Realistic options for Japan 1937-41

[Thumpalumpacus]

Problem may have been that there wasn't one Japan, there may have been at least two and maybe 3. And the American diplomats were not negotiating with the Japanese Army/nationalists.

While they weren't negotiating with IJA, IJA very much had the final word on whether an agreement would be reached or not. If the government reached an American agreement that IJA didn't like, all they had to do was resign the Minister of the Army and the government would collapse. Because no government could be formed without the Army and Navy appointing their own ministers from the active duty officer corps, they could prevent the formation of any government that did not do what they wanted.

What face saving could be done to justify giving back that territory?

Nothing the US would, or perhaps could, offer.

 

[Greyman]

Problem may have been that there wasn't one Japan, there may have been at least two and maybe 3.

I'm quite the dunce when it comes to the Pacific War but I had a general grasp of the main events.

What I completely lacked was any understanding of Japanese history in the leadup to the war and Dan Carlin's relatively recent podcast series on the subject was a fantastic learning experience.

It's still free at the moment, and in six parts -- each part being a few hours long (so maybe easier to chip away at on drives to work or while walking the dog).

Available on itunes or on their website here:

Part 1: starts Edo period / ect. and ends just before Nanjing​

Hardcore History 62 – Supernova in the East I

www.dancarlin.com

​

Part 2: starts with Nanjing and ends with Pearl Harbour​

Hardcore History 63 – Supernova in the East II

www.dancarlin.com

As Shortround hinted at -- the complications (to put things lightly) Japanese leaders were faced with were pretty mind-boggling.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I wonder if FDR's advisors and the American negotiators understood this. Did the US offer any face saving way out for the Japanese?

No. Our last offer was essentially a restatement of the two previous offers, though there was some confusion in Japanese circles what was meant exactly by "removing all forces from China", whether that meant all of China or just Manchukuo, and so on. The negotiations were pretty churlish at any rate and neither side was willing to compromise on significant issues. The Army would have removed any Japanese government that did.

I remember my negotiating courses at university, skills and learning I use to today, especially the importance of preparation and understanding any cultural limitations. I would like to think the US consulted with whatever experts on Japan were available to them, and that the State Department approached FDR with something along the lines of "in Japanese culture face savings is very important, the Japanese government needs a way out that satisfies both the pride of the people and does not provoke their military from executing a coup." and in reply, rather than not understanding this nuance, FDR said "I fully understand, I'm briefed by our Japan experts, but f#ck em, we'll crush their asses."

I don't think the American gov't had a decent understanding of Japanese cultural psychology at that time. The way the State Dept essentially froze Ambassador Grew out of the process meant that they couldn't benefit from his insights into Japanese outlooks.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't have a good understanding of politics involved and I may be way off but the Japanese and Americans seem to be working at cross purposes.

America " we will let you have oil and steel and R.M. (raw materials) if you go back to your borders of several years ago."

Japan " we want the oil, steel and R.M. so we can expand our borders and you are asking us to to give up what we paid for with our troops lives"

Now reconcile those two positions?

 

[Admiral Beez]

The way the State Dept essentially froze Ambassador Grew out of the process meant that they couldn't benefit from his insights into Japanese outlooks.

Not listening to Grew does seem to be an error. He told Washington about the Pearl Harbour attack. Perhaps this was another chance for Japan to avoid war, if in Nov 1941 the US announces we know about your plans to attack Pearl Harbour. This should stir up some internal arguments in Tokyo as the element of surprise and plan to prolong negotiations as the strike is prepared is gone.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Not listening to Grew does seem to be an error. He told Washington about the Pearl Harbour attack. Perhaps this was another chance for Japan to avoid war, if in Nov 1941 the US announces we know about your plans to attack Pearl Harbour. This should stir up some internal arguments in Tokyo as the element of surprise and plan to prolong negotiations as the strike is prepared is gone.

