Proposal to purchase of Japanese aircraft for RAAF in 1939/40

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you have to remember that Britain still controlled most of Australias foreign affairs and tax and finance...Churchill was draining the Aus treasury to buy goods for Britain.
Which returns us to my question above, how did Australia benefit from its connections to Britain in the interwar and WW2 years?

Australia has two needs here, first they want to diplomatically reduce the threat of war with Japan (by recognizing Manchukuo or otherwise helping Japan step down in China), second, RAN wants to procure modern fighter planes. It seemed that Britain was unwilling or unable to assist in either. I just can't see how Britain ever helped protect Australia during the 20th Century. During WW1 it was Japan and Australia that seized Germany's territory in the Pacific, Britain didn't appear to lift a finger.


With Australians and Japanese fighting together (or separately nearby) in WW1 it's no wonder the former sought to find common ground with the latter. One thing for certain, once HM QE2 dies Canberra will be pushing for a Republic Australia. I'm a Brit-born Canuck and appreciate the connections with the Crown, but if I could understand the Australian POV.
 
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Sorry but I fundamentally disagree with this. We've been over this on other threads and yet you persist in stating these opinions without a single fact to back them up.

Threat = Capability + Intent. In some respects, Britain did underestimate Japan's military capability. However, the intent was not clear until very late in 1941. Prior to that point, Britain accurately described Japan's ongoing internal tussles over its China problems and future strategic/operational intentions.

Also, there was considerable animosity towards Japan for its invasion of China, and lingering distrust after Japan walked out of the League of Nations. If Britain diplomatically recognized Manchukuo, it would likely embolden the Army hawks in Tokyo and elsewhere rather than giving them an off-ramp. More on this topic below.



Japan may have needed a face-saving exit from the rest of China but Tokyo generally, and Army hotheads in particular, didn't WANT an exit. As Army control over the political decisions increased in the late-30s, so did the hawkish tendencies of Tokyo....largely driven by the assassination of several politicians who refused to give the Army its way. From 1939 onwards, and perhaps earlier, Japan had multiple opportunities to consolidate its position or back down but, instead, thy decided to escalate and expand the conflict.

It's interesting that Japan made the same fundamental mistakes in its Pacific expansions as it did in China. In the latter, the Japanese Army dominated the large towns and cities but struggled to control the communication links between them, which were prime targets for guerilla interdiction by Chinese forces, both Communist and Nationalist. Thus Japan became mired in a war where it held strongly onto puddles of high-density urban environments, but those puddles were not mutually-supporting because the IJA lacked the forces to dominate everywhere. The same thing happened in the Pacific, with the IJA occupying islands that were not mutually-supporting and hence could be defeated in detail. Thus, Britain's assessment of Japan's military as not being the equal of a "first rate" military is probably correct...it's just that it took until 1943, and later in the case of Burma, for the Allies to provide first-rate opposition for Japan's military across the entirety of operations.
 
Proof?
 
The Ki-27 would have been an interesting opponent in RAAF hands in the MTO. Beyond the Gladiators and Falcos were there were any fixed undercarriage fighters in active combat?
The IJN used the A5M. They shot down some USN SBDs in 1942.

And the Polikarpov I-15 was still used extensively by the Soviet AF in 1941 as well as by the Chinese AF.
 
If it wasn't for the constitutional, regional, linguistic, indigenous and ethno-nationalist sh#tstorm it would ignite in Canada we'd do the same.

Same will occur here.

Add to that the public have already rejected a republic in a referendum (the only way to bring it about) because it was for the politicians, by the politicians and of the politicians and screw the voter.

The same or similar crap will be put up again and rejected for that and other reasons.

Ask yourself two quick questions (but do not answer because politics is not permitted on this site)

of over 100 republics in existence at present name ten that are true democracies - leave out the USA because the voter has less and less power every election and the recent electoral changes remove it from the list of true democracies as far as many non Americans are concerned. Democracies support free speech. As this summary of an Orlando Sentinel news article shows free speech is dead in parts of the USA.

Raul Pino has been put on leave from his state-government job because of an email he sent about the Covid vaccine. Pino is a doctor and has been a respected figure in Covid matters. But the state he works for is Florida, and he emailed Health Department workers saying that "in the absence of reasonable and real reasons it is irresponsible not to be vaccinated." So the department decided an inquiry was warranted, and at least for now, Pino is no longer functioning as Orange County's top state health official. A Florida Department of Health spokesperson said the agency "is committed to upholding all laws, including the ban on vaccine mandates for government employees."

of the 40+ constitutional monarchies name five that are not democracies.
 
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Mmmm, Ark Royals defending the I/PTO from operating bases in presumably Trincomalee & Fremantle? Sounds like fun. Might be an idea to make those ships a bit larger (and more expensive, and fewer) to get better range.
Would presumably also need a fair few of those millions diverted into building dockyard facilities in India and AU so they don't need to go to UK or Canada for repairs and maintenance.
And divert a few more millions for destroyers and cruisers to keep them company.
Presumably some crews for all these ships would be useful too, and they tend to need regular pay, not just a signing-on bonus.
That £60 million goes fast, and then we still need to figure out a backup solution for when the whole lot gets diverted to convoy duty in the Atlantic.

Makes some sense with use of the retrospectoscope, but tbf with 100% hindsight the Brits could equally just write off everything east of the Arabian Sea as "gonna go eventually anyhow" and let the US/AU/NL worry about it.
 
It is all very well saying don't build the Singapore Navy Yard and build more ships, but the simple truth was that in 1942, after its loss, the remaining Dockyard facilities around the Indian Ocean in places from Simonstown and Durban in South Africa, Kilindini (Mombasa) in Kenya, Massawa (in Eritrea, captured from the Italians), Bombay, Colombo and Trincomalee round to Fremantle, combined, couldn't match Singapore's facilities. With its loss Britain lost use of the battleship sized King George VI dry dock and AFD9 and a cruiser sized dry dock plus workshops, stores etc.

