- Thread starter
-
- #81
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
well, I am just trying to set a plausible scenario. Then we can discuses plausible forces involved and discuss actual technical factors which might affect combat.This is all quite interesting, (sincerely) but the point of the thread was really just to compare and contrast the naval resources, fleets and fighting machines (in the air, on the water, under the water etc.) of the two nations. And I think it's already pretty clear: The IJN was superior, even if you brought most of the RN over to contend with them. Numbers are really the main advantage the British have. Radar and functional torpedoes will help, superior cryptography will help more, but not enough to overcome the clear and blatant inferiority in aircraft, and (the more arguable but I think also pretty clear) disadvantage in warships.
And the whole point of that is just to show that the Japanese were not, in fact behind technologically or militarily. In 1941 they probably had the best, (if not the largest) navy in the world. They did gradually fall behind and stumbled in some of their weapon development in 1943, but they were still quite formidable on the world stage even into 1944, probably until after the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Only the USN could stand up to them (with the help of USAAF and RAAF air assets, and RN and RAN as well). Victory over the Japanese was neither easy nor (in my opinion) a foregone conclusion. Yes they looked weak in 1945. They had lost the war by then. Most of their fighting age men, cities, and all of their major war machines had been annihilated.
They did not look so weak in 1941, 1942, or even 1943. To the contrary, they looked terrifying.
As for scenarios, it does seem like oil in Brunei and / or Dutch East Indies would be pretty tempting. I think that was the whole point behind their attempt to push into Russian Siberia prior to Kalninin Gol (oil, I mean). Rubber in Indochina looks pretty tempting too. Bauxite (aluminum ore), copper and iron etc. in Malaya as well.
But of those 21 old cruisers 4 were AA cruisers armed only with 4" guns and lighter AA (Coventry, Curacao, Carlisle & Cairo) while Cardiff had been a Gunnery Training Ship since being withdrawn from the front line in Oct 1940.The British had 21 pre-1921 cruisers afloat in late 1941, 3 C class and one d and one Hawkins having been sunk by that time, number damaged?
However British also had 8 Leander/Perths, 4 Arethusa, 6 Dido's for small 6 in Cruisers available (or at least floating) in late 1941.
Of the 13 County class, Sussex was under long term repair from Sept 1940 to Aug 1942 having been bombed during the blitz on Glasgow.The British had built 13 eight gun 8n cruisers and two 6 gun cruisers, Only York had been sunk by Dec 1941 and that was in Crete evacuation.
The British never built another 8in cruiser, They did build 10 of the 12 gun 6in cruisers of the Southampton through Edinburgh classes and had completed 5 of the 11 Fiji's by the end of 1941 (although not all in commission? )
Crete saw a number of these cruisers sunk.
It may depend on how we view the British big 6in gun cruisers, At 8,500 to 10,500 tons they have the size of some heavy cruisers.
either the British have a bit of a deficient in heavy cruisers and out number the Japanese by about 2 to 1 in light cruisers (and a Southampton vs Kumo match up is not going to go well for the Japanese if they don't get a torpedo hit) or the British do have a numerical advantage in large cruisers even if not 8in ones.
The 1922 Washington Treaty and the 1930 London Treaty expired on 31 Dec 1936. So there was a flurry of activity in 1935/36 to design ships to use up available tonnages before its expiry. So ships like the carrier USS Wasp and the 2 British Edinburgh class cruisers come to mind.Am I mistaken in believing that the RN went to war as the only signatory that took the Washington Naval Treaty seriously (sort of)? And the resultant fleet available in 1939-41 reflected as such?
Interesting, thank you.The 1922 Washington Treaty and the 1930 London Treaty expired on 31 Dec 1936. So there was a flurry of activity in 1935/36 to design ships to use up available tonnages before its expiry. So ships like the carrier USS Wasp and the 2 British Edinburgh class cruisers come to mind.
The Japanese, in compliance with the 1922 Treaty, gave notice in Dec 1934 that they would be withdrawing from the 1922 Treaty. It was however hoped that they might be persuaded to rejoin, or at least not build ships hugely different from the limits set out in the 1936 London Treaty. Nowhere is that clearer than in Article IV(2) of the 1936 Treaty:-
"No capital ship shall carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 14 in. (356 mm.); provided however that if any of the Parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament signed at Washington on 6 February 1922, should fail to enter into an agreement to conform to this provision prior to the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, but in any case not later than 1 April 1937, the maximum calibre of gun carried by capital ships shall be 16 in. (406 mm.)."
Japan didn't sign up so the gun limit reverted to 16" on 1 April 1937.
