Rising Sun warbirds

[R Leonard]

Numbers don't lie. By the end of the Battle of Midway, the F4F pilots already had an upper hand against the A6M2 drivers, this without the wide spread adoption of any special defensive tactics such as Jimmy Thach's Beam Defense, later known as the Thach Weave.

Personally knowing many of the fighter pilots involved in the actions at Coral Sea and Midway (for example, when I think of Jimmy Thach, I don't see some picture in a book, I remember a tall thin man sitting in our living room who was kind to children with lots of questions) I take some exception to the characterization of their physical reaction to the concept of combat with the A6M2. So I'll re-ask the question as to the source of that particular tidbit, or expect, at the least some modification of the characterization or, better, a retraction.

Regards,

Rich

 

[FLYBOYJ]

This was a post by Mr. James Martin from another WW2 site I visit......

Father was attached to 2nd Observation Sqd. at Nichols Field, Dec. 1941
: My Father was stationed at Nichols Field in the Phillippines, as an radio operator, in the 2nd Observation Sqd. Dad was wounded in a bombing attack on Dec. 9th and later evacuated by ship to Australia.
December 1941


Monday 8 December 1941

The first word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is received on Luzon, Philip-pine Islands by commercial radio between 0300-0330 hours local. Within 30 minutes radar at Iba Field, Luzon plots a formation of airplanes 75-miles (120-km) offshore, heading for Corregidor Island. P-40's are sent out to intercept but make no contact. Shortly before 0930 hours, after Japanese aircraft are detected over Lingayen Gulf heading toward Manila, B-17's at Clark Field, Luzon are ordered airborne to prevent being caught on the ground. Fighters from Clark and Nichols Fields are sent to intercept the enemy but do not make contact. The Japanese airplanes swing East and bomb military installations at Baguio, Tarlac, Tuguegarao, and airfields at Cabantuan are also attacked. By 1130 hours, the B-17's and fighters sent into the air earlier have landed at Clark and Iba Fields for refueling, and radar has disclosed another flight of Japanese aircraft 70-miles (112-km) West of Lingayen Gulf, headed South. Fighters from Iba Field make a fruitless search over the South China Sea. Fighters from Nichols Field are dispatched to patrol over Bataan and Manila. Around 1145 hours a formation is reported headed South over Lingayen Gulf. Fighters are ordered from Del Carmen Field to cover Clark Field but fail to arrive before the Japanese hit Clark shortly after 1200 hours. B-17's and many fighters at Clark Field are caught on the ground, but a few P-4O's manage to get airborne. 2d Lieutenant Randall B. Keator of the 20th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor), 24th Pursuit Group (Interceptor), shoots down the first Japanese aircraft over the Philippines. The P-40's earlier sent on patrol of the South China Sea return to Iba Field with fuel running low at the beginning of a Japanese attack on that airfield. The P-40's fail to prevent bombing but manage to prevent low-level strafing of the sort which proved so destructive at Clark Field. At the end of the day's action it is apparent that the Japanese have won a major victory. The effective striking power of Far East Air Force has been destroyed, the fighter strength has been seriously reduced, most B-17 maintenance facilities have been demolished, and about 90 men have been killed.


Tuesday 9 December 1941

Shortly after 0300 hours, Japanese aircraft attack Nichols Field. This attack, added to the previous day's raids on Clark and Iba Fields, leaves the Far East Air Force strength reduced by half. Only 17 of 35 B-17's remain in commission; about 55 P-40's, 3 P-35's, and close to 30 other aircraft (B-10's, B-18's, and observation airplanes) have been lost in aerial combat or destroyed on the ground. During the morning and afternoon, B-17's from Mindanao Island fly reconnaissance missions and land on Clark and San Marcelino Fields on Luzon. Several more B-17's are flown from Mindanao Island to these Luzon bases for resistance against a possible invasion attempt. The 3d Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor), 24th Pursuit Group (Interceptor), transfers from Iba Airfield to Nichols Field, Luzon with P-40's. The 17th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor), 24th Pursuit Group (Interceptor), based at Nichols Field begins operating from Clark Field, Luzon with P-40's.

Real whopping numbers of P-40s?!? Through out early 1942 I doubt there were more than 100 P-40 available at any given time in the South Pacific.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Here's some more info about P-40s in the PTO early in the war....

