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According to Mason's The Secret Years:WBK, regarding the Wellington figures, is that range or radius? If radius, that would put it with B-17 and B-24 which i find suspicious, but of course i could be wrong. But even the very rangy G4M could only do 880 nautical miles max.
Yes, and I hold a different opinion. I think it could go either way. Both navies were very skilled. Both sides had some technical edges. And for what the Brits might bring to the Pac, you'd have to equally wonder which ships the Japanese retain in home/mandated waters due to an unfriendly America.
And that raid -- which is precisely what it was -- had no capacity for putting long-term pressure on British SLoCs. This is not a real answer to my point.
Indeed I have. And I don't dismiss the Type 93s, I only pointed out that they didn't always represent the silver bullet. Of course they can be lethal. They could also miss.
As for my state of bias, I struggle to take an equitable look at these historical discussions and consider all sides. I have already said I think it would be a close-run thing dependent upon when this war happens. That said, it's still possible that I'm biased. That's possible of anyone, after all. View attachment 733820
These are rough figures, the more expensive bits, I have never seen a breakdown of the costs to this level,One engineering calculation I have seen showed that one battleship with nine 16" guns used enough material to build 50 destroyers. Perhaps twenty light cruisers ?
WBK, regarding the Wellington figures, is that range or radius? If radius, that would put it with B-17 and B-24 which i find suspicious, but of course i could be wrong. But even the very rangy G4M could only do 880 nautical miles max.
It could definitely go either way, but I think in the carrier battle, the IJN has a big advantage over the FAA which would be a severe problem for the British. Surface combat is more arguable, I lean toward IJN again here, at least initially, in large part due to the torpedoes, but it's certainly a closer match.
This is my major disagreement with you in this post. Yes, in the real world, this was a raid, albeit a powerful one. But that's only because they had to go back and contend with the USN. What did the British have to stop the Japanese from going further into the Indian Ocean, capturing Ceylon, and utlimately for example, bombing and sending in battleships and heavy cruisers to bombard ports on the coast of India itself?
Sure, but I don't think it was like 50/50. In most surface battles in the Pacific War they were major factor.
We all struggle with it, we all have biases, that's why we have long detailed debates about it. It's no biggy.
It is interesting that many of these entire classes of ships were built based on faulty intelligence. That kind of thing happened a lot in the 20th Century.
The MiG 25 was built to counter the (failed, aborted) B-70 Valkyrie double / triple supersonic fighter. Then the US, in a panic over how good the MiG 25 was (it being nowhere near as good as they thought, but it did make Mach 3), developed the F-15. So theoretically, a goof. But the F-15 ended up being an excellent fighter which was dominant in the Cold War for 20+ years and (in heavily upgraded form) is still considered somewhat viable more than 40 years after the first flight. They still fly over my neighborhood fairly often from the big nearby air base across the river from my house.
I would say from the operational history of the various battles, the heavy cruisers with the bigger guns did have a role. They seemed to punch Mike Tyson hard, and aside from the type 92 torpedoes and the battleships / battlecruisers, it seems to me that the 8" guns actually did most of the real damage in many of these battles. The shells seemed to be more accurate and a few, or even a single hit could wreck an enemy ship.
They also had a more punishing impact in bombardment.
The battleships were also clearly very useful in the surface actions, and bombardment, and in air defense for the carriers. But they use such an incredible amount of resources (both in terms of building them, and operating them) that I would agree that it is arguable if they were cost effective.
Sure, arms, and counters to them, are a never-ending race.
Well, you fight with what you have, not with what you wish you had. Or what some armchair admirals on the internet 80 years after the fact might think would have been a better force composition if history had played out slightly differently. In the end, heavy cruisers were relatively plentiful, and it was an easier decision to risk a cruiser than a BB. Committing BB's to the nighttime knife fights around Guadalcanal was a pretty ballsy (and rare!) move.
For shooting at hardened targets, sure. For non-hardened area bombardment, arguably a 6" would be better. Lots of smaller bangs tend to be more efficient than a few bigger ones, that's why cluster munitions are considered so effective in modern times.
A BB as an carrier air defense platform is wildly cost inefficient, but it did work. And the BB's did exist already, and didn't take slipway capacity away from some other sorely needed ship. All in all, probably a good way to utilize them given the situation at the time.
These are rough figures, the more expensive bits, I have never seen a breakdown of the costs to this level,
Fletcher class destroyer, 2,050 tons, 60,000 SHP, 1 fire control, no armour, 275 crew, 500 tons of fuel for 4,140 miles at 20 knots
Cleveland class cruiser, 10,000 tons, 100,000 SHP, 4 fire control, 1,470 tons armour, 992 crew, 2,200 tons fuel for 6,860 miles at 20 knots
Iowa class battleship, 45,000 tons, 212,000 SHP, 6 fire control, 10,175 tons armour, 1,921 crew, 7,900 tons fuel for 11,700 miles at 20 knots.
