Regarding the true combat performance of the P-38 (and other advanced US fighters) in the PTO from 1942-44

[GregP]

Reading through these recent posts, I am now convinced that I will have to post, in detail (including additional context), the claims and losses as shown in Claringbould's Osprey-published works and Dunn's online articles. There may be some discrepancies between their works and other sources, such as, for instance, Pacific Wrecks' entry and Dunn's F6F article on the combat that took place on September 16, 1943, so I'll need to mention and attempt to account for such discrepancies as they come. I should have done this earlier.

As for their reliability, Claringbould appears to regard his IJNAF sources as being reliable, accurate, "hard data" when it comes to losses, and that the Allied and Japanese reports he has accessed can and have been cross-referenced to provide an accurate picture of the combat and losses each side sustained. Make of that however you will. Dunn appears to be in a similar boat, though I do not believe that he made any definitive statements of that nature. The only comment I can make in this regard is that it's clear that Japanese records can't simply be ignored outright, but from what I've seen, most sources, likely because they usually lack access to them for whatever reason, choose to forgo referencing them. Even if such records prove to be insufficient somehow, like some in this thread have suggested, they must still be considered and referred to regardless, before any final judgement on their quality and reliability can be made.

Once again, I shouldn't have expected or demanded of an expert in this forum, but it's still slightly disappointing that no one here has accessed any actual Japanese loss records...as a silver lining, however, at least one other person in this thread has provably read the works of someone who did.

Getting "hard data" for anything Japanese in WWII aerial combat seems to not be possible. The IJN and IJA didn't even SAVE individual combat records. They saved unit records. All we have for individuals comes from pilot's logs and notes, which are as reliable as anyone else's pilot's logs and notes.

These exact same notes and logs from US and German pilots are said in here to be off by a wide margin, even 5 : 1, yet the Japanese records of the same type fights are good, hard data?

We can agree to disagree here.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

There are plenty of examples of aircraft that made it back but were not repaired or further damaged after arrival (1 January 1945 Bodenplatte 8th Air Force and Bomber Command casualties come to mind) or cannibalised, or the other way, written off but later repaired. Aircraft lost on combat missions but not due to enemy action, reported missing but turned up later. The tenuous line of supplies to the South West Pacific area coupled with the weather effects on or simply time for aircraft awaiting repair would have magnified losses. Write the what is a loss section then present the data.

Even lightly damaged aircraft subsequently written off (or captured, bombed, strafed etc.) days or weeks or months after combat are a very common thing. It happened routinely in German and Italian bases in North Africa in 1942-43. But that doesn't really have anything to do with whether a 'destroyed' claim during combat was valid. That's a completely different type of study.

There is South Pacific Air War by Richard L Dunn and South Pacific Air War by Michael Claringbould and Peter Ingman (Avonmore books since 2017, no idea of the overlap with any Osprey ones) and to keep the confusion going we have the South Pacific aviation information at Australia @ War by Peter Dunn - Australia during WWII by Peter Dunn. When I asked an RAAF researcher about Claringbould and Ingman the reply came back Ingman is good, but some supplied accurate material was ignored. A USN researcher noted problems with USN fighter claims around Guadalcanal but thought the USAAF ones were worse.

I have four volumes of South Pacific Air War and 3 of Solomons Air War and a handful of others by the very prolific Clairngbould among several others covering this time and place. As well as many by Shores and several other authors covering other Theaters.

I do think Claringbould has some biases and have already said as much. The thing is, once somebody has accessed these Japanese records, it gets easier and easier for more such studies to be done. It becomes risky to put your thumb on the scale no matter how much you may want to because other people will definitely check. I'm a published historical researcher myself for a very different time and place, considerably more remote than anywhere in WW2, and in my field we have gone through a very similar process in about the last twenty years for many subjects of interest in that field, using hitherto untranslated (and often also untranscribed) primary sources. There are always terms of art, slang, abbreviations, inside jokes, period and regional dialects and so on, but these things can gradually become demystified, especialy when a lot of people are invlolved and collaborating, formally and informally.

Rene Francillion, John Lundstrom, Masanobu Tsuji, Henry Sakaida, Ikuhiko Hata and others kind of started this process for the Pacific Theater back in the 20th and earlier 21st Century, and it's getting easier now. The Senshi Sosho (official Japanese history of the Pacific War) is now partly accessible online, at least some of it translated into English. NHK has published thousands of war interviews with Japanese soldiers, sailors, pilots and aircrew, as well as newsreel clips and so on. There are now several score memoirs published by Japanese officers, many now translated into English. Several Universities in the US and Australia now have publicly accessible archives of primary source data for Japanese units*.

We can of course quibble about actual outcomes on a given day or week, but it's already clear the picture is very different from the stories and ostensible statistics we learned while most of us were growing up. And that is a bit unnerving, I'm not going to lie, even for me. But it's also super exciting. Now is the time when we can learn much more. For some folks, the whole story was told generations ago, and there is nothing more to learn. That is a depressing idea to me. But now it's also very clear to me that there is much more to learn. I've learned so much about so many aircraft, units, pilots, and battles that I hadn't known almost anything about prior to reading some of these histories. I've learned that planes I dismissed as afterthoughts like the F1M floatplane fighter and the E-14 (submarine launched) seaplane were a good bit more important than I'd ever realized. I learned that planes like the Ki-21, Ki-48, yes, the Ki-43, and even the famous A6M were far more effective than they generally have been given credit for being. I learned that the P-39 and P-400 wasn't quite as useless in the Pacific as I'd once believed (and that it was useful in some ways I hadn't though of), I've gained a much more nuanced grasp of just how the early P-38 made a difference, that the Commonwealth Boomerang was more useful than I'd realized, as was the Hudson, and the old much maligned Kittyhawk. The vital role played by the DC-3 and C-46 in several campaigns. I've learned a lot more about the successes and failures of different types of bombing - including that B-17s could actually sink ships! I've learned that bombers and seaplanes on both sides routinely got into duels around the South Pacific, just as they also did in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

There are still many mysteries I'd like to plumb deeper and learn more about. This type of history has really opened doors for me. I'm really looking forward to more of it.

