, about 25% wider and about 20-22% taller than a Kestrel, weight not including coolant. To get the landing speed the same with the bigger engine ( or have the same turning ability) you need a bigger wing, and perhaps heavier landing gear to support the larger airplane (and more fuel). Remember that there were darn few wind tunnels at the time and what was 'common knowledge' about streamlining was mostly intuition (guess work) and not actual facts.
Planes may have been built to a price also and using a Buzzard engine to tote around a pair of 7.7mm mgs might have looked like a very expensive solution. Everything changed in just a few years

 

[Balljoint]

Please enlighten me.


With regard to Poland, it was beyond Britains power to avert the subversion of Poland both in 1939 and in 1945. But britain did more to at least try and protect Poland than Finland has ever done. All Finland did was side with Germany. Too precious to get their own hands dirty but happy enough to side with a regime bent on the extermination of millions. That, sadly, made her an enemy. And Finland did what to help anyone but the germans and themselves?

There's a bit of mismatch between Great Britain and Finland. After Napoleon's defeat, Europe was divided into major countries and sphere of influence counties; Austria, Germany collectively, Russia, Britain and France constituting the former, and the remaining countries being secondary dependencies. WW1 generally resulted from the rise of nationalism in the "sphere" countries and particularly Germany's response to the challenge to imperial rule.

Poland and Finland are sphere countries without the military or political clout to determine an independent course of action. They could only react and compromise –though Poland attempted to ally and maintain an independent course. With hindsight, they might have been better advised to ally with the Soviets or Germans since these countries were the centers of their sphere –Germany incipiently so.
Similarly Britain recognized the better course to be cooperation with the Soviets, a sphere center, though save for a personality clash they seemingly could have allied with Germany in return for Germany perhaps yielding in Western Europe –just speculation. The point being the sphere of influence principle originally more or less kept the peace during the initial decades – but certainly presently has proven to be a cure as bad as the decease.

Britain vis-a-vis Finland are two entirely different entities in terms of available responses to Soviet/German aggression. Britain made arbitrary but reasonable major power decisions. It's inappropriate to moralize relative to Britain –though it may be useful to critically review decisions and results for future reference.

 

[bobbysocks]

I don't see Poland having the funds to get an airforce that would give Germany any reason to hesitate. maybe if france and the uk basically worked out a lend lease deal with them it could have been bolstered somewhat. if the us did lend lease the planes they could give them were what...buffalos, severskys, peashooters, p40s?? at that stage of the game they would have been better off with French and uk ac.

 

[kool kitty89]

What date is the earliest Hawkers could deliver Hurricanes to the Poles and would the Air Ministry allow any delays to RAF deliveries to equip the Polish AF. Also just the Hurricanes arriving in Poland doesnt mean they could go straight into service did the Poles have the time to get Pilots and ground crew trained for a useful number of Hurricanes into service.

Another thought on the Hurricane is that: while the Hurricane Mk.I was faster, its rate of climb (with the fixed pitch prop) was significantly worse than the P.24 while the armament was worse than the P.24's as well (at least against bombers). Same should be true for the P.11g or a Pegasus powered P.24 derivative. (possibly the P.11c as well)

Polish interest in Gloster's F.5/37 monoplane might for export might have been more useful given it wouldn't compete with RAF orders aside from Gladiators (which were already on the export market using similar Mercury VIII engines). I was under the impression the F.5/34 was publicized and not developed under any great degree of secrecy, so such a scenario should be plausible. (whether they reached Poland in time is another matter, and I suppose this same argument could apply to Finnish Gladiator orders as well with the exception that they didn't already have aircraft with equal/superior performance to the Gladiator -the P.11c's performance and armament were equivalent or slightly better)

There may have been a different design philosophy in the the early 30s (not universal) that saw fighters as light and agile and large/heavy engines, even though powerful, being more suited to bombers/flying boats) than to fighters.

Yes, so in the 1930 time range when the P.7 was under development, the Kestrel would have been the main British engine to consider next to the Mercury and Jupiter, and focusing on the Bristol engines certainly had advantages.