Bigger ship, less machinery per ton, less crew per ton, less miles per fuel ton, armour would add a lot of cost and I expect armour twice as thick would cost more than twice as much.
So 5 Fletcher class destroyers staying with a Cleveland class for 6,860 miles would need the same weight of material, 3 times the engines, 1 more fire control, about 400 extra crew and about twice the fuel.
22 Fletcher staying with an Iowa for 11,700 miles would need the same amount of material, 6 times the engines, 3.67 times the fire control, 3 times the number of crew and pushing three times the fuel.
While money has its limit as a measuring device, the attachment is total cost of ownership according to the RN in the late 1930's, note the destroyer costs are for 8 ships, in rough terms a destroyer and submarine cost about the same per year, a small cruiser 3.4 times a destroyer, a large cruiser 4.9 times and a battleship 10.7 times. Aircraft were expensive, making even a small aircraft carrier more costly than anything except a battleship, an airgroup of 36 made the carrier more expensive, an airgroup of 72 made the carrier nearly twice as expensive as a battleship.
If you just go for building costs, a small cruiser is 2.7 times the cost of a destroyer, large cruiser 4.4 times, battleship 16 times, small carrier 6.5 times, large carrier 8.1 times.
The navies all wanted a larger proportion of heavy ships during peace time, given build times and operating costs.
I'm almost certain that with the absence of the naval treaties limiting cruiser tonnage, we wouldn't have seen the glass cannon 8" cruisers at 10000 tons. A decently well balanced 8" cruiser would probably clock in at around 15000 tons.
I really don't dislike most of your comments, except when you get real mad for reasons I can't fathom. Most of the regular posters here are fine once they learn to respect you a bit. Sometimes you have to fight a bit before that happens, in almost any walk of life. When somebody throws a punch at me, I punch back, that's how I was raised. But I don't necessarily keep a grudge. The only thing that really rubs me the wrong way on here is when sometimes the spin or advocacy clearly and intentionally crosses in front of the known data. Which I haven't seen you do, really.
But sometimes you don't really make sense to me. I can live with that & it doesn't bother me or cause me to dislike your posts.
As an aside the 6pdr (57mm) had an HE round and the 6pdr was fitted to the Valentine and was standard on most Churchills prior to the ROF 75mm and, of course, the Canadian Ram II tank. Canada built about 6000 Valentines, Rams and Sextons (SP 25pdr on a Ram hull ), IIRC. Production numbers were low because Valentine and Ram production ended in 1943.re the Churchill in the Far East
The UK and Australian armies performed comparison tests on New Guinea in mid- to late-1944 to decide what tank would perform best for the upcoming projected jungle war in the Far East, and to develop operational procedures ahead of time. They used the Matilda for the baseline as the Australians considered the Matilda quite good for the jungle war. The Australians were looking for a replacement for their Matildas and the UK looking to decide what tank they should send for their own troops as well as for Australia. The 2 alternative types were the Sherman (75mm) and the Churchill (75mm & 95mm).
This is a link to a video highlighting the tests, at the Australian War Memorial website "Churchill and Sherman tanks (Tank trials)"
I have run across the complete report in digital print online somewhere, but I do not remember where. I think it is a copy of what was sent back to the UK. The video does not present the conclusions (the Churchill was considered better than the Sherman) and IIRC there are a couple of minor inaccuracies in the video (ie statements that imply things the written report did not).
This I'm not sure about.
Of all the bombardments in WW2, one of the most effective seems to have been the Japaense bombardment, by two battle-cruisers, against Henderson field. They almost knocked it out. There is really no bunker deep enough (almost) to protect against those big guns.
We can approximate it as a simple geometry problem. The blast overpressure (or shrapnel density if you prefer) spreads out into space. Recall the formula for the surface area of a sphere, S = 4*pi*r^2. So e.g. at twice the distance from the explosion the blast pressure drops to a quarter. To cover an area target with at least a specific overpressure, you need much less explosive overall if you spread it out in multiple smaller explosions rather than one big explosion in the middle.
(Now reality is of course significantly more complex than the napkin calculation above, in that a shell doesn't explode exactly symmetrically, and also half the sphere volume is air and the other half is earth, where the earth partially focuses the blast wave along the ground and partially reflects it upwards. etc etc. But the basic conclusion holds, more efficient to use multiple smaller bangs than one big boom.)
