Rn vs IJN

[RCAFson]

The six 35,000 tons battleships were laid down October 1937 to February 1940, commissioned April 1941 to August 1942, the 4 completed Iowas February 1943 to June 1944. It certainly took time to build the heavy guns and their mountings, but for the US it was a few months longer than the time to launch the hull, which is what production scheduling would be trying to do. The first triple 6 inch/47 turrets were delivered in February 1942, the Cleveland class began launching in November 1941, the first triple 8 inch/55 turrets were delivered in December 1942, the first Baltimore launched in July 1942.

The first two USN battleships weren't completed until sometime after they commissioned and machinery problems weren't alleviated sufficiently for them to enter service until Dec 1941.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Good timing

 

[don4331]

Re: Cost of Ships
RN numbers from early 30s:

	Maintenance cost (annual)	Aircraft cost (annual)	Capital Cost (annualized)	Mid life Refit cost (annualized over life)	Total Cost (per annum)
Single engine Airplane (Squadron of 16 A/C)	$ -	$ 862,745	$ -	$ -	$ 862,745
Twin Engined Airplane (Squadron of 16 A/C)	$ -	$ 2,000,000	$ -	$ -	$ 2,000,000
Four Engined Airplane (Squadron of 16 A/C)	$ -	$ 4,764,706	$ -	$ -	$ 4,764,706
Capital Ship	$ 1,519,607	$ 169,118	$1,507,353	$ 268,627	$ 3,464,705
Cruiser Killer	$ 1,218,137	$ 112,745	$ 983,089	$ 183,333	$ 2,525,490
Cruiser, Large	$ 916,667	$ 112,745	$ 458,824	$ 98,039	$ 1,586,275
Cruiser, Small	$ 637,255	$ 112,745	$ 281,863	$ 73,039	$ 1,104,902
Aircraft Carrier (80 A/C)	$ 1,875,000	$ 5,073,528	$1,488,971	$ 165,441	$ 8,602,939
Aircraft Carrier (36 A/C)	$ 1,250,000	$ 2,029,411	$ 992,647	$ 110,294	$ 4,382,352
Aircraft Carrier (15 A/C)	$ 784,314	$ 845,588	$ 796,569	$ 95,588	$ 2,522,059
Destroyer Flotilla (J.Class - 8 Vessels)	$ 1,627,451	$ -	$ 891,176	$ 71,078	$ 2,589,705
Submarine (1000 tons)	$ 195,098	$ -	$ 125,980	$ -	$ 321,078
Liberty Ship	$ 40,000	$ -	$ 400,000	$ -	$ 440,000

NOTES
(a) Maintenance covers the pay, victualling and miscellaneous expenses of the personnel, naval stores, fuel and armament stores consumed, and the cost of annual docking and repair.
(b) The figure for aircraft covers cost of replacing equipment (assumed life-5 years) plus annual cost of maintenance of personnel and material chargeable. It has been assumed that Capital Ships would carry 3 aircraft and Cruisers 2 aircraft.
(c) This figure represents the capital cost of building the ship divided by its 'life'. The lives assumed are:
Capital Ships 26 years
Carriers 20 years
Cruisers 23½ years
Destroyers 22 years
Submarines 14 years
(d) Large repairs take place about every ninth year of the ship's life. In the case of a Capital Ship, a second large repair takes place about the eighteenth year. The figure taken for this column represents the aggregate cost of large repair(s) divided by the vessel's life as scheduled under (c). The actual cost of large repair is, for the most part, conjectural as little or no experience has been gained of these vessels.
(e) Submarines are not subjected to 'Large Repairs'. The average annual cost of all repairs and of periodic renewal of batteries is reflected in column (a).
GENERAL
The 'Maintenance Costs' make no allowance for the non-effective liability of the personnel borne, which does not mature until years later. But if, as should be the case, it may be assumed that the reduction of any particular vessel enables a consequent reduction to be made in Vote A, there would be an eventual saving to the non-effective votes.