Did Rolls Royce ever even offer a license for the Kestrel? Sure there was the fairly similar V-1570 around the same time with similar power and Curtiss was in a tighter situation actually trying to find buyers, but I think it relied on glycol cooling and might not have transitioned to water cooling easily, or it might have benefited from it given the 100% glycol related coolant leaking and hot-spot formation issues. (which the Kestrel avoided by using pressurized water cooling until the Peregrine, I believe)

The Buzzard was several hundred pounds heavier, about 25% wider and about 20-22% taller than a Kestrel, weight not including coolant. To get the landing speed the same with the bigger engine ( or have the same turning ability) you need a bigger wing, and perhaps heavier landing gear to support the larger airplane (and more fuel). Remember that there were darn few wind tunnels at the time and what was 'common knowledge' about streamlining was mostly intuition (guess work) and not actual facts.
Planes may have been built to a price also and using a Buzzard engine to tote around a pair of 7.7mm mgs might have looked like a very expensive solution. Everything changed in just a few years

Mid 1930s fighter designs like the YP-24/P-30, Supermarine 224, and Hawker Hurricane with their rather large size and wing area would have been better cases for an engine of the Buzzard's class, but that already was discussed to some extent in the Supermarine 224 thread a while back.

 

[kool kitty89]

I don't see Poland having the funds to get an airforce that would give Germany any reason to hesitate. maybe if france and the uk basically worked out a lend lease deal with them it could have been bolstered somewhat. if the us did lend lease the planes they could give them were what...buffalos, severskys, peashooters, p40s?? at that stage of the game they would have been better off with French and uk ac.

P-40s would come way too late and as it was Finnish B-239s came too late to be used in the Winter War. P-36s were already mentioned as a bit late as well and expense while P-35s might have been more realistic but also likely relatively expensive. An export version of Gloster's F.5/37 seems potentially more attractive but might be just as costly (still seems like a more timely option given the shorter distance to Britain and greater commonality with the Mercury VIII the Poles were already targeting). The D.XXI was also mentioned but I think the Poles could have done as well or better with more extensive modifications to the P.11/P.24 (but simpler and earlier than the P.50's more dramatic redesign)

They had good pilots and potentially more of the needs was more seriously realized. (and an expanded training program was established) But the first big step would be replacing the several hundred old P.11s with something at least close to competitive with German (and Soviet) opposition. Threats came from both sides (before the invasion began), so focusing solely on the capabilities of one over the other wouldn't make as much sense.

I still say that the Poles should have acquired similar licenses for the Gnome Rhone 14K as the Romanians had. Engines with competitive performance to the Mercury VIII were available sooner (as the Romanians applied to their P.24s). Mating those engines with a more dramatic improvement over the P.24 airframe should have been able to create something at least directly competitive with the Mercury VIII engined D.XXI or possibly better. (the P.24 already had the engine and fuselage, the engineering for the new wing and landing gear is what was needed, best to stick with fixed landing gear to expedite production and service entry)

Its more than a bit rich to argue that the Germans were sympathetic to Finland's position, when in fact they were doing everything they could to hurt Finland.

From March 1940 until Finland's joining with the Axis, the British protected and allowed free movement of Finnish shipping which provided the Finns with considerable external revenue. Not all of this shipping was used for allied purposes, much of it was used for the transport of non-military neutral cargoes. It was still the target of unrestricted warfare by the Germans and still afforded whatever protection could be undertaken by the RN. Hardly the actions of a nation bent on Finland's destruction. And for Germany, hardly the actions of a nation acting in good faith with the welfare of Finland paramount in German interactions with the Finns.

Might it be more fair to say that Germany didn't have so much a strong interest in sympathy to Finland as much as an interest in building allies? And actions taken against Finland's favor were at least in part intended to pressure them into such an alliance?

From Finland's point of view it seems mostly a matter of choosing which allies are most necessary and useful. (this includes practical material resources and considerations regarding how trustworthy or dependable ... or at least predictable said allies might be)

On the whole, they seem to have played things very smart, perhaps the smartest of the smaller countries involved in the European war. That was one of my bigger points regarding Poland's situation in 1939. (Poland had a more complicated situation sandwiched between Germany and Russia such that allying themselves with neither left them open for invasion by both) The potential for various alliances or treaties (as fleeting as they might have ended up) and general diplomatic and military negotiation in 1938 and early 1939 were in far more flux with more possibilities than once war broke out and the players began to get more set in their roles.

In 1939, Poland (and Romania for that matter) would have had more to gain from an alliance with Germany than Finland would by far, while maintained trade and support from Britain was entirely practical and sensible for the Fins. (same for any support or trade from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, or Holland)

Either way, Germany and the USSR would remain the biggest threats even as 'allies' and remaining vigilant towards actions from either would be absolutely necessary. (had an alliance been made with Germany, it's still entirely possible that Hitler would have become dissatisfied with the arrangements and invaded one way or another) The question is more whether Poland could have delayed conflict further and potentially gained some advantages in the short term from an alliance either of those looming threats. (German materials and technology support/trade? Or soviet? -Germany seems the more practically useful option by far and easier to manipulate and exploit to their advantage than the Soviets -the Soviets were also an older, more established long-term threat building up gradually ... Germany's was a flash in the pan that was far less stable and more fickle in nature -much more confusingly and ambiguously so without the benefit of hindsight, obviously)

Would the British have put sanctions on Poland if they allied themselves with Germany? (or Russia?) Unless that was a real threat, then there doesn't seem to be a whole lot arguing against playing more heavily with German politics and economic exchange prior to the war.

