- Thread starter
- #261
...
There are a few things that I think should be clarified on this thread:
1.) "Ready for El Alamein" is not even possible, (unless the British have a crystal ball)
The British have no idea that when or where battle will occur in the future (El Alamein), so can't prepare tanks for this purpose. (And Tomo hasn't specified WHICH battle of El Alamein, 1st or 2nd?)
A better wording would be "Best British tank in production by the summer of 1942". British tanks will need to be produced by June of 1942, to allow time to ship them to Egypt (July August), then at least a month for training desert modifications (September) which would be ready for operations in the late Autumn (October/November).
The "Best British tank in production by the summer of 1942" would be indeed a better wording. The "Ready for El Alamein: ideal British tanks" wording, however, rings much better. And yes, indeed, that should be 'Monty's Alamein' ie. the second battle.
2.) It seems that there has been a tendancy here to assume that a new tank design can be slapped together in a few months, when in reality issues such as cooling problems, delays in gun production etc often caused unforseen delays in tank production. Typical tank development from proposal, through design, to production was about 2 years, although the Cavalier was shortened to about 18 months by developing the design from an existing tank, the Crusader. (But the end product was rejected)
Well put.
3.) Personally, I don't see how an "Ideal British tank" and "In production before summer 1942" is even possible, given only what was known at the time.
They could develop the "ideal tank" or have a tank ready for summer 1942 production - but not both!
It was known well before 1942 that heavy armor can shrug off AP shots, that some suspension types are better for higher speeds rough terrain than others, that bigger gun can defeat armor more easily, or at greater distances etc. British know that Matilda's 2 pdr cannot pierce the other Matilda (nor that towed 2pdr can), they also know that tanks under 15-18 tons are likely to be put out of action by German 3,7 or British 2pdr, while the 20+ ton tanks would defeat that threat. They can realistically assume that Germans would introduce better tanks and AT guns as they possibly can. They know that neither solid shot, nor MG is useful thing to overcome any decent field fortification, nor a well placed AT gun.
4.)The thread starting in the second half of 1940 pre-supposes that the British could have or should have done something differently, so I'd really like someone to point out what was the bit of information that was ignored?
All posted just above?
Just to review, in the summer of 1940, (and taking into account the events of the Battle of France), Vauxhall are about to start production of the Churchill, and Nuffield will start production of the Crusader in early 1941.
The Tank board discusses follow on tank production, and decides that to expidite development, the new tank should be based on an existing design, so they ask for proposals from both Nuffield Vauxhall for a new cruiser.
It should be capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun. (Despite the 2 pdr performing well in France against German tanks)
Their request sounds so right - there are other targets in the battlefield, not just tanks (= 2pdr is seen as useless vs. those), they were expecting that Germans would move on with their tanks AT guns, they were demanding the maneuverability so the future tanks could be able to envelope and cut off the enemy.
So my questions: What other specifications were missed? What other lessons were ignored?
The British did not fielded a tank, filling the Tank Board specification ("capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun"), until D-day, ie. in mid 1944, with Cromwell. They were 1.5-2 years too late, and the Germans have, by that time, moved up the bar. They ignored the lesson about weapon system being good only if the timing is good.
In the beginning of 1941 (when it was decided to go forward with the Nuffield proposal) the British didn't know that any American tanks at all would be available, that Lend-Lease would be enacted, or that the resulting tanks (Grant/Sherman) would even be acceptable.
They didn't know that the Crusader would be inadequate against the Pz II or Pz III, as the only battles in the desert so far, the Matildas Cruiser Mk III Mk IV had performed admirably against Italian forces in Compass.
They also didn't know that the upgraded Crusader project (ie Cavalier) would turn out to be a dissapointment.
They do know that main enemy is Germany, not Italy. They also know what the main enemy is capable for. Tailoring the next-gen tanks by the performance of the current-gen tanks vs. Italian forces would've been as short-sighted as possible.
The crux of it is this, if they had a crystal ball and could have known all these things, maybe they could have taken the slower route and developed a whole new design, but at the time, given the urgency of the situation, the Nuffield proposal was the best option for a tank that could be put into production quickly, with reduced time expected for design changes, production problems training.
There was no crystal ball when Supermarine was designing the Spitfire, yet that one turn out pretty well. There was not also the crystal ball when the Matilda II was designed; turned out pretty well, too.
By Nuffield proposal, you mean Crusader?
Last edited: