Some of the above information is not correct. For example Britain sold Hurricanes and Blenheims to the Rumanians and Hurricanes to Yugoslavia.
The PZL P.24 represented the ultimate Puławski-wing fighters. Foreign interest exceeded all expectations but a number of potential sales came to nothing for lack of credits and financial backing. It was never ordered by the Lotnictwo Wojskowe, not because they were waiting for the P.50, but because they began to favour the re-equipment of their fighter force with a multipurpose twin-engined, two-seat aircraft, not a dedicated single-seat fighter aircraft. When this decision was later severely criticised the excuse given was that the P.24 was powered by a Gnome-Rhône engine which was not manufactured in Poland and could not be bought in quantity because of a scarcity of foreign currency. This, however, does not stand scrutiny as Poland was given a large armament loan by France and half of it, to be spent in France, remained unused for some time.
The Politics.
The second comprehensive Polish rearmament plan began to take shape immediately after the death of Marshal Piłsudski in May 1935. The LW's expansion proposals were evolved by General Rayski in 1935-36, building on the basis of his three year plan of 1933. The command structure had been split in 1926 into two unrelated peacetime and wartime channels and left the LW without a unified command for its direction and control. Rayski prepared his new plan in a vacuum without any knowledge of any specific defence aims for the air arm or any overall strategic concepts. In fact no such aims existed. The Central Staff, composed of army officers, that had no understanding of air warfare, failed to define clear-cut role for the air arm in a future war. While the army chiefs were completely engrossed with producing detailed plans for a war with the Soviet Union, the air arm was being shaped by the hypothesis of war with Germany.
At that time General Douhet's prophetic theory proclaimed air power, a new and totally independent component of armed strength, as the decisive weapon in any future war. Douhet emphasised the power of the bomber to which, according to him, there was no defence. Some foreign experts forecast the demises of the single-seat fighter. Probably influenced by Douhet's views and Germany's example, Rayski embarked on a vast build-up of Poland's bomber force. He subordinated all other aviation needs to that objective with catastrophic consequences in the fighter-interceptor field.
To meet the requirements of the plan, Rayski authorised the construction of prototypes of six new designs, two each – one interim and one principal service model - for bomber, army support and 'companion' squadrons. A prototype for a single-seat fighter was conspicuously absent. The main equipment of the army support formations was to be provided by a multipurpose, twin-engined, two-seat, dive-bomber/attack fighter, the P.38 Wilk. This design was fundamental to Rayski's rearmament proposals, for in addition to the army support role, the P.38 was intended supplement the LW's bomber potential, provide bombers with fighter protection and contribute to national air defence as a fighter, thereby reducing the need for a conventional single-seat fighter.
Rayski's lack of appreciation for a single-seat fighter was reflected by his curious proposal that the sturdy, all metal P.11 should be replaced by the P.39/LWS.4, a cheap, wire-braced, light-weight monoplane of composite construction. Under his plan this aircraft was to remain in frontline service with fighter squadrons until April 1942, and also was to serve as an intermediate fighter trainer. It could not operate at night or winter conditions, its estimated top speed was 380 km/hr (205 mph) and its practical ceiling was limited to only 1,500 m (4,900 ft). The design contrasted sharply with other Polish projects, all technically advanced, and when, in June 1936, Rayski asked the Government for permission to build the P.39/LWS.4 prototypes, he was refused. In the meantime, the specialist PZL fighter team responsible for the P.7, P.11, and P.24 was dissolved and Wsiewołod Jakimiuk, who led the team after the death of Puławski, was entrusted with the design and development of a twin-engined passenger transport, the PZL 44 Wicher.
Rayski's 1936 plan was not officially endorsed, but served the Central Staff only as the basis for the preparation of their own plan. This was the work of infantry Colonel Jan Jagmin-Sadowski and was ratified at the XVIIth Session of the KSUS (Committee for Armament and Equipment Affairs) on 13th October 1936. The KSUS plan was based on a more conventional tactical concept, which called for new designs for army support and single-seat fighter squadrons and adopted a cautious approach to the new class of P.38 Wilk two-seat fighter squadrons reducing their strength to 100 aircraft. The gap arising from interrupted development of a single-seat fighter to succeed the P.11 proved difficult to close.