(*I would also like to add, that unfortunately there have also been to me quite tragic disappearances of some super useful online sources for aviation history in the last couple of years, but I'll make a post about that in another thread)

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Getting "hard data" for anything Japanese in WWII aerial combat seems to not be possible. The IJN and IJA didn't even SAVE individual combat records. They saved unit records. All we have for individuals comes from pilot's logs and notes, which are as reliable as anyone else's pilot's logs and notes.

These exact same notes and logs from US and German pilots are said in here to be off by a wide margin, even 5 : 1, yet the Japanese records of the same type fights are good, hard data?

To be clear Greg: The Japanese data for their own losses seem to be fairly accurate, for the reasons I've already pointed out. Their estimates for enemy losses are as bad or worse than everyone else's, depending on where and when precisely.

Nobody is suggesting, as you seem to be implying here up above, that Japanese victory claims are accurate while US, Australian, Chinese, British etc. claims are wrong.

We can agree to disagree here.

No problem.

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

I don't disagree with the opinion expressed in this thread recently that loss records aren't perfect and don't invalidate claims or victories entirely. Regardless of how valid I, or anyone else, think they are, claims should be included as points of comparison, at the very least. I would, however, suggest considerable caution, more than you might think necessary, before using them as the primary indicator of a military aircraft's performance in the air, even if they may be the only sources remaining. There have been plenty of well-informed people that haven't, even Nimitz, himself suspecting over-claiming while the war was still ongoing, claimed in March 1944, before the so-called "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot", that even if the ratio of victories-to-losses for US aircraft "is 3 times as high as the full facts would justify, the superiority of our planes, pilots and tactics is apparent." Many people, both online and offline, including several in this thread, appear to share the same sentiment, even as new research is gradually challenging that notion. This is merely an example of how claims and recorded aerial victories can influence even the most cautious and informed individuals, especially when loss records of the opponent are either in short supply on hand, or no longer exist, for whatever reason.

As for my previous post, I perhaps should have clarified my (Claringbould's claim actually) point better; when it comes to losses they [the Japanese] sustained, and not the losses that they (claimed) to have inflicted on their opponents. Their own losses. I never once disagreed, especially since my main points of reference in this particular thread, Claringbould and Dunn, also never disagreed, that the Japanese frequently over-claimed, by all accounts, to a higher degree than their Allied counterparts. I believe one of them did go into detail on why it was the case, though I unfortunately couldn't find that text on hand, and I recall one reason in particular, a general lack of gun cameras, except for training and other similar purposes.

Some members in this thread, including one 'odd' individual in particular, have falsely accused me of ill intent, but just the previous month, I too believed in the utter superiority of 2nd generation Allied aircraft, and that most of the issues they may have encountered against their Japanese opponents, highly manoeuvrable but otherwise flimsy and obsolete, were quickly overcome earlier on, both in their designs and in combat, or were edge cases involving highly capable and experienced Japanese pilots under desperate circumstances. I have come to doubt that such was truly the case since picking up some Osprey books, some of them authored by a certain Claringbould. I wish the Zeke wasn't so ugly, personally. The Oscar doesn't look much better. It was no beauty contest, however, or the Corsair would have taken first prize straight from the get-go...

In the coming days, I may post the encounters listed in Claringbould's Osprey-published F4U-A6M book to begin with, as I explained in my post prior. I might gather some sources from other authors as well, perhaps even try Lundstrom or similar, for comparison's sake.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The Ki-43 is an incredibly beautiful aircraft, in my opinion

We just don't actually get to see real ones flying very often...

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

If you say so. Personally, it reminds me of a narrower Zeke with a cartoonishly squashed cockpit, or a diminutive Frank with awkwardly placed wings. It's just my opinion, however. I can see how someone would like it.

 

[GregP]

Beauty is in the eye of the beerholder ...

 

[Juha3]

Well, most of the Soviet fighters had pretty short range anyway, not until probably around 1944 did they have some longer ranged Yak 9s right? I guess they also had Kittyhawks etc.

But god forbid you got shot down in Axis territory, the theory was you would turn fascist just by touching the soil, or so it seemed...

Even VVS-SF (the Air Force of the Soviet Northern Fleet) used its P-40s more as fighter-bombers and recon a/c than as a fighter from the end of 1943 even if its opponent, JG 5 got newer fighter types and versions later than units operating in the main operational areas.
The most famous of the few free hunting unit was the 176. GIAP (Guards Fighter Regiment) equipped with La-7s, a rather short range fighter but the Soviet free hunter ops were not deep penetration ops. So the effectiveness of the a/c as a fighter was more important than its range. They usually worked in pairs, sometimes in fours.

 

[Shortround6]

The P-38 gets sort of a bum rap and also gets credit for somethings it maybe shouldn't? A lot of aircraft fall into that area.

It took the P-38 a long time to get into squadron service and some other planes had closed the technology gap.
Short History of the P-38.
March 36, Lockheed starts design sketches/calculation.
Jan 37, Army issues specification.
Jun 37 Lockheed gets contract for prototype.
Jan 27th 39, first flight.
Feb 11th 39, XP-38 crashed after cross country record flight.
April 27th 39, contract for 13 YP-38s issued.
Feb 1940 fabrication of the YP-38s started.
Sept 16th 40 first flight of the YP-38.

Well into BoB for a plane that started in 37 (or earlier?), almost makes the French look good but this is not the end.

June 1941, all 13 YP-38s are delivered. 1334 P-38s/ 322s are on order about the time Germany invades Russia.
Oct 31st 41. 80 P-38s have been delivered.

