Last Corsair order to Vought : 94 F4U-7 for the French Navy, last one delivered january 31, 1953. Last flight with the French Navy : september 1964.I have a real problem with this statement.
The Japanese on built around 716 of the "1942 model" Ki-43s out of over 5700 versions. While the last Ki-43 I built rolled out of the factory in Feb 1943 they had been building Ki-43 IIs in November so there is some overlap. Ki-43 I's in frontline squadron service in 1944??? Training squadrons yes, 'home defense' squadrons yes. In 1944 just due to normal attrition "1942 model" Ki-43 was well under 10% of the of the strength.
Same pretty much goes for the A6M. While the Navy was a lot quicker to get the two speed supercharger into the A6M the "1942 models" actually cover at least 3 models of A6Ms. The A6M2 21 which is the classic Pearl Harbor, Midway, early Guadalcanal Zero with long wing and single stage supercharger. The A6M3 32 which got the new engine, shorter wing (tips removed). Production started in spring of 1942 and was first spotted by the Allies in Aug 1942, However the new engine meant that the fuselage tank was reduced in size and with the thirstier engine this reduced range. Field commanders requested additional fuel tankage to restore range and after testing the A6M3 22 (yes the numbers are reversed, earlier plane used the higher model number) entered in production in Dec 1942 with the old folding wings in addition to the new small tanks in each wing. So what was the "1942 model"? Also note that 1941-42 production of the A6Ms was about 17% of total production so again, numbers of 1942 production fighters in front line squadrons in 1944 would have been very small.
I would also note that many Allied and Axis pilots weren't much better at aircraft identification than they were at accurate score keeping. Japanese had an easier time of it as the 6 main US fighters were all rather different. Many allied pilots could not tell a Ki-43 from an A6M. They often could tell the A6M3 32 from the others due to the clipped, squared off wing tips.
The rate of attrition on both sides was huge. Many aircraft were written off as soon as they landed due to combat damage, as noted earlier, many were written off due to landing/taxing damage. In the Solomon's and New Guinea both sides lost numbers of planes due to bombing raids (or shell fire). "1942 model" planes, on both sides, were in 2nd line or 3rd line squadrons/areas of operation/duties in 1944.
I don't hold much stock in after WW II use. Too much depends on the actual air force and planes involved. As an example France was still using Hawk 75s (very few) as trainers into the early 50s. Any that had been built with Wright R-1820 engines had been repowered with P&WR-1830 engines. France had enough trouble paying for new combat jets, no money for training aircraft.
F4U was sort of a special case. P&W and Vaught had managed to shoe horn in new version of the R-2800 engine that gave much better performance at altitude than many of the early jets. This was at a time when they were still figuring out how to operate jets of carriers (Corsair was no picnic but the jets were really bad) and the new Corsairs were also easy to convert to night fighters (they already knew how to mount the radar). As a air frame already in production and a work force in place it was also easy to stick in an old model engine for a ground attack variant and there was also a French order (cheap aircraft?)
Vaught may also have been getting a pity contract or two. Their jets pretty much sucked. Not all due to Vaught, Navy insisted that Vaught use Westinghouse engines. Axial flow was just so much better than centrifugal (sarcasm) in 1944-47.
View attachment 848688
Took about 5 years to get this into service. Navy had to keep Vaught in business building something
The Navy did get a lot more use out of F4U-5 fighters than many of the early jets which were, effectively, little more than trainers for pilots, maintenance men and operations.
Regarding the true combat performance of the P-38 (and other advanced US fighters) in the PTO from 1942-44
- Thread starter Jobbin02
- Start date
GregP
Major
Will get a few tomorrow an PM them to you. Right now, the engine is off becasue we are working on a cylinder or two, discovered last Devcember when we went to fly it and didn't like the sound. The repairs are not general Museum knowledge and even if I knew the exact particulars, we aren't supposed to make detailed reports on Museum assets to the public. But, no reason not to get a shot or two.Tiny thread jack, as long as you were here. Do you have any current shots of the "Saipan Zero"?
Our P-47G is back flying after a year and half down for engine / prop overhaul, along with some airframe "freshening." I'm sure there will be a YouTube video soon if it isn't already there.
Cheers!
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Thanks!
Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
Joblin, disagreement without sound reasoning is worthless. Perhaps you should lay out your reasoning.
- Thread starter
- #25
Why the challenge?
Do forced landings from combat count as operational losses? Are holes in cockpits and hydraulics mere "teething issues"?
It's clear that most of you haven't read any of Claringbould's works, certainly not Pacific Profiles, never mind Dunn's readily available online articles related to these overrated Allied aircraft, and just how exactly they were overrated, referencing actual Japanese documents, as opposed to some form of statistical manipulation like
GregP seemingly implied in his previous post. You're practically irrelevant to the discussion at hand.Why the excessively high kill ratios for the Allied aircraft of the PTO, then? From all accounts, they're largely based on claims or victories, "confirmed" or otherwise, without taking into account actual losses reported by the enemy. They would especially be inaccurate for late 1943 and early 1944; Dunn's article on the F6F goes into some detail on how its claims could have been over-inflated almost 5-fold. The Japanese did over-claim by a considerably larger margin, but that's beside the point; the overall picture is a roughly 1:1 ratio for this period, and the same applies to the F4U, maybe the P-47 and P-38 as well. I don't have much data on hand, especially for kill ratios by year as opposed to the entire war, and by theatre. The Pacific Profiles books may provide some information in this regard, but I'm currently unsure. I may have to purchase them myself, seeing as how no one here appears to have even read or touched them. It's also important to note that the higher-ups in the US military were already aware of over-claiming to some non-negligible degree, even making occasional comments on it, though they appeared to have been unaware of its full extent.
Speed alone, be it level, while diving, or in a climb, doesn't appear to have been the overriding factor in WWII-era aerial combat that you think it was, not from what I've read recently. The A6M was also more durable than you likely think, according to remarks from Corsair pilots themselves.
The Ki-43-II, especially against its later, more advanced opponents, was effectively a 1942 aircraft. In that sense, it could even be considered equivalent to the fighter aircraft that were engaged in combat over Britain and the Channel in 1940, two whole years earlier. Despite its disadvantages, it apparently managed to hold its own against supposedly superior aircraft into early 1944, as shown in its engagements with the 400+mph Spitfire VIII.
I don't care. Either way, "outdated" A6Ms managed to keep up with 'state-of-the-art' enemy fighters into early 1944, both in kills and even in some cases, performance in the field. It matters not whether or not said A6Ms were manufactured in 1942 or in 1943/44.
I suppose that Rabaul had largely lost its relevance as a naval base by 1944, but A6M2/3s still appear to have been operational around that area into February 1944, especially as Rabaul was reinforced by carrier-based A6Ms, many of which were A6M2s.
Well, Claringbould and Dunn are both concerned with losses recorded by both sides, emphasis on both, as opposed to claims or "victories", which have been cited by nearly every historian, 'would-be' or otherwise, in Osprey titles and elsewhere, especially when discussing the WWII PTO.
It seems that this discussion has largely run its course in its brief lifetime. We keep circling this drain of kill ratios deflated by operational losses, something that no reputable individual, certainly not Claringbould or Dunn, has set out to do, and you would know this if any of you had actually read any of their works. As it stands, both the A6M and Ki-43 withstood opponents that should have had all the significant advantages, up until attrition had worn them significantly enough that the latter could finally gain a truly decisive advantage over them. With that in mind, I feel like WWII aviation, if not WWII or military aviation as a whole, has largely run its course for me. It has lost much of its lustre. On that note, this forum appears to be less active recently; it's as much in decline as is its subject matter.