For the most part, agreed. I know that the Japanese had decided to go ahead with the attack even if surprise had been lost 24 hours prior. I'm unsure how willing they would have been with a longer period of foreknowledge.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I'm unsure how willing they would have been with a longer period of foreknowledge.

It depends on what the USA does from Jan 1941 onwards.

January 27, 1941, Grew secretly cabled the State Department with rumors passed on by the Peruvian Minister to Japan: "Japan military forces planned a surprise mass attack at Pearl Harbor in case of 'trouble' with the United States." Grew's report was provided to Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Husband Kimmel, Commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, but it was discounted by everyone involved in Washington, D.C., and Hawaii.

If for example, from early March 1941, following FDR's public announcement that "the State Department has received reliable intelligence that Japan is planning to attack Pearl Harbor if the US does not agree to their demands in China", the USA begins preparing Pearl Harbor for a major attack, with significant patrols and war readiness, thus demonstrating that any IJN move towards Hawaii would be a near guaranteed disaster, then I can't see Japan going ahead with it.

 

[cherry blossom]

Coming in only on the details of American-Japanese diplomacy, the Japanese suffered very severely from their awful diplomatic coding machines. One example was the exclusion of Ambassador Grew from the critical decisions. The logic was that he couldn't be told that the USA was reading Japanese codes in case he revealed the secret and his opinions weren't considered useful because he hadn't seen the messages. The other issue was that Ambassador Nomura wasn't considered reliable because he made proposals that did not reflect his instructions from Tokyo. The point was that Nomura was a reserve full admiral of the IJN. He considered relations with the USA to be navy business and had no intention of obeying foreign ministry instructions. His plan was to have the Navy Minister present his agreements to the cabinet but the Americans didn't believe his proposals were honest.

Now is it possible that the Japanese Foreign Ministry could have done better? Let us suggest a simple method: Enigma machines were commercially available and were bought by several countries such as Switzerland. They were not cheap but cost about the same as an average car. What if the Japanese decide that Enigma machines are available and reliable but not sufficiently secure. They buy a number of machines and a licence to produce more in 1937 (ideally earlier but the thread title has 1937). Then they take an enigma and remove the reflector, replacing it with a normal rotor. They install a copy of the "Eintrittswalze", possibly by taking one from a second machine, in contact with the replacement rotor making it an "Auftrittswalze" and connect this to 26 labelled plugs. They then wire together this to another Enigma so that both step together and run 26 cables to labelled plugs leading to the "Eintrittswalze" of the second machine. The second machine could retain its reflector or could also be modified as the first so that reflection would require 13 additional short cables. Notches should be cut in the rotors to cause 5, 7 or 9 movements of the neighbouring rotor with the instructions always ensuring that there were different numbers of turns for the two initial rotors of the two machines. Finally messages should start with a five character group such as TOKYO which must not be reused that day. The machine is set to its base setting of the eight rotors and the cables connected and TOKYO input. The resulting AZGNL can then set five of the rotors before the message is encoded or decoded.

Obviously, the pair of machines would take up some space and might not be acceptable in a submarine but should be acceptable for an embassy. I doubt if the code would be broken before 1945. The cost of the Enigmas would be much less than a Pacific War.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It depends on what the USA does from Jan 1941 onwards.

January 27, 1941, Grew secretly cabled the State Department with rumors passed on by the Peruvian Minister to Japan: "Japan military forces planned a surprise mass attack at Pearl Harbor in case of 'trouble' with the United States." Grew's report was provided to Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Husband Kimmel, Commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, but it was discounted by everyone involved in Washington, D.C., and Hawaii.

If from March 1941, for example the USA begins preparing Pearl Harbor for a major attack, with significant patrols and war readiness, thus demonstrating that any IJN move towards Hawaii would be a near guaranteed disaster, then I can't see Japan going ahead with it.

I didn't realize the foreknowledge was that far-sighted. Japan most likely wouldn't have attacked at PH. That would call Yamamoto's first resignation threat. Who would blink on that issue?

