Realistic options for Japan 1937-41

[Admiral Beez]

Was there any realistic, face saving option for Japan between their July 1937 invasion of China to before Dec 1941 Pearl Harbor to avoid war with the US and British Empire? The USA's ten points were neither realistic nor face saving.

And if not after the 1937 invasion of China, was there any realistic opportunity to come to terms with Japan before 1937? The Australians were particularly eager to maintain good relations with Tokyo.

 

[SaparotRob]

I've wondered about that myself.

 

[yosimitesam]

Was there any realistic, face saving option for Japan between their July 1937 invasion of China to before Dec 1941 Pearl Harbor to avoid war with the US and British Empire? The USA's ten points were neither realistic nor face saving.

And if not after the 1937 invasion of China, was there any realistic opportunity to come to terms with Japan before 1937? The Australians were particularly eager to maintain good relations with Tokyo.

Probably not, IMO. The Japanese military (particularly the Army) saw China as their European equivalent of the New World. The "West", particularly the U.S., had a racist attitude and were viewed by the Japanese as duplicitous and hypocritical. The US had a small empire (Philippines) and Britain had a huge empire. The British fueled their entire economy on that empire. What was good for the West was good for the East, and the Japanese saw themselves as the preeminent power in the East. They were already aiding their economy from the seizure of Manchuria and its resources. They saw China as their own "Manifest Destiny" and felt that seizing it was no more egregious than Europeans seizing the New World. The Japanese were just coming out of the Great Depression, like most of the rest of the world, and saw this period as a turning point in their long term future. They felt it was now-or-never for them to begin the process of becoming a world power. The Japanese military was determined to make this happen and the feeling among their general population was that this was a chance to make their own destiny. There was very little opposition in the general population to adopting a policy of imperialism, since this was how the West came to be powerful. While "saving face" was important to the Japanese, the military were thinking more in terms of hard-nosed practicality, and even the Emperor would not be able to put a stop to it.

 

[Shinpachi]

It was communists' scenario to make ROC and Japan, and the Allies and Japan finally, fight.

Xi'an incident
Chiang had been captured by Mao.

Xi'an Incident - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Admiral Beez]

Probably not, IMO.

Did Japan's negotiators have a counter proposal, aside from screw you, we'll do whatever we want?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Did Japan's negotiators have a counter proposal, aside from screw you, we'll do whatever we want?

Japan essentially wanted America to ratify their conquest of the various parts of China, and lift the various embargoes. John Toland's The Rising Sun delves deeply into the drift into war. It's dated but very well-documented.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japan essentially wanted America to ratify their conquest of the various parts of China, and lift the various embargoes.

America would never have agreed, but if Japan had read the tea leaves better they should have looked to their former allies in Europe for support. In 1936 it is clear that Britain and France are becoming increasingly concerned about the growing strength of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This is Japan's chance, no to ally themselves with the fascists, but to approach Britain (and France and the Netherlands) to offer both assistance and protection in exchange for diplomatic concessions and Britain ignoring Japan's invasion of China. So forget the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact and the 1940 Tripartite Pact. Instead, in Sept. 1939, a thus far neutral Japan offers to Britain immediate military assistance in exchange for access to British resources. Now Britain desperately needs the USA's help, and after WW1 is financially beholden to USA debt, so some diplomatic work or herculean proportions is needed.

But this is where I see Japan's best chance, in that their former ally, Britain needs help and also have things Japan needs. It's the perfect opportunity to seek concessions.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

America would never have agreed, but if Japan had read the tea leaves better they should have looked to their former allies in Europe for support. In 1936 it is clear that Britain and France are becoming increasingly concerned about the growing strength of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This is Japan's chance, no to ally themselves with the fascists, but to approach Britain (and France and the Netherlands) to offer both assistance and protection in exchange for diplomatic concessions and Britain ignoring Japan's invasion of China. So forget the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact and the 1940 Tripartite Pact. Instead, in Sept. 1939, a thus far neutral Japan offers to Britain immediate military assistance in exchange for access to British resources. Now Britain desperately needs the USA's help, and after WW1 is financially beholden to USA debt, so some diplomatic work or herculean proportions is needed.