02/27/42

Fifth AF

Battle of Java Sea. Allied air and naval units try to stop convoy of some 80 ships approaching Java from NE. All available B-17's, A-24's, P-40's and LB-30's are put into the air but achieve only insignificant results. An Allied naval force, 5 cruisers and 11 destroyers, under Adm Doorman, Royal Netherlands Navy, meets the enemy near Surabaya and is decisively defeated, losing 5 ships. Most of Fifth AF ground echelon in Java is evacuated by sea. The Sea Witch delivers 27 crated P-40's to Tjilatjap, Java, but these will be destroyed to prevent their falling into Japanese hands. 32 P-40's aboard the USS Langley, which sailed from Australia for India on 23 Feb, are lost when the Langley is sunk by aircraft 100 mi S of Tjilatjap. The pilots are rescued by other vessels in the convoy, but the enemy sinks these ships with the exception of a destroyer, which delivers 2 of the pilots to Perth.

03/02/42

Fifth AF

5 B-17's and 3 LB-30's (the last airplane taking off just before midnight) evacuate the last 260 men from Jogjakarta, the last A/F on Java in Allied hands. Ground forces are within 20 mi at this time. Bataan-based P-40's attack shipping in Subic Bay. The pilots claim considerable damage to the ships, but 4 of the few P-40's remaining on Bataan are lost.

03/12/42

Tenth AF

10 P-40's arrive in Karachi by ship from Australia

https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/chron/41dec.htm

 

[syscom3]

That was a lot of aircraft for the time. Compare it to the realities of Dec 1941, not a couple of years later when that many planes a day were manufactured.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

That was a lot of aircraft for the time. Compare it to the realities of Dec 1941, not a couple of years later when that many planes a day were manufactured.

Sure they were, but you're making it sound like the Zero shot down hundreds of P-40s during this period and hundreds more fled to Australia

But read your own words..

Are you saying that in the first 6 months of the war, all of those P40's sent to the PI, to Java, to New Guinie, just sort of all dissapeared on their own? They never saw battle, they just took off one day, never to return? And of course the Japanese couldnt shoot them down cause our planes were indestuctable, and the pilots were better! And of course the people on the ground were imagining things when they saw allied planes flying straight down into the ground. Engine failures no doubt.

Hmmmm. Maybe some UFO got in their way?

Lots of allied planes (P40 included) went up to fight the Japanese, decided to dogfight the Zero/Zeke/Oscar and plenty ended up shot down. Takes awhile for lessons of aerial combat to sink into a doctrine. Once those lessons were learned then loss rates went down in a hurry.

Bottom line, there weren't "lots" or "numerous" aircraft in the area at the start of the war and if the Japanese destroyed 100 aircraft (P-40s, P-39s, P-35s and P-36s) in air-to-air combat during this period, I would be surprised. What is being learned here is the losses we are made to think occurred during this period were not as numerous as one would think. Look at the numbers for the Battle of Coral Sea and Midway. Until Rich posted these numbers I would assume that we lost hundreds of F4Fs. The same hold true for the P-40 and even the P-39.....

Conclusion: overall AAF totals in the Pacific are 3960 air kills and 925 air losses. Break them down by aircraft and find out how many were lost to Zeros it's going to show, based on it's combat record, the Zero was highly over-rated!!!!

 

[syscom3]

......
Sure they were, but you're making it sound like the Zero shot down hundreds of P-40s during this period and hundreds more fled to Australia

Sorry if you misunderstood me. I was referring more to the kill ratio of the first 6 months of the war. I will even admit that the zero was at its apex beginning in May/June, and declined steadily.

I found this interesting story at the Pacific Wrecks webpage. If you read down to "15", theres an interesting account described by both pilots on how a wildcat was shotdown. The Zero pilot was Sakai, the Wildcat pilot was Southerland.

http://www.pacificwrecks.com/history/tainan-ku.html#_ftn13

 

[evangilder]

Good info there Joe! If I didn't know better, I would think you have been hanging around with Rich.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

......
Sure they were, but you're making it sound like the Zero shot down hundreds of P-40s during this period and hundreds more fled to Australia

Sorry if you misunderstood me. I was referring more to the kill ratio of the first 6 months of the war. I will even admit that the zero was at its apex beginning in May/June, and declined steadily.