USS Alaska class have number of difference influences for their requirements:
The Deutschland and Myōkō-class cruisers. There was concern that the KM and IJN cruisers would be able to overwhelm USN CAs in either commerce raiding or Fleet defense. - in Fleet problem XIV, Lexington was caught and sunk by enemy forces. The Alaska's would be able to guard CVs against these threats while keeping up with CV.
The KM ugly twins/NM twins and supposed cruiser killers from IJN.
When the gov't has purse strings completely open, you ask for what you think would be useful...you'll find a use for it later.

USN high rates of fire on 6" guns were achieved by "pool cueing" the rounds into the barrel - not exactly recommended procedure (round isn't placed reliably in chamber, hurting accuracy), but it is fast.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I don't know what the cost per unit - or for operation, of the Alaska was but a ship with 12" guns, 9" armor, and excellent anti-aircraft guns (12 x dual purpose 5" and 90 lighter AA cannon) and that can do 33 knots, with a range of 12,000 nautical miles at 15 knots, is pretty appealing to me in imaginary admiral role, as just a type of fast pocket battleship.

 

[Shortround6]

For the US if you don't need the 12in guns it didn't do anything the Baltimore's could not do.
The Baltimore's and Cleveland's had the same 5in AA battery and the Baltimore's only used 8 fewer 40mm guns.
You could provide fuel for 3 Baltimore's compared to 2 Alaska's.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I don't know what the cost per unit - or for operation, of the Alaska was but a ship with 12" guns, 9" armor, and excellent anti-aircraft guns (12 x dual purpose 5" and 90 lighter AA cannon) and that can do 33 knots…

Ideal for taking on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The twins have more armour, but the faster and more heavily armed Alaskas have far superior fire control and radar. If the Renowns worried the twins the Alaskas would be worse.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Ideal for taking on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The twins have more armour, but the faster and more heavily armed Alaskas have far superior fire control and radar.

It is worth noting that the world's largest battleships were both sunk by air attack.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It is worth noting that the world's largest battleships were both sunk by air attack.

To Beezy's point, Gneisenau was rendered useless in harbor after mining and aerial bombardment, while Scharnhorst was sunk in action against a real battleship. I'd still take an Alaska over a Twin.

Of course air-power and missiles rendered all heavy ships limited to gun range obsolete ... later.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

For the US if you don't need the 12in guns it didn't do anything the Baltimore's could not do.
The Baltimore's and Cleveland's had the same 5in AA battery and the Baltimore's only used 8 fewer 40mm guns.
You could provide fuel for 3 Baltimore's compared to 2 Alaska's.

Define "need the 12in guns"...

 

[z42]

All that sounds pretty impressive, but the thing is, they bombarded Henderson field multiple times. Mostly with smaller ships firing smaller guns. Only the heavy bombardment with the 14" guns really came close to shutting it down.

IIRC most of the other bombardments were more like drive-by's done by a few destroyers and the odd light cruiser that had been escorting transports to Guadalcanal (or later themselves transporting stuff when using slow transports became untenable). Of course the results are going to be different if you park 70ktons of naval hardware in front of the airfield and blast away for more than an hour.

 

[WARSPITER]

To Beezy's point, Gneisenau was rendered useless in harbor after mining and aerial bombardment, while Scharnhorst was sunk in action against a real battleship. I'd still take an Alaska over a Twin.

Of course air-power and missiles rendered all heavy ships limited to gun range obsolete ... later.

The twelve inch guns in the Alaska's were quite potent and the armour put her in the ranks of a light battle cruiser.

As to escort duties, more lighter ships with AA and ASW capability would be better for use with carriers. The destroyers and
aircraft used against the IJN at Leyte drove off larger ships . In that fight it also became apparent that the Japanese gun laying
was out of date in concept on the larger ships as they used only manual calculations which were worked out for a world war one
scenario where ships would be travelling in lines with little to no deviation.