Production totals for 1941-42-43.
year...........P-38................P-39.................P-40....................P-47..................P-51...................F4F..................F4U....................F6F
1941.........207....................926................2248.......................1........................138 (B).............324
1942......1479..................1932................3854.....................532......................634 **...........1470..................178.....................10
1943......2497..................4947...............4258....................4428...................1710................1537................2293.................2547

The B means British only (except for 2) and the ** means does not include A-36s.
What I get from this is that the P-38 was not fully sorted out in early/mid 1942 but the P-39 and P-40 were seen as not being up to handling a lot of the duties of a 1942 fighter.
This is world wide and the P-40s and P-39s had been fairly or unfairly, been dismissed from British European service and been sent to the back waters of of the Empire. British don't even want P-39s in the back waters of the Empire and send them off to Russia as soon as possible. This leaves, in late 1941 and early 1942, the P-38 as the only 1st rate (hopefully) fighter the US has in production in any numbers in 1942 to equip service squadrons with.
The P-38 has performance numbers, but they don't quite translate into combat capability for several reasons. The US, in general, has very little combat experience. The P-38 fighter, as a twin, is more complicated to fly. The P-38 with it's turbos, is more complicated to maintain. P-38 was not quite a "twin" in regards to not having 2nd generators (or other pumps?) The P-38 is one of the first planes to run into the compressibility problem. P-38 is one of the first planes to fly at high altitudes on a regular basis. P-38 recon planes and fighter escorts flew higher than the B-17s did, enough higher that they ran into more problems. It took much of 1942 and 1943 to sort out a lot of the issues and even well into 1944 to sort out some the worst training goofs of the USAAC.

In 1942 and 1943 the US High Command was very hesitant to make changes that would affect P-38 Production. Flawed as the P-38 was, they didn't know if the P-47 and in 1943 the P-51 would work (be better or worse than the P-38). The P-39 and P-40 needed major changes to fly at high altitude (P-63 didn't really work and had short range) and had short range. So it was the P-38 by default in the planning schedules.

Because of the low production relative to the other fighters and because of either prestige of the P-38 or the need for something that could fly at high altitudes or long ranges, relative to the P-39 and P-40 and (early P-47s ?) the P-38s were scattered all over the place as every General wanted them in his command. India had one squadron (?) for quite some time. The Burma area might have had one squadron? Getting even a group into the New Guinea area took a while. Getting 3 groups to North Africa for Torch meant delaying fighter escort missions for the 8th Air force for 3-4 months (and the experience of dealing with really cold weather).
One or two squadrons in some of the lower priority theaters meant that the P-38s did not show large scores. The enemy simply tried to engage other types of aircraft at different altitudes at times.
But the P-38 did allow for the US to push the fight to enemy in ways that the P-39 and P-40 could not. P-38s could provide fighter cover and ground attack over the Sicilian invasion beaches from airfields in Tunisia. Later the P-38s can provide cover over the Italian invasion beaches at a 350 radius for one hour including 10 minutes of combat. But replacements are not equaling losses.
Pease note that P-47s only get water injection and Paddle props in Nov/Dec of 1943 fixing one of it's major deficiencies. In Jan 1944 they start getting wing drop tanks.

So the P-38 could do in 1942-43 what other US Army fighters could not do, it was spread out and not concentrated in one area/theater, it was used in small numbers in most areas.

Did they over claim? Yes.

Could any British or German fighter do what the P-38 could do in 1942-43-44?
Could any Italian or Russian fighter do what the P-38 could do in 1942-43-44?
In squadron service please.
Could any Japanese fighter do what the P-38 could do?
This does get closer.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

P-38 did offer some capabilities that other Allied fighters lacked. Especially in those crucial mid-war years of later 1942 through 1943.

The P-51 was supposed to do this, and it's a myth that the early ones all went to Britain. There were multiple P-51A squadrons (and some A-36) operating in Burma / India. And they had the extra range to some extent at least, but didn't do so well in combat. The P-38s in that Theater were also a little bit lackluster in combat outcomes but better than the P-51As probably.

But that was definitely the field test for the very promising P-51 and it wasn't quite working out.

The "Tertiary Theater" concept is always weird to me by the way, considering that is where almost all the fighting was really taking place after the BoB and before the heavy bomber campaign really ramped up. What is more of a 'Tertiary' sideshow the Second Battle of El Alamein or Dieppe? Guadalcanal and Torch or the Rhubarb raids?

Anyway, the P-38 did offer the range, and at least some promise as a fighter. But the limits were rather narrow.

In North Africa and the Med they mostly used them to escort B-24s on long range and relatively high altitude strikes. They did best around 20-25,000 ft. That meant they were not so good at escorting bombers that flew at lower altitudes like the Bostons and Baltimores, or the various fighter-bombers. They were not very useful in that Theater as 'Top Cover' which is largely a myth anyway.

Most of the fighting against the Luftwaffe and Regia in North Africa was done by the P-40s, especially the merlin-engined ones, and the Spitfire Mk Vs and by the end of 1943, some Mark IXs. But those were still quite limited in range. They only got a handful of the longer ranged Mk VIII in North Africa, but some fought in Italy.

In the Pacific the P-38s were flying in that narrow window of 20-25,000 feet but often trying to escort lower flying B-25s and A-20s and such, with mixed success, but did better in air combat.

In Burma it was the same thing pretty much, when forced to fight down low they didn't do so well, but in their optimal altitude they did ok.

I think with the P-38 the improvements also came more piecemeal, but each one helped. The H had a better intercooler which fixed some of the engine issues, and the ability to carry heavier drop tanks. The J which came in 1943 brought the boosted ailerons, again more fuel, and better turbos with more power. The L was the ultimate model but it came later.

 

[buffnut453]

The "Tertiary Theater" concept is always weird to me by the way, considering that is where almost all the fighting was really taking place after the BoB and before the heavy bomber campaign really ramped up. What is more of a 'Tertiary' sideshow the Second Battle of El Alamein or Dieppe? Guadalcanal and Torch or the Rhubarb raids?

The term tertiary is entirely appropriate; it was third on the list of priorities. That doesn't mean fighting didn't happen there, just that the bulk of the Allied effort was focused on the higher priorities. Just look at the efforts expended in 1942 to establish the 8th and 9th Air Forces while the Pacific theatre struggled to get much of anything.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The term tertiary is entirely appropriate; it was third on the list of priorities. That doesn't mean fighting didn't happen there, just that the bulk of the Allied effort was focused on the higher priorities. Just look at the efforts expended in 1942 to establish the 8th and 9th Air Forces while the Pacific theatre struggled to get much of anything.