At tehran the focus of the western allies were the future military operations, in particular the second front and securing Soviet entry into the pacific war. The western alliance was still fighting for survival in many ways, or at least trying to do all possible to maximise the chances of its success in the up coming cross channel attack. Nevertheless, both the US and Britain did what they could to try and curb Soviet aggression.

Would it not have at least been plausible (by 1944) to be paranoid/distrustful or at least seriously concerned about Stalin to consider Soviet involvement in the Pacific war a viable sacrifice for limiting their status in Europe as soon as a reasonable armistice with Germany (on the Western Front) could be established? Not just Europe either, but curb risk of potential Soviet expansion in East Asia as well. (what's the point of defeating Japan if the former Japanese Empire ends up occupied by a -potentially, at the time- similarly dangerous Imperial influence?)

You'd loose Soviet resources, but you'd gain all those late-war lend-lease resources (including thousands of P-39Qs, P-40Ns, and likely all P-63s) going to the USSR to redistribute to the Western Allies (including those newly freed from German Occupation and their associated colonies) along with independent South East Asian allies from China to the South Pacific (again, including colonies and Commonwealth states).

Obviously, there's more logic to this in hindsight, but even at the time there was plenty of evidence to support Stalin's character and aspirations. Churchill seems to have seen this much at least and it seems more that Roosevelt's relations with (and perception of) Stalin compromised the situation a great deal. Had the US treated the USSR as a necessary evil (at least behind closed doors) rather than a friend and ally, the above scenario seems far more plausible.

 

[kool kitty89]

Poland and Finland are sphere countries without the military or political clout to determine an independent course of action. They could only react and compromise –though Poland attempted to ally and maintain an independent course. With hindsight, they might have been better advised to ally with the Soviets or Germans since these countries were the centers of their sphere –Germany incipiently so.
Similarly Britain recognized the better course to be cooperation with the Soviets, a sphere center, though save for a personality clash they seemingly could have allied with Germany in return for Germany perhaps yielding in Western Europe –just speculation. The point being the sphere of influence principle originally more or less kept the peace during the initial decades – but certainly presently has proven to be a cure as bad as the decease.

The British might not have sided with the Soviets at all if the war had started differently with different alliances involved. Different actions taken in 1938 and 1939 could drastically change the actual state of conflict and aggressors active by 1940, let alone 1941. Circumstances might have led the Soviets to be greater aggressors at that point and the Germans may have failed to gain a good position to invade Western Europe (unless they were insane enough to invade under unfavorable conditions -delay and manipulation making Germany hesitate and they loose their advantage of speed and surprise, but any direct aggression on Western countries would screw up a lot of potential alliances, trade and/or neutrality)

If Poland handled things more like Finland, they'd have switched allies depending on the situation. Germany made a lot of sense (logistically and politically) to find some sort of partnership with in 1938/39, but further relations from 1939 onward would heavily depend on Germany and Russia's actions and if/when and where active hostilities broke out. The UK might have made more sense as a FRIENDLY ally than Germany, but in terms of raw practical political, economic, and military needs and stability (or preparations for lack thereof) in 1938/39 and the strategic situation involved, Germany seems much more attractive. (The USSR as well, location wise, but Germany seems to have had more to offer on the whole AND was boxed in by other Western countries vs the USSR's more solid single boarder and expansive territory making counter-attacks much more difficult, especially on the ground the Russia's massive numerical superiority)

There's also the other question: would it have been possible to sway Hitler (and the Nazi regime in general) to put focus in Eastern Europe as much higher priority than any aspirations of expanding westward? Or at least any direct acts of aggression towards the West? Would numerous alliances with Germany with de-facto goals of anti-Soviet action (in a cold or hot conflict) prevent Germany from being in an effective situation to attack western Europe? Could Germany have been coerced into passing up their chance to strike at Western Europe, delaying action long enough to allow various Western European countries to properly prepare for possible action and circumventing many of the flawed interim measures that allowed Germany to be so effective in 1939?

 

[parsifal]

....Might it be more fair to say that Germany didn't have so much a strong interest in sympathy to Finland as much as an interest in building allies? And actions taken against Finland's favor were at least in part intended to pressure them into such an alliance?