By 1944 ships were acting more independently and the constant changes of direction by individual ships made it very hard for the
larger Japanese vessels to use their main guns efficiently.

 

[Shortround6]

Define "need the 12in guns"...

Engage the Japanese 'equivalent' of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (both sunk before the Alaska's got in service) or a left over Kongo.

The 12in guns are "nice to have" but not needed for engaging 8in cruisers. The Baltimore's used the 335lb AP shell and had an advantage over the Japanese 8in cruisers, they also had better fire control in 1944 and having 3 Baltimore's instead of two Alaska's also gives an advantage. Also the 8in guns can fire about 1/3 faster.

As a side note the 8in guns lasted about twice as long. Granted you don't fire 12in AP very often (HE had a lower wear rate) but wearing out the guns and needing to be re-tubed is a consideration.
With the Baltimore's having 9 guns to the Japanese cruiser's 10 guns or anybody else's 8 guns the Baltimore's are either ahead or not giving up much.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The twelve inch guns in the Alaska's were quite potent and the armour put her in the ranks of a light battle cruiser.

As to escort duties, more lighter ships with AA and ASW capability would be better for use with carriers. The destroyers and
aircraft used against the IJN at Leyte drove off larger ships . In that fight it also became apparent that the Japanese gun laying
was out of date in concept on the larger ships as they used only manual calculations which were worked out for a world war one
scenario where ships would be travelling in lines with little to no deviation.

By 1944 ships were acting more independently and the constant changes of direction by individual ships made it very hard for the
larger Japanese vessels to use their main guns efficiently.

I was just reading about the Battle off Samar again last night, and this definitely occurred to me. The US destroyers and DEs were successful with their radar guided guns in large part because they were making very effective use of smoke screens and there was some (conveniently, but not necessarily unusually) intense rain squalls breaking out all around them during the fight. Also high rate of fire and ammunition capacity, well trained gun crews, brave and daring captains, and excellent damage control. This could have been an effective tactic for the British in our imagined scenario, assuming they had similar capabilities to US 1944 radar and good smoke laying capability.

Whether they could have sunk three cruisers in that situation without the help of all those TBFs and FM2s of course, is an open question. But it certainly was a remarkable action and you are right, the Japanese gun-laying systems were shown to be inferior in that battle.

It's a shame some of those guys couldn't be rescued sooner and were probably eaten by sharks.

Such an incredibly dramatic story. It's kind of incredible nobody has made a film about it yet, but it may be too complicated to portray in any meaningful manner, especially by Hollywood.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Engage the Japanese 'equivalent' of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (both sunk before the Alaska's got in service) or a left over Kongo.

The 12in guns are "nice to have" but not needed for engaging 8in cruisers. The Baltimore's used the 335lb AP shell and had an advantage over the Japanese 8in cruisers, they also had better fire control in 1944 and having 3 Baltimore's instead of two Alaska's also gives an advantage. Also the 8in guns can fire about 1/3 faster.

As a side note the 8in guns lasted about twice as long. Granted you don't fire 12in AP very often (HE had a lower wear rate) but wearing out the guns and needing to be re-tubed is a consideration.
With the Baltimore's having 9 guns to the Japanese cruiser's 10 guns or anybody else's 8 guns the Baltimore's are either ahead or not giving up much.

I think if I was going to be going into surface action against the IJN, I'd really be happy to have an Alaska or two. Of course this depends if the 12" gun systems on the Alaska had the same (apparent) advantage in accuracy that the 14" -16" guns on the battleships seemed to have. But my guess is they would have an advantage over the typical 8" gun cruiser, and definitely so over 6" gun heavy cruisers or CLs (at least in gunnery - type 93 torpedoes could still be a problem).

I also think the 12" gun is an advantage for the bombardment role.