Feasibility studies in the light-fighter field were to be expanded and in addition to some further work on the improved P.39/LWS 4 project, a superior PZL design, the P.45 Sokół, proposed by Kazimierz Korsak, was investigated in detail. Later, two more competitive designs, the PWS 42 and RWD 25 entered the Sokół light-fighter programme and although the future of such an aircraft was not yet decided, all three were awarded prototype contracts.
Jakimiuk, still working on the PZL.44, did not begin design studies for an interceptor-fighter, the P.50 Jastrząb, until the winter of 1936-37. His creation was a modern, all-metal, low-wing monoplane, employing a thin aerofoil-section wing and other advanced aerodynamic features. However, the P.50 specification, drafted to Rayski's directives, represented a subtle departure from the KSUS requirement, calling for a fast aeroplane, with manoeuvrability taking second place to speed, capable of carrying a 300 Kg (600 lb) bomb. These were the characteristics of the 'pursuit' fighter, affording insurance against the looming failure of the P.38 Wilk, rather than those of the classic fighter sought by the KSUS. An ill-matched engine, the Mercury VIII radial with a nominal output of only 730 hp and maximum rating of 840 hp, which was forced upon the designer to save time and money, offered little prospects for the fighter's success. The P.50 was hastily ordered off the drawing board into mass order production. PZL received an initial order for 150 Mercury VIII powered examples, which was soon increased to 500, with deliveries of the first 50 to commence in September 1939. The P.50/I prototype was to fly in October 1938 but the late delivery of the Dowty landing gear delayed flight tests until February 1939. The P.50/II prototype adapted to take a more powerful radial of up to 1,600 hp stood idle awaiting the delivery a power plant which remained unspecified until June 1939, when a 925-1,145 hp Bristol Taurus was ordered for it.
At the beginning of July 1936, in a belated move to entrust someone in the GUSZ-controlled 'wartime' command channel with specific responsibilities for air defence, the Inspektorat Obrony Powietrznej Państwa (IOPP, Inspectorate of Air Defence of the State) was created, with Gen Orlicaz-Dreszer, a cavalry officer, appointed its head. Killed in a air-crash twelve days later he was succeeded by Gen Józef Zając, an infantry officer. In the autumn of 1937 a miniscule Air Staff was formed at the Central Staff. This was a new body completely, unconnected with Rayski's Aviation Command in the 'peacetime' channel. The two Air Staffs did not even communicate with each other.
Gen Zając was a novice to aviation but after a few months in office he thought himself qualified to pronounce judgment on intricate questions of operational and equipment policy. Charged with the country's air defence, he began to promote the view that the top priority should be given to development of a fighter force. He completely rejected the proposed building of the bomber force, maintaining that Poland could not afford twin-engined bombers and did not need such aircraft in general, and the P.37 Łoś in particular. He contended that the bomber capability should be provided by the French or British air forces as and when necessary. He began to voice increasingly strong criticisms of Rayski's decisions and opposed the ethos of the KSUS plan which bore the hallmark of Rayski's influence.
In 1936 Zając unveiled his own plan. This envisaged 102 combat squadrons with 900 warplanes by April 1942; 30 single-seat fighter squadrons (300 aircraft), 15 pursuit fighter squadrons (150 aircraft), 22 army support squadrons (220 aircraft), 20 observation squadrons (140 aircraft), and 15 bomber squadrons (90 aircraft) – a large proportion of the bombers to be provided by French or British units stationed in Poland. This coincided with a deepening equipment crisis. Shortages of the P.11 necessitated the retention of the obsolete P.7 in three squadrons. Worse, in early 1938, the P.11 steel engine frames began to crack due to metal fatigue. At the end of November, 1938, Zając prepared a secret defence report on the LW's state of readiness that pinpointed the devastating deficiencies in equipment and stressed that apart from bombers; the situation would worsen in 1939 and would not significantly improve before 1941. He warned that in case of war in 1939 or 1940 the LW would not last longer than two to four weeks.