I dont think either is accurate. Germany was not about building alliances. Wartime Germany never ran "alliance warfare" with any of its partners. Germany adhered to the view that minor nations were client kingdoms there to do the bidding of their masters. Their treatment of all their partners was always the role of the imperious master and the dependant client kingdoms doing her bidding or be thrown on the fire, as all of them were eventually as germany began losing.

At the time of the Soviet invasion of Finland, Germany was not interested in any alliance with Finland. Consideration was being given to an invasion of Sweden, and plans were actively underway for the subjugation of Norway and Denmark. Norway and Denmark offer pretty good insight as to what was likely to happen if Finland tried to side with germany. That was never going to happen in any case. The secret protocols worked out between the USSR and Nazi Germany as part of the non-aggression pact were a division of the territories that separated them. All but one of the Baltic states were allocated to Russia, half of Poland also ceded to Russia as well as Finland. One of the Baltic States (Lithuania?) was to go to Germany, the western half of Poland and later, Rumania were to be german spheres of influence. Bulgaria was considered Russian, whilst Hungary initially thought best left to italy. Russia was to meet the raw materials needs of Germany, and Germany was to provide technical and military assistance to the Russians. No side adhered completely with the obligations of the treaty. The Soviets occupied all three of the baltic states and made aggressive inroads into Rumania, Bulgaria entered the German orbit after the attack on Greece (though they did remain loyal to Russia as well). The Hungarians gravitated to the Germans after Case Yellow. Germany gave only a small fraction of the technical support to the russians. But during the winter war, Germany actively supported Stalins by denying foreign entry in support of finland where she could, assisting in the Soviet naval blockade by passing vital information to them, and adopting a seizure policy of their own toward Finnish shipping. In 1939-40, even Hitler acknowledged the vital nature of the arrangements with Stalin. They would never have considered alliance with Finland at that time, until after Soviet duplicity was exposed as this would have jeopardised the far more important pact with Russia.

From Finland's point of view it seems mostly a matter of choosing which allies are most necessary and useful. (this includes practical material resources and considerations regarding how trustworthy or dependable ... or at least predictable said allies might be)

There is an element of truth to that, though the degree to which it has been played up in the interests of cold war tensions is open to debate. What is clear is that for Finland, BARBAOSSA offered them the opportunity to win back lost territory. Finland from that perspective ran a parallel war, not an alliance war. They never allowed German troops into their country except in the far north, never agreed or allowed expansions much beyond the 39 borders, never allowed German entry into Karelia, and never undertook anything other than occasional bombarment of the great city of Leningrad. Frankly they werent interested in German victory in the german grand scale. In fact they conducted their war in the hope the Germans would lose, and their conduct, being entirely consistent with Churchills secret memo to Mannerheim appears to be hoping for an eventual allied victory in which they could retain their prewar boundaries, with a weakened USSR powerless to protest. They were, in effect, hoping for the germans and Russians to bleed themselves white and allow Finland to survive.

That was one of my bigger points regarding Poland's situation in 1939. (Poland had a more complicated situation sandwiched between Germany and Russia such that allying themselves with neither left them open for invasion by both) The potential for various alliances or treaties (as fleeting as they might have ended up) and general diplomatic and military negotiation in 1938 and early 1939 were in far more flux with more possibilities than once war broke out and the players began to get more set in their roles.

There already existed a non-aggression pact between Germany and poland, derived mainly from fear of Polish aggression on the one hand by Germany, and secondly by a fear of Soviet aggression by Poland on the other. But as Germany re-armed and gained strength, this marriage of convenience with Poland fell away in importance. Hitler had no interst in developing any sought of rapport with Poland after 1938. Hitlers main worry seems to have been that the Poles actually would accede to his demands and avoid war for the moment. He was tensing up because he was worried war would yet again be avoided. All this stuff came out in painful detail at Nuremberg as germany was indicted for actively seeking to wage aggressive war. Hitler loathed the whole concept of an independant Poland, loather its people, coveted its resources and hated them becuse of the innate threat they posed to German security during the Weimar republic days. Talk of an alliance with Poland is a daydream after 1938.

In 1939, Poland (and Romania for that matter) would have had more to gain from an alliance with Germany than Finland would by far, while maintained trade and support from Britain was entirely practical and sensible for the Fins. (same for any support or trade from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, or Holland)

If Germany had been prepred to enter an alliance with Poland, that would have destroyed any chance of a detente with Russia. Without Russian raw materials Germany was going to be in trouble economically very quickly....within months. A Germany floundering because of a lack of resources would have begun the exterminations in Poland earlier, not later as the Nazis began to look for ways to appease a resless and angry home front.

