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I wonder how a Nelson class would do against a 16" armed Nagato class.These guns were designed in 1922 for the planned but never built G3 Battle Cruisers. This was before the WNT and the restrictions on capital ship construction. Navweaps gives the following explanation:-
"From inadequate firing trials, a mistaken theory was promulgated by the Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO) that held that a high-velocity, low-weight projectile would have superior armor penetration characteristics at large oblique angles of impact, a conclusion which was the opposite of previous findings. This theory was not substantiated by later trials, but these took place too late to affect the decision to use a lightweight APC projectile for new designs. As a result, these guns proved to be only marginally better in terms of armor penetration than the previous 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I and much less satisfactory than those older guns in terms of accuracy and barrel life."
Both very close when it comes to penetrating hits at similar ranges and weight of shot. Interesting that the British 15" BL was just as goodI wonder how a Nelson class would do against a 16" armed Nagato class.
It's too bad Nagato wasn't pelted with 16" guns of various type instead of going down (eventually) to the Bomb.Nelson would have a protection advantage against a Nagato type whereas a hit from Nelson would be unknown until it hit due the varying quality
of the Japanese armour.
That photo is of the Operation Crossroads Test Baker explosion at Bikini on 25th July 1946. In that case the bomb nicknamed "Helen of Bikini", was suspended 90ft underwater from an LSM. As a result much more damage was done to the assembled ships, and the amount of radioactive fallout was far greater than than expected.Losing so many historically important ships is a shame. Nagato, Prinz Eugin, USS Saratoga, or USS Nevada and USS Pennsylvania. Yeah, I know. $tore and maintain them where? You can't just put them in most rental garages. Still, I guess it's sort of like being sunk by gunfire.
Did the Navy kid the Air Force about missing an orange battleship with an A-bomb?
I wonder if the exodus of talent from lack of orders led to the NelRods having the worst 16" guns. Someone thought high velocity, lightweight shells would do the trick.
Well, Samurai swords of not, the Japanese were not flying around China with old Newport Biplanes from WW I, They were not using French Renault F 17 tanks in China
View attachment 755238
As the caption says. In England in 1937 for the Coronation of KGVI.
Guided tours may not have been given but you don't show up with that and have your enemies expect your torpedoes date from 1912.
You are right, good binoculars are important, but it is fact that most of the time the Allies knew something was out there, roughly where it was and in what direction it was going in well before the Japanese did during most or all of the Night battles around Guadalcanal. The Allies could have had surprise every time. They only managed it once or twice.
At Tassafaronga the Americans not only had radar images, they had visual on one Japanese ship 6 minutes before the Japanese spotted them. Both sides waited before opening fire.
The Japanese were trying to run supply drums to the men on shore. The American squadron was blown out of the water by a supply run so yes, it was a major blunder.
It was a strategic victory for the Americans because the supplies did not reach shore. A high price was paid for shortening the campaign by a few days or a week.
US commander made several errors.
He didn't know the capabilities of his own weapons.
He didn't trust his ship commanders.
He ordered the torpedo launce too late.
He ruined the torpedo attack by opening fire with his cruiser guns about 1 minute after the torpedoes were launched which gave the Japanese warning to start evading. Maybe the MK 15s would have missed anyway or malfunctioned but that does not excuse basic tactical mistake.
American cruisers did not take evasive action of their own (except for one ship) which resulted in four cruisers taking torpedo hits at within US MK 15 torpedo effective range. No extra long range needed. It's the 4th night battle (and 6th night?) and the US is still believing that it is Japanese subs operating in the waters causing them problems??
yes I have hind sight and hind sight says there was some "cover your ass" going on.
The R class were younger than the Queen Elizabeth class but were slated for replacement.And of those four were clapped out Revenge class. Dark days indeed.
As Ewen has pointed out the big bottlenecks were guns, mountings and armour, as well as size growth. The early RN dreadnoughts were about half the displacement of the WWII King George V, with about a fifth the installed power, no directors, no AA capability and minimal underwater protection (see HMS Audacious in 1914). Yes the WWII programs were curtailed by the rise of the aircraft carrier but the pre WWI were largely peace time builds as everyone tried to avoid battleship gaps. The economic strain can be seen in the way the British and Germans largely stopped laying down new dreadnoughts after WWI began.It's too bad Britain ran down its shipbuilding capability between the wars. One could argue that in those days of post-WW1 naval treaties, government war debt repayments and depression economics that a rundown was inevitable, but it was not in the nation's interest for the government to facilitate the industry's decline. The UK went from a nation that in a span of ten years from 1906 to 1916 could build AND complete thirty-five dreadnought battleships, eleven battlecruisers and over fifty turbine-powered light cruisers (20xTown, 14xC-Class, 8xArethusa, 3xActive, 2xBoadicea, 2xBlonde) to one that struggled from the mid-1930s onwards to build for the new war. For example, Britain needed five and half years (65 months) to complete the carrier HMS Implacable, even though by autumn 1942 Britain had lost five carriers and was desperately short of the type.
I was lamenting the loss of some historically significant ships to both tests.
Mr Sinclair has skipped the original problems with the R class which had some bearing on this.The R class were younger than the Queen Elizabeth class but were slated for replacement.
Yes, I also think it would be nice if there were more museums, flying warbirds etc etc, but apart from economics, I can sort of understand that in the immediate post war period, having gone through two devastating world wars in quick succession the populations didn't want to see, hear or think of those infernal death machines ever again.
And a huge amount of effort would have been required to decontaminate them all after Test Baker.It's an incredible amount of what would seem like valuable resources, metal etc., to just sink to the bottom of the ocean. A lot of effort to mine, to smelt and forge, to temper, etc. etc.
I think the question was why blow them up with nukes in the first place instead of just sailing to the scrap yards.And a huge amount of effort would have been required to decontaminate them all after Test Baker.
And a huge amount of effort would have been required to decontaminate them all after Test Baker.
The CVL Independence for example couldn't be boarded for over 3 weeks and then the time aboard was limited to 5 hours. Over the next 3 days limited numbers of personnel were allowed abord for no more than 4 hours. She was then towed first to Kwajalien, the PH then to San Francisco where she became a guinea pig for decontamination efforts.
USS Independence (CVL 22) and Operation Crossroads | Naval Historical Foundation
By John G. Lambertnavyhistory.org
And the reult of those activities was radioactive pollution of the Bay area.