For the Empire, Burma and India were tertiary, and North Africa may have been treated that way to some extent, but it was really the main show in 1942 in the West.

 

[buffnut453]

For the Empire, Burma and India were tertiary, and North Africa may have been treated that way to some extent, but it was really the main show in 1942 in the West.

No, it was tertiary as agreed by Roosevelt and Churchill. Europe and North Africa/Middle East/Mediterranean were first and second (and included support to the USSR).

It was a strategic prioritization of where resources would be dedicated rather than playing whack-a-mole responding to wherever fighting flared up (which is at the operational level of warfare).

 

[Shortround6]

There was a bit of shifting around between Europe and the Med but since they had to stage a lot of stuff for the Med out of England it gets a bit confusing.
Dieppe, while a raid, failed so badly it showed that the allies were not ready to invade by land into NW Europe in 1942 or 1943. So some effort was shifted to North Africa.
There were 3 fighter groups with P-38s staged in England for the 8th Air Force for escorts in 1942. Two were flown to NA a few days after Torch and the 3 rd group was pretty much feed in as replacements.

I am a bit confused by the time line or deployments as put forth by Steamed_Banana

Most books/articles on the Mustang say that there were 620 Mustang Is built for the British starting in April 1941 but production starts off slow and shipping takes around 2 months. They don't go operational until April 1942.
The P-51 (Mustang IA), 150 planes was ordered by the British but the US grabs 57 of them after Pearl Harbor (actually summer of 1942).
A-36 was next off the production lines, starting in Oct 1942. British get 1.
The P-51A followed the A-36s in March 1943 and the British get 50 as repayment for the 57 P-51s with cannon that the US grabbed.

Now where is the Myth that all of the early ones went to to Britain? Yes P-51As did go China-Burma-India but they don't start showing up in theater until Sept-Oct 1943.
Some A-36s are sent from Italy to the CBI theater.
What is "early"?
Allison powered Mustangs go into action in the CBI within 1-2 months of Merlin P-51s starting to operate from Britain getting ready for the Bomber escort missions.

More later.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

No, it was tertiary as agreed by Roosevelt and Churchill. Europe and North Africa/Middle East/Mediterranean were first and second (and included support to the USSR).

It was a strategic prioritization of where resources would be dedicated rather than playing whack-a-mole responding to wherever fighting flared up (which is at the operational level of warfare).

That is how it was defined at one level of command. But this is not how things precisely played out in reality.

Most of the US heavy bomber force for example was shifted south from England to support Torch and other Allied campaigns in North Africa for several months (thereby delaying the strategic bombing campaign). By the time of the invasions of Sicily and Italy enormous resources were being shifted in the Med to support those campaigns (including, tragically, stocks of poisonous gas which really didn't need to be there and ended up causing a nightmarish catastrophe). Many of the latest aircraft types and other assets were deployed there by that time.

Many resources and assets including aircraft, ships, troops, fuel, ammunition and other logistic assets were also shifted to the Pacific to support various campaigns going on there.

All of which is pretty well known.

But my point is more really that the Med / North Africa was really the main Theater of fighting for the Anglo-Americans in that hemisphere for almost two years (a lot of 1942 and most of 1943) and probably should have received even higher priority than it did in fact get.

Burma and India were definitely neglected though, probably more by the British than the Americans who seemed to have ramped up a bit sooner. By the time of the Japanese invasion at Imphal in mid 1944 the Allies had sufficient assets there (including a quite impressive air armada with hundreds of aircraft, including bombers and strike aircraft, vitally important transports, and relatively new fighter types like later model P-47s, Spitfires, P-38s, P-51s etc.)

 

[Steamed_Banana]

There was a bit of shifting around between Europe and the Med but since they had to stage a lot of stuff for the Med out of England it gets a bit confusing.
Dieppe, while a raid, failed so badly it showed that the allies were not ready to invade by land into NW Europe in 1942 or 1943. So some effort was shifted to North Africa.
There were 3 fighter groups with P-38s staged in England for the 8th Air Force for escorts in 1942. Two were flown to NA a few days after Torch and the 3 rd group was pretty much feed in as replacements.

I am a bit confused by the time line or deployments as put forth by Steamed_Banana

Most books/articles on the Mustang say that there were 620 Mustang Is built for the British starting in April 1941 but production starts off slow and shipping takes around 2 months. They don't go operational until April 1942.
The P-51 (Mustang IA), 150 planes was ordered by the British but the US grabs 57 of them after Pearl Harbor (actually summer of 1942).
A-36 was next off the production lines, starting in Oct 1942. British get 1.
The P-51A followed the A-36s in March 1943 and the British get 50 as repayment for the 57 P-51s with cannon that the US grabbed.

Now where is the Myth that all of the early ones went to to Britain? Yes P-51As did go China-Burma-India but they don't start showing up in theater until Sept-Oct 1943.
Some A-36s are sent from Italy to the CBI theater.
What is "early"?
Allison powered Mustangs go into action in the CBI within 1-2 months of Merlin P-51s starting to operate from Britain getting ready for the Bomber escort missions.

More later.

a few stats on fighter and bomber deployments in the CBI, per Shores "Bloody Shambles" vol III.

Looks like the P-51A and A-36 were both in Theater and operational before Dec 1943. P-38 recon before June 1943, P-38 fighters before July 1944. Looks like the British were the first using Thunderbolts in Theater before July 1944. Looks like the P-51B/C/Ds arrived some time in 1945.