This is just one of the difficulties I see with a possible german/Polish Alliance.

Would the British have put sanctions on Poland if they allied themselves with Germany? (or Russia?) Unless that was a real threat, then there doesn't seem to be a whole lot arguing against playing more heavily with German politics and economic exchange prior to the war.

Absolutely. the British would impose sanction on the Poles if they sided with Germany. Anyone found to be treating with the enemy was subject to allied control commission attentions. Sanctions were applied to Russia until June 1941, also against Denmark, Vichy, Spain and italy in the lead up to war. Poland would have been forced into economic ruin if she followed that route.

 

[parsifal]

Would it not have at least been plausible (by 1944) to be paranoid/distrustful or at least seriously concerned about Stalin to consider Soviet involvement in the Pacific war a viable sacrifice for limiting their status in Europe as soon as a reasonable armistice with Germany (on the Western Front) could be established? Not just Europe either, but curb risk of potential Soviet expansion in East Asia as well. (what's the point of defeating Japan if the former Japanese Empire ends up occupied by a -potentially, at the time- similarly dangerous Imperial influence?)

You'd loose Soviet resources, but you'd gain all those late-war lend-lease resources (including thousands of P-39Qs, P-40Ns, and likely all P-63s) going to the USSR to redistribute to the Western Allies (including those newly freed from German Occupation and their associated colonies) along with independent South East Asian allies from China to the South Pacific (again, including colonies and Commonwealth states).

Obviously, there's more logic to this in hindsight, but even at the time there was plenty of evidence to support Stalin's character and aspirations. Churchill seems to have seen this much at least and it seems more that Roosevelt's relations with (and perception of) Stalin compromised the situation a great deal. Had the US treated the USSR as a necessary evil (at least behind closed doors) rather than a friend and ally, the above scenario seems far more plausible.

Equipment was never the problem for the allies after 1943. it was manpower. A defeat in Normandy was estimated to lengthen the war by moiree than 2 years by the JCS and probably cost more than a million men. Britain alone would have been forced effectively out of the war. The US would have been forced to raise another 100+ divisions and destroy, or seriously damage their own economy. So no, you dont get all those extra goodies. You have had to raid your domestic workforces to make up the army to a stronger outfit than it was. In the pacific, in the pre-atomic bomb planning, the expectations were also for a million allied casualties. Thats 2 million American casualties in two years. Frankly I dont think the US could absorb that level of punishment and keep fighting. So getting the Russians on side was definately something worth selling several kidneys over.

 

[kool kitty89]

Equipment was never the problem for the allies after 1943. it was manpower. A defeat in Normandy was estimated to lengthen the war by moiree than 2 years by the JCS and probably cost more than a million men. Britain alone would have been forced effectively out of the war. The US would have been forced to raise another 100+ divisions and destroy, or seriously damage their own economy. So no, you dont get all those extra goodies. You have had to raid your domestic workforces to make up the army to a stronger outfit than it was. In the pacific, in the pre-atomic bomb planning, the expectations were also for a million allied casualties. Thats 2 million American casualties in two years. Frankly I dont think the US could absorb that level of punishment and keep fighting. So getting the Russians on side was definitely something worth selling several kidneys over.

Yes, planning tied to pursuing the full ground invasion of Japan would make that somewhat attractive, though there was an alternate route there too: A-Bomb or no A-Bomb you had mass carpet bombing (particularly incendiary bombing) to continue for a good while, particularly with most of Japan's population centers much more vulnerable to that than Germany's. Horrific loss of life on the Japanese end ... but much lower risk for the allies as far as manpower goes.

Reaching out and establishing enough force (from the entirety of international allied resources) on the ground to push the IJA back from its remaining occupied territories would be more important than any plans to invade the Japanese islands.


Honestly, the biggest losers in a scenario like that would seem to be Russia and Japan.


The remaining IJN surface fleet remnants might be a problem too, but on the Navy end of things, I'd think a working Japanese atomic bomb would be the worst hypothetical possibility. (even then somewhat unlikely to be successfully deployed and only really useful against densely masses fleet formations -like an invasion force- and if an allied invasion force didn't eventuate, then that wouldn't matter either)

I dont think either is accurate. Germany was not about building alliances. Wartime Germany never ran "alliance warfare" with any of its partners. Germany adhered to the view that minor nations were client kingdoms there to do the bidding of their masters. Their treatment of all their partners was always the role of the imperious master and the dependant client kingdoms doing her bidding or be thrown on the fire, as all of them were eventually as germany began losing.

