Exactly right. hence my comment about what is Handley Page and Bristol not building before the war, when the outcomes that we know today could not have possibly been known in 1939 or earlier. far too much retrospectoscope gazing.
Retreat after retreat. Would the RAF been better off building bomber transports in a 1:1 ratio with medium bombers?
- Thread starter Kevin J
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Exactly right. hence my comment about what is Handley Page and Bristol not building before the war, when the outcomes that we know today could not have possibly been known in 1939 or earlier. far too much retrospectoscope gazing.
- Thread starter
- #22
Kevin J
Banned
There's no truth to the statement made that the RAF couldn't hit German targets at night. It was their ability to hit inland industrial targets that was lacking and solved by the use of pathfinders and area bombing.
- Thread starter
- #23
Kevin J
Banned
The last 30 Bristol Bombays were never built. Let's assume we have them available in Malaya. How many troops could they resupply? 4000 not 40000? So we'd have about 10% of the ideal force size. So insufficient to resupply III Corps in N.E. Malaya. III Corps also has the Penang fortress on the West coast.
Last edited:
Shortround6
Major General
In late 1940 and early 1941 the RAF had trouble finding the right German cities. Better navigation came later. One Reason the first 1000 bomber raid was done on Cologne was that it was within range of GEE as it existed in the spring of 1942. Cologne is about 30 miles from the Belgian/Dutch border.
Capabilities changed considerably over the course of the war.
If the the British had been able to hit German targets at night in 1940/41 then the Butt report
Butt Report - Wikipedia
is either disinformation or a myth.
The chances of the British setting up a GEE system in Burma when they were struggling to build enough units for bomber command in England in late 1941/early 1942 are about zero.
- Thread starter
- #25
Kevin J
Banned
The Germans weren't going to guide our bombers in. Our troops on the ground would guide our transports in. My statement still holds true. We could and did accurately bomb coastal targets at night and those upriver from the coast. We even successfully destroyed an acquaduct in North Germany with Hampden bombers. Water can be made out at night. Its visible. Low level daylight raids were made but they were suicidal.
Shortround6
Major General
The Bristol Bombay's were actually built by Shorts and Harland in Belfast. Bristol being too busy building Blenheims. However Shorts replaced the Bombay production with Handley Page Herefords (Hampdens with Napair Dagger engines) who's major contribution to the war effort was providing airframes that could be converted back to Hampdens with a suitable supply of Pegasus engines 
Increased Bombay production certainly looks possible given 20/20 hindsight.
Given the RAFs lack of transport ability however and the general tendency to shift planes progressively eastward Singapore is lucky they didn't wind up with the Vickers Valentia for transports.
Increased Bombay production certainly looks possible given 20/20 hindsight.
Given the RAFs lack of transport ability however and the general tendency to shift planes progressively eastward Singapore is lucky they didn't wind up with the Vickers Valentia for transports.
Shortround6
Major General
This rather depends on the situation. Lighting up the airfield to land transports for resupply because you are surrounded and land supply is cut off generally means the surrounding enemy can see the airfield and bring it under fire. Their fighters may not get you but the mortar/artillery fire will.
The forward troops will not have radar to spot the incoming transports, they can only hear them. And if the British troops can hear them the Japanese troops can hear them. trying to direct the transports to the proper area to begin landing before lighting up the field seems to be rather iffy and if the planes are 5-15 miles off what then?
This scheme relies too much on a command/control system that was nonexistent in Burma and the Malaysia in Dec 1941/Jan 1942. If such a command and control system had existed one would assume that the British forces would have done better than they did.
Go back and read the wiki article on the Butt's report.
"Postwar studies confirmed Butt's assessment, showing that 49% of Bomber Command bombs dropped between May 1940 and May 1941 fell in open country.[5] As Butt did not include those aircraft that did not bomb because of equipment failure, enemy action, weather or which failed to find the target, only about 5% of bombers setting out bombed within 5 mi (8.0 km) of the target."
Your version of the RAFs navigation and bombing accuracy seems to be at odds with their own studies/reports.
a few bombing success stories out of many failures is a pretty thin thread to hang the airborne resupply of a number of widely separated units on.
- Thread starter
- #28
Kevin J
Banned
The Bristol Bombay's were actually built by Shorts and Harland in Belfast. Bristol being too busy building Blenheims. However Shorts replaced the Bombay production with Handley Page Herefords (Hampdens with Napair Dagger engines) who's major contribution to the war effort was providing airframes that could be converted back to Hampdens with a suitable supply of Pegasus engines
Increased Bombay production certainly looks possible given 20/20 hindsight.