I see mention of P-51Ds by February 1945 with 2nd Fighter Squadron, 2nd Air Commando Group

For the following Orders of battle I'm just including the fighters, fast recon, newer heavy bombers and light bombers for brevity

Order of Battle, Sept 1942
224 Group Calcutta - One squadron Mohawk (5 Sqn), Six squadrons Hurricane (67, 136, 607, 135, 146, 615)
222 Group Colombo / Ceylon- Three squadrons Hurricane (30, 258, 261), one squadron Fulmar (273)

(I think these Hurricanes are still Mk 1)

Order of Battle, Jan 1943
165 Wing Chittagong - Two squadrons Hurricane IIc (17, 79) two squadrons Hurricane IIb (135, 136)
Cox's Bazaar - Two units Hurricane IIb ("detachment only")
166 Wing Feni - Two squadrons Hurricane IIc (607, 615)
169 Wing Agartala - Two squadrons Mohawk IV (5, 155), one squadron mixed B-25C/ Hurricane IIc Spit IV (3 PRU / 681 Sqn)
Imphal - One unit Hurricane IIb (28 Sqn detachment)
Ramu - One unit Hurricane IIb (28 Sqn detachment)
51st Fighter Group Assam (Dinjan) - Two squadrons P-40K/M (25th and 26th Sqns both US)
8th PR Group - One sqn Lockheed F-4 (9th Recon US)
Amanda Road - One sqn Beaufighter VIf (27 Sqn)
Dum Dum - One unit Hurricane IIb (258 Sqn detachment), one Sqn Beaufighter VIf (178 Sqn)
Alipore - One squadron Hurricane IIc (67 Sqn) one unit Hurricane IIb (146 Sqn Detachment)
Red Road - One unit Hurricane IIc (17 Sqn detatchment)
Colombo / Ceylon - One squadron Hurricane IIc (30 Sqn), one squadron Hurricane IIb (30 Sqn)
Ratmalana - Two squadron Hurricane IIb (261 and 273)

Order of Battle, June 1943
(here he doesn't give subtypes for Hurricanes or Beaufighters etc.)
293 Wing Calcutta - Three squadron Hurricane (136, 607, 615), one squadron Beaufighter (176)
170 Wing Imphal - One squadron Mohawk (155 Sqn), one unit Hurricane (28 Sqn detachment)
168 Wing Digri - Two squadrons & one detachment Hurricane (2 IAF, 5 Sqn, 28 Sqn detachement), three squadrons Vengeance (45,110, 82), one squadron Beaufighter (177 Sqn)
224 Group Chittagon - Five squadrons Hurricane (79, 146, 67, 51, 17), one squadron Beaufighter (27)
222 Group Colombo - Three squadrons Hurricane (30, 258, 273) (also one squadron Liberator 160 sqn)
225 Group Bangalore - Three squadrons Hurricane (6 IAF, 20, 35), one squadron Vengeance (84)
223 Group Peshawar - Three squadrons Hurricane (3 IAF, 4 IAF, 1 IAF) two squadrons Vengeance (7 IAF, 8 IAF)
US 10th Air Force - Two squadrons P-40 (25, 26th Sqn, 51 FG US), one sqn F-4 (9th PR US), also four squadrons B-24 (7th BG US), and three squadrons B-25 (341s BG US)

Order of Battle, Dec 1943
221 Group Imphal - Two sqns Hurricane IIc (5, 34 Sqn), one sqn Hurricane IIb (28 Sqn), one sqn Hurricane IV (42 Sqn) one sqn Mohawk IV (155 Sqn), three sqns Vengeance (45, 110, 84)
224 Group Chittagong - Three sqns Spit Mk VC (136, 607, 615), five sqns Hurricane IIc (261, 79, 258, 60, 11), one sqn Hurricane IIb (6 IAF), two sqns Vengeance (82, 8 IAF), two sqns Beaufighter (177, 27)
Northern Air Sector Dinjan (US) - Three sqns P-40K/N (88th, 89th, 90th Sqn, 80th FG US), two sqns P-51A (529th, 530th / 311 FBG US), one sqn A-36A (528th / 311 FBG US), Two sqn Hurricane (67, 146) one mixed Hurricane / Beaufighter NF (176 Sqn)
Strategic Air Force, Calcutta - Four sqns B-24 (7th BG US), four sqns B-25 (341 BG US), one sqn Liberator III
Photo Recon Force, Comilla - Three sqns F-4 / F-5 (9th, 21st, 99th PR), one sqn Spit IV (681) one sqn Mosquito IV (684)
222 Group Colombo - Three sqns Hurricane IIc (17, 30, 273), one sqn Beaufighter NF (89), one sqn Liberator (160 sqn)
225 Group Bangalore - One sqn Hurricane II (4 IAF)
8th Photo Recon Group - One sqn P-40 (20th TacR US), two sqn F-7 / B-24 (24th and 34th Combat Mapping Sqns US), one F-5 (40th PR Sqn US)

There are also at this point two 'non opertational squadrons of Spitfire Mk VIII (81 and 152), two of Hurricane IIc (123 and 134) one of Hurricane (2 IAF), and two of Liberator (203 and 354)

Order of Battle, July 1944
221 Group Imphal - Three sqn Spitfire Mk VIII (81, 607, 615), seven sqns Hurricane II (60, 1 IAF, 1, 42, 113, 28, 34), one sqn Vengeance (84 sqn)
224 Group Chittagong - Two sqn Spitfire Mk VIII (152, 136), four sqns Hurricane II (9 IAF, 4 IAF, 6 IAF, 20 Sqn), one sqn P-38 (459 FS US), one sqn Vengeance (8 IAF), one sqn Beaufighter X (211 Sqn)
231 Group Strategic Air Force Calcutta - Three sqn Liberator VI (355, 356, 159), four sqn B-24 (7th BG US) one sqn B-25 (490th Sqn US)
Troop Carrier Command Calcutta - Four sqns B-25 (12th BG US)
Photo Recon Group, Comilla - One sqn P-40 (20th TacR US), one sqn Spitfire Mk XI (681 sqn), one sqn Mosquito (684 sqn), one sqn F-5 (9th PR US), one sqn F-7 (24th Combat Mapping US)
US 10th Air Force - Two sqn Spitfire Mk VIII (67 sqn, 155 sqn RAF), three sqn P-40N (80th FG US), two sqn P-51A (529th, 530 / 311 FBG US), one sqn A-36 (528th Sqn / 311 FBG US)
222 Group Colombo - Two sqn Spitfire Mk VIII (17, 273 Sqn), three sqn Beaufighter (89, 22, 217), one squadron Thunderbolt (135 Sqn), one sqn Liberator VI
225 Group Bangalore - One sqn Hurricane IIc (5 Sqn), two sqn Beaufighter (27,47), two sqn Liberator VI (200, 354)