I wasn't suggesting Poland create any real alliance with Wartime Germany, I was suggesting they form a facade of an alliance with pre-war Germany and play their cards very carefully to milk as much out of the arrangement as possible for as long as possible without outright effectively capitulating to Germany (or putting themselves in a position where defiance/betrayal of their alliance was strategically impossible). Trusting Hitler or Stalin for much of anything was folly, but playing the sneaky, manipulative diplomat and military power/'common enemy' appeal to different degrees outside and behind closed doors seems what was necessary.

It might have even avoided the war going hot in the sense that it did historically, but how that might have worked out in the long run is another matter. (personally, the Nazi regime of 1939 seemed much more likely to fall apart in a timely manner than Stalin's) But even that doesn't matter so much when we're trying to see things from Poland's perspective ... they wouldn't be so concerned about what happened INSIDE Germany as they were to what Germany might do beyond their current boarders.

There's a lot more middleground between outright appeasement and direct violent resistance. (I'm sure Hitler's own subordinates and peers alike had to deal with plenty of manipulative placation to his whims ... so why not apply that on an international diplomacy level? -and Hitler's delusions seem far more readily played on than Stalin's ... aspirations) Unless you think Poland lacked the skilled diplomats and statesmen to pull that off.


(possibly more later, but that seems the short of it)

 

[kool kitty89]

There is an element of truth to that, though the degree to which it has been played up in the interests of cold war tensions is open to debate. What is clear is that for Finland, BARBAOSSA offered them the opportunity to win back lost territory. Finland from that perspective ran a parallel war, not an alliance war.
...
In fact they conducted their war in the hope the Germans would lose, and their conduct, being entirely consistent with Churchills secret memo to Mannerheim appears to be hoping for an eventual allied victory in which they could retain their prewar boundaries, with a weakened USSR powerless to protest. They were, in effect, hoping for the germans and Russians to bleed themselves white and allow Finland to survive.

I expressed similar context to a Polish 'alliance' with Germany among my first few posts in this thread. (particularly regarding it only being useful to the Poles if they could gain German support/resources -for a time at least- without significant numbers of German troops entering the country) That is also one more area the Germans were more attractive than the Soviets: more potential technology to make use of in relatively small quantities but relatively potent in quality. Any resources requiring numerical foreign troop 'support' would just make Poland an easier target to take apart from within: a de facto preemptive invasion.

Actual expeditionary type volunteer support would have made more sense from some other potential allies or supporters, but not Germany or Russia. (A stronger alliance with Romania seems to be one of the most immediately useful scenarios from both the Polish and Romanian perspectives in 1938/39, and Romania as it was played more into tricky political/diplomatic cooperation with Germany during war-time -albeit a potentially different context had Germany not invaded Poland or if Poland and their allies had stood united against any eventual invasion) Even if cultural and ideological grounds complicated matters, the Poles, Romanians, Slavic states, and potentially even further down into the Balkin region had common ground to share from a strategic standpoint against both Germany and Russia. The Western European countries had just Germany to worry about directly on their boarders and those separated by the sea had yet greater degrees of separation (plus France, in 1939 technically should have been highly resistant to invasion, logistically and strategically speaking, and fears over breakdown in coordination/communication weren't really present to drive serious concern of a looming invasion threat on the level of the countries stuck between Germany and the USSR). And Finland at least had mostly the USSR to worry about and a more secure route to supply/resources/aid to the west.

There already existed a non-aggression pact between Germany and poland, derived mainly from fear of Polish aggression on the one hand by Germany, and secondly by a fear of Soviet aggression by Poland on the other. But as Germany re-armed and gained strength, this marriage of convenience with Poland fell away in importance. Hitler had no interst in developing any sought of rapport with Poland after 1938. Hitlers main worry seems to have been that the Poles actually would accede to his demands and avoid war for the moment. He was tensing up because he was worried war would yet again be avoided. All this stuff came out in painful detail at Nuremberg as germany was indicted for actively seeking to wage aggressive war. Hitler loathed the whole concept of an independant Poland, loather its people, coveted its resources and hated them becuse of the innate threat they posed to German security during the Weimar republic days. Talk of an alliance with Poland is a daydream after 1938.