GregP
Major
Joblin, the above tells me that a thread should be started to look at what is considered a victory / kill and what is considered a loss.
Basic to the issue is whether the losses were reported truthfully. Telling the truth in the Soviet Union could get you killed if Stalin didn't want to hear it just then and the same can be said for a few cases in Japan.
In Germany, many records were lost due to war damage and I am not sure the victory and loss records will ever add up to anything definite. They can't even tell us how many Bf 109s were built. Wht should they be able tell us how many were lost? We don;t know much about the production of Bf 110s, either. Everyone published a number, but nobody has ever said where that number came from. Thge most quoted number is about 6,170. However, if they can't tell us how many of what variant were built, how did they get the total? Loss records were similarly lost to bomb damagem and were impossible to reconstruct from existing data, as far as I know to date.
Some people think that for a loss to count, it has to show up oh the enemy's loss list. To me, if a fighter pilot or a bomber gunner shoots down a plane and it force-lands, I don't care a bit if it is recovered and flies again later or not, that pilot or gunner got a victory. That means losses and victories do NOT have to match.
So, again, the definition of a victory or a loss needs to be rather carefully defined. If we mandate complete destruction of the victim, then no escort would ever continue escorting, they would follow the victim down, strafe it until it burned, and the escorted bombers would lose their escort. People do funny things in war in search of glory, so you have to careful to make things so that accomplishing the mission is not compromised by requirements for victory confirmation, and morale means you have to give credit where credit is due. History is replete with soldiers who weren't very good because morale sucked. Motivated soldiers, on the other hand, have done impressive things.
Basic to the issue is whether the losses were reported truthfully. Telling the truth in the Soviet Union could get you killed if Stalin didn't want to hear it just then and the same can be said for a few cases in Japan.
In Germany, many records were lost due to war damage and I am not sure the victory and loss records will ever add up to anything definite. They can't even tell us how many Bf 109s were built. Wht should they be able tell us how many were lost? We don;t know much about the production of Bf 110s, either. Everyone published a number, but nobody has ever said where that number came from. Thge most quoted number is about 6,170. However, if they can't tell us how many of what variant were built, how did they get the total? Loss records were similarly lost to bomb damagem and were impossible to reconstruct from existing data, as far as I know to date.
Some people think that for a loss to count, it has to show up oh the enemy's loss list. To me, if a fighter pilot or a bomber gunner shoots down a plane and it force-lands, I don't care a bit if it is recovered and flies again later or not, that pilot or gunner got a victory. That means losses and victories do NOT have to match.
So, again, the definition of a victory or a loss needs to be rather carefully defined. If we mandate complete destruction of the victim, then no escort would ever continue escorting, they would follow the victim down, strafe it until it burned, and the escorted bombers would lose their escort. People do funny things in war in search of glory, so you have to careful to make things so that accomplishing the mission is not compromised by requirements for victory confirmation, and morale means you have to give credit where credit is due. History is replete with soldiers who weren't very good because morale sucked. Motivated soldiers, on the other hand, have done impressive things.
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Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,133
- Sep 29, 2025
Why the challenge?
Do forced landings from combat count as operational losses? Are holes in cockpits and hydraulics mere "teething issues"?
It's clear that most of you haven't read any of Claringbould's works, certainly not Pacific Profiles, never mind Dunn's readily available online articles related to these overrated Allied aircraft, and just how exactly they were overrated, referencing actual Japanese documents, as opposed to some form of statistical manipulation like
Why the excessively high kill ratios for the Allied aircraft of the PTO, then? From all accounts, they're largely based on claims or victories, "confirmed" or otherwise, without taking into account actual losses reported by the enemy. They would especially be inaccurate for late 1943 and early 1944; Dunn's article on the F6F goes into some detail on how its claims could have been over-inflated almost 5-fold. The Japanese did over-claim by a considerably larger margin, but that's beside the point; the overall picture is a roughly 1:1 ratio for this period, and the same applies to the F4U, maybe the P-47 and P-38 as well. I don't have much data on hand, especially for kill ratios by year as opposed to the entire war, and by theatre. The Pacific Profiles books may provide some information in this regard, but I'm currently unsure. I may have to purchase them myself, seeing as how no one here appears to have even read or touched them. It's also important to note that the higher-ups in the US military were already aware of over-claiming to some non-negligible degree, even making occasional comments on it, though they appeared to have been unaware of its full extent.
Speed alone, be it level, while diving, or in a climb, doesn't appear to have been the overriding factor in WWII-era aerial combat that you think it was, not from what I've read recently. The A6M was also more durable than you likely think, according to remarks from Corsair pilots themselves.
The Ki-43-II, especially against its later, more advanced opponents, was effectively a 1942 aircraft. In that sense, it could even be considered equivalent to the fighter aircraft that were engaged in combat over Britain and the Channel in 1940, two whole years earlier. Despite its disadvantages, it apparently managed to hold its own against supposedly superior aircraft into early 1944, as shown in its engagements with the 400+mph Spitfire VIII.
I don't care. Either way, "outdated" A6Ms managed to keep up with 'state-of-the-art' enemy fighters into early 1944, both in kills and even in some cases, performance in the field. It matters not whether or not said A6Ms were manufactured in 1942 or in 1943/44.
I suppose that Rabaul had largely lost its relevance as a naval base by 1944, but A6M2/3s still appear to have been operational around that area into February 1944, especially as Rabaul was reinforced by carrier-based A6Ms, many of which were A6M2s.
Well, Claringbould and Dunn are both concerned with losses recorded by both sides, emphasis on both, as opposed to claims or "victories", which have been cited by nearly every historian, 'would-be' or otherwise, in Osprey titles and elsewhere, especially when discussing the WWII PTO.
It seems that this discussion has largely run its course in its brief lifetime. We keep circling this drain of kill ratios deflated by operational losses, something that no reputable individual, certainly not Claringbould or Dunn, has set out to do, and you would know this if any of you had actually read any of their works. As it stands, both the A6M and Ki-43 withstood opponents that should have had all the significant advantages, up until attrition had worn them significantly enough that the latter could finally gain a truly decisive advantage over them. With that in mind, I feel like WWII aviation, if not WWII or military aviation as a whole, has largely run its course for me. It has lost much of its lustre. On that note, this forum appears to be less active recently; it's as much in decline as is its subject matter.
I have read a great deal of Claringbould's Work, (notably several volumes each from both South Pacific Air War series and Solomons Air War series). I've also read several other similar books which cover the same and other Theaters with the same approach of using both-sides loss data rather than just claims, notably but not limited to Christopher Shores now sadly out of print three volume "Bloody Shambles" series about Burma and India, and his five volume Mediterranean Air War Series. Also Christer Bergsrom's "Black Cross / Red Star" series (which I don't 100% rate) and The First Team, Into the Endless Mist, Volume 2 (on the Aleutian War) and some others.
I think you will find that these and some others are actually known here, and many here own these books and have read many of them, but I would somewhat agree on your take that the implications of the data they show has really not been taken seriously into consideration. I agree with several of your points, namely:
Overclaiming was much worse than we assumed - (On every side). This definitely varied by Theater, with the South Pacific being one of the most chaotic and difficult to verify, but it was certainly much greater than I think people have realized. I should also note that overclaiming is often not intentional. Air combat is confusing, precisely who shot down an aircraft that was clearly destroyed (blew up, pilot bailed out etc.) isn't always obvious, and it turns out enemy aircraft may look destroyed but survive to limp home. Including Japanese aircraft, to wit ...
Japanese Aircraft were much more formidable than the postwar legend has it - I agree with you that A6M and Ki-43 were far more effective fighters (and for much longer) than seems to be the consensus in the Anglophone sphere, both around here where people really could know better, and more generally.
Japanese Fighters were nowhere near as flimsy and disposable as the legend has it - Part of the reason for overclaiming is that it's quite clear that Japanese fighters often took heavy battle damage and still managed to limp home.
Some Allied Fighters were not as superior as claimed - This is a tricky one, because I think you are overstating it a little (and such claims tend to be overblown in both directions), but it's clear that Japanese fighters were not instantly overwhelmed by the second generation US (and British) fighters. Largely, I think, it's as Shortround6 said, many of them had long teething periods and the early versions were nowhere near as good as the later ones. But the later ones did eventually arrive...
Speed and Altitude Performance isn't everything - This too is abundantly clear, I think. I agree with your conclusion on that. It depends a lot on the nature of the fighting, but not all Theaters worked the way 8th Air Force heavy bomber raids or the Battle of Britain did. I think this is a common and very big mistake in Anglophone WW2 aviation circles.
Weather was a bigger problem than we tend to assume - So many planes lost to bad weather. So many nightmarish situations. More planes lost to weather than combat.
What counts as a victory is tricky to calculate - I tend to agree with what I think(?) you were saying, namely that an enemy aircraft which does not make it back to base and has to make a forced landing does also count as a victory, whether it is later recovered or not. A victory in fact doesn't really hinge on whether the plane could fly again, IMO. But the key factor is that the authors of these kinds of books need to use consistent standard for both sides.
These kinds of sources are really changing perception of the air war in WW2. You would think in a place like this that would be more welcome, but it's kind of hard to get your head around. In fact you yourself seem to be struggling with the revelations.
And I think you are also overstating some issues.
In Claringbould's Solomon Air War and South Pacific Air War series, it's already clear that there were some lop-sided victories for the Allies. I just finished reading South Pacific Air War Volume 6 which came out in August, and covers Jan-March 1943. And it's quite clear in that volume that Richard Bong for example did already shoot down a few Japanese fighters, and the Battle of the Bismark Sea was a very lopsided Allied victory. In the appendix of that book he lists losses for each side in each volume, it's pretty clear that the Guadalcanal Campaign was also a catastrophe for the Japanese. In Oct 42 they lost 225 aircraft vs 203 for the US (including 85 A6M, vs 77 F4F lost) and much more telling, the Japanese lost 428 aircrew killed vs. 104 for the US.
Volume 6 also shows a lot of action for the P-38s, which did seem to do a bit better than the Japanese fighters, but they had some limitations. They were picking off Japanese fighters from altitude, often not lingering long to defend the bombers, (for very good reasons as these were the early P-38s, as Shortround6 noted.) But it does look like Bong already figured out how to make them work.
Another thing worth noting, for reasons I'm not really sure of, the US lost almost twice as many aircraft to accidents, mechanical problems and weather as the Japanese did, but by the end of this volume (Vol III) the Japanese had lost significantly more fighters than the US did. Mostly to P-38s, P-40s, and heavy bombers like B-17s and B-24s.
Some other things to keep in mind:
It's still basically the first generation of these new types of Operational Histories, - and they do have errors. This new approach is really exciting and promising, but it's not perfect yet. One thing to note, as an example, when Christopher Shores first attempted his first book on the Mediterranean - "Fighters over the Desert" way back in 1969, he checked the German records but forgot to check the Italian (and also, it was a lot harder to do). He concluded that most DAF aces had overclaimed by enormous amounts, which turned out to be a kind of overcorrection. Another researcher from Australia challenged him with his own book pointing out several omissions by Shores, who then eventually went back, made an alliance with an Italian researcher and was then able to include the Italian losses ... or at least some of them... plus more of the German losses (including forced landings etc.) and a lot more detail in general, in his new Mediterranean Air War series, and this was much more successful.
I think we are going to need to see a couple more rounds of checking these initial attempts to be real sure that we know, as best we can know, what really happened. But we can already at this point start to see some new and to me interesting patterns emerging.
Japanese records are indeed not perfect - One thing I've learned about Japanese records of operational losses is that they did not always record aircraft losses, but they did record pilots or aircrew killed, missing or captured. Japanese fighter losses correlate pretty closely with lost pilots, but not perfectly. So this can sometimes be a problem. That said, I don't think it's anywhere near enough of a problem to account for 11-1 or 7-1 kill ratios, but there is some gray area there.
The second / third generations of "uber" fighters did actually take a toll - In Shores "Bloody Shambles" Volume III, it's quite clear that the P-51B/C/D and the Spitfire Mk VIII did in fact take a significantly unequal toll of the Ki-43s. By this point these were Ki-43-II and also some III (I don't know the exact number of these flying but I think Shortround6 is wrong about the numbers, there were definitely more than ten because there were whole units flying them). It was clear in the data and the Japanese pilots were complaining about it. They specifically noted that Spit VIII could outclimb them and that both Spit VIII and P-51B/C/D could extend away at will and come back to attack again.
My understanding about the F6F and the F4U is that initial successes were not as dramatic as some people think or thought, in fact as you noted the Corsairs initially were about equal, but they did actually start taking a heavy toll as they improved technical problems and developed tactics to suit the new aircraft. Claringbould's month by month operational history books haven't really got to this point yet, but probably the next volumes will see some Corsair data which should be very interesting. I think there were Corsairs in combat over the Solomons in April 1943.
What the exact ratios were I don't know for sure, but as someone already noted upthread, you don't need 7-1 to make a big difference. If there are frequent air clashes, 2-1 or even 1.5-1 in losses is actually a pretty big deal.
On the Ki-43 and A6M versions - I should also note, that in South pacific Air War Volume 6, which covers fighting through March 1943, the Japanese Army was only flying Ki-43-I, which is to say the earliest major production mark, with the two bladed propeller and often either two 7.7mm machine guns or one 7.7 and one 12.7mm machine gun. The much improved Ki-43-II with the three blade prop, armor, new supercharger and heavier guns hasn't showed up in New Guinea as of March 1943. But nevertheless, these Ki-43-I shot down plenty of Allied aircraft including some heavy bombers. In SPAW Vol 6 there were a mix of A6M2 and a couple of different types of A6M3 flying for the IJN.
In Bloody Shambles Vol 3, Ki-43-I and II were dominant over Hurricane Mk I and IIb and IIcs, about equal with Spitfire Mk V, P-38s and P-47s in this Theater, and seemed to have an edge over the early P-51A mustangs as well. On the other hand the RAF Mohawks seemed to hold their own against them, US P-40s clearly had an edge, and the Beaufighters and Vengeances rarely got shot down, but on the other hand Ki-43s shot down a lot of B-24s, C-47s, Blenheims and other Allied bombers. It's noteworthy that even at this stage (say 1942-43), it clearly wasn't a cakewalk for the IJA. They were taking steady losses, and the Ki-43 Sentai leaders were already being killed at an alarming rate, being replaced every few months. But it seems to be when the merlin powered P-51B and C started arriving, and the Spit VIII, they were having serious problems. The Spit VIII were brought in after an RAF officer finally made a big stink about the unsuitability of the Hurricane in this Theater. Once the new Mustang and the Spit VIII arrived, the Japanese pilots talked about it and the Ki-43 units started being used as close air support / fighter bombers, with the Ki-84 taking over most of the air to air (and according to some Japanese fighter pilots, using their speed to flee the battle area more often than not).
The big question though, for me, is Why would this turn you off to WW2 Aviation History?