Given the RAFs lack of transport ability however and the general tendency to shift planes progressively eastward Singapore is lucky they didn't wind up with the Vickers Valentia for transports.
View attachment 545807
I don't know whether to laugh or cry.
- Thread starter
- #29
Kevin J
Banned
The other problem with aerial resupply in Malaya is that monsoon season is October to March so my idea may well have been positively dangerous.
Shortround6
Major General
"Valentias were used for night bombing operations over the Western Desert in 1940[1] and remained in service with the Iraq and Persia Communications Flight until 1944.[1] The South African Air Force pressed a Valentia into service as a bomber in the East African Campaign in 1940–41"
- Thread starter
- #31
Kevin J
Banned
I really can't help but think that our government was dangerously fixated on bombing to the detriment of the army. After 400 to 500 miles of retreating the Soviet Army counter attacked at Smolensk. We simply surrendered.
pinehilljoe
Senior Airman
- 717
- May 1, 2016
Harris changed tactics to match the ability of the Bomber Force. The technology to hit industrial targets in all weather and night didn't exist, so they were not targets, and the De Houseing strategy was adopted by Harris and Cherwell. Essentially saying the targets you couldnt hit, like factories were not important, and targets you could hit, like Cities and dwelling were important, rather than divert some of the resources to tactical use like Coastal Command or support of troops.
Shortround6
Major General
Don't forget the Navy and the whole Coastal Command/anti sub fiasco of the first few years of the war.
It wasn't the government so much as the high command in the RAF that was trying to prove to the government that the RAF was fully the equal (in not superior) to the Army and Navy and deserved the bigger part of the budget/resources.
- Thread starter
- #34
Kevin J
Banned
Sad, isn't it? So many retreats. I think America is at the same stage with their financial empire. The worst is yet to come.
Shortround6
Major General
Staying out of current politics/events.
The British are easy to criticize for decisions made in the run up and early part of WW II because many of the decisions are well documented and many of the historians after the war were English speaking if not English. The Americans had a bit more time to get their act together (and were still getting it together in 1943) and were able to learn at least a few lessons from the 2 years of war before they joined in.
Russian decisions are still somewhat murky although a lot has come out in the last 20-25 years? German and Japanese decisions from their points of view (and not an English or American writers take on it) are harder to come by, not impossible but nowhere near the "popular" narratives of the Americans and British.
I, for one, consider the British "retreat" in France/Belgium to be both unavoidable and a great credit to the men and officers who conducted it. It was not only the miracle at Dunkirk, but a near miracle that the British army (and some brave French troops) managed to retreat, in good order, for a number of days back to the positions at Dunkirk. It did not turn into a rout and the units involved leapfrogged back in a controlled and steady manner, often at night. It was not perfect but mistakes were few enough that the Germans were not able to capitalize on them.
The British are easy to criticize for decisions made in the run up and early part of WW II because many of the decisions are well documented and many of the historians after the war were English speaking if not English. The Americans had a bit more time to get their act together (and were still getting it together in 1943) and were able to learn at least a few lessons from the 2 years of war before they joined in.
Russian decisions are still somewhat murky although a lot has come out in the last 20-25 years? German and Japanese decisions from their points of view (and not an English or American writers take on it) are harder to come by, not impossible but nowhere near the "popular" narratives of the Americans and British.
I, for one, consider the British "retreat" in France/Belgium to be both unavoidable and a great credit to the men and officers who conducted it. It was not only the miracle at Dunkirk, but a near miracle that the British army (and some brave French troops) managed to retreat, in good order, for a number of days back to the positions at Dunkirk. It did not turn into a rout and the units involved leapfrogged back in a controlled and steady manner, often at night. It was not perfect but mistakes were few enough that the Germans were not able to capitalize on them.
- Thread starter
- #36
Kevin J
Banned
To me the lack of transports is a massive oversight. The Germans had 5000 Ju 52's, the USSR, 5000 Li-2's and we had 100 Harrows, 50 Bombays and a motley collection of assorted bomber conversions. No shortage of bombers that either got shot out of the skies by day or missed their targets at night.
Shortround6
Major General
You also have to look at the needs. Where were the Germans going to use their transports?
