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How could a useful portion of the RN get half way around the world, and it remain a secret to those you'd prefer not know it ?
Clearly by their lack of info on USS Yorktown the Japanese lack foreign intel at PH. Columbo to Pearl Harbour is about 7,500 nmi, well within the 11,000 nmi range (@14 knots) of the Illustrious class, so the RN carriers should transit undetected to PH. Though the 22 days transit is a little long, I'd want to press the bunker tanks and run at 20 knots for ETA fifteen days. That said, a more overt transit through Darwin may worry and disrupt the IJN's planners.How could a useful portion of the RN get half way around the world, and it remain a secret to those you'd prefer not know it ?
I expect if USN aircraft are available that the Americans ask to swap in USN owned and operated fighters. By 1942 the radar and FDO on the Illustrious were top notch.I wonder if the RN carriers would have operated independently of the USN carriers.
Agreed. At Midway the IJN split their forces into four disparate groups (four fleet carriers upfront, seven battleships 500 miles behind, Midway invasion fleet behind that, two light carriers 800 miles to north at Aleutians). To your point..... they lost.A key rule is to not split your forces. Keep them together and use the strengths that both the RN and USN had.
After Coral Sea and knowing from intel of the coming attack on Midway et al, the USN requested Britain send carriers to support the effort. The US of course had sent USS Wasp to support the Malta run. In May 1942 Britain had three carriers in the IPTO, HMS Indomitable, Illustrious and Formidable, the latter two the US had just repaired/rebuilt. Meanwhile the USN, in defending the British/Aus territories of the Solomons and PNG had lost USS Lexington and saw the USS Yorktown. With their losses and the US' support of Britain in mind, the USN asked for British support. But Britain said no, and instead the RN sent their their carriers to take on the soft target of Vichy Madagascar with Operational Ironclad. Apparently King never forgave Britain for this, notwithstanding the loaner HMS Victorious in 1943.
Let's change this, and two if not all three RN carriers skip Ironclad and sail immediately after Coral Sea for Pearl Harbour. Now what?
Ironclad can carry on with the RN battleships, cruisers, etc. on hand. We're pulling the carriers, not the entire fleet. That said, can Japan really pull off invading and then supporting Madagascar?Of course not undertaking 'Ironclad' would also have had consequences.
Ironclad can carry on with the RN battleships, cruisers, etc. on hand. We're pulling the carriers, not the entire fleet. That said, can Japan really pull off invading and then supporting Madagascar?
Because the US has intel that the Japanese are coming in full force for Midway, the US has been helping Britain from 1939 to 1942, and now they've asked for Britain's help. At Coral Sea the USN lost a carrier and many dead whilst defending British and Australian territory in the Solomons and PNG. Agreeing to this request will bolster US-British relations and give the British the opportunity to hit back at Japan, whom they've been surrendering to and fleeing from since Malaya.Why is the Pacific to be considered more important than the other theatres?
Perhaps a high >20 knot speed run straight south from Celyon, turning SE near Perth and around southern Australia, refuel at Melbourne and then sprint to Pearl.I wonder how far the carriers would have to steam to avoid Japanese land-based recon based in an arc throughout Indonesia to Rabaul, Mindinao, and up into the Central Pacific.
The Japanese didn't seem to twig onto the idea that their codes had been broken when they arrived at Ceylon in March 1942 and no one was there. Nor did Japan consider this possibility after the USN was serendipitously placed off Midway in June 1942, or when USAAF Lightnings magically appeared to shoot down Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943.they'd still be left wondering why the Brits were making such an audacious move.
Perhaps a high >20 knot speed run straight south from Celyon, turning SE near Perth and around southern Australia, refuel at Melbourne and then sprint to Pearl.
The Japanese didn't seem to twig onto the idea that their codes had been broken when they arrived at Ceylon in March 1942 and no one was there. Nor did Japan consider this possibility after the USN was serendipitously placed off Midway in June 1942, or when USAAF Lightnings magically appeared to shoot down Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943.
The combination of prudent RN navigation and Japanese cryptographic incompetence should deliver our three RN carriers to Pearl Harbour with Japan unawares.
Two options. I can't find the figures for range at 25 knots. Wikipedia shows 11,000 nmi for the Illustrious class at 14 knots, but if we have the endurance for the 7,500 nmi then yes, we can get to Pearl Harbour in 12 days at 25 knots. Let's assume King makes his request on May 10, 1942 after Coral Sea, so ETA Pearl Harbour May 22nd.Above you'd mentioned they could make the trip without refueling, though. If they must refuel now, that adds perhaps two days to the trip, plus the extra mileage that forced the refueling in the first place, no?
Two options. I can't find the figures for range at 25 knots. Wikipedia shows 11,000 nmi for the Illustrious class at 14 knots, but if we have the endurance for the 7,500 nmi then yes, we can get to Pearl Harbour in 12 days at 25 knots. Let's assume King makes his request on May 10, 1942 after Coral Sea, so ETA Pearl Harbour May 22nd.
If on the other hand we're going around Australia to avoid Japanese scouts in the Solomons we might as well stop in for gas. Columbo to Melbourne is 4,700 nmi, 7 days at 25 knots, ETA May 17th. One day for expedited refuelling, depart May 19th. Melbourne to Pearl Harbour is 4,800 nmi, another 8 days at 25 knots, arriving at Pearl Harbour on May 28th.
So, we have two options, ETA May 22nd and May 28. Either way it's tight with the Battle of Midway commencing June 4, 1942. That's not much time for the RN go do any preparing at Pearl Harbour beyond refueling. I'd want to place USN senior and ops staff on the British flagship to discuss joint ops enroute.
How much prior warning did US intelligence have that Midway was the target ?
They knew about when, before they knew where.
Even the US Navy had do do some fast shuffling to get forces on the scene.