If it's just ASW or AA cover for the carriers, I agree Baltimore class or CL Atlanta class would probably be better.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

You put two 250 lb bombs on a Wellington, and probably half of the bomb bay has an extra fuel tank put in it. You send about 30 of those to bomb the docks in Batavia or Surbaya, or oil facilities somewhere on Java, striking at about 3:00 am... two or three times a week for a couple of months. The bombs may be light but the damage will be telling, I suspect.

All the evidence suggests otherwise, even more if the British have been at peace, the 1940/41 problems of night raids locating targets, the bomb tonnages required to hurt refineries in 1944/45, the accuracy of weather reports. The proposed Wellington strikes are twice the distance of the European ones and lots of over water navigation, depending on where the allied bases are. Throw in a steep learning curve of using modern aircraft in the tropics. The Japanese had more refining capacity in Japan than their local crude oil production as far as I am aware, even though Japan as a whole was using about the same amount of oil as Australia despite having 10 times the population.

The first two USN battleships weren't completed until sometime after they commissioned and machinery problems weren't alleviated sufficiently for them to enter service until Dec 1941.

Agreed they were not ready for a time after their official commissioning, the vibration problems (which were also reported to a lesser degree for the South Dakotas but were a big problem for the Atlantas) were never completely cured. The time issue was how long it took to make the armament, which was fitted post launch, the cranes lacked the precision to lower the heavy weights directly onto the ship, so at low tide a crane would lower the armament to near the deck and the rising tide would close the remaining distance. The armament production time in the US was made comparable to laid down to launch time, in the planning anyway, as far as I am aware.

Re: Cost of Ships RN numbers from early 30s:

Interesting table but early 1930's with Liberty ships and Cruiser Killers? Early 1940's? Where the entries are comparable the dollars in the table are 4.9 times the pounds in the table I have. The single engine aircraft costs in the squadron are $53,922 each, the aircraft on the ships are $56,372.50, except for those in the 80 aircraft air group at $63,419.1 each. Sounds like the RCN received the same sort of offer as the RAN but updated.

The aircraft costs do tie into a long ago seen figure of 2 or so squadrons of Wellingtons to the King George V.

It looks like the Liberty ship lifetime is considered around 5 years. In terms of the ship yards, when it comes to Liberty ships, (EC2-S-C1), the following applies, table is ship yard, ships delivered, average cost,

Alabama / 20 / 1,958,000
Bethlehem-Fairfield / 361 / 1,755,000
California / 306 / 1,858,000
Delta / 128 / 1,939,000
Jones-Brunswick / 85 / 1,993,000
Jones-Panama City / 66 / 2,020,000
Kaiser-Vancouver / 2 / 2,703,000
Marinship / 15 / 3,012,000
New England / 228 / 1,892,000
North Carolina / 126 / 1,544,000
Oregon / 330 / 1,643,000
Permanente-Richmond #1 / 138 / 1,875,000
Permanente-Richmond #2 / 351 / 1,667,000
Rheem / 1 / 7,191,000
St Johns / 82 / 2,099,000
Southeastern / 88 / 2,043,000
Todd-Houston / 208 / 1,833,000
Walsh-Kaiser / 10 / 3,923,000

Firstly showing the advantages of mass production but also the efficiencies of the different yards. If you take a minimum of 50 ships delivered as the cut off point then costs vary between 1.5 and 2.1 million dollars each, a rather significant difference. It is clear the US expansion was so great that it could not manage, during the course of the war, to bring the spread of ship building costs down to a more reasonable figure. Or alternatively it was prepared to pay a premium for rapid delivery. It would require a breakdown of average build time by yard to see exactly what was being done.

Naval shipyards would also have varying costs for the same type of ship, but not as extreme, during peacetime anyway.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Man them guys at Rheem were strait grifters...

 

[z42]

Man them guys at Rheem were strait grifters...

On the off chance this isn't a joke, see Wright's law Learning curve - Wikipedia Experience curve effects - Wikipedia

They made only one, so it was bound to cost more compared to somebody who had streamlined their processes over many ships.