Where were the British going to use theirs?
The Germans were going to use theirs over short distances (a few hundred miles) while the British had to cover thousands of miles if not tens of thousands of miles. The British had used air transport for the first long distance troops move (ahead of the German/Spanish troop movement of the Spanish civil war) but the numbers of troops was under a battalion.
I would note that the German use of air transport for initial combat, while innovative was very, very expensive. The Germans could not sustain it. Losses of Ju 52s in Norway, Holland and Crete were in the hundreds, even counting the recovered/repaired aircraft. Which hurt later air transport operations.
I would also note that hundreds of the Ju 52s were either dual purpose or were bomber versions. and the bomber versions were not that easily convertible as they had bomb bay doors in the bottom of the fuselage, a ventral gun position (retractable) and hole in the top of the fuselage for a dorsal gunner. Yes you could convert the planes but it was hardly bomb on Monday and tuesday, transport on thursday and Friday and be back to bombing on Sunday. Many of the old bomber versions wound up as multi engine engine trainers rather than transports.
If you wanted to move a lot of troops (and their supplies) you still needed trains on land or ships to move over water.
The Germans did try to supply Stalingrad by air, however, success or failure aside, the distances were only a few hundred miles (if that?) and the airfields were supplied by rail or rail/truck. They were NOT flying the supplies from Germany/Poland.
There was little need of air transport inside the British Isles ( one of the highest density railway systems in the world)
In too many cases air forces, armies, and navies looked around, saw what the "Joneses" had and figured that if the "Joneses" had something then they needed it too, rather than actually figuring out what they did or did not need.
England was an Island nation that depended on imports just to feed it's people, let alone other supplies. Anti-sub aircraft or aircraft to ensure safe passage of ships should have been high on the priority list. They weren't, and that is a bigger failing than lack of air lift capacity.
Where were the British going to use theirs?
The Germans were going to use theirs over short distances (a few hundred miles) while the British had to cover thousands of miles if not tens of thousands of miles. The British had used air transport for the first long distance troops move (ahead of the German/Spanish troop movement of the Spanish civil war) but the numbers of troops was under a battalion.
I would note that the German use of air transport for initial combat, while innovative was very, very expensive. The Germans could not sustain it. Losses of Ju 52s in Norway, Holland and Crete were in the hundreds, even counting the recovered/repaired aircraft. Which hurt later air transport operations.
I would also note that hundreds of the Ju 52s were either dual purpose or were bomber versions. and the bomber versions were not that easily convertible as they had bomb bay doors in the bottom of the fuselage, a ventral gun position (retractable) and hole in the top of the fuselage for a dorsal gunner. Yes you could convert the planes but it was hardly bomb on Monday and tuesday, transport on thursday and Friday and be back to bombing on Sunday. Many of the old bomber versions wound up as multi engine engine trainers rather than transports.
If you wanted to move a lot of troops (and their supplies) you still needed trains on land or ships to move over water.
The Germans did try to supply Stalingrad by air, however, success or failure aside, the distances were only a few hundred miles (if that?) and the airfields were supplied by rail or rail/truck. They were NOT flying the supplies from Germany/Poland.
There was little need of air transport inside the British Isles ( one of the highest density railway systems in the world)
In too many cases air forces, armies, and navies looked around, saw what the "Joneses" had and figured that if the "Joneses" had something then they needed it too, rather than actually figuring out what they did or did not need.
England was an Island nation that depended on imports just to feed it's people, let alone other supplies. Anti-sub aircraft or aircraft to ensure safe passage of ships should have been high on the priority list. They weren't, and that is a bigger failing than lack of air lift capacity.
Shortround6
Major General
to further the last post, Russia had a really crappy rail network, at least as far as number of rail lines per unit of land mass. The Road network was pretty dismal and may not even deserve the title road network (at least during WW II) Russian infrastructure was such that they made wide use of hydrofoils and air cushion river ferries in the 1960s and 70s to make use of the rivers when they were not frozen. With vast distances and often not a lot between major cities air travel/transport made more sense than in some other countries.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
No they didnt 4,792 Ju52 were produced between 1933 and 1951
No they didnt 4900 were built between 1939 and 1952.
The most the Germans and Soviets would have had in service at any one time during the war would have been measured in the low hundreds.
- Thread starter
- #40
Kevin J
Banned
Most of their rail network was in the 2 million square miles of territory west of the Urals. Roads, none too good.