The old consensus was wrong. We now have an opportunity to develop a new one. To me it's fascinating. I don't know if people in this particular venue will really welcome the news, but it's certainly an exciting time if you are interested in this subject, as far as I can tell. Yes it's perhaps a bit shocking to find out that all that 11-1 stuff was B.S. But these old legends never fully rang true for me. Now we are starting to see something closer to the truth, not just in WW2 but also in the Korean War, Vietnam, many others. I think it's fascinating stuff. I wait for new releases of these operational histories with baited breath. The story wasn't nearly as simple as we thought. There was more than one way for a fighter to be effective, it seems. There is a lot to learn. Isn't that a good thing?
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Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
Because disagreement without reasoning is vapid and should be beneath you.
Are you asking my opinion? If so, I say "yes". If you're asking officialdom, you'll have to look at the protocols of each air force.
This question is disingenuous and as such doesn't merit an answer.
It's clear that most of you haven't read any of Claringbould's works, certainly not Pacific Profiles, never mind Dunn's readily available online articles related to these overrated Allied aircraft, and just how exactly they were overrated, referencing actual Japanese documents, as opposed to some form of statistical manipulation like
It's equally clear you haven't read Lundstrom. Have you read Bruce Gamble?
And if you think I'm irrelevant, go on and ignore me. But if you disagree with a point of mine, I reserve the right to, ahem, "challenge" you.
Anyone with a lick of knowledge about the PTO would understand that what records the Japanese didn't intentionally destroy were often destroyed in the firebombing raids. As such, while these enemy records are certainly helpful, regarding them as definitive is not warranted.
No one is arguing that American pilots did not overclaim. Please put that red herring to bed for once and for all.
I'm sure they were aware of the problem, probably during the war, and certainly after the war.
The fact that you seem to think that additional weight only affects speed is not encouraging. Weight doesn't affect straight-line speed as much as it does climb rate and horizontal maneuverability, which I'm sure we agree are very important in air combat. This doesn't mean that speed is not important, though. It means that if you don't increase power as you increase weight, you're decreasing performance parameters vital to combat.
There's a lot more nuance to this issue than you seem to think.
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Or rather Lindbergh...
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,133
- Sep 29, 2025
Well I think he helped figure out the improved range, but in this case I mean Bong had figured out how to shoot down Japanese fighters, which was not so easy in early P-38s for a variety of reasons...
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
You and others may very well be correct. Most books (old ones) are rather confusing about the Ki-43 III with no firm numbers except the 10 (or 12) and those are often listed as prototypes, with no number given for production machines. We also have the confusion as to what is a Ki-43 III as there seems to have been the Ki-43 III-Ko and the Ki-43 III Otsu. Most old sources say only the Ki-43 III Otsu had the two 20mm guns and the Mitsubishi Ha-112 engine instead of the Nakajima Ha-115 engine.
Is the Ki-43 III-Ko basically a Ki-43 II Kia with slightly more power and/or water injection?
There is an over looked aspect of Allied pilot quality. For the US the Navy entered the war with some vey experienced pilots, not in combat but overall they had some high time pilots. Thach for instance became an aviator in 1930. O'Hare finished his aviator training on May 2nd 1940. He had been flying for just about 22 months when he made his famous intercept on the Japanese bombers. We can argue about the exact score but the point is that Thach was pulled from combat after Midway and O'Hare was pulled from combat after that one fight and did not return to combat until 1943.
Much of the combat the US engaged in the 2nd part of 1942 and a lot of 1943 was with lower time pilots than they had in first part of 1942. This is on average. It took a while to get the average experience back up and while the US pilots got a more than average number of flight hours it still was not enough for combat. US did lengthen the training as the war went on and using a number of combat veterans helped increase the quality of training.
Japanese had the problems of using fewer flight hours in training as the war went on and they didn't rotate their pilots back to the training schools as often so the new pilot quality really took a hit. Where they crossed over is certainly subject to question.
The American aircraft helped more of their pilots survive and return to action. which certainly helped in the long run. The US effort put into aircrew rescue is often overlooked.
But that starts at the beginning. Using the parachute, having a decent radio to make a mayday call (or mayday call by wingman). Having armor/BP glass, decent protection on fuel tanks. Having the crashboats/PT boats/ Submarines that can be assigned to the right areas.
Like many types of warfare, it often came down to percentages. Not outright wins/losses. Like American major league baseball. Out of 162 games, all (almost) teams are going to win 60 games per season, all (almost) teams are going to loose 60 games per season. The difference between 1st place and last place is often the 42 games in middle.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
The question is when????
On April 12 1944, Captain Bong shot down his 26th and 27th Japanese aircraft.
In early April 1944 Lindbergh was still in the US. He did a lot with Corsairs in the first month or two (?) he was in the Pacific.
Not to take a lot away from Lindbergh but if the USAAC had listened to either/both Allison and/or Lockheed months earlier about how to cruise the P-38 they wouldn't have needed a celebrity pilot to show them how to do it.
RAF had been using low rpm and high boost for long range cruise since at least 1942 if not before. It was hardly "new stuff".
The real "story" is how some people were not court marshalled for appalling bad training procedures over 2 years leading to how many lives lost.
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,133
- Sep 29, 2025
I think this may be the point of confusion, there was and still is talk about this fantastic sounding Ki-43-III with 20mm cannons, but as far as I am aware, none ever made the production line, or if they did, none got to the field. I've never heard of a 20mm cannon-armed Ki-43 making it into any combat unit, let alone involved in combat.
Which is kind of crazy because they almost certainly could have had these back in 1942 or 43.
The Ki-43-III yes had improved engines and I think a bit more armor or better fuel tank protection etc. but I don't remember the details. I think it had better altitude performance though.
This is definitely both true, and clear in the combat history. It's really kind of hard to understand how an F4F-3, let alone an F4F-4 can hold up against a Zero, but they definitely did in the Guadalcanal campaign. And that has to be to a large degree down to training. You can also see how some units with the same aircraft perform consistently better than others. Navy SBDs hit ships much more often than USMC ones.
I would say this is true in the Pacific, I'm not sure about CBI but in the Med the USAAF pilots were apparently very well trained by Allied standards, having received considerable gunnery training and training in fighter tactics with some other Allied units never got before going into combat. They had high numbers of hours.
Some of the US pilot-commanders in the Pacific were also experienced, like Col. Paul Wurtsmith of the consistently successful 49th FG, though the majority of his pilots initially went into action with almost no time on type.
The tipping point, wherever it is somewhere between mid 1942 and mid 1943 (and varying between Theaters somewhat), is the most interesting point in the Air War, for me.
Definitely. I notice a lot that for Japanese and German pilots the issue of declining training standards if often brought up, but the reverse is often glossed over for many Allied pilots in the early war in the secondary Theaters (i.e., beyond England). Also true for the Soviet pilots. When Soviet pilots started scoring victories in 1944-45, it's often noted that the Luftwaffe pilot quality had declined, but the same was also true when those German aces were racking up most of their kills in 1941-42.
I think this was a very big issue in the Solomons especially. The Japanese did make some efforts at air sea rescue, apparently, but they simply did not have anywhere near the same number of assets for this, especially seaplanes. On the other hand, they did have armed seaplanes which were sometimes surprisingly effective, notably up in the Aleutians. They were for a while in the Solomons too but eventually Wildcat units caught up to them and wiped a lot of them out.
Agree, except The armor and self sealing fuel tanks doesn't seem to have mattered quite as much as i would have thought (and was taught to believe). Fighters like Ki-43 and A6M were getting heavily battle damaged constantly and still flying back to base, sometimes to be written off after landing. Even Japanese bombers like D3A, Ki-20, Ki-49, Ki-51 and G4M, Mavis Flying Boats etc. which all had barely any protection (if any at all), seemed to get shot up and survive more often that I would have thought, especially in clashes with other bombers, seaplanes and recon planes and such (which happened a lot more than I had ever assumed, as in almost daily).
