RN sends CVs to Pearl May 1942

[Admiral Beez]

After Coral Sea and knowing from intel of the coming attack on Midway et al, the USN requested Britain send carriers to support the effort. The US of course had sent USS Wasp to support the Malta run. In May 1942 Britain had three carriers in the IPTO, HMS Indomitable, Illustrious and Formidable, the latter two the US had just repaired/rebuilt. Meanwhile the USN, in defending the British/Aus territories of the Solomons and PNG had lost USS Lexington and saw the USS Yorktown. With their losses and the US' support of Britain in mind, the USN asked for British support. But Britain said no, and instead the RN sent their their carriers to take on the soft target of Vichy Madagascar with Operational Ironclad. Apparently King never forgave Britain for this, notwithstanding the loaner HMS Victorious in 1943.

Let's change this, and two if not all three RN carriers skip Ironclad and sail immediately after Coral Sea for Pearl Harbour. Now what?

 

[SaparotRob]

I wonder if the RN carriers would have operated independently of the USN carriers. There wouldn't have been much time to practice coordination between the two groups. The USN knew the IJN was going to hit Midway. The FAA and RN itself were much more practiced at night operations which would be a force multiplier, especially with radar equipped Swordfish the Admiral mentioned in an earlier thread. Would the USN have gone along with tactics "not invented here"?
The "flight to nowhere" might not have happened. There would have been more scouting planes available to scour the area where the "missing" IJN carriers were thought to have been. The Swordfish would have to be used in night attacks or suffer the same fate as the TBD's. However, would Fletcher and Spruance gone along with a night strike and give away that the US already knew of the attack? There could have been a larger CAP if the carriers operated together but if they didn't, then the IJN forces would be "diluted" having to strike at more targets at different locations. And we could see if armoured flight decks were all they were cracked up to be. (Yes IMHO).
Perhaps the British force could strike at the smaller Aleutian invasion force. The RN had some experience with bad weather and high seas I'm told.

 

[tyrodtom]

How could a useful portion of the RN get half way around the world, and it remain a secret to those you'd prefer not know it ?

And how would that effect things in areas this useful portion had been in ?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

How could a useful portion of the RN get half way around the world, and it remain a secret to those you'd prefer not know it ?

And further to your point, wouldn't the Japanese be wondering why the British picked that precise moment to send so many ships to the area the Japanese were aiming at?

 

[Glider]

A key rule is to not split your forces. Keep them together and use the strengths that both the RN and USN had.

 

[Admiral Beez]

How could a useful portion of the RN get half way around the world, and it remain a secret to those you'd prefer not know it ?

Clearly by their lack of info on USS Yorktown the Japanese lack foreign intel at PH. Columbo to Pearl Harbour is about 7,500 nmi, well within the 11,000 nmi range (@14 knots) of the Illustrious class, so the RN carriers should transit undetected to PH. Though the 22 days transit is a little long, I'd want to press the bunker tanks and run at 20 knots for ETA fifteen days. That said, a more overt transit through Darwin may worry and disrupt the IJN's planners.

Assuming the RN carriers get to Pearl undetected, imagine if at Midway IJN aerial reconnaissance was accurate and reports to Yamamoto that SIX aircraft carriers are detected! Now that would be a palm to face moment.

I wonder if the RN carriers would have operated independently of the USN carriers.

I expect if USN aircraft are available that the Americans ask to swap in USN owned and operated fighters. By 1942 the radar and FDO on the Illustrious were top notch.

 

[Admiral Beez]

A key rule is to not split your forces. Keep them together and use the strengths that both the RN and USN had.

Agreed. At Midway the IJN split their forces into four disparate groups (four fleet carriers upfront, seven battleships 500 miles behind, Midway invasion fleet behind that, two light carriers 800 miles to north at Aleutians). To your point..... they lost.