 

[Admiral Beez]

I didn't realize the foreknowledge was that far-sighted. Japan most likely wouldn't have attacked at PH. That would call Yamamoto's first resignation threat. Who would blink on that issue?

I also think such foreknowledge if taken seriously might have expedited USN rearmament.

For example, of the Essex class carriers, eleven were ordered from July to Nov 1940, but then none others until after Pearl Harbor - more than a whole year without any orders for new carrier construction. Mind you, eleven Essex class plus the Yorktowns, Lexingtons, plus Wasp and Ranger would already be a massive, world leading carrier fleet.

 

[Shortround6]

For example, of the Essex class carriers, eleven were ordered from July to Nov 1940, but then none others until after Pearl Harbor - more than a whole year without any orders for new carrier construction

You can order (put on paper) whatever you want.
You actually have the build the stuff and for that you need factories, shipyards and workers.
In 1940 under peace time conditions they were estimating that the Essex would not be completed until 1944. Contracts were modified and with a lot of work the Essex was launched ahead of schedule in July 1942 and commissioned Dec 1942.
There was an awful lot of figuring out what slipways were going to build which ships as not all slipways were the same length, were the same width, and the same depth of water or distance to far bank to launch really large ships. Sometimes even the crane capacity has to figured in. Ordering too much too soon may mean that you have to shift things around. Like supplies of building materials, moving tens of thousands of steel by ship/barge or railroad also needs planning.

 

[EwenS]

I also think such foreknowledge if taken seriously might have expedited USN rearmament.

For example, of the Essex class carriers, eleven were ordered from July to Nov 1940, but then none others until after Pearl Harbor - more than a whole year without any orders for new carrier construction. Mind you, eleven Essex class plus the Yorktowns, Lexingtons, plus Wasp and Ranger would already be a massive, world leading carrier fleet.

Those 11 Essex class ordered in 1940 were due to be completed between April 1944 and late 1946. Only 5 laid down by PH (2 about a week before). 2 more ordered Dec 1941, 10 In Aug 1942 and 3 in 1943.

By PH Essex completion date had advanced only 3 months. Another 13 months were saved after PH.

And before the Montanas could be laid down new building docks had to be built, for which funding started around 1938. Completion wasn't due until 1942/43.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I also think such foreknowledge if taken seriously might have expedited USN rearmament.

For example, of the Essex class carriers, eleven were ordered from July to Nov 1940, but then none others until after Pearl Harbor - more than a whole year without any orders for new carrier construction. Mind you, eleven Essex class plus the Yorktowns, Lexingtons, plus Wasp and Ranger would already be a massive, world leading carrier fleet.

Perhaps, but while Congress probably would've approved the funding, whether it could be turned up that quickly remains to be seen. Still would've helped.

 

[yosimitesam]

We know what Japan wanted. But what were Japan's negotiators offering America in return?

"Give us what we want or we'll kick your ass in war" doesn't really work when you're speaking to the largest industrial power on earth.

The U.S. was not viewed by most of the world at that time to be as "fearsome" as it has become since WWII. The U.S. Navy was respectably powerful but the U.S. Army was still tiny. It ranked 17th or 18th in the world in 1939, being about the size of Portugal's army of 150,000-200,000. It was growing, however, and had reached about one million in 1941, but the U.S.'s potential adversaries calculated it would not be dangerous for another 2 or 3 years, at least. This was a strategic mistake on their part. In any case, the political divisions within the U.S. (e.g., America First Committee and the like, plus general isolationism) seem to be signaling a weak and divided country that would not interfere with the totalitarian ambitions of the Axis powers, at least not for the foreseeable future. Only in trade and commerce could the U.S. put any kind of real pressure on the Axis (re: the steel and oil embargo of Japan.) Thus, Japan really didn't have to offer up anything in the "negotiations." The Japanese military (who were the ones really in charge) in 1940-1941 knew that the "peace talks" were just theater to buy some more time for preparations. Isolationism in the U.S. died an instant death, of course, when the first bomb struck Pearl Harbor.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The vote to continue conscription passing by only 1 vote in 1941 was inevitably interpreted by some that the US was not really willing to fight, along with anything else that could be fitted to this conclusion. With a still peacetime press there were plenty of stories of US unreadiness, unwillingness and failures.

The Tripartite Pact (Written in English, the US soon had a copy) from 27 September 1940 committed Japan to attack the US if the US attacked Germany and/or Italy and vice versa. Lots of people were sure the US would enter the European war "soon", thinks like the transfer of destroyers, Lend Lease etc. The way Britain let the US lead negotiations with Japan, trying to convince Japan they were going to fight together. Better to start the fighting yourself that be on the receiving end.

Taranto Raid 11 November 1940, a Japanese naval officer was allowed to do an inspection.

A Japanese nightmare was a collapse into civil war resulting in Japan being colonised. The level of violence in Japanese politics made the possibility seem very real. As of 1940 the existing Japanese leadership was tied to the China War, they would have to go before a change in policy but given the radicals, both civil and military, a change in war policy would definitely result in violence and assassinations. The Japanese rule from below concept, "I am their leader, I must follow them."

Whether the US could or should enter the European War was a live political issue in 1941, if the US announces Japan is thinking of attacking Pearl Harbor there will be strong demands to prove it, where is the evidence, wonder what will happen if the answer is Peruvian Ambassador or that the idea has been dismissed by US military officials.

1) the IJN could not put a large carrier fleet into Hawaiian waters except from the mandated islands, according to intelligence.
2) Pearl had enough search aircraft to guard this approach.
3) Pearl Harbor had 161 out of the USAAF total of 1,618 fighters at the end of November 1941 (the Philippines had 228, Latin America 231 according to the USAAF Statistical digest). Pearl had several radar sets available, plus the radars on USN ships.
4) Until Shokaku and Zuikaku could be considered operational the carrier raid from the north was 1 IJN carrier.
5) Until at sea refuelling was possible the carriers coming from the north would have minimal escorts.
6) The possibility of an airstrike was always on the table, the point was how probable, how much to tie Pearl Harbor up on that possibility, cutting into the time and material needed for other things like training.
7) The "best" use for the IJN carriers was covering the landings in South East Asia (like the IJN Naval General Staff wanted) or waiting to counter USN moves.
8) The known IJN war plan was to attrition the USN as it advanced, the carriers and most battleships in home waters waiting to engage the advancing USN fitted into this.
9) Pearl Harbor was attacked by submarines.

The IJN fleet had to learn refuelling at sea to make it, using civilian tankers which tended to require rounding up every morning, and the Naval General Staff spent a lot of time refusing to allocate enough tankers to enable 6 carriers to go.

It should be remembered that during 1940 and 1941 there were plenty of IJN officers prepared to, in effect, state in Japan versus the world bet on Japan sort of attitudes. There were all sorts of rumours about what might happen and plenty of warnings that had turned out to be false.

If I understand Edwin Layton correctly the warning was the Peruvian minister had been told "from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble's breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all their strength and employing all their equipment."

Admiral Yamamoto had handed his idea to attack Pearl Harbor to the Navy Minister on 7 January 1941, as part of a 9 page report called "Views on preparations for War". It was a series of suggestions. The idea it was a leak is implied because Grew reported the information on 27 January, three weeks after Yamamoto reported his ideas. Yamamoto advocated a total change in strategy, from allowing the US to advance, to seeking out the US including an air attack on Hawaii and a submarine blockade. A copy of Yamamoto's idea had gone to Admiral Onishi for study and evaluation. Onishi came back 6 weeks later, so 3 weeks after Grew's message, to report the operations was feasible if surprise was achieved. Commander Genda then spent 2 months to work out the tactical plan. In other words Yamamoto's paper was a suggestion paper not a detailed plan, about what the IJN should evaluate as initial war plans. After apparently being widely leaked and also exaggerated when the plan was only known by 3 senior IJN Admirals there were no further leaks for the next 10 to 11 months.