No problem! - but if one was would say the Zero kill ratio was 2 to 1 during this period, I think that might be considered high....

You had several pilots in the theater at the time who scored kills in P-39s and P-40s and as a whole operated very effectively against Japanese forces until the P-38 entered the theater in late 42. Jay Robbins, Thomas Lynch, and Danny Roberts were all top P-38 fighter pilots but all would do well when they first arrived in the area flying P-39s (Lynch got 2 Zeros in May 42' flying the P-400). As a matter of fact the 39th Pursit Group operating out of New Guinea did extremely well with the P-39 considering it's limitations.

Again, there were folks knocking down Zeros with 39s, 40s and 400s. They held the line until the P-38 arrived and their losses weren't reflective of what you would think the Zero could inflict....

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Good info there Joe! If I didn't know better, I would think you have been hanging around with Rich.

Thanks Eric!

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Wow good info. I think history speaks for itself on how good the Zero really was.

 

[syscom3]

Heres what the Chino "Raiden" looks like. It would be great if they could ever get it airworthy again.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Nice looking plane though.

 

[Parmigiano]

I have found in a book the US report of a captured Zero (model 21) in comparison with the US fighters of the time (P39, P40, P38F, Wildcat and one of the first Corsairs)
According to the report, this Zero (crashed and rebuilt with a non original prop, so likely not in her best shape) is superior or holding well in comparison to the US planes, except with the Corsair.

If allowed by the policy of the site, I can scan the pages and post some .JPG (sorry, no time to manually copy the text...)
let me know, I don't want to violate some law...

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I know of the same report. A propeller had to fabricated because the Zero's propeller (and engine) rotates opposite when compared to US fighters. When they did those test, some of the simulated combat was done under 300 MPH.....

Also compared was equipment and construction methods. Except for the lack or armor and self-sealing tanks the inital captured Zeros were designed and built as well or better when compared to their western counterparts...

 

[syscom3]

one other interesting fact about the design of the Zero........ the IJN wanted the design of the airframe to allow for the engine to be changed quickly. I think it took less than 30 minutes for a complete engine change as compared to hours with the F4F.

 

[R Leonard]

If you are referring to "Informational Intelligence Summary No. 85 – Flight Characteristics of the Japanese Zero Fighter" (December 1942), you might want to carefully re-read the document. It clearly sets forth the instances were the A6M2 was found to be superior and where it was deficient. The report points to the previously identified (September 1942) rapid fall off of maneuvering ability as the A6M2 approaches 300 knots and the engine cut-out under conditions of negative Gs.

The document is US government and no longer classified (de-classified in 1958) and as such is in the public domain. In fact, you can find a copy already posted on the internet at:

http://www.warbirdforum.com/diego.pdf

The propeller on the A6M2 #4593 was the original. One blade was slightly damaged in the crash and was repaired. The "replacement" of the propeller is one of the recurring myths surrounding the restoration of # 4593. It is usually trotted out to try to explain away any performance failings. Oddly enough, had the Navy replaced the original, they would have used a Hamilton constant speed type which was essentially identical to the original.

Here is a narrative from a USN fighter pilot, an F4F ace with 2 A6M2s to his credit, who flew this aircraft in September and October of 1944:

"I first saw the captured Zero as a pile of salvage shortly after it arrived from Alaska. Soon after I was sent to the Southwest Pacific and didn't see the plane again until August 1944 while I was assigned as fighter training officer at ComFAirWest at San Diego.

"The Zero had gone to Tactical Air Intelligence Center and was based at Anacostia Naval Air Station, near Washington, D.C. After Sanders, Hoffman, and others tested, compared, and evaluated the airplane, the Army put it though similar paces.

"While fighter training officer at San Diego, I learned that Koga's Zero was still at Anacostia, airworthy, but unused. I arranged for it to be flown to San Diego. The Zero 21 was a mighty sweet machine, even in its superannuated. The refined aerodynamic design was not compromised by mass production. Fit and finish of all plates, rivets, the close and accurate fit of fairings, engine cowl, access plates, canopy, and wheel doors were most faithfully executed.