 

[MikeMeech]

After Coral Sea and knowing from intel of the coming attack on Midway et al, the USN requested Britain send carriers to support the effort. The US of course had sent USS Wasp to support the Malta run. In May 1942 Britain had three carriers in the IPTO, HMS Indomitable, Illustrious and Formidable, the latter two the US had just repaired/rebuilt. Meanwhile the USN, in defending the British/Aus territories of the Solomons and PNG had lost USS Lexington and saw the USS Yorktown. With their losses and the US' support of Britain in mind, the USN asked for British support. But Britain said no, and instead the RN sent their their carriers to take on the soft target of Vichy Madagascar with Operational Ironclad. Apparently King never forgave Britain for this, notwithstanding the loaner HMS Victorious in 1943.

Let's change this, and two if not all three RN carriers skip Ironclad and sail immediately after Coral Sea for Pearl Harbour. Now what?

Hi

Of course not undertaking 'Ironclad' would also have had consequences. The operation was to forestall any Japanese force landing on the island. Indeed not long after the British landing five Japanese submarines arrived off shore on the 29th May, 1942. These were from the IJN 4th Submarine Flotilla based at Panang, two carrying a midget submarine each the others carrying a small aircraft (Yokosuka E14Y, 'GLEN'), which also flew a reconnaissance mission over Diego Suarez harbour (they had previously undertaken recce missions off the East African coast). Two midget submarines were launched and entered the harbour sinking an oil tanker 'British Loyalty' (later refloated) and damaging HMS Ramillies. Two midget submarine crew members were later found on the island, they refused to surrender and were shot. These were Lt. Saburo Akieda and PO Masami Takemoto. So one wonders what would have happened if the Japanese had arrived before the British or 'Ironclad' had not taken place? It may be that the supply routes to the Middle East and India would have been interdicted by the Japanese using submarines and aircraft therefore causing major problems.

Mike

 

[Admiral Beez]

Of course not undertaking 'Ironclad' would also have had consequences.

Ironclad can carry on with the RN battleships, cruisers, etc. on hand. We're pulling the carriers, not the entire fleet. That said, can Japan really pull off invading and then supporting Madagascar?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Here's the CAG of the three carriers as they sailed for Pearl Harbour in early May 1942. Total 34 Martlets, 30 Fulmars, 9 Sea Hurricanes, 45 Albacores, and 21 Swordfish.

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

HMS Formidable: April 1942
* Total of 37 boosted to 49 for Indian Ocean ops.
888 Squadron: 16 Martlet
820 Squadron: 21 Albacore
803 Squadron: 12 Fulmar

HMS Illustrious: February 1942 to August 1942
* Relaxation of stowage spacing standards allowed the carrier a total air group of 45 aircraft.
881 Squadron: 12 Martlet MkII
882 Squadron: 6 Martlet MkII
806 Squadron: 6 Fulmar MkII
810 Squadron: 9 Swordfish MkI
829 Squadron: 12 Swordfish MkI

HMS Indomitable: April 1942
* Total of 45 aircraft for operations off Ceylon
800 Squadron: 12 Fulmar
880 Squadron: 9 Sea Hurricane
827 Squadron: 12 Albacore
831 Squadron: 12 Albacore

HMS Indomitable's forward lift can take the SBD Dauntless, so perhaps the Swordfish are beached and USN-operated SBDs are swapped in. Then at the conclusion the FAA can buy a dozen or so.

It's too bad the Blackburn Skua was removed from service as the Battle of Midway with its matchstick IJN carriers may have been ideal. Though the Skua won't stand up to the Zero like the Dauntless could.

 

[MikeMeech]

Ironclad can carry on with the RN battleships, cruisers, etc. on hand. We're pulling the carriers, not the entire fleet. That said, can Japan really pull off invading and then supporting Madagascar?

Hi

So any assault would have to take place without most of its air cover and air support (there was limited support from the SAAF), plus a loss of the escort vessels of the aircraft carriers? It was expected that the Vichy forces would not put up much resistance as they did in French Indo-China. Any Japanese forces would be 'supported' by the resources already on the island. As it was the Japanese submarines were operating in the Mozambique Channel, fourteen allied ships being sunk in June (59,205 tons), they were being supported by two auxiliary cruisers (Hokoku Maru and Aikoku Maru). The RN had a severe shortage of escort vessels in the area.
Also if three RN carriers go to the Pacific in 1942, what has the RN left they are not going to get back to the Indian Ocean, Med or Atlantic very quickly if needed. Why is the Pacific to be considered more important than the other theatres?