But this is where I see Japan's best chance, in that their former ally, Britain needs help and also have things Japan needs. It's the perfect opportunity to seek concessions.

The problem is that, in order to agree to the Washington Naval Treaty, America had insisted that the UK denounce the Anglo-Japanese treaty, which of course insulted the Japanese. Going to the UK hat-in-hand would be seen as equally disastrous and face-losing by the radicals in and out of the Tokyo government.

I think the UK might have been suspicious of Japanese intentions as well, after it withdrew from both the League of Nations and the London Naval Conference in the early 30s.

 

[Shinpachi]

Yes, Japanese people thought they had been betrayed by UK

 

[Admiral Beez]

The problem is that, in order to agree to the Washington Naval Treaty, America had insisted that the UK denounce the Anglo-Japanese treaty, which of course insulted the Japanese. Going to the UK hat-in-hand would be seen as equally disastrous and face-losing by the radicals in and out of the Tokyo government.

All good points. But the smarter Japan position should have been to recognize that like themselves, Britain also got f#cked over by the Americans and the WNT. Britain went from having the largest naval force in the world in 1914 to a rump of clapped out ships that with only numerical parity with the USN's newer vessels. Japan was humiliated? Absolutely, and so was Britain, having to grovel to its former colony for thruppennies. The smarter Japan goes to Britain and says, those damn Yanks screwed us both over; okay, so we've had to cancel our alliance, but with the Germans smoked, really neither one of our empires is now under threat anyway, so let's instead contest the Americans on trade, so in 1928, the Britain-Japan FTA is signed.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

All good points. But the smarter Japan position should have been to recognize that like themselves, Britain also got f#cked over by the Americans and the WNT. Britain went from having the largest naval force in the world in 1914 to a rump of clapped out ships that with only numerical parity with the USN's newer vessels. Japan was humiliated? Absolutely, and so was Britain, having to grovel to its former colony for thruppennies. The smarter Japan goes to Britain and says, those damn Yanks screwed us both over; okay, so we've had to cancel our alliance, but with the Germans smoked, really neither one of our empires is now under threat anyway, so let's instead contest the Americans on trade, so in 1928, the Britain-Japan FTA is signed.

Both Japan and the UK benefitted from the WNT limiting American shipbuilding. The UK didn't have the money for a shipbuilding race, and Japan lacked both the money and the slipways.

As soon as your hypothetical agreement gets signed, America denounces the WNT, and neither rival has the wherewithal to compete in build numbers.

 

[EwenS]

All good points. But the smarter Japan position should have been to recognize that like themselves, Britain also got f#cked over by the Americans and the WNT. Britain went from having the largest naval force in the world in 1914 to a rump of clapped out ships that with only numerical parity with the USN's newer vessels. Japan was humiliated? Absolutely, and so was Britain, having to grovel to its former colony for thruppennies. The smarter Japan goes to Britain and says, those damn Yanks screwed us both over; okay, so we've had to cancel our alliance, but with the Germans smoked, really neither one of our empires is now under threat anyway, so let's instead contest the Americans on trade, so in 1928, the Britain-Japan FTA is signed.

Well that is one way of looking at the WNT.

Another is that everyone, particularly a financially broke Britain, avoided another naval arms race and was able to clear out a lot of old junk that was costing money to maintain. Japan had a similar issue financially (was its planned building programme really sustainable. Look at the cancellations:-

USA - Washington, 6 BB49 class (10x18"), 6xLexington class battlecruisers (13 ships all under construction)
Japan - 2xTosa class, 4xAmagi class battlecruiser, 4xKii class, 4xNo13 class (14 ships with 6 under construction)
Britain - 4xG3 battlecruisers (ordered immediately prior to Conference and on which no construction work had commenced) (4 ships)

When you look at the 1922 Treaty in detail, everyone got something out of it that they wanted. Maybe not everything, but something. What annoyed the Japanese most was that the US and Britain wouldn't consider them equals and grant them parity in capital ship & carrier numbers / tonnages.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Well that is one way of looking at the WNT.