"The propeller spinner faired into a cowling that smoothed the contours of the reduction gear housing of the engine. The interior aerodynamics of the engine cowling permitted the adequate cooling of the two-row 14-cylinder engine with a remarkably small intake. Contrast that with the inlet on the F4F-3 and -4 which originally came with a spinner but had to sacrifice it to cure engine overheat problems. The Sakae engine looked and sounded much like our R-1830. It ran smoothly and cool. Displacement was somewhat less that the Pratt and Whitney 1839, but its 1130 hp was smoother and adequate. It was not supercharged as extremely as the R-1830-76/86 and at very high altitude (over 30,000 feet) compared very poorly with the Pratt and Whitney. But we hardly ever encountered Zeros above 10,000 feet with our F4F-3s and -4s, so we were carrying supercharger hardware as extra baggage. The F4F, which became the FM-2, was re-engined with the Wright R-1820 with about the same power as the R-1830, but much less supercharger. This was a better machine to fight Zeros with, but we didn't get in squadrons until 1944, and by that time the Zero was no the problem it had been in the beginning.

"By the time I was flying the Zero 21 it may have had some of its automatic systems disabled. An example is the automatic altitude compensation of carburetor mixture. The first time I went for altitude the engine began to cut up disgracefully above 5000 feet. Worried that the engine was giving up, mixture came to mind. On this machine full rich is a rearward position of the mixture control. Manual leaning comes by easing this control forward. On doing this gingerly the engine smoothed up beautifully and the airplane jumped ahead with about 500 more horses - no less.

"The propeller was auto hydraulic cum Hamilton – no mysteries. We ran the engine as though it was an R-1830, but did not let the RPM go over 2600.

"The case of the manifold pressure gauge had been cracked n the crash at Akutan and it leaked. It was left in the instrument panel, but we used a standard AN type attached to a bracket nearby.

"The throttle sat in a quadrant outboard of the mixture control. It was shaped like the handle of a knife – complete with wood side plates for contour. It was about five inches long and on the top had a switch to be operated by the left thumb. This switch was for cutting in or out the 20mm cannon.

"The Zero carried many rounds of 7.7mm for the two fuselage guns and only 80 to 100 for each of the 20mm wing guns. Ergo, sight in with the 7.7 then cut in the two 20s for telling shots. I dimly remember there was a trigger lever you could pull up and squeeze on the front edge of the throttle. If you were not in combat, this lever would drop down where inadvertent firing was precluded (we had sad events because the trigger on the stick of U.S. fighters was easily squeezed in excitement).

"Cockpit was not so tidy as the F4F, but easily as tidy as the F4U and earlier Vought birds. Instruments were much like ours, but metric for pressures, temperatures, [and] altitude. Airspeed was in knots. It had an inner and outer scale as the needle needed to go around about 1½ circles to get to the high end of the scale.

"In the Zero 52 there was an exhaust temperature gauge as well as the usual cylinder head temperature gauge. My guess is that it was a refinement to fine tune the mixture to get the remarkable endurance and range the Zero was famous for.

"Gyro horizon had a sky blue upper half like some of the German WWII instruments I have seen. To the envy of every F4F pilot, the landing gear was hydraulically actuated!

"Tail wheel was fully retracted behind tight doors. Tail hook was faired into a recess along the keel. The hook was hinged on the end of its strut, latched in the snatch position to catch the wire then dumped, so the Zero could taxi forward over other wired unimpeded. I understand we toyed with this idea but gave it up because of worries it might misbehave and cause an unarrested landing.

"Brakes were hydraulic – weak. The wide tread and relatively low landing speed favored weak brakes so you might say they were adequate. Rudder bar was center-pivoted with stirrups for each foot. Brakes were actuated by a hand lever; rudder angle determined which wheel received braking action.

"The canopy gave a beautiful view of the outside world, noticeably good to the rear in contrast to our VF's. The enclosure was made up of many panes of plexi, some contoured. Wind noise was moderate. Some of the enclosure had been destroyed and was remade by A and R.

"The windscreen section was original, for it bore deep craters from the corrosion that took place during its dip into the marsh of Akutan. These cavities had a way of coming into focus when air speeds built up. I often wondered why they had not been replaced by A and R. In VF-42 we had some nasty experiences with the original F4F windscreens blowing out on use when flying at more that 300 knots. Grumman corrected it with a beef-up that robbed us of valuable forward vision, but it ended the problem. The Zero had no such heavy structure in the first place, so it was a source of uneasiness.