Mike

 

[Admiral Beez]

Why is the Pacific to be considered more important than the other theatres?

Because the US has intel that the Japanese are coming in full force for Midway, the US has been helping Britain from 1939 to 1942, and now they've asked for Britain's help. At Coral Sea the USN lost a carrier and many dead whilst defending British and Australian territory in the Solomons and PNG. Agreeing to this request will bolster US-British relations and give the British the opportunity to hit back at Japan, whom they've been surrendering to and fleeing from since Malaya.

Madagascar is not as important and can be cleared later of whatever Japanese forces attempt to hold the place, same as Wake Island, the Nicobar Islands, DEI and much of the Japanese held territory post VJ Day.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I wonder how far the carriers would have to steam to avoid Japanese land-based recon based in an arc throughout Indonesia to Rabaul, Mindinao, and up into the Central Pacific.

Of course, if they're seen, that could throw a wrench into Japanese plans as well. How many ships did they have based at Truk at this time? Probably some, given their designs on Port Moresby right around the same time. They also had CarDiv 5 operating in support in the same time-frame.

I think it would be pretty dicey, even disregarding Tom's point about what such a movement would reveal about Allied cryptography. Even if the Japanese spotted but could not attack the RN carriers, though, they'd still be left wondering why the Brits were making such an audacious move.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Also, according to the Micronesian National Historic Parks page, the Japanese moved their Fourth Fleet there in 1939. Combat units of 4th Fleet in Dec 1941 consisted of a couple of light cruisers, a destroyers squadron, and a submarine squadron, along with various support units (minesweepers etc).

Not sure what ships were there in May of 1942, but probably not many given the Moresby operation.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I wonder how far the carriers would have to steam to avoid Japanese land-based recon based in an arc throughout Indonesia to Rabaul, Mindinao, and up into the Central Pacific.

Perhaps a high >20 knot speed run straight south from Celyon, turning SE near Perth and around southern Australia, refuel at Melbourne and then sprint to Pearl.

they'd still be left wondering why the Brits were making such an audacious move.

The Japanese didn't seem to twig onto the idea that their codes had been broken when they arrived at Ceylon in March 1942 and no one was there. Nor did Japan consider this possibility after the USN was serendipitously placed off Midway in June 1942, or when USAAF Lightnings magically appeared to shoot down Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943.

The combination of prudent RN navigation and Japanese cryptographic incompetence should deliver our three RN carriers to Pearl Harbour with Japan unawares.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Perhaps a high >20 knot speed run straight south from Celyon, turning SE near Perth and around southern Australia, refuel at Melbourne and then sprint to Pearl.

Above you'd mentioned they could make the trip without refueling, though. If they must refuel now, that adds perhaps two days to the trip, plus the extra mileage that forced the refueling in the first place, no?

The Japanese didn't seem to twig onto the idea that their codes had been broken when they arrived at Ceylon in March 1942 and no one was there. Nor did Japan consider this possibility after the USN was serendipitously placed off Midway in June 1942, or when USAAF Lightnings magically appeared to shoot down Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943.

The Japanese changed their naval codes not long before Midway. I wonder if that was prompted by two American carriers showing up by "chance" right before Inoue was sailing into the Coral Sea?

The combination of prudent RN navigation and Japanese cryptographic incompetence should deliver our three RN carriers to Pearl Harbour with Japan unawares.

Perhaps. Or perhaps Japanese flying-boats sight them and either stick CarDiv 5 onto them, or 4th Fleet -- or both. It's a what-if, all answers are good, right?

But back to my question: was your original view that the RN carriers should go around Australia to the south? Is that factored into your fueling assessment and ETA at Pearl?

If so, puts paid to my questions, which is cool.