Another is that everyone, particularly a financially broke Britain, avoided another naval arms race and was able to clear out a lot of old junk that was costing money to maintain. Japan had a similar issue financially (was its planned building programme really sustainable. Look at the cancellations:-

USA - Washington, 6 BB49 class (10x18"), 6xLexington class battlecruisers (13 ships all under construction)
Japan - 2xTosa class, 4xAmagi class battlecruiser, 4xKii class, 4xNo13 class (14 ships with 6 under construction)
Britain - 4xG3 battlecruisers (ordered immediately prior to Conference and on which no construction work had commenced) (4 ships)

When you look at the 1922 Treaty in detail, everyone got something out of it that they wanted. Maybe not everything, but something. What annoyed the Japanese most was that the US and Britain wouldn't consider them equals and grant them parity in capital ship & carrier numbers / tonnages.

Exactly right, both Britain and Japan benefited, and behind closed doors likely admittedly so, from the WNT. Japan is still on par or stronger than France or Italy, the former one of the global naval powers. Are there any opportunities for a smarter Japan to make some decisions in the interwar period that can avoid its suicidal rush into war with Britain and the USA.

 

[Shinpachi]

Choice was already decided by the Japanese leaders and people in early 1941.
That would be also what American leaders and people wanted as my hindsight.
If other countries should have wanted to stop it, they should not have remained as spectators IMO.
For example, if UK had suggested any possibility of oil supply to Japan, there would have been no Pearl Harbor and occupation of Singapore at least.
Spectators can't help in the history IMO.

 

[yosimitesam]

Japan essentially wanted America to ratify their conquest of the various parts of China, and lift the various embargoes. John Toland's The Rising Sun delves deeply into the drift into war. It's dated but very well-documented.

Yes. I've read Toland's book twice. It opened my eyes to just how different the Japanese culture was from that of the West. In a strange way, they were more racist than the Nazi's, but for centuries their insular nature made then more or less invisible to the West. Toland's chapters on the post WW-I political turmoil in Japan were truly enlightening.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japan essentially wanted America to ratify their conquest of the various parts of China, and lift the various embargoes.

We know what Japan wanted. But what were Japan's negotiators offering America in return?

"Give us what we want or we'll kick your ass in war" doesn't really work when you're speaking to the largest industrial power on earth.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

We know what Japan wanted. But what were Japan's negotiators offering America in return?

Peace in the Pacific. They thought that's what America wanted most. Our mild response to the Panay's sinking may have helped this misreading along.

They underestimated the strength of the China lobby, and also underestimated American outrage at their atrocities of Nanking and Shanghai.

America wanted peace in China. No Japanese government could offer that and remain in power. It follows that with IJA being able to kill any government, no reasonable peace offer amenable to America could be made.

 

[Admiral Beez]

America wanted peace in China. No Japanese government could offer that and remain in power.

I wonder if FDR's advisors and the American negotiators understood this. Did the US offer any face saving way out for the Japanese?

I remember my negotiating courses at university, skills and learning I use to today, especially the importance of preparation and understanding any cultural limitations. I would like to think the US consulted with whatever experts on Japan were available to them, and that the State Department approached FDR with something along the lines of "in Japanese culture face savings is very important, the Japanese government needs a way out that satisfies both the pride of the people and does not provoke their military from executing a coup." and in reply, rather than not understanding this nuance, FDR said "I fully understand, I'm briefed by our Japan experts, but f#ck em, we'll crush their asses."

 

[Shortround6]

Problem may have been that there wasn't one Japan, there may have been at least two and maybe 3. And the American diplomats were not negotiating with the Japanese Army/nationalists.

And separating out industrial power from nation size/population may have been a more difficult concept.
The Japanese had already taken over land areas with almost twice the population of the United States and over 4 times the population of Japan itself in 1939 and was getting more territory in 1940.
What face saving could be done to justify giving back that territory?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Problem may have been that there wasn't one Japan, there may have been at least two and maybe 3. And the American diplomats were not negotiating with the Japanese Army/nationalists.

And separating out industrial power from nation size/population may have been a more difficult concept.
The Japanese had already taken over land areas with almost twice the population of the United States and over 4 times the population of Japan itself in 1939 and was getting more territory in 1940.
What face saving could be done to justify giving back that territory?

Good points. Perhaps the best chance for Japan was for America to support Nationalist China to deter the invasion.