Of course, to penetrate armor plate or destroy a deep underground bunker, sure, you need a massive enough projectile, and if you haven't got it you can keep pounding all week with little effect.
AFAIU there were no deep bunkers on Henderson field. At that time wasn't it a pretty much makeshift recently constructed airstrip? They didn't even have revetments for the planes at the time IIUIC. I'm sure they had trenches for the personnel to hide in though. Not sure how fuel storage was handled, was it just a bunch of barrels stored on the perimeter of the field, or did they have trenches for the barrels/tanks etc.?
Anyway, from wikipedia Guadalcanal campaign - Wikipedia : "Over the next one hour and 23 minutes, the two battleships fired 973 14-inch (356 mm) shells ...", "Many of the shells were fragmentation shells, specifically designed to destroy land targets. The bombardment heavily damaged both runways, burned almost all of the available aviation fuel, destroyed 48 of the CAF's 90 aircraft, and killed 41 men, including six CAF pilots. "
So over 83 minutes they fired 973 shells, making for an average of 0.73 shells/minute/barrel, around half the maximum they would theoretically have been capable of (which makes sense considering it was a prolonged bombardment, time for spotting, switching aim points etc.). Going by Geoffrey Sinclair's figures above, a battleship cost between 3 and 6 times as much as a light cruiser (depending on whether you look at purchase or operating cost). If we take the middle value of 4.5, instead of those two battleships we could have 9 light cruisers. Using the figures for the Brooklyn class I calculated above (too lazy to look up values for Japanese light cruisers and guns, they might not have achieved the same rate of fire as the Americans), at half the maximum rate of fire, during those 83 minutes you'd have a rain of 9*15*9/2*83 = 50423 6" shells over Henderson field. More than enough to ruin your breakfast, I'm sure.
Though I'm quite sure no light cruiser had enough magazine capacity to go BRRRT for 83 minutes straight, so you'd have to settle for a shorter slightly less ridiculously overkill bombardment.
Alternatively, lets calculate the time it would take for the light cruiser squadron to deliver the same amount of HE to Henderson field. The 14" HE shell fired by the Kongos contained 29.5 kg HE Japan 36 cm/45 (14") 41st Year Type - NavWeaps , whereas per my previous post the American 6" HE contained 6.0 kg. So you need 973 * 29.5/6.0 = 4784 6" HE shells. Delivering those with 9 Brooklyns would take 4784/(9*15*9/2) = 8 minutes!
This also nicely demonstrates the previous point I made about being able to cram more HE into smaller shells. The 14" HE shell weighed 625 kg, so 29.5/625 = 4.7% HE content. For comparison, the 6" HE has 6.0/47.6 = 12.6% HE content.
The RAAF confined the RAF units to defence of Darwin, under 1 Wing, while 80 wing took over command of the RAAF Spitfires going north.
The RAAF Mutiny of the Aces had a number of causes, the type of operations being done was a big one, so was the way the RAAF was doing them, the RAAF had followed the Army system of largely keeping the regulars in staff positions and using hostilities only people as combat commanders. In 1945 a number of regular officers were sent to the front for combat experience, but were way behind those who had been doing it for years. It did not work very well. Throw in Australians had alcohol and the Americans did not and air forces can be good at unofficially moving important supplies. MacArthur's wither on the vine required US and RAAF units to keep applying defoliant.
The Wellington came in so many versions ranges vary as do performance quotes for given models, end 1941 your choice was Ic being built since February 1940 (Pegasus), II built from October 1940 (Merlin), III built from May 1941 (Hercules), IV from December 1940 (Twin Wasp) and VIII from December 1940 (Pegasus). RAAF Official History, mark, still air range/bomb load,
Ic 2,250/1,000, 1,805/2,750, 1,200/4,500
II 2,445/1,150, 1,725/3,500
III 2,040/1,500, 1,200/4,500
IV 1,510/4,500
VIII 1,270/3,300, 1,580/2,700, 1,900/1,800
Initial prototypes of the mark II and III were flying in 1939
RAF performance report, Ic at 30,000 pounds at 195 mph, 1,055 miles with 4,500 pounds of bombs, 1,600 miles with 2,800 pounds of bombs, 2,255 miles with 500 pounds of bombs, at 165 mph, 1,805 miles with 2,800 pounds of bombs, 2,550 miles with 500 pounds of bombs. Mark II at 32,000 pounds at 195 mph, 1,273 miles/4,500 pounds bombs, 1,580 miles/3,500 pounds, 2,245 miles 1,150 pounds, at 175 mph, 1,725 miles/3,500 pounds, 2,445 miles/1,150 pounds. Ranges have 50 minutes allowance.