It seems what I was suggesting is exactly that: diplomatic dealings playing right into Hitler's concerns and delaying war further. Germany needed war to make war, and they couldn't sustain rearmament even at the pre-war pace they were moving at if they were forced to wait much longer. (while the rest of Europe would have more time to update their own defenses, let alone ability to retaliate) They might not have guessed all of Hitler's aspirations and motives, but there seems enough indicators to make reasonable guesses. (the only other factor to bet on was that delays would allow non German countries to expand their military potency more quickly than Germany could continue its own advancement, and a good enough understanding of Germany's economic situation to have some confidence in that -sort of a case where underestimating Germany's capabilities would be better than overestimating as predicting they would NOT outpace the surrounding nations would be a strong reason to force delays and non-aggression for as long as possible)

I have probably been confusing matters by even using the word 'alliance' in this context. I should have been more explicit in the context of broader diplomatic negotiations that avoided forcing immediate conflict. (still different than pure appeasement if the intentions were more strategic in mind and less passive isolationist)

If Germany had been prepred to enter an alliance with Poland, that would have destroyed any chance of a detente with Russia. Without Russian raw materials Germany was going to be in trouble economically very quickly....within months. A Germany floundering because of a lack of resources would have begun the exterminations in Poland earlier, not later as the Nazis began to look for ways to appease a resless and angry home front.

Not a direct counter to this, but in the alternate 1938/1939 context of a Polish-Soviet alliance (or economic partnership of SOME sort), it does indeed seem like access to Soviet raw materials would be the most practical advantage. Allowing Soviet troops to enter Poland would be strategically unwise, and Soviet aircraft of 1939 weren't more attractive than the variety of options from Western Europe. In either case, it would still be an unreliable and dangerous situation for Poland regardless of any posed cooperation with Russia or Germany. (neither could be trusted and neither were remotely practical options for genuine alliances, finicky diplomatic and trade negotiations were the most practical pre-war-extenuating options I can see)

Absolutely. the British would impose sanction on the Poles if they sided with Germany. Anyone found to be treating with the enemy was subject to allied control commission attentions. Sanctions were applied to Russia until June 1941, also against Denmark, Vichy, Spain and italy in the lead up to war. Poland would have been forced into economic ruin if she followed that route.

I mean in 1939, before any military action was taken. Would an alliance (or more specifically, a particularly favorable diplomatic/economic agreement) with Germany put pressure on the UK to restrict trade to Poland and thus further weaken/delay Poland's own military build up and potential effective capability to resist or strike back against Soviet or German aggression.

The basic idea here is anticipating that Hitler and/or Stalin (or more likely, both) would eventually betray any real cooperation and support for peace or Polish independence and thus prepare for such betrayal as best as possible while also delaying it as long as possible with the aim to maximize strategic advantages.


Though in all of that, if they couldn't establish an alliance with at least Romania, their odds at resisting German and Russian conflict would be bad (unless there was some sort of coup, Hitler's hand would be forced sooner or later, and further delays may have even compelled him to make more intimate deals with Stalin for support of one sort or another, which would obviously be horrible).

In fact, I'd go back to my suggestion of Romania and Poland aiming at standardizing more of their manufacturing, including Poland focusing on a Gnome Rhone 14N license to compliment Romania's (and allow the P.24 to be produced with entirely domestic components -even if aluminum would still need to be imported). Either collaboration or competition on the PZL.50 and IAR 80 projects might have accelerated development of both (and some of the PZL.50's structural issues could have been avoided if the P.24's engine specifications had been focused on rather than making provisions for the heavier and more powerful 14N). Likewise, having both countries focus on a combination of Oerlikon FF and 7.92 mm Browning guns, possibly with additional introduction of 23 mm madsen cannons would also be exceptionally useful. (the PZL.37 seems to have had plenty of potential development as a potent medium bomber and recon aircraft too) I'm not sure if the Romanians would have had enough interest in the PZL.38 to be supportive of it or a similar, heavier design powered by Mercury or 14N engines.



I don't know much about the intricacies of Polish-Romanian politics, so maybe there was something big holding back cooperation there as well. (it at very least seems far more likely than a Polish-German or Polish-Soviet alliance) Honestly, outright avoiding strong relations with Germany in 1938 and focusing on gaining Romanian and Slavic support (and continued favorable trade with Western Europe) should have left Poland in a decently favorable position to ally with Finland as well. (allying with Russia in any way would have ruined much of those chances)

 

[kool kitty89]

On this off topic 1944/45 Soviet alliance line, I should acknowledge I've failed to address a wide number of compromises or middle ground regarding potential conditional surrender terms from Germany earlier, general Alliance management with Stalin, and different routes to take that would still have maintained Soviet support in the Pacific. (I believe it was Roosevelt alone that insisted on unconditional surrender, Stalin may have benefited from this in the end -at the expense of many of his own troops- but from what I understand he, along with Churchill were more willing to compromise on conditions of surrender with Germany and possibly end the war sooner without requiring a full out invasion force or the continued bombings in early 1945)