Order of Battle, December 1944
221 Group Imphal - Four sqn Spitfire Mk VIII (152, 17, 155, 607), six sqn Hurricane IIc (1 IAF, 42, 60, 11, 34, 113), one sqn Mosquioto VI (45 Sqn)
224 Group, Cox's Bazaar - Two sqn Spitfire Mk VIII (67, 273), four sqns Thunderbolt (30, 135, 134, 258), three sqns Hurricane IIc (9 IAF, 2 IAF, 4 IAF)
10th Air Force - Four sqn P-47 (80th FG US), three sqn P-38 (33rd FG US), , one sqn B-25 (490th BS US)
Strategic Air Forces Calcutta - Six sqn Liberator VI (99, 355, 356, 159, 215, 357), four sqns B-24 (7th BG US) four sqns B-25 (12th BG US)
Photo Recon Force Calcutta - Two sqn F-5 (9th, 40th PR US), one sqn Spitfire XI (681), one sqn Mosquito (684 sqn), one sqn P-40 (20th TacrR US) one sqn F-7 (24th Combat Mapping US)
293 Wing Defense of Calcutta - One sqn Spitfire VIII (615 Sqn) one sqn Beaufighter NF (89 Sqn NF)
222 Group Colombo - Two sqn Spitfire VIII (81, 136 Sqns), three Squadrons Beaufighter (22, 217, 176 NF), two Sqn Liberator VI (354, 160)
225 Group Bangalore - One sqn Hurricane IId and IV (20 Sqn), one sqn Liberator VI (200 sqn), one sqn Liberator VI and Dakota (357 Sqn)

He has an order of battle for June 1945 but he doesn't include the US types. Anyway I think this is enough, i'm just still not certain

 

[Shortround6]

a few stats on fighter and bomber deployments in the CBI, per Shores "Bloody Shambles" vol III.

Thank you for typing all of that out. It is a lot easier than trying to look at several books that cover only one type of aircraft and trying to see the whole picture.
The F4 and F5 recon aircraft are P-38s, almost always without guns.
The F-6s are P-51s. The F6As are P-51s (55 converted). The F6Bs are P-51As (35 converted) the F6Cs are Merlin powered P-51B & Cs ( 91 converted)
The F-7s are modified B-24s.

Britain and the US were trying to satisfy Stalin's demand to do more in 1942 but a 1942 invasion (large scale) of France was not going happen and even without invading North Africa a 1943 invasion was very unlikely. Just from a logistics point of view. Amount of landing craft needed. Number of troops and equipment. Stockpiled ammo and supplies, You don't want to start a big invasion and then get hit with an intense U-Boat campaign that leaves the on shore army short of food and ammunitions.
Churchill was big on the soft underbelly of Europe idea. Turns out that Italy wasn't so soft and the terrain was a defenders dream. They didn't really get into the Alps until everything was falling apart anyway.

Even with 500 A-36s the US never fielded more than two fighter groups and a 7th squadron. There were not enough P-51As to really do a lot with. 310 built, 50 given to the British for repayment and 35 converted to recon aircraft. Not enough for even two full groups (?) if putting aside a decent amount of spare aircraft/replacements.

P-40Fs were more uncommon than some people think. Yes they make about 1560 of them (plus about 700 Ls) but they didn't show up North Africa (or anywhere else?) until July 1942.
72 planes of of the 57th fighter group are put aboard the Ranger and flown off to land on Gold Coast, then flown across Africa and then north to the middle east. Takes over a month and first actual missions are flown Aug 31st 1942 (?). Next P-40Fs don't show up until the Torch landings (33rd group) and the 3rd group, the 79th don't show up until Nov 12th in Egypt. Two P-40F squadrons show up at Guadalcanal in Nov/Dec 1942. A few other strays may have shown up in the Pacific theaters. But that is the Merlin P-40 involvement in the Pacific. The US tried to use Merlin powered P-40s in North Africa for logistics reasons.
French seem to have been rough on their P-40s. They have replaced some them 3 times?

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Thank you for typing all of that out. It is a lot easier than trying to look at several books that cover only one type of aircraft and trying to see the whole picture.
The F4 and F5 recon aircraft are P-38s, almost always without guns.

Yeah I know

The F-6s are P-51s. The F6As are P-51s (55 converted). The F6Bs are P-51As (35 converted) the F6Cs are Merlin powered P-51B & Cs ( 91 converted)
The F-7s are modified B-24s.

Yeah I think I noted that

Britain and the US were trying to satisfy Stalin's demand to do more in 1942 but a 1942 invasion (large scale) of France was not going happen and even without invading North Africa a 1943 invasion was very unlikely. Just from a logistics point of view. Amount of landing craft needed. Number of troops and equipment. Stockpiled ammo and supplies, You don't want to start a big invasion and then get hit with an intense U-Boat campaign that leaves the on shore army short of food and ammunitions.
Churchill was big on the soft underbelly of Europe idea. Turns out that Italy wasn't so soft and the terrain was a defenders dream. They didn't really get into the Alps until everything was falling apart anyway.

North Africa wasn't initially about the soft underbelly theory so much as it it was preventing the Axis from getting at the 'naked throat' of British Imperial supply lines from India and through the Suez, and also their oil fields in the Middle East. If they had been crushed in that Theater, which definitely seemed possible at a couple of points, they would have really had a major 'Priority One' problem on their hands. Knocking Italy out of the war also turned out to be useful if not completely decisive. I agree that the 'soft underbelly' was not soft, and Italy was a tough slog. Maybe they should have invaded Provence instead.

Even with 500 A-36s the US never fielded more than two fighter groups and a 7th squadron. There were not enough P-51As to really do a lot with. 310 built, 50 given to the British for repayment and 35 converted to recon aircraft. Not enough for even two full groups (?) if putting aside a decent amount of spare aircraft/replacements.