But it is also true that these planes got seriously mauled a couple of times in the books I've read when they got caught unescorted by Wildcats or P-40s.
You can kind of see the balance tipping in the Clairngbould series already, though the Japanese are still ahead in overall losses (as in, they had fewer losses). In the Med the tipping point was around Second El -Alamein. In Burma for the British, it was quite late, like around 1944, but it was earlier in China for the Americans (though I've yet to find a good 'both sides' operational history for air war in China, Shores only covers it tangentally)
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,133
- Sep 29, 2025
One other thing that really surprised me to learn was that B-17s actually hit some Japanese ships, mostly cargo ships and merchant transports, doing skip bombing or mast-head height bombing. PBY's and Hudsons got some too also in low-level attacks.
Another interesting detail was the frequent, and apparently successful use by the Japanese of submarine-launched seaplanes, which were used to scout out harbors and channels before the sub dared to sail into them.
Another interesting detail was the frequent, and apparently successful use by the Japanese of submarine-launched seaplanes, which were used to scout out harbors and channels before the sub dared to sail into them.
Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
Bong was an ace before Lindy showed up in Mar 1944. This myth is pernicious and annoying.
GregP
Major
I show 3 Ki-43 prototypes, 10 pre-production, 716 Ki-43 I Type 1 Model 1, 5 Ki-43 II prototypes, 3 Ki-43 II pre-production, 2,491 Ki-43 III Type 1 Model 2, and 10 Ki-43 Type 1 Model 2, with indefinite Ki-43 IIa and IIb. These are airplanes built.
I show as airplanes delivered and accepted:
1941 - 1942: Nakajima - 273
1942 - 1943: Nakajima - 742
1943 - 1944: Nakajima - 1,627; Tachikawa - 420
1944 - 1945: Nakajima - 543; Tachikawa - 1,840
1943 - 1945: Rikugun - 22
Apr- Aug 1945: Tachikawa - 284.
TOTAL: 5,751
... but no totals by variant. Frustrating!
source 1: The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Ki-43 "Oscar", Japanese Fighter
source 2: Profile Publications, Leatherhead, Surrey, England, George Faulkner and Sons
Generally-accepted total is about 5,918 with Wiki showing 5,751.
Numbers probably worth what you paid for them ...
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ThomasP
Chief Master Sergeant
Hey JoblinTheGoblin,
I think you may have overlooked the problem involved in situational awareness, which may be a(the?) majority factor in the apparent disconnect between the number of losses relative to the quality of aircraft discussion you have initiated. I may have missed it, but I do not remember it being mentioned upthread.
The basic fact is that somewhere between 70% and 90% of aircraft shot down from WWI through Korea happened without the victim being aware that the enemy aircraft was about to shoot him down. In at least a small majority of these cases this happened without the victim being aware that the enemy aircraft were in close proximity at all (ie he was caught totally by surprise), and in the rest it was a case of the victim knowing that he was in a combat but had never been aware of, or lost awareness of, 1 or more enemy aircraft involved in the engagement. In both situations the first warning of their impending doom tended to be seeing the tracers passing by and/or receiving hits on their aircraft.
It should be mentioned at this point that the above information is agreed upon in general by all belligerents - including the pilots involved and their country's operational research studies.
An example of what I am talking about can be realized from a simple though exercise.
If we assume 80% of aircraft are shot down without the pilot realizing he is about to get shot down, then only 20 our of 100 losses will have the opportunity to be caused by the superiority of one aircraft over another.
This is an obvious oversimplification of the problem, which involves:
1. Training (eg are the pilots flying with their "heads out of the cockpit" and "on a swivel"?, effective communication, tactics, etc)
2. Visibility from the cockpit (eg bubble canopy? armour plate in the way? cramped cockpit so not amenable to looking over one's shoulder easily?, etc)
3. Combat cruise speed (an aircraft cruising at 300 mph (eg P-51B-D) is less likely to be "jumped" by an enemy aircraft with a top speed of 331 mph (eg A6M2, Ki-43-I/II) than by an aircraft with a top speed of 370-400 mph (eg Ki-61, Ki-44, Ki-84)
4. Starting with a positional advantage (eg attacking from below and behind, or with an altitude advantage that can be traded for overtake speed, etc)
5. Numerical disparity (which self explanatory to a large degree where large disparity in numbers is the case, but can have significant impact even in relatively small differences depending on the situation.)
6. Mission type, eg Escort (where you are not allowed to just make one pass and go home), Strike (with fighter-bombers attacking enemy bases where you have a bombing mission to accomplish as well as surviving/shooting down enemy aircraft), CAP, Intruder, etc, or are you defending the target (with running away not being an option)?
Just to name a few factors, not necessarily in order of importance or numerical ocurrence.
In effect, I believe the current discussion relative to superior quality of aircraft revolves around at most a moderate minority of the kills.
If we assume only 20% of kills involve combat where the technically superiority of any particular aircraft may come into play, how does that affect your premise?
Another factor that may be slanting the appearance of aircraft superiority (or lack thereof) is that for the vast majority of missions where a kill was recorded the story is usually told from the view of the winner - in effect causing a form of survivor bias to creep into the equation.
Yes? No?
The above does not, of course, address the problem of inflated/exaggerated/falsified claims and/or lack of accurate post-war research by the various nation's agencies.
I think you may have overlooked the problem involved in situational awareness, which may be a(the?) majority factor in the apparent disconnect between the number of losses relative to the quality of aircraft discussion you have initiated. I may have missed it, but I do not remember it being mentioned upthread.
The basic fact is that somewhere between 70% and 90% of aircraft shot down from WWI through Korea happened without the victim being aware that the enemy aircraft was about to shoot him down. In at least a small majority of these cases this happened without the victim being aware that the enemy aircraft were in close proximity at all (ie he was caught totally by surprise), and in the rest it was a case of the victim knowing that he was in a combat but had never been aware of, or lost awareness of, 1 or more enemy aircraft involved in the engagement. In both situations the first warning of their impending doom tended to be seeing the tracers passing by and/or receiving hits on their aircraft.
It should be mentioned at this point that the above information is agreed upon in general by all belligerents - including the pilots involved and their country's operational research studies.
An example of what I am talking about can be realized from a simple though exercise.
If we assume 80% of aircraft are shot down without the pilot realizing he is about to get shot down, then only 20 our of 100 losses will have the opportunity to be caused by the superiority of one aircraft over another.
This is an obvious oversimplification of the problem, which involves:
1. Training (eg are the pilots flying with their "heads out of the cockpit" and "on a swivel"?, effective communication, tactics, etc)
2. Visibility from the cockpit (eg bubble canopy? armour plate in the way? cramped cockpit so not amenable to looking over one's shoulder easily?, etc)
3. Combat cruise speed (an aircraft cruising at 300 mph (eg P-51B-D) is less likely to be "jumped" by an enemy aircraft with a top speed of 331 mph (eg A6M2, Ki-43-I/II) than by an aircraft with a top speed of 370-400 mph (eg Ki-61, Ki-44, Ki-84)
4. Starting with a positional advantage (eg attacking from below and behind, or with an altitude advantage that can be traded for overtake speed, etc)
5. Numerical disparity (which self explanatory to a large degree where large disparity in numbers is the case, but can have significant impact even in relatively small differences depending on the situation.)