 

[Balljoint]

On this off topic 1944/45 Soviet alliance line, I should acknowledge I've failed to address a wide number of compromises or middle ground regarding potential conditional surrender terms from Germany earlier, general Alliance management with Stalin, and different routes to take that would still have maintained Soviet support in the Pacific. (I believe it was Roosevelt alone that insisted on unconditional surrender, Stalin may have benefited from this in the end -at the expense of many of his own troops- but from what I understand he, along with Churchill were more willing to compromise on conditions of surrender with Germany and possibly end the war sooner without requiring a full out invasion force or the continued bombings in early 1945)

This would have been viable if one of the several assassination attempts on Hitler's life been successful. In fact it was a primary motivator for such plots. With Hitler in charge neither side would seem disposed towards a conditioned surrender.

 

[parsifal]

Its true that if Hitler were removed, ther would been possibilities to avoid war. But after Hitlers betrayal at Munich, his true self was exposed and none except his own lackeys trusted him. Even the most die hard appeasement lobbyists were shocked into silence by his duplicity. Everybody opposed to him knew that they could never trust him. Even Stalin and Mussolini were wary in their dealings with him. None of the non-aligned, much less the regimes opposed to him were ever going to deal with Hitler on a statesman level again after Munich. Some have argued that britain in particular manipulated the situation to force Germany into acting out the aggressor nation. All nations engaged in that sort machiavellian scheming, its just that Nazi Germany had so much wrong with it that they were bound to get themselves into trouble sooner or later.

Without Hitler there would be no Nazi Party in power, and without the Nazis there would be no right wing revival. The most likely outcome of a "no Hitler scenario is a communist takeover in Germany. This would likley6 lead to civil war in Germany, but assuming the communists were able to hold on to a weakened germany, more disorganised, less well developed technologically, and with an army basically headless bewcause it officers were all dead, you get some interesting musings. This kinda leads to the same conclusion as the Nazi path.....sort of. A rise of communism would generate opposition in France and Britain, encirclement of Poland and an alliance between Germany and Russia to crush Poland. Then it gets interesting. What would Russia do with a fair dinkum communist ally that was then at war with the west. I think she would come to her ally's aid, and from there a whole different war.

 

[Timppa]

You, and your country are in no position to lecture me, or countries i identify with, in any way. You should just hang your head low and be thankful that we did win.

Yeah, Finns do not need to bow anybody, but perhaps Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Polish, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians and the people of "East Germany" were the lucky ones of your "victory". Just ask them (from those left living).

 

[klugi]

The original Puławski fighter, the PZL P.1, was constructed with a Hispano-Suiza liquid cooled V engine. The continuation of this line the P.8 was built with a Lorraine V12, the added weight of the coolant negated the reduction in drag and performance was on par with the P.7. The Rolls-Royce Kestrel was apparently considered for the PZL P.10 but the licencing fees were considerably high, this coupled with Puławski's death and the ministry's preference of radial engines spelled an end to this development line.

 

[GrauGeist]

Yeah, Finns do not need to bow anybody, but perhaps Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Polish, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians and the people of "East Germany" were the lucky ones of your "victory". Just ask them (from those left living).

I can tell you for a fact that Tsar Boris III, in an agreement with Hitler, never declared war on the Soviet Union and made sure that Bulgarian assets were not involved in any actions against the Soviet Union and was the only Axis nation to do this.

When the war was drawing to a close, Tsar Boris met with Stalin to draw a neutrality and ensured Stalin that the Bulgarians would expel the Germans out of Bulgaria proper.

Within a few hours after returning from the meeting, Boris died mysteriously and the Soviets tore through Bulgaria.

So "victory" or not, Stalin was just as determined as Hitler was, to occupy as much territory as he could get away with.

 

[fastmongrel]

I can tell you for a fact that Tsar Boris III, in an agreement with Hitler, never declared war on the Soviet Union and made sure that Bulgarian assets were not involved in any actions against the Soviet Union and was the only Axis nation to do this.

When the war was drawing to a close, Tsar Boris met with Stalin to draw a neutrality and ensured Stalin that the Bulgarians would expel the Germans out of Bulgaria proper.

Within a few hours after returning from the meeting, Boris died mysteriously and the Soviets tore through Bulgaria.

So "victory" or not, Stalin was just as determined as Hitler was, to occupy as much territory as he could get away with.

Tsar Boris died after returning from a meeting with Hitler in August 43 and I dont think he ever met Stalin during the war. The Soviets invaded Bulgaria in September 1944.