If not, then that should require some reconsideration, it seems to me.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Above you'd mentioned they could make the trip without refueling, though. If they must refuel now, that adds perhaps two days to the trip, plus the extra mileage that forced the refueling in the first place, no?

Two options. I can't find the figures for range at 25 knots. Wikipedia shows 11,000 nmi for the Illustrious class at 14 knots, but if we have the endurance for the 7,500 nmi then yes, we can get to Pearl Harbour in 12 days at 25 knots. Let's assume King makes his request on May 10, 1942 after Coral Sea, so ETA Pearl Harbour May 22nd.

If on the other hand we're going around Australia to avoid Japanese scouts in the Solomons we might as well stop in for gas. Columbo to Melbourne is 4,700 nmi, 7 days at 25 knots, ETA May 17th. One day for expedited refuelling, depart May 19th. Melbourne to Pearl Harbour is 4,800 nmi, another 8 days at 25 knots, arriving at Pearl Harbour on May 28th.

So, we have two options, ETA May 22nd and May 28. Either way it's tight with the Battle of Midway commencing June 4, 1942. That's not much time for the RN to do any preparing at Pearl Harbour beyond refueling. I'd want to place USN senior and ops staff on the British flagship to discuss joint ops enroute. First of all, once the RN carriers are within 900 nmi of Pearl Harbour I'd fly the British admiral (Cunningham, Sommerville, Fraser?) in a Fulmar (1,000 nmi range with drop tanks, cruise speed 204 knots) to spend several days meeting with Nimitz, Fletcher and Spruance. An Albacore might be more comfortable, but slower and no ability to defend itself.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Two options. I can't find the figures for range at 25 knots. Wikipedia shows 11,000 nmi for the Illustrious class at 14 knots, but if we have the endurance for the 7,500 nmi then yes, we can get to Pearl Harbour in 12 days at 25 knots. Let's assume King makes his request on May 10, 1942 after Coral Sea, so ETA Pearl Harbour May 22nd.

If on the other hand we're going around Australia to avoid Japanese scouts in the Solomons we might as well stop in for gas. Columbo to Melbourne is 4,700 nmi, 7 days at 25 knots, ETA May 17th. One day for expedited refuelling, depart May 19th. Melbourne to Pearl Harbour is 4,800 nmi, another 8 days at 25 knots, arriving at Pearl Harbour on May 28th.

So, we have two options, ETA May 22nd and May 28. Either way it's tight with the Battle of Midway commencing June 4, 1942. That's not much time for the RN go do any preparing at Pearl Harbour beyond refueling. I'd want to place USN senior and ops staff on the British flagship to discuss joint ops enroute.

Have you factored Japanese recon ranges into this routing?

As for joint ops, and assuming your timeline is correct, perhaps Fletcher returning to PH from Coral Sea with Yorktown et al can rendezvous with the RN carriers and get some underway training? But that seems like a stretch in a couple of senses: one, the two fleets must settle on battle-terminology to minimize misunderstandings, and two, flight ops will necessarily slow down the voyage as the winds vary and probably will be westerly through CenPac.

Not a lot of time for the first objective, because each fleet has different doctrine and operational standards; How long did it take for USS Robin to work up with Saratoga?
Were they ever combat-efficient as CarDiv1?

The second issue, of practicing air ops en route, could work against the fastest straight-line speed to PH, and that will force a choice between mutual training, and being present for the battle, perhaps.

If the British carriers in this hypothetical made PH in time to deploy for the battle at Midway, they certainly should in my mind be kept unitary, with their own doctrines, and under American orders. But would American admirals grasp British capabilities for, say, night attack?

It's not that it's a bad idea, it's just that it's fraught with difficulties.

 

[tyrodtom]

How much prior warning did US intelligence have that Midway was the target ?
They knew about when, before they knew where.
Even the US Navy had do do some fast shuffling to get forces on the scene.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

How much prior warning did US intelligence have that Midway was the target ?
They knew about when, before they knew where.
Even the US Navy had do do some fast shuffling to get forces on the scene.

IIRC, Rochefort had the low-water ruse sent by the middle of May.