6. Mission type, eg Escort (where you are not allowed to just make one pass and go home), Strike (with fighter-bombers attacking enemy bases where you have a bombing mission to accomplish as well as surviving/shooting down enemy aircraft), CAP, Intruder, etc, or are you defending the target (with running away not being an option)?
Just to name a few factors, not necessarily in order of importance or numerical ocurrence.
In effect, I believe the current discussion relative to superior quality of aircraft revolves around at most a moderate minority of the kills.
If we assume only 20% of kills involve combat where the technically superiority of any particular aircraft may come into play, how does that affect your premise?
Another factor that may be slanting the appearance of aircraft superiority (or lack thereof) is that for the vast majority of missions where a kill was recorded the story is usually told from the view of the winner - in effect causing a form of survivor bias to creep into the equation.
Yes? No?
The above does not, of course, address the problem of inflated/exaggerated/falsified claims and/or lack of accurate post-war research by the various nation's agencies.
Last edited:
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,271
- Sep 30, 2021
The obvious statement, the more bases you lose the more records you lose, that applies to the US in 1941 and early 1942 and the Japanese mostly from late 1943 onwards, it took a while for allied armies to advance far enough.
Far East Air Forces (5th and 13th), P-39 and P-40 from the start, P-38 arriving August 1942, P-47 June 1943. The RAAF received its first Spitfire VIII in late October 1943 and began equipping squadrons in January 1944. The USAAF Statistical Digest gives the FEAF data as follows (Sorties, Bomb tonnages, end of month strength)
the major jump in activity in early 1943 is noteworthy, the major cause of combat sortie casualties were enemy aircraft, the 1 to 1 ratio fighter losses to claims in 1942 indicates the Japanese were winning that contest, for 1943 if the average US overclaiming was 2 to 1, it was winning the fighter contests, if 3 to 1 it was breaking even. If you believe the heavy bombers were overclaiming in the order of the 8th Air Force 5 to 1 for the Schweinfurt missions than it was around a 1 to 1 loss rate in air combat, in 1943 the Luftwaffe was achieving around a 1.5 to 1 loss ratio in favour of the fighters versus the 8th Air Force heavy bombers.
Australian Archives file MP1022/3 3, RAAF losses at home since 7 December 1941, cumulative to 1 November 1943.
To 31 August 1945,
1,961 Accident
77 Air Combat
99 Anti Aircraft
212 Missing
84 Strafed
13 Bombed
485 Total Enemy Action
The USN reports for air combat for 1942 and 1943 claim to loss ratios of, F4F 6.6 and 4.3 to 1, F-6F n/a and 13.9 to 1, SBD 2.3 and 6.5 to 1, SB2C n/a and 2.7 to 1, TBF/M 0.7 and 1.9 to 1 for carrier based, F4F 5.4 and 3,3 to 1, F4U n/a and 6.8 to 1, F6F n/a and 4.2 to 1, the PB4Y-1 n/a and 4.1 to 1 for land based. Overall the USN has 696 enemy bombers and 1,333 enemy fighters claimed, total 2,029, versus 375 USN losses to enemy aircraft, 5.4 to 1, from 2,925 USN sorties reporting air combat engaging an estimated 5,882 enemy aircraft. In 1942 for every carrier based F4F sortie reporting air combat 0.74 enemy aircraft were claimed, land based it was 0.86.
According to Rene Francillon, including prototypes, Nakajima produced 728 Ki-43-I, 2,500 II and 10 III, production of the II ending in October 1944 (production switched to the Ki-84), Tachikawa produced 2,631 II and III May 1943 to August 1945, plus another 49 II at another plant. The USSBS says main types by main manufacturers
Far East Air Forces (5th and 13th), P-39 and P-40 from the start, P-38 arriving August 1942, P-47 June 1943. The RAAF received its first Spitfire VIII in late October 1943 and began equipping squadrons in January 1944. The USAAF Statistical Digest gives the FEAF data as follows (Sorties, Bomb tonnages, end of month strength)
| Sorties/Bombs | Grand | Totals | Heavy | Bomber | Medium/Light | Bomber | Fighter | Fighter | Bombs | Bombs | Bombs | Bombs | Strength | Strength | Strength | Strength |
| Month | Airborne | Effective | Airborne | Effective | Airborne | Effective | Airborne | Effective | Total | HB | M/LB | Fighter | P-38 | P-39 | P-40 | P-47 |
Dec-41 | 212 | n/a | 49 | n/a | 0 | 0 | 163 | n/a | 36 | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | ||
Jan-42 | 341 | n/a | 39 | n/a | 10 | n/a | 292 | n/a | 20 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 139 | ||
Feb-42 | 742 | n/a | 64 | n/a | 7 | n/a | 671 | n/a | 37 | 33 | 0 | 4 | 150 | 273 | ||
Mar-42 | 979 | n/a | 59 | n/a | 37 | n/a | 883 | n/a | 46 | 33 | 9 | 4 | 271 | 108 | ||
Apr-42 | 1,181 | n/a | 74 | n/a | 158 | n/a | 949 | n/a | 95 | 39 | 53 | 3 | 369 | 90 | ||
May-42 | 1,223 | n/a | 91 | n/a | 262 | n/a | 870 | n/a | 122 | 46 | 73 | 3 | 267 | 129 | ||
Jun-42 | 1,180 | n/a | 103 | n/a | 293 | n/a | 784 | n/a | 139 | 53 | 82 | 4 | 238 | 131 | ||
Jul-42 | 1,172 | n/a | 136 | n/a | 313 | n/a | 723 | n/a | 155 | 63 | 89 | 3 | 188 | 137 | ||
Aug-42 | 1,197 | n/a | 195 | n/a | 325 | n/a | 677 | n/a | 250 | 152 | 95 | 3 | 30 | 233 | 118 | |
Sep-42 | 1,352 | n/a | 201 | n/a | 372 | n/a | 779 | n/a | 279 | 153 | 121 | 5 | 65 | 250 | 117 | |
Oct-42 | 1,604 | n/a | 232 | n/a | 412 | n/a | 960 | n/a | 386 | 249 | 131 | 6 | 72 | 314 | 155 | |
Nov-42 | 1,663 | n/a | 289 | n/a | 404 | n/a | 970 | n/a | 547 | 438 | 102 | 7 | 68 | 299 | 142 | |
Dec-42 | 1,677 | n/a | 314 | n/a | 376 | n/a | 987 | n/a | 557 | 470 | 79 | 8 | 94 | 291 | 131 | |