Now to evaluate Grew's message, all strength and all equipment, if true must mean an invasion. The rumour does not say a major raid, it says all out attack. It also says Grew is reporting second hand and that the majority of the sources are other diplomats. Ever done the pass the message test, where a chain of people whisper a message to each other and you observe the difference between the first and final versions of the message? Already, if we are to believe it was a real leak of Yamamoto calling for an air strike, it has escalated to most of the combined fleet supporting a major invasion. A USN evaluation talks of disposition of Japanese Naval and *Army* forces, how "the present" disposition rules it out, absolutely correct.

Layton notes that a Japanese author had published the idea of an air attack on Pearl Harbor in the mid 1930s, apparently in response to the USN fleet problem that demonstrated the concept.

The famous things are going to happen automatically message gave the cut off date as 29 November 1941, the 30th was a Sunday, so some of the US Army intelligence people put out a prediction of an attack on the 30th, when it did not come it meant future predictions were treated with greater reserve.

As another example on the 23rd of September 1941 the Japanese consulate in Buenos Aires sent a message to Tokyo stating it had received copies of Italian maps of the Panama Canal Zone and was sending them by courier to Japan. This message was translated by the US on 22 October. Admittedly the message seems to suggest the gaining of the maps was fortuitous, not as part of a (much) earlier request. Should Panama have been alerted, and if so in what way and what should they do? One hypothetical US Japan war scenario begins with Japanese merchant ships blowing themselves up while in the Panama Canal locks.

 

[EwenS]

Let's not go down the Panama Canal hypothetical. It has recently been done to death over on the Axis History Forum. Plenty of reasons why it wouldn't work.

Dec. 7'41 : A Day Japan Didn't Bomb Panama but Could Have - Mark 2 - Axis History Forum

Covers bombing raids as well as blowing up ships in the locks.

 

[yosimitesam]

The vote to continue conscription passing by only 1 vote in 1941 was inevitably interpreted by some that the US was not really willing to fight, along with anything else that could be fitted to this conclusion. With a still peacetime press there were plenty of stories of US unreadiness, unwillingness and failures.

The Tripartite Pact (Written in English, the US soon had a copy) from 27 September 1940 committed Japan to attack the US if the US attacked Germany and/or Italy and vice versa. Lots of people were sure the US would enter the European war "soon", thinks like the transfer of destroyers, Lend Lease etc. The way Britain let the US lead negotiations with Japan, trying to convince Japan they were going to fight together. Better to start the fighting yourself that be on the receiving end.

Taranto Raid 11 November 1940, a Japanese naval officer was allowed to do an inspection.

A Japanese nightmare was a collapse into civil war resulting in Japan being colonised. The level of violence in Japanese politics made the possibility seem very real. As of 1940 the existing Japanese leadership was tied to the China War, they would have to go before a change in policy but given the radicals, both civil and military, a change in war policy would definitely result in violence and assassinations. The Japanese rule from below concept, "I am their leader, I must follow them."

Whether the US could or should enter the European War was a live political issue in 1941, if the US announces Japan is thinking of attacking Pearl Harbor there will be strong demands to prove it, where is the evidence, wonder what will happen if the answer is Peruvian Ambassador or that the idea has been dismissed by US military officials.