They only seem to have two squadrons of P-51As and one of A-36 active in India, but they seemed to also be the longest ranged Allied fighters at the time they arrived, at least based on Shores book. He does not include the US units in China at this time who also had some P-51A (and / or possibly A-36 I'm not sure about that). But at any rate, their relatively small numbers belies their significance, because they were escorting the B-24s on long distance raids to targets that Hurricanes just couldn't reach. So they were in action a lot in that Theater.

The A-36 were also active in Italy for a while.

P-40Fs were more uncommon than some people think. Yes they make about 1560 of them (plus about 700 Ls) but they didn't show up North Africa (or anywhere else?) until July 1942.
72 planes of of the 57th fighter group are put aboard the Ranger and flown off to land on Gold Coast, then flown across Africa and then north to the middle east. Takes over a month and first actual missions are flown Aug 31st 1942 (?).

I believe some 57th FG pilots were flying with British units already in June of 42

Next P-40Fs don't show up until the Torch landings (33rd group) and the 3rd group, the 79th don't show up until Nov 12th in Egypt. Two P-40F squadrons show up at Guadalcanal in Nov/Dec 1942.

Two squadrons of the US 18th FG were flying P-40F in Guadalcanal by early 1943, and another squadron later on in New Guiea which I forgot but can look up.

A few other strays may have shown up in the Pacific theaters. But that is the Merlin P-40 involvement in the Pacific. The US tried to use Merlin powered P-40s in North Africa for logistics reasons.

They were using the Merlin powered P-40s in North Africa because due to their much higher operational ceiling they could contend with the Bf 109F/G and MC 202, whereas the early mark Kittyhawks no longer could and were being relegated to fighter-bomber missions by third quarter of 1942. From the second half of 1942 to early 1943 the Merlin P-40s and the Spit Vs were the main air superiority fighters of the DAF. The P-38s (two FGs) were mainly flying escort to B-24s at longer range and high altitude, but that was kind of a niche.

There were no less than 5 full US fighter groups flying the P-40F/L (at their peak) in the Med: 57th, 33rd, 79th, 325th, and 324th. Of those the 324th was flying mainly fighter bomber missions, but the other four were flying mostly air superiority and escort missions (sometimes escorting older mark Kittyhawks). There was briefly a shortage where 57th was using some P-40Ks for about two months but that was sorted out when the British came up with a Merlin XX spare engines and parts supply pipeline which were coming from (I guess damaged/) Hurricanes and some parts they were fabricating at Aboukir.

In addition to that there was the 99th FS ('Tuskegee') were using P-40F, and two British squadrons, 260 RAF and 3 RAAF which were all using the Kittyhawk II and IIa which was the British equivalent of the P-40F/L. 260 Sqn moved off of them briefly to Kittyhawk III (either P-40K or M) but after casualties went up they found some spare engines and switched back. There were also at least two Free French squadrons from GC II/5 flying Kittyhawk IIs...

French seem to have been rough on their P-40s. They have replaced some them 3 times?

... but the French had been given clapped out P-40s which seem to have had unreliable engines.

Speaking of which, I'm reading a memoir by an RAAF pilot from 450 Sqn RAF, flying Kittyhawk IIIs. 450 Sqn was mainly a fighter-bomber unit, and they apparently had been given 'clapped out' Kittyhawk IIIs (which means either P-40K or M) and he said they were plagued with catastrophic failures of the Allison engines, with burned out bearings and even ruptured crank cases being fairly common, the latter usually causing a catastrophic fire. Happened to the author twice. I mention this because I know you have pointed this out as a potential problem resulting from frequent overboosting. Sounds like this was in fact an issue. The same author also mentions rather casually going to 54" Hg (seemingly in leiux of military power) during the beginning of engagements with Bf 109s. Like as soon as he spots them.

 

[Shortround6]

North Africa wasn't initially about the soft underbelly theory so much as it it was preventing the Axis from getting at the 'naked throat' of British Imperial supply lines from India and through the Suez, and also their oil fields in the Middle East. If they had been crushed in that Theater, which definitely seemed possible at a couple of points, they would have really had a major 'Priority One' problem on their hands. Knocking Italy out of the war also turned out to be useful if not completely decisive. I agree that the 'soft underbelly' was not soft, and Italy was a tough slog. Maybe they should have invaded Provence instead.

You are right.
But the Med campaign covered over 3 years. I don't know when the NA/Med campaign shifted to the Italian campaign
American aircraft (purchases/lend lease) show up after about 1 year. American squadrons show up after about 2 years (?) a few bomber squadrons?
American troops and fighter squadrons show up after almost 2 1/2 years.
Often long term plans were derailed by events on the Ground. Both sides thought they were on verge of total victory several times and had to switch from grand plans of follow operations to just figuring out how to hang on/stay alive.
A lot of these grand plans overlooked practical matters. Actually invading areas that were defended was a lot harder than many people realized and with the increased importance of air power success invasions needed a lot of airplanes located with reach of the Battle field/invasion sites. Like a lot of carriers and/or plans that had the range to fly overwater several hundred miles.
Churchill thought that the Italian invasion would be an easy way to open a 2nd front to satisfy Stalin. A few divisions running back and forth in North Africa didn't impress him much when there over a hundred divisions on each side in Russia (Russians used small divisions so while they had a lot more numbers the actual manpower was closer). Of Stalin didn't really understand sea power either.

The A-36 were also active in Italy for a while.

They were quite active. During the war (in both theaters) A-36s fly 23373 combat missions, drop 8000 tons of bombs, claim 84 enemy aircraft in the air and 17 more on the ground.
That is claimed and I am just using it as an indication of activity. Not interested in if the claims were accurate at this point. This source claims 177 A-36s were lost due to all causes of enemy action which I take as not including operational losses (running out of gas/engine failure/landing accidents etc.) and shows why 500 planes were needed to keep 7 squadrons in combat for over a year.