Jan-43 | 4,315 | 3,842 | 494 | 435 | 498 | 416 | 3,323 | 2,991 | 755 | 488 | 254 | 13 | 135 | 255 | 150 | |
Feb-43 | 2,816 | 2,465 | 415 | 382 | 302 | 257 | 2,099 | 1,826 | 591 | 494 | 96 | 1 | 134 | 262 | 156 | |
Mar-43 | 4,257 | 3,963 | 506 | 460 | 308 | 276 | 3,443 | 3,227 | 647 | 558 | 86 | 3 | 132 | 251 | 145 | |
Apr-43 | 5,023 | 4,652 | 431 | 366 | 239 | 229 | 4,353 | 4,057 | 540 | 477 | 63 | 0 | 117 | 223 | 139 | |
May-43 | 5,517 | 4,968 | 611 | 511 | 416 | 347 | 4,490 | 4,110 | 710 | 596 | 114 | 0 | 115 | 253 | 135 | |
Jun-43 | 5,874 | 5,236 | 715 | 594 | 619 | 532 | 4,540 | 4,110 | 1,015 | 857 | 158 | 0 | 144 | 314 | 124 | 59 |
Jul-43 | 8,826 | 7,755 | 1,148 | 945 | 1,474 | 1,297 | 6,204 | 5,513 | 2,708 | 1,762 | 946 | 0 | 211 | 323 | 148 | 114 |
Aug-43 | 11,472 | 9,905 | 1,355 | 1,158 | 1,184 | 974 | 8,933 | 7,773 | 2,910 | 2,300 | 609 | 1 | 291 | 309 | 186 | 107 |
Sep-43 | 12,777 | 11,437 | 1,302 | 1,157 | 1,198 | 1,080 | 10,277 | 9,200 | 3,025 | 2,267 | 749 | 9 | 279 | 287 | 213 | 149 |
Oct-43 | 12,149 | 10,595 | 1,381 | 1,117 | 1,334 | 991 | 9,434 | 8,487 | 3,269 | 2,578 | 685 | 6 | 263 | 250 | 160 | 175 |
Nov-43 | 13,073 | 11,627 | 1,669 | 1,390 | 2,051 | 1,620 | 9,353 | 8,617 | 4,354 | 3,063 | 1,280 | 11 | 269 | 210 | 147 | 293 |
Dec-43 | 17,048 | 15,670 | 2,583 | 2,306 | 3,605 | 3,148 | 10,860 | 10,216 | 9,181 | 6,140 | 2,994 | 47 | 279 | 126 | 131 | 308 |
| 1941/42 | 14,523 | 0 | 1,846 | 0 | 2,969 | 0 | 9,708 | 0 | 2,669 | 1,785 | 834 | 50 | ||||
1943 | 103,147 | 92,115 | 12,610 | 10,821 | 13,228 | 11,167 | 77,309 | 70,127 | 29,705 | 21,580 | 8,034 | 91 | ||||
| Total | 117,670 | 92,115 | 14,456 | 10,821 | 16,197 | 11,167 | 87,017 | 70,127 | 32,374 | 23,365 | 8,868 | 141 |
| Loss/claim | All Types | Losses | Heavy | Bomber | Medium/Light | Bomber | Fighter | Fighter | All Types | claims | Heavy | Bomber | Medium/Light | Bomber | Fighter | Fighter | Fighter |
| month | Total | Enemy A/C | Total | Enemy A/C | Total | Enemy A/C | Total | Enemy A/C | Total | In the air | Total | In the air | Total | In the air | Total | In the air | claim/loss |
Dec-41 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||||
Jan-42 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||||
Feb-42 | 46 | 45 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 44 | 44 | 27 | 27 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 20 | 20 | 0.45 | ||
Mar-42 | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 12 | 25 | 19 | 11 | 7 | 0 | 14 | 12 | 1.00 | |||
Apr-42 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 18 | 9 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 9 | |||||
May-42 | 49 | 48 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 14 | 33 | 32 | 36 | 29 | 0 | 22 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 0.44 | |
Jun-42 | 32 | 32 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 28 | 28 | 33 | 30 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 20 | 20 | 0.71 |
Jul-42 | 16 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 11 | 18 | 18 | 12 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0.36 |
Aug-42 | 24 | 23 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 11 | 11 | 75 | 58 | 31 | 29 | 3 | 3 | 41 | 26 | 2.36 |
Sep-42 | 25 | 23 | 13 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 10 | 48 | 29 | 31 | 29 | 17 | 0 | 0.00 | ||
Oct-42 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 46 | 34 | 36 | 26 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 6 | ||
Nov-42 | 44 | 43 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 32 | 32 | 76 | 76 | 38 | 38 | 13 | 13 | 25 | 25 | 0.78 |
Dec-42 | 17 | 14 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 116 | 110 | 60 | 55 | 2 | 1 | 54 | 54 | 6.75 |
Jan-43 | 23 | 14 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 101 | 96 | 57 | 55 | 3 | 41 | 41 | 6.83 | |
Feb-43 | 22 | 19 | 10 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 9 | 72 | 67 | 26 | 23 | 2 | 44 | 44 | 4.89 | |
Mar-43 | 15 | 13 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 86 | 86 | 48 | 48 | 0 | 38 | 38 | 6.33 | |
Apr-43 | 28 | 27 | 11 | 11 | 1 | 16 | 16 | 50 | 44 | 23 | 23 | 7 | 1 | 20 | 20 | 1.25 | |
May-43 | 18 | 16 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 35 | 31 | 22 | 20 | 2 | 11 | 11 | 1.83 | |
Jun-43 | 36 | 23 | 11 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 16 | 12 | 108 | 106 | 21 | 21 | 1 | 86 | 85 | 7.08 | |
Jul-43 | 84 | 65 | 25 | 23 | 15 | 4 | 44 | 38 | 120 | 118 | 13 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 104 | 104 | 2.74 |
Aug-43 | 58 | 31 | 11 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 37 | 19 | 416 | 241 | 117 | 95 | 169 | 16 | 130 | 130 | 6.84 |
Sep-43 | 50 | 36 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 31 | 25 | 247 | 247 | 79 | 79 | 14 | 14 | 154 | 154 | 6.16 |
Oct-43 | 66 | 48 | 13 | 10 | 16 | 8 | 37 | 30 | 676 | 414 | 146 | 105 | 284 | 75 | 246 | 234 | 7.80 |
Nov-43 | 84 | 68 | 14 | 12 | 24 | 17 | 46 | 39 | 291 | 217 | 47 | 30 | 78 | 30 | 166 | 157 | 4.03 |
Dec-43 | 55 | 35 | 10 | 5 | 12 | 3 | 33 | 27 | 264 | 260 | 37 | 36 | 12 | 9 | 215 | 215 | 7.96 |
| 1941/42 | 276 | 264 | 45 | 37 | 41 | 39 | 190 | 188 | 518 | 439 | 231 | 205 | 75 | 44 | 212 | 190 | 1.01 |
1943 | 539 | 395 | 129 | 104 | 117 | 58 | 293 | 233 | 2,466 | 1,927 | 636 | 547 | 575 | 147 | 1,255 | 1,233 | 5.29 |
| Total | 815 | 659 | 174 | 141 | 158 | 97 | 483 | 421 | 2,984 | 2,366 | 867 | 752 | 650 | 191 | 1,467 | 1,423 | 3.38 |
Australian Archives file MP1022/3 3, RAAF losses at home since 7 December 1941, cumulative to 1 November 1943.