1) the IJN could not put a large carrier fleet into Hawaiian waters except from the mandated islands, according to intelligence.
2) Pearl had enough search aircraft to guard this approach.
3) Pearl Harbor had 161 out of the USAAF total of 1,618 fighters at the end of November 1941 (the Philippines had 228, Latin America 231 according to the USAAF Statistical digest). Pearl had several radar sets available, plus the radars on USN ships.
4) Until Shokaku and Zuikaku could be considered operational the carrier raid from the north was 1 IJN carrier.
5) Until at sea refuelling was possible the carriers coming from the north would have minimal escorts.
6) The possibility of an airstrike was always on the table, the point was how probable, how much to tie Pearl Harbor up on that possibility, cutting into the time and material needed for other things like training.
7) The "best" use for the IJN carriers was covering the landings in South East Asia (like the IJN Naval General Staff wanted) or waiting to counter USN moves.
8) The known IJN war plan was to attrition the USN as it advanced, the carriers and most battleships in home waters waiting to engage the advancing USN fitted into this.
9) Pearl Harbor was attacked by submarines.

The IJN fleet had to learn refuelling at sea to make it, using civilian tankers which tended to require rounding up every morning, and the Naval General Staff spent a lot of time refusing to allocate enough tankers to enable 6 carriers to go.

It should be remembered that during 1940 and 1941 there were plenty of IJN officers prepared to, in effect, state in Japan versus the world bet on Japan sort of attitudes. There were all sorts of rumours about what might happen and plenty of warnings that had turned out to be false.

If I understand Edwin Layton correctly the warning was the Peruvian minister had been told "from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble's breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all their strength and employing all their equipment."

Admiral Yamamoto had handed his idea to attack Pearl Harbor to the Navy Minister on 7 January 1941, as part of a 9 page report called "Views on preparations for War". It was a series of suggestions. The idea it was a leak is implied because Grew reported the information on 27 January, three weeks after Yamamoto reported his ideas. Yamamoto advocated a total change in strategy, from allowing the US to advance, to seeking out the US including an air attack on Hawaii and a submarine blockade. A copy of Yamamoto's idea had gone to Admiral Onishi for study and evaluation. Onishi came back 6 weeks later, so 3 weeks after Grew's message, to report the operations was feasible if surprise was achieved. Commander Genda then spent 2 months to work out the tactical plan. In other words Yamamoto's paper was a suggestion paper not a detailed plan, about what the IJN should evaluate as initial war plans. After apparently being widely leaked and also exaggerated when the plan was only known by 3 senior IJN Admirals there were no further leaks for the next 10 to 11 months.

Now to evaluate Grew's message, all strength and all equipment, if true must mean an invasion. The rumour does not say a major raid, it says all out attack. It also says Grew is reporting second hand and that the majority of the sources are other diplomats. Ever done the pass the message test, where a chain of people whisper a message to each other and you observe the difference between the first and final versions of the message? Already, if we are to believe it was a real leak of Yamamoto calling for an air strike, it has escalated to most of the combined fleet supporting a major invasion. A USN evaluation talks of disposition of Japanese Naval and *Army* forces, how "the present" disposition rules it out, absolutely correct.

Layton notes that a Japanese author had published the idea of an air attack on Pearl Harbor in the mid 1930s, apparently in response to the USN fleet problem that demonstrated the concept.

The famous things are going to happen automatically message gave the cut off date as 29 November 1941, the 30th was a Sunday, so some of the US Army intelligence people put out a prediction of an attack on the 30th, when it did not come it meant future predictions were treated with greater reserve.

As another example on the 23rd of September 1941 the Japanese consulate in Buenos Aires sent a message to Tokyo stating it had received copies of Italian maps of the Panama Canal Zone and was sending them by courier to Japan. This message was translated by the US on 22 October. Admittedly the message seems to suggest the gaining of the maps was fortuitous, not as part of a (much) earlier request. Should Panama have been alerted, and if so in what way and what should they do? One hypothetical US Japan war scenario begins with Japanese merchant ships blowing themselves up while in the Panama Canal locks.

That was the problem with the U.S. intelligence "organization" in 1941. It was fragmented and a realistic, in-depth analysis of all intelligence really didn't take place, as there was no infrastructure in the US government to actually do it. Thus, the US command could not separate "the signal from the noise" from the intelligence it had.