The PZL P.24 represented the ultimate Puławski-wing fighters. Foreign interest exceeded all expectations but a number of potential sales came to nothing for lack of credits and financial backing. It was never ordered by the Lotnictwo Wojskowe, not because they were waiting for the P.50, but because they began to favour the re-equipment of their fighter force with a multipurpose twin-engined, two-seat aircraft, not a dedicated single-seat fighter aircraft. When this decision was later severely criticised the excuse given was that the P.24 was powered by a Gnome-Rhône engine which was not manufactured in Poland and could not be bought in quantity because of a scarcity of foreign currency. This, however, does not stand scrutiny as Poland was given a large armament loan by France and half of it, to be spent in France, remained unused for some time.
The Politics.
The second comprehensive Polish rearmament plan began to take shape immediately after the death of Marshal Piłsudski in May 1935. The LW's expansion proposals were evolved by General Rayski in 1935-36, building on the basis of his three year plan of 1933. The command structure had been split in 1926 into two unrelated peacetime and wartime channels and left the LW without a unified command for its direction and control. Rayski prepared his new plan in a vacuum without any knowledge of any specific defence aims for the air arm or any overall strategic concepts. In fact no such aims existed. The Central Staff, composed of army officers, that had no understanding of air warfare, failed to define clear-cut role for the air arm in a future war. While the army chiefs were completely engrossed with producing detailed plans for a war with the Soviet Union, the air arm was being shaped by the hypothesis of war with Germany.
At that time General Douhet's prophetic theory proclaimed air power, a new and totally independent component of armed strength, as the decisive weapon in any future war. Douhet emphasised the power of the bomber to which, according to him, there was no defence. Some foreign experts forecast the demises of the single-seat fighter. Probably influenced by Douhet's views and Germany's example, Rayski embarked on a vast build-up of Poland's bomber force. He subordinated all other aviation needs to that objective with catastrophic consequences in the fighter-interceptor field.
To meet the requirements of the plan, Rayski authorised the construction of prototypes of six new designs, two each – one interim and one principal service model - for bomber, army support and 'companion' squadrons. A prototype for a single-seat fighter was conspicuously absent. The main equipment of the army support formations was to be provided by a multipurpose, twin-engined, two-seat, dive-bomber/attack fighter, the P.38 Wilk. This design was fundamental to Rayski's rearmament proposals, for in addition to the army support role, the P.38 was intended supplement the LW's bomber potential, provide bombers with fighter protection and contribute to national air defence as a fighter, thereby reducing the need for a conventional single-seat fighter.
Rayski's lack of appreciation for a single-seat fighter was reflected by his curious proposal that the sturdy, all metal P.11 should be replaced by the P.39/LWS.4, a cheap, wire-braced, light-weight monoplane of composite construction. Under his plan this aircraft was to remain in frontline service with fighter squadrons until April 1942, and also was to serve as an intermediate fighter trainer. It could not operate at night or winter conditions, its estimated top speed was 380 km/hr (205 mph) and its practical ceiling was limited to only 1,500 m (4,900 ft). The design contrasted sharply with other Polish projects, all technically advanced, and when, in June 1936, Rayski asked the Government for permission to build the P.39/LWS.4 prototypes, he was refused. In the meantime, the specialist PZL fighter team responsible for the P.7, P.11, and P.24 was dissolved and Wsiewołod Jakimiuk, who led the team after the death of Puławski, was entrusted with the design and development of a twin-engined passenger transport, the PZL 44 Wicher.
Rayski's 1936 plan was not officially endorsed, but served the Central Staff only as the basis for the preparation of their own plan. This was the work of infantry Colonel Jan Jagmin-Sadowski and was ratified at the XVIIth Session of the KSUS (Committee for Armament and Equipment Affairs) on 13th October 1936. The KSUS plan was based on a more conventional tactical concept, which called for new designs for army support and single-seat fighter squadrons and adopted a cautious approach to the new class of P.38 Wilk two-seat fighter squadrons reducing their strength to 100 aircraft. The gap arising from interrupted development of a single-seat fighter to succeed the P.11 proved difficult to close.