| Type | Category | Accident | Air Combat | Anti Aircraft | Missing | Strafed | Bombed | Total Enemy Action | Total Loss |
| Airacobra | Fighter | 6 | 6 | ||||||
| Beaufighter | Fighter | 37 | 5 | 13 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 29 | 66 |
| Spitfire | Fighter | 35 | 23 | 16 | 39 | 74 | |||
| Boomerang | Fighter | 13 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 15 | |||
| Kittyhawk | Fighter | 70 | 15 | 20 | 3 | 38 | 108 | ||
| Buffalo | General Purpose | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | ||||
| Lancer | General Purpose | 2 | 2 | ||||||
| Wirraway | General Purpose | 68 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 18 | 2 | 31 | 99 |
| Vengeance | Dive Bomber | 13 | 13 | ||||||
| B-25 | Medium Bomber | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 10 | ||
| Beaufort | Medium Bomber | 77 | 6 | 12 | 1 | 19 | 96 | ||
| Boston | Medium Bomber | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 15 | |
| Hudson | Medium Bomber | 53 | 18 | 8 | 44 | 34 | 4 | 108 | 161 |
| CA-11 | Medium Bomber | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Anson | Reconnaissance | 9 | 1 | 1 | 10 | ||||
| Catalina | Reconnaissance | 11 | 1 | 10 | 3 | 14 | 25 | ||
| Lightning | Reconnaissance | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Seagull/Walrus | Reconnaissance | 6 | 4 | 4 | 10 | ||||
| Kingfisher | Reconnaissance | 2 | 2 | ||||||
| DC-2 | Transport | 4 | 1 | 1 | 5 | ||||
| DH84 | Transport | 16 | 1 | 1 | 17 | ||||
| Douglas Dolphin | Transport | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| C-47 | Transport | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Ford | Transport | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | ||||
| Empire Flying Boat | Transport | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ||||
| Anson | Trainer | 67 | 67 | ||||||
| Avro Trainer | Trainer | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Battle | Trainer | 42 | 42 | ||||||
| Demon | Trainer | 16 | 16 | ||||||
| Oxford | Trainer | 46 | 46 | ||||||
| Wackett | Trainer | 17 | 17 | ||||||
| Wirraway | Trainer | 66 | 66 | ||||||
| Tiger Moth | Trainer | 94 | 94 | ||||||
| Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous | 18 | 18 | ||||||
| Total | Total | 811 | 74 | 32 | 122 | 64 | 11 | 303 | 1114 |
| Combat Total | Combat Total | 419 | 73 | 32 | 122 | 61 | 11 | 299 | 718 |
1,961 Accident
77 Air Combat
99 Anti Aircraft
212 Missing
84 Strafed
13 Bombed
485 Total Enemy Action
The USN reports for air combat for 1942 and 1943 claim to loss ratios of, F4F 6.6 and 4.3 to 1, F-6F n/a and 13.9 to 1, SBD 2.3 and 6.5 to 1, SB2C n/a and 2.7 to 1, TBF/M 0.7 and 1.9 to 1 for carrier based, F4F 5.4 and 3,3 to 1, F4U n/a and 6.8 to 1, F6F n/a and 4.2 to 1, the PB4Y-1 n/a and 4.1 to 1 for land based. Overall the USN has 696 enemy bombers and 1,333 enemy fighters claimed, total 2,029, versus 375 USN losses to enemy aircraft, 5.4 to 1, from 2,925 USN sorties reporting air combat engaging an estimated 5,882 enemy aircraft. In 1942 for every carrier based F4F sortie reporting air combat 0.74 enemy aircraft were claimed, land based it was 0.86.
According to Rene Francillon, including prototypes, Nakajima produced 728 Ki-43-I, 2,500 II and 10 III, production of the II ending in October 1944 (production switched to the Ki-84), Tachikawa produced 2,631 II and III May 1943 to August 1945, plus another 49 II at another plant. The USSBS says main types by main manufacturers
| Maker | Navy Dep | Mitsubishi | Nakajima | Nakajima | Mitsubishi | Nakajima | Mitsubishi | Navy Dep | Mitsubishi | Navy Dep | Kawanishi | Kawanishi | Kawanishi | Nakajima | Army Dep | Nakajima | Tachikawa | Nakajima | Kawasaki | Kawasaki | Kawasaki | Nakajima | Kawasaki | Kawasaki |
| Type | A5M4-k | A6M | A6M | A6M2N | A7M | J1N1-B | J2M | J2M | N1K | N1K | N1K1 | N1K1-J | N1K2-J | Ki-27 | Ki-43 | Ki-43 | Ki-43 | Ki-44 | Ki-45 (+N) | Ki-61-I | Ki-61-II | Ki-84 | Ki-100 | Ki-102 |
| Code | Claude | Zeke | Zeke | Rufe | Sam | Irving | Jack | Jack | George | George | Rex | George | George | Nate | Oscar | Oscar | Oscar | Tojo | Nick | Tony | Tony | Frank | Randy | |
1941 | 0 | 402 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 433 | 0 | 157 | 0 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1942 | 10 | 692 | 558 | 116 | 0 | 26 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 289 | 7 | 616 | 0 | 131 | 150 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1943 | 62 | 1029 | 1760 | 207 | 0 | 150 | 90 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 65 | 71 | 1 | 0 | 42 | 1347 | 199 | 519 | 563 | 710 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 |
1944 | 31 | 1356 | 2474 | 0 | 8 | 301 | 274 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 824 | 67 | 0 | 0 | 1070 | 1682 | 565 | 938 | 1891 | 239 | 1904 | 0 | 59 |
1945 | 0 | 299 | 1416 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 116 | 111 | 9 | 11 | 0 | 112 | 338 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 748 | 2 | 21 | 19 | 165 | 1485 | 378 | 169 |
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,133
- Sep 29, 2025
I think that 70%-90% ratio is overstated, (I think it comes from a statement by Erik Hartmann?) and is more applicable in the early war when:
1) Pilots, especially on the Allied side, were often inexperienced and untrained.
2) Allied pilots in many Theaters were not flying with Wingmen and / or in Finger-Four formations.
3) Most fighters were turtleback type rather than bubble canopy. (Malcolm hood was a partial solution to this, but I don't know the exact dates these became available to various fighter types, the RAF had it first...)
4) Many fighters (notably Russian and Japanese, and I think Italian too) either didn't have radios or had radios that were barely working
5) and it took a while for these to be fitted with rearview mirrors
6) Even once they got radios, it took a while before these to be truly reliable and good procedures for their use had been worked out.
In the Middle East and Burma, even in 1942 through early 1943 the Anglo-Americans were still having some problems with radio communication (for example between squadrons and between fighters and bombers), but by then all the fighters at least had rearview mirrors and squadron radio coms at relatively short range (a few miles) were usually at least partly functional.
In the Middle East they worked out, by around mid-1942, standard procedure for entire squadrons turning into enemy attacks from above, coordinated with the radio. This made a huge difference in outcomes, as the Axis fighters (Bf 109F and G, MC 202) usually had the altitude advantage. They also started using Finger-Four / Two pairs of Wingmen formations at this time.
It's noteworthy that Japanese fighters had better canopies for situational awareness from the get-go.
Ki-43
A6M
On the other hand radios were often lacking.
Whether fighters saw or noticed the enemy before being attacked depended partly on this, and partly on the size of the engagement, and partly on how the engagement started (were they bounced etc.) but it was quite common for small engagements to take place where both sides saw the other long before they engaged. It depends on altitude, on the mission (flying escort? intercepting enemy bombers? fighter sweep? Recon? fighter bomber attack), the weather, functional radios?)
Speed does matter in the way you describe (a higher normal 'combat speed' making it higher to intercept / reach a target solution) but that isn't always going to be the decisive factor in a real situation. That is one of the specific lessons that these sources are showing us.
A more broad lesson, I think, is that various "axiomatic truths" we thought always or at least usually decided the outcome of air combat were not as reliable as we have come to believe. Ki-43s and A6Ms didn't instantly blow up as soon as they got hit. Even if they caught on fire, it seems they sometimes could put the fire out in a dive or by other means. Conversely, it wasn't always so easy to dive away and escape them, even in a fast plane. Their light armament, especially in the case of the Ki-43, did not prevent them from shooting down Allied fighters, or even heavy bombers. It was never a cake walk or safe to engage Japanese fighters.
In Shores Bloody Shambles Vol III, Ki-43s routinely shot down, and sometimes pursued and caught P-51A and P-38s after a long chase, which I assume may be due to the latter having to maneuver around mountainous terrain, or for other reasons I haven't thought of. But it's clear that at least sometimes other factors trumped the effects of speed, because these planes are all 30-60 mph faster than a Ki-43, depending on the specific models and load-outs, altitude etc.
Bottom line, it's a more complex story than we thought.
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