 

[Greg Boeser]

All the evidence suggests otherwise, even more if the British have been at peace, the 1940/41 problems of night raids locating targets, the bomb tonnages required to hurt refineries in 1944/45, the accuracy of weather reports. The proposed Wellington strikes are twice the distance of the European ones and lots of over water navigation, depending on where the allied bases are. Throw in a steep learning curve of using modern aircraft in the tropics. The Japanese had more refining capacity in Japan than their local crude oil production as far as I am aware, even though Japan as a whole was using about the same amount of oil as Australia despite having 10 times the population.


Agreed they were not ready for a time after their official commissioning, the vibration problems (which were also reported to a lesser degree for the South Dakotas but were a big problem for the Atlantas) were never completely cured. The time issue was how long it took to make the armament, which was fitted post launch, the cranes lacked the precision to lower the heavy weights directly onto the ship, so at low tide a crane would lower the armament to near the deck and the rising tide would close the remaining distance. The armament production time in the US was made comparable to laid down to launch time, in the planning anyway, as far as I am aware.


Interesting table but early 1930's with Liberty ships and Cruiser Killers? Early 1940's? Where the entries are comparable the dollars in the table are 4.9 times the pounds in the table I have. The single engine aircraft costs in the squadron are $53,922 each, the aircraft on the ships are $56,372.50, except for those in the 80 aircraft air group at $63,419.1 each. Sounds like the RCN received the same sort of offer as the RAN but updated.

The aircraft costs do tie into a long ago seen figure of 2 or so squadrons of Wellingtons to the King George V.

It looks like the Liberty ship lifetime is considered around 5 years. In terms of the ship yards, when it comes to Liberty ships, (EC2-S-C1), the following applies, table is ship yard, ships delivered, average cost,

Alabama / 20 / 1,958,000
Bethlehem-Fairfield / 361 / 1,755,000
California / 306 / 1,858,000
Delta / 128 / 1,939,000
Jones-Brunswick / 85 / 1,993,000
Jones-Panama City / 66 / 2,020,000
Kaiser-Vancouver / 2 / 2,703,000
Marinship / 15 / 3,012,000
New England / 228 / 1,892,000
North Carolina / 126 / 1,544,000
Oregon / 330 / 1,643,000
Permanente-Richmond #1 / 138 / 1,875,000
Permanente-Richmond #2 / 351 / 1,667,000
Rheem / 1 / 7,191,000
St Johns / 82 / 2,099,000
Southeastern / 88 / 2,043,000
Todd-Houston / 208 / 1,833,000
Walsh-Kaiser / 10 / 3,923,000

Firstly showing the advantages of mass production but also the efficiencies of the different yards. If you take a minimum of 50 ships delivered as the cut off point then costs vary between 1.5 and 2.1 million dollars each, a rather significant difference. It is clear the US expansion was so great that it could not manage, during the course of the war, to bring the spread of ship building costs down to a more reasonable figure. Or alternatively it was prepared to pay a premium for rapid delivery. It would require a breakdown of average build time by yard to see exactly what was being done.

Naval shipyards would also have varying costs for the same type of ship, but not as extreme, during peacetime anyway.

My Grandma-in-Law worked as a welder's helper in Portland, OR.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

On the off chance this isn't a joke, see Wright's law Learning curve - Wikipedia Experience curve effects - Wikipedia

They made only one, so it was bound to cost more compared to somebody who had streamlined their processes over many ships.