Need to dry dock a battleship? Until 1944 Durban was your only choice in the IO. A floating dry dock was built for Trincomalee during the war, but it collapsed the first time it was used in Aug 1944, crippling HMS Valiant in the process. Next nearest was the floating dock at Alexandria (wrong side of the Suez Canal) which was limited to the QE & R classes. In 1945 the RN had to send HMS Howe from Sydney to Durban to refit because the carriers got priority in the then brand new, opened 1945, Captain Cook Dock. Again the large Sturrock dry dock at Cape Town only opened in 1945.

Bombay could handle an Illustrious, but the preference was for Durban.

The rest of the places I mentioned only have cruiser sized dry docks.

Trincomalee was an excellent anchorage for a fleet with huge fuel storage, but next to no repair facilities.

Look at the distances involved. Trincomalee to Singapore as the crow flies is 1700 miles. Sydney to Singapore again as the crow flies 3900 and Fremantle 2500 miles. All longer by sea.

In the 1920s Britain realised that if it was going to support a fleet in the Far East it had to have a new Dockyard somewhere. Any action against Japan was likely to be in the South China Sea somewhere between Singapore and Japan. Singapore was chosen after a lengthy review of the options. Hong Kong was rejected as too far forward to be easily defended. Sydney was rejected as being too far from the scene of the action.

If you decide on one of these further flung places, you then need to spend money on tankers or forward anchorages to support the Fleet. Take a look at the effort and resources that went into supporting the BPF from Australia in 1945 to fight off Japan.

Bottom line. You need to build facilities somewhere in the 1920s.
 
Mmmm, Ark Royals defending the I/PTO from operating bases in presumably Trincomalee & Fremantle? Sounds like fun.
I only use the carriers to provide a comparative cost to the Singapore base. Treaties, shipyards, etc. won't allow it. But if some of the £60 spent on the base at Singapore can be reduced they're may be money for different defence initiatives. Can we get a drydock and base in Singapore for less?
 
Thing is the construction of the Esquimalt Graving Dock had nothing to do with the Royal Navy or its capital ships.

Control of the naval dockyard at Esquimalt passed from the RN to Canada in 1905. In the 1920s the Canadian Govt looked at the trans-Pacific liner trade with its ships of ever increasing size. The nearest large docks were across the border in the USA. So it decided to build a new dry dock in Esquimalt to tap into that market. It chose a site close to, but separate from, the naval yard. The dock was sized to match the size of the then Panama Canal locks and so able to take the largest of liners including the Queens.

In 1938 the Australian Govt decided it better have a new large dock capable of taking the largest capital ships to improve its strategic position in the event of war. After investigation a site in Sydney harbour was selected,. Construction began at the end of 1940 and the first ship docked in March 1945. That was HMS Illustrious.

After the outbreak of war with Japan, Australia also began construction of a new large dry dock in Brisbane in Sept 1942. That opened in 1944 as the Cairncross Dockyard. However at that time access to it was difficult for the largest ships.


The need for the Sturrock Dry Dock in Cape Town was recognised after the Med closed to through shipping when Italy entered the war. Cape Town harbour had to expand significantly to cope with the increased traffic. Part of that was ensuring it had a dry dock capable of taking the largest ships on the route.

But note, the South China Sea, where the RN expected to fight, is not the Pacific. And any reinforcing fleet is coming from Britain eastbound via Gibraltar, Malta etc and not across the Atlantic, through the Panama Canal (under US control) and across the Pacific. ISTR that until late war their were issues with the depth of the waters round northern Australia that limited the size of ships that could pass that way. Planning to base a fleet in Sydney adds hugely to the journeys out and to the expected combat zone north of Singapore.
 
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When pitching new warships to the RAN pre WWII Britain put a "total cost of ownership" for an Aircraft Carrier with a 36 aircraft airgroup, over its 20 year lifetime, at 894,000 pounds a year, to build, operate and refit. (225,000 pounds maintenance, 414,000 for 36 aircraft, 202,500 replacement, 22,500 large repairs, per year). Aircraft costed at 11,500 pounds a year over a 5 year lifetime.

Another 30 aircraft would add 345,000 pounds a year. Not sure what the Singapore Dockyards costed to run each year in maintenance and personnel, or the infrastructure lifetime, but it seems clear it is not 12 carriers to the dockyard.

Note the document I am quoting from may be in Australian pounds, not Sterling.

Nelson class battleship with 3 aircraft, 26 year lifetime, (310,000 pounds maintenance, 34,500 aircraft, 307,500 replacement, 54,800 large repairs), total 708,800 pounds per year.
 
Building a major naval base without coastal artillery and plenty of anti-aircraft is flushing money down the toilet (well, unless it's in Newport News or San Diego, nowhere near the "front lines"). Dropping in coastal artillery without very heavy fortifications ensures its rapid destruction, especially in the age of aircraft. Concrete fortifications proof against 15" shells are enormously expensive.

But then, it's better than sortieing (sp?) your fleet and having a handful of destroyers show up and destroy your naval base.

If you don't have a base in Singapore, you can defend, but you can attack. UK strategy was to blockade Japan, one way or another (see the RN's long range subs optimized for the Pacific). As we know, Japan was quite vulnerable to strangulation, in the end. If your forces in Singapore managed to keep the Japanese from seizing the NEI, the Japanese are in a far worse situation.
 
I doubt Australia will become a republic; the RSL has too strong a presence in conservative Australia. Any politician attempting to create a republic would be committing political suicide.
 

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