The problem for Britain was that it needed to start its capital ship building programme as soon as possible after 31 Dec 1936 and couldn't afford to wait for a Japanese decision in the first 3 months 1937 to design a new capital ship. KGV and POW were laid down on 1 Jan 1937 after a lengthy design period. At one point in late 1935, for the space of only a few weeks, the Admiralty's choice was a battleship armed with 9x15" (3x3). Then came the 1936 Treaty.
The US on the other hand felt it could wait a bit longer, allowing the North Carolina design to be changed to incorporate the 16" gun in time to have the ship laid down in Oct 1937.
I think most signatory nations tried to comply with the 1922 Treaty, or at least no one set out to disregard them completely. One of the problems was that ship design was not an exact science. Until Washington, no one had tried to build a ship to a theoretical figure of "standard displacement" tonnage before. Everyone, including Britain, played the "game" to a greater or lesser extent (e.g. including a load of ammo in magazines capable of holding more in the event of war).
So you get the problems of the 10,000 ton Treaty cruisers. The Japanese tried to squeeze a quart into a pint pot, and found their ships had stability problems leading to weight increases to fix them. So the Myokos came out about 11,000 tons. On the other hand, despite starting later and being able to see what other nations had achieved, the US Pensacolas came out significantly underweight.
Germany of course was not a signatory to the Washington Treaty. What it could or could not do was governed by the Versailles Treaty of 1919. Hence it was able to build the Deutschlands as replacements for its old Battleships that needed replaced. Germany's next constraint was the Anglo German Naval Agreement of 1935 that allowed it to build up to approx 35% of the RN tonnage.
With no war in the ETO/MTO the plan was to convert two D-class cruisers to AA cruisers, each with 8 - 4.5in guns.But of those 21 old cruisers 4 were AA cruisers armed only with 4" guns and lighter AA (Coventry, Curacao, Carlisle & Cairo) while Cardiff had been a Gunnery Training Ship since being withdrawn from the front line in Oct 1940.
And Delhi was being converted to an AA cruiser in the USA with a main armament of 5x5"/38. She didn't return to service until May 1942 after further work in Britain plus trials etc.
Frobisher didn't rejoin the fleet until Jan 1942, having been rearming since the outbreak of WW2. She had a low priority so the work took a long time.
Nov/Dec 1941 was costly for the RN/RAN historically. Ark Royal, Barham, Sydney, Neptune & Galatea all sunk. QE & Valiant put out of action at Alexandria.
And of the 6x5.25" armed Didos, Cleopatra only completed in Dec 1941 (as did the 4.5" armed Charybdis) but Phoebe was in the USA undergoing major repairs for torpedo damage suffered in Aug and didn't return to the fleet until July 1942.
Edit - and don't forget the old HMAS Adelaide.
That is part of it. EwenS has the general consensus down pretty good. In the 1920s everybody was pretty much trying to follow the treat guidelines. But the only real limits were on Battleships, carriers and heavy cruisers. And the limits on carriers were pretty much to stop flagrant cheating. "No, that 25,000 ton ship with 6 14in guns and 6 planes on the back is NOT a carrier". Other limits include the age of the ships, you could not get rid of new ship ship that was only 5 years old and replace it with an even newer ship. There was a lot of language about was allowed and not allowed for refits/improvements.Interesting, thank you.
I was under the impression that while the Admiralty were not specifically bound to the constraints of the treaty after a certain point, they continued to order ships within the parameters, in a hope that other nations may still as well, as an attempt to keep costs down. Britain still obviously reeling from the financial affects of WWI
The plan to convert the C class ships kept chopping and changing between 1936 and 1939. First it was the remaining 11 (Coventry and Curlew having already been converted on an emergency basis in 1935/36 as a result of the Abyssinian Crisis). Then 8, excluding the 3 ships of the Caledon group with a different armament layout. 1939/40 Cairo, Calcutta, Curacao and Carlisle were converted but the outbreak of WW2 saw the already planned conversion of Capetown & Colombo cancelled. These ships proved so useful that Colombo and Caledon were converted in 1942/43 to a modified design.With no war in the ETO/MTO the plan was to convert two D-class cruisers to AA cruisers, each with 8 - 4.5in guns.
The need to concentrate on escort production delayed the completion of many larger ships.
The larger between the wars Cruisers were supposed to carry up to 3 aircraft. The Swordfish and Shark were both float capable. The specs called for the Albacore but I am not sure it went anywhere.Did the RN have any cruisers with substantial air assets, like the Tone with it's five E13s? The E13 had a substantial range of ~1,200 miles / 14 hours endurance, which made it quite effective in the recon and probably also in the ASW role. It could also carry a 250kg bomb or a depth charge. I know the British had the Walrus but it suffers quite a bit by comparison. The US OS2U was kind of in between.
Might have been desperation. Since the Japanese AA pretty much sucked maybe using the F1M was more effective than using the ships own AA?Some Japanese warships (not sure if just battleships or also cruisers) also carried the Mitsