Reggiana 2005 Vs. Bf 109F

Reggiana Re. 2005 vs. Messerschmitt Bf 109F


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I'm not saying that the G.55 production scheme was a tactical move against Messerschmitt's Me 209 production scheme for certain - I'm just saying the possiblity exists and cannot be ruled out.
If you say it like that, then YES, it is indeed a critical assessment. :)

It is indeed possible... :)
Kris
 
There seems to be another reason why the LW finally abandoned the idea of producing the G55: the quoted text is taken from:

G55 - Aircraft History


"On 4 August 1944 a test pilot of Aeritalia, using one of the G55's ready to be delivered (MM91156), picked up an Allied spy in the narrow G55 cockpit and escaped beyond the front line. The aircraft (shown in fig. 3) was then captured by the Allied and shipped in England to be used for evaluations. This episode was relevant for the German authorities to decide to stop the Aeritalia production that definitively ended in September 1944."

There is also a picture of a G55 with English roundels, it would be interesting if anybody could confirm this from some other source (for cross-comparison)
Also it would be interesting to find the outcome of this 'evaluation tests' performed in England...
 
Hi Parmigiano,

>There seems to be another reason why the LW finally abandoned the idea of producing the G55:

Hm, if the G.55 would have been produced in Germany, there should have been no special concerns regarding the reliability (or lack thereof) of the factory workers.

>Also it would be interesting to find the outcome of this 'evaluation tests' performed in England...

Very good point - it's probably there, buried in some archive ... fascinating thought!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Hi Kris,

>If you say it like that, then YES, it is indeed a critical assessment. :)

Glad we reached agreement again :)

A friend who is a psychologist once told me that "negative knowledge" - to know what one doesn't know - is one type of information that is difficult to handle intuitively for the human brain.

I think this transfers to the language - there is a clear term for "certainty", but there is none for "confirmed uncertainty" in the sense that we know with certainty that we are missing an important bit of information.

This makes "negative knowledge" difficult to communicate at times :-/

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Hi Parmigiano,

>
Hm, if the G.55 would have been produced in Germany, there should have been no special concerns regarding the reliability (or lack thereof) of the factory workers.


Henning (HoHun)

I think that fear of mass desertion was not the main point: my interpretation is that if I have to develop and deploy a new fighter I also count on a surprise effect. If the enemy already can evaluate this machine even before I can field it in numbers, I lose this advantage and this can influence my decision to invest on the project.
 
But if that G.55 was taken by the allies, you won't be sharing new technology if a second or a third lands. So I doubt they stopped production because they feared the allies might get the upper hand in technology.

I think the real problem of that runaway pilot was that it was bad for fighter production and also shattered morale. These stories would definitely have inspired the other Italian workers.

But I think there's no doubt as to why production was stopped if you look at the date: September 1944. In that month many aircraft were taken out of production due to rationalisation. Italian fighters also fall in that list: it was economically not worth to ship resources to Italy for an insignificantly small fighter production.

Kris
 
Yes, that's a good point: by sept 44 rationalization called for few types with dispersed production, plus Italy was not the safest place to build aircrafts because of the Partisans and the Allied troops already close to the North.
 
Hi Parmigiano,

>I think that fear of mass desertion was not the main point: my interpretation is that if I have to develop and deploy a new fighter I also count on a surprise effect. If the enemy already can evaluate this machine even before I can field it in numbers, I lose this advantage and this can influence my decision to invest on the project.

Hm, I don't think that was a factor in WW2. The Allies were ware of the long-nose Fw 190 almost two years before it actually went into production, and as far as I can tell, they had no advantage from that at all.

(In fact, tactical evaluation of captured aircraft so often gave misleading results that sometimes, I wonder who actually benefitted more ... the captor or the underestimated enemy ;)

I'd admit that the psychological impact would be greater if the new type arrives un-announced, though - as it was the case with the first Fw 190s in 1941.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Thanks for clearing that about the FW 190.

The P-47 was big all around. :)

And then, after a certain point, they all became lighter. P-47N, P-51H, and Ta-152H were all lighter than P-47D, P-51D, and FW 190D. (How funny, all D's!)

Flying weights for the Ta's were between 650 and 1000 kg higher than for the 190Ds:

Fw-190D-9: 4270 kg
Fw-190D-12: 4430 kg

Ta-152 C-1: 5380 kg
Ta-152 H-1: 5220 kg
Ta-152 E-1: 5085 kg

Same for the P-47s, up to 3200 lbs heavier than the D model:

P-47D-10: 13,230 lbs
P-47D-40: 13,730 lbs

P-47N: 15,790 lbs
P-47N-5-RE: 16,400 lbs
 
A bit surprised to see the 152H and E weighing so much less than the C. The H had a bigger wing. The DB 603 didn't weigh much more than the Jumo 213E IIRC. And the 152E-1 also had the wing of the 152C. It also carried less armament but also the photocamera equipment weight quite a bit. So to see 300 kg difference between the C and E is beyond me...

Kris
 

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