Where I live we have plenty of shipyards and I and many other people I know have done work for some of them at a variety of levels (from welders and inspectors to accouting and high level software services) and from my experience, corruption and military contracts are not exactly a rare combination, I'll just say that.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

All the evidence suggests otherwise, even more if the British have been at peace, the 1940/41 problems of night raids locating targets, the bomb tonnages required to hurt refineries in 1944/45, the accuracy of weather reports. The proposed Wellington strikes are twice the distance of the European ones and lots of over water navigation, depending on where the allied bases are. Throw in a steep learning curve of using modern aircraft in the tropics. The Japanese had more refining capacity in Japan than their local crude oil production as far as I am aware, even though Japan as a whole was using about the same amount of oil as Australia despite having 10 times the population.

The scenario we have been talking about for RN vs IJN is 1941-1943. The British did initially have problems targeting cities at night in 1940 - early 1941, but IIRC these were mostly worked out (including by RDF navigation aids) by mid- 1942. The Strategic bombing campaign isn't my main focus of study, but for sure by this time they (mostly SAAF) were hitting all kinds of targets, from individual ships to airfields and ports, even columns of trucks, with fairly good precision all around the Med, using Wellingtons at night (sometimes assisted by Albacores used as spotters or target markers).

The Germans were certainly ahead of the Japanese both in terms of industrial capacity and air defense. Refineries, ports and airfields in the Far East were not as built up as those in Central Europe. When a refinery was damaged in say, Romania, major components, supplies, skilled labor and parts could quickly be brought in by rail from nearby manufacturing centers. On-site foundries and machine shops could make parts and tools needed for smaller repairs. This was not necessarily the case in Java or Malaya, in fact most materiel needed to repair damaged industrial facilities of any kind would have to be brought in by ship.

I suspect Far Eastern industrial sites are more vulnerable, in part based on the rather immense amount of damage caused by a relatively small number of small to moderate sized raids consisting of fairly lightly armed (max 2,000 lb bomb load) aircraft. Such as IJA Ki-21s and IJN G3Ms and G4M against British controlled facilities in both Malaya and Burma, and against Australian and USAAF bases around Darwin.

I am not sure what makes navigating over the ocean at night necessarily more perilous than navigating over land at night. In fact many people in this forum have repeatedly insisted that navigating over the Pacific is less problematic than flying long distances over Continental Europe, specifically because unless you are flying near an enemy island base (or the unlikely event you get caught by an aircraft carrier with night-capable fighters) you can safely fly at much lower speed, and won't be targeted by either fighters or AA along the route. So, compared to flying from England to Berlin, you may be able to get farther and and with a bit more safety along route on the way to Java from Broome.

There is of course the threat of bad weather in various forms in the Pacific, but you get a lot of fog and cloud cover (blocking the stars) in the North Sea / Baltic Sea zones, and North-Central Europe more generally. In the Pacific, you have a lot of squalls and storms, but not necessarily solid cloud cover at 30,000 feet for hundreds of miles (unless there is an active Typhoon). US forces adapted to conditions in the Pacific fairly quickly, sufficient to be able to conduct effective strikes, if not to completely eliminate the risk of mission-aborts or losses. And so did the RN eventually. I suspect there are tradeoffs, neither situation is ideal if you have engine trouble two hours into your flight. But I don't think Pacific should be vastly more difficult than flying over Benelux and lower Saxony.

Black painted PBY Catalinas (so called "Black Cats") were being used to carry bombs and torpedoes long distances over the Pacific to strike Japanese shipping, ports, and airbases at night with relative impunity and a fairly high rate of success, again by 1942 (one of them hit a ship with a torpedo at Midway). Much like the Wellingtons were being used at that same time by SAAF units in the Med, and not too long after, (or so I gather) from bases in India.

I think Wellingtons, which are better bombers than a PBY, and which ultimately turned out to be particularly effective in the night intruder / night raid missions, would have had the potential to cause significant damage to the (I believe, fairly fragile) infrastructure of Japanese bases in the former colonial urban centers and logistics hubs. They were flying raids IIRC from India from not too late in the war, although I don't know a lot of details about this operational history yet. Not sure if there were any Wellingtons based in Australia in the war but I'm sure someone here does. Anyway, they certainly could have been sent there.