I believe some 57th FG pilots were flying with British units already in June of 42

You may very well be right. But those pilots may have been flying British planes (Kittihawks) for training/familiarization.
Hubert Zemke had flown Tomahawks in Britain in 1940-41 (not in combat) and later instructed Soviet pilots in their early lend-lease Tomahawk/P-40s in Russia as an example of pilots being in areas that the US was not operating squadrons of aircraft.

Somethings took a long time. Like 50 P-40es being allocated to the AVG in China in Jan 1942. Shipments by water start in Feb, most (not all) are in China by June 1942.
The P-40F is hard to figure out, Jan 3rd 1941 is supposed to be the delivery of the first P-40F but how fast production was in spring and early summer of 1942 is hard to find.
Not sure how the Merlin engines were split up. Like did the British get priority in certain months? It did take until July 1942 for Packard to reach the 800 engines per month production goal. The P-40Fs were built in the same factory as the P-40E/K so monthly production totals don't do much good.

As far as early Tomahawk operations in North Africa go, In April of 1941 RAAF squadron #3 is the first to get Tomahawk IIBs. 310 are eventually sent to equip 3 RAF, 1 RAAF and 3 SAAF squadrons but no more than 90 are operational at one time.
Oct 1941 sees the first P-40s arrive in Egypt. Jan 1942 sees the first Kittihawks go into action.

The delay between allocations and first use in theater was months. Intended use vs actual use once they were in theater can be very different.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

You are right.
But the Med campaign covered over 3 years. I don't know when the NA/Med campaign shifted to the Italian campaign

No argument there

American aircraft (purchases/lend lease) show up after about 1 year.

The earliest ones were diverted French purchases - the Martin 167 "Maryland" bombers for example which turned out to be very useful. And the DB-7 Bostons. Thanks to these, the Blenheims were retired from front-line service fairly quickly. I think the Tomahawks arrived mid 1941 IIRC. The British got the majority of them and most of the early Kittyhawks, almost the whole run of the Kittyhawk II / P-40D and a good portion of the Kittyhawk IIa / P-40E. They almost got pretty much all of the Martin 187 "Baltimores" which became their main bomber. And seem quite good.

American squadrons show up after about 2 years (?) a few bomber squadrons?

I think you may be right some B-24 units got in early in 1942. I think the fighters were there basically by mid-year as I noted, with the 57th FG showing up first, but then there were also reverse lend-lease Spitfire units like 31 Fighter Group, the P-38s (1st FG, 14th FG, then the 82nd FG IIRC), medium bombers like the B-25s and B-26s, and more A-20s - the American version A-20A and A-20B, which ended up important during Torch.

American troops and fighter squadrons show up after almost 2 1/2 years.

Right, summer 1942

Often long term plans were derailed by events on the Ground. Both sides thought they were on verge of total victory several times and had to switch from grand plans of follow operations to just figuring out how to hang on/stay alive.

Again, no argument there

A lot of these grand plans overlooked practical matters. Actually invading areas that were defended was a lot harder than many people realized and with the increased importance of air power success invasions needed a lot of airplanes located with reach of the Battle field/invasion sites. Like a lot of carriers and/or plans that had the range to fly overwater several hundred miles.

Agree, they learned many harsh lessons

Churchill thought that the Italian invasion would be an easy way to open a 2nd front to satisfy Stalin. A few divisions running back and forth in North Africa didn't impress him much when there over a hundred divisions on each side in Russia (Russians used small divisions so while they had a lot more numbers the actual manpower was closer). Of Stalin didn't really understand sea power either.

Agree... I do think the Italian invasion was helpful, but the effort to results ratio tapered off after the Italian government fell and the invasion bogged down in the mountains.

They were quite active. During the war (in both theaters) A-36s fly 23373 combat missions, drop 8000 tons of bombs, claim 84 enemy aircraft in the air and 17 more on the ground.
That is claimed and I am just using it as an indication of activity. Not interested in if the claims were accurate at this point. This source claims 177 A-36s were lost due to all causes of enemy action which I take as not including operational losses (running out of gas/engine failure/landing accidents etc.) and shows why 500 planes were needed to keep 7 squadrons in combat for over a year.

Again, totally agree. I think the A-36 is very underestimated as a dive bomber. It was one of the few, if not the only type which could successfully operate in the absolutely lethal environment over Italy, and it was faster and more accurate than P-47s, P-38s and P-40s which were the other closest competitors probably.

You may very well be right. But those pilots may have been flying British planes (Kittihawks) for training/familiarization.

My understanding is they were flying P-40Fs, not sure if those came from the British or via the US.

Hubert Zemke had flown Tomahawks in Britain in 1940-41 (not in combat) and later instructed Soviet pilots in their early lend-lease Tomahawk/P-40s in Russia as an example of pilots being in areas that the US was not operating squadrons of aircraft.

Somethings took a long time. Like 50 P-40es being allocated to the AVG in China in Jan 1942. Shipments by water start in Feb, most (not all) are in China by June 1942.
The P-40F is hard to figure out, Jan 3rd 1941 is supposed to be the delivery of the first P-40F but how fast production was in spring and early summer of 1942 is hard to find.
Not sure how the Merlin engines were split up. Like did the British get priority in certain months? It did take until July 1942 for Packard to reach the 800 engines per month production goal. The P-40Fs were built in the same factory as the P-40E/K so monthly production totals don't do much good.

I agree the monthly production for the P-40F and L is hard to follow

As far as early Tomahawk operations in North Africa go, In April of 1941 RAAF squadron #3 is the first to get Tomahawk IIBs. 310 are eventually sent to equip 3 RAF, 1 RAAF and 3 SAAF squadrons but no more than 90 are operational at one time.
Oct 1941 sees the first P-40s arrive in Egypt. Jan 1942 sees the first Kittihawks go into action.

You forgot a couple, the 112 RAF was a big one. The Tomahawk quickly became a very important fighter for the British even though in limited numbers.

The delay between allocations and first use in theater was months. Intended use vs actual use once they were in theater can be very different.

It seemed to vary quite a bit. They did some impressive logistics for North Africa