"The Zero 21 had no primer for engine starting. The carburetor has a large capacity acceleration pump you feel when you moved the throttle. To start, you had the mechanic wind up the inertia starter as you wobbled up fuel pressure and work the throttle two or three times to spray in the discharge of the accelerator pump. On contact the engine rolled over readily, caught, and picked up to run without complaint.

"The carburetor barrel has an oil jacket through which circulated lube oil to combat any tendency to form ice. I'm not sure whether it was always in action of selectable from the cockpit. We never touched it as I remember. Seems a tidy way to handle ice.

"In February-March 1945 I has a dandy low-time fresh-caught Zero 52 to fly. It was much like Koga's Model 21, but heavier because of two more 20mm guns. It had a hundred or so more horses, and ejection type exhaust stakes, but flew essentially like the Model 21 – very sweet."

I'd suggest a look at Jim Reardon's "Koga Zero". There's a couple of other reports wandering around if you know where to look, such as Lt Cdr Eddie Sanders' initial evaluation "Report for Flight Test Officer – 29 September 1942" (and duplicated within the "Enemy Material Report, No 71 – Headquarters, Allied Air Forces South West Pacific Area Directorate of Intelligence") and "Technical Aviation Intelligence Brief No. 3" (4 November 1942). There is also another report from 4 September 1942, "Informational Intelligence Summary No. 59 – The Japanese Zero Fighter" that is a compilation of information based on examination of crashed aircraft from various locations and issued some 16 days before the A6M2 # 4593 was first flown by Sanders.

FWIW, the Sanders report fully describes the propeller: "The propeller is a hydraulically operated constant speed 3-blade design, 9'6" in diameter, much like ours with many parts interchangeable." Intelligence Summary No. 59 also describes the propeller used on the A6M2 and corroborates the statements of Sanders and the gent who flew the plane in 1944: "The propeller is a 3-blade, constant speed Sumitomo of the hydraulic type, and apparently identical with the Hamilton model."


Regards,

Rich

 

[FLYBOYJ]

one other interesting fact about the design of the Zero........ the IJN wanted the design of the airframe to allow for the engine to be changed quickly. I think it took less than 30 minutes for a complete engine change as compared to hours with the F4F.

I've seen F4F and Zeros up front and having changed a few large radial recips, I would say they look about the same. Maybe the differance lies in adjusting the engine controls (prop, mixture, throttle) but basically the layout seems the same.

Great information Rich!

 

[syscom3]

The engine mounts, electrical harness and the other engine accessories were all easily accessed.

Some simple "human engineering" paid lots of dividends in field maintenence.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

In looking at photos of both aircraft it seems the engine mount set up is similar. 4 engine mount points on the engine bolted on a steel tube engine mount, which in turn is bolted to the airframe, again in 4 points. it seems the zero cowl might come off easier (Eric could verify this). The F4F had a cooler intake and carburetor duct on the cowl so this would probably require removal once the cowl is off. Aside from that it's a matter of disconnecting electrical harnesses, rigging for the throttle, prop. control and mixture control and then un-bolting the engine. Some manufacturers mandate you remove the propeller first, others allow the engine and propeller to be removed together.

Once the engine is removed and the new one installed, the major consumer of time is rigging the engine. This involves setting up engine controls so they work through their designed travel and have the engine correlate those adjustments when the engine is run up after installation.

The Zero might be a bit simpler to do an engine change on but I don't think you're looking at major time difference between the two.

 

[NAVAIR]

one other interesting fact about the design of the Zero........ the IJN wanted the design of the airframe to allow for the engine to be changed quickly. I think it took less than 30 minutes for a complete engine change as compared to hours with the F4F.

Indeed, former Vought Engineers claim that the Zero's QEC package drew heavily from the Vought V-143 fighter prototype, sold to Japan in 1938. One Engineer stated that the entire accessory section layout was pure Vought.

Japan did not copy western aircraft per se, but they were wise enough to borrow useful technology, as did everyone else. Even Kurt Tank admitted to having been greatly influenced by Palmer's design (aka, the Hughes H-1). No one designs in a vacuum, not Mitchell, not Kartvelli, not Willie or even Camm. Everyone draws from the work of everyone else.

My regards,

NAVAIR