Feasibility studies in the light-fighter field were to be expanded and in addition to some further work on the improved P.39/LWS 4 project, a superior PZL design, the P.45 Sokół, proposed by Kazimierz Korsak, was investigated in detail. Later, two more competitive designs, the PWS 42 and RWD 25 entered the Sokół light-fighter programme and although the future of such an aircraft was not yet decided, all three were awarded prototype contracts.
Jakimiuk, still working on the PZL.44, did not begin design studies for an interceptor-fighter, the P.50 Jastrząb, until the winter of 1936-37. His creation was a modern, all-metal, low-wing monoplane, employing a thin aerofoil-section wing and other advanced aerodynamic features. However, the P.50 specification, drafted to Rayski's directives, represented a subtle departure from the KSUS requirement, calling for a fast aeroplane, with manoeuvrability taking second place to speed, capable of carrying a 300 Kg (600 lb) bomb. These were the characteristics of the 'pursuit' fighter, affording insurance against the looming failure of the P.38 Wilk, rather than those of the classic fighter sought by the KSUS. An ill-matched engine, the Mercury VIII radial with a nominal output of only 730 hp and maximum rating of 840 hp, which was forced upon the designer to save time and money, offered little prospects for the fighter's success. The P.50 was hastily ordered off the drawing board into mass order production. PZL received an initial order for 150 Mercury VIII powered examples, which was soon increased to 500, with deliveries of the first 50 to commence in September 1939. The P.50/I prototype was to fly in October 1938 but the late delivery of the Dowty landing gear delayed flight tests until February 1939. The P.50/II prototype adapted to take a more powerful radial of up to 1,600 hp stood idle awaiting the delivery a power plant which remained unspecified until June 1939, when a 925-1,145 hp Bristol Taurus was ordered for it.
At the beginning of July 1936, in a belated move to entrust someone in the GUSZ-controlled 'wartime' command channel with specific responsibilities for air defence, the Inspektorat Obrony Powietrznej Państwa (IOPP, Inspectorate of Air Defence of the State) was created, with Gen Orlicaz-Dreszer, a cavalry officer, appointed its head. Killed in a air-crash twelve days later he was succeeded by Gen Józef Zając, an infantry officer. In the autumn of 1937 a miniscule Air Staff was formed at the Central Staff. This was a new body completely, unconnected with Rayski's Aviation Command in the 'peacetime' channel. The two Air Staffs did not even communicate with each other.
Gen Zając was a novice to aviation but after a few months in office he thought himself qualified to pronounce judgment on intricate questions of operational and equipment policy. Charged with the country's air defence, he began to promote the view that the top priority should be given to development of a fighter force. He completely rejected the proposed building of the bomber force, maintaining that Poland could not afford twin-engined bombers and did not need such aircraft in general, and the P.37 Łoś in particular. He contended that the bomber capability should be provided by the French or British air forces as and when necessary. He began to voice increasingly strong criticisms of Rayski's decisions and opposed the ethos of the KSUS plan which bore the hallmark of Rayski's influence.
In 1936 Zając unveiled his own plan. This envisaged 102 combat squadrons with 900 warplanes by April 1942; 30 single-seat fighter squadrons (300 aircraft), 15 pursuit fighter squadrons (150 aircraft), 22 army support squadrons (220 aircraft), 20 observation squadrons (140 aircraft), and 15 bomber squadrons (90 aircraft) – a large proportion of the bombers to be provided by French or British units stationed in Poland. This coincided with a deepening equipment crisis. Shortages of the P.11 necessitated the retention of the obsolete P.7 in three squadrons. Worse, in early 1938, the P.11 steel engine frames began to crack due to metal fatigue. At the end of November, 1938, Zając prepared a secret defence report on the LW's state of readiness that pinpointed the devastating deficiencies in equipment and stressed that apart from bombers; the situation would worsen in 1939 and would not significantly improve before 1941. He warned that in case of war in 1939 or 1940 the LW would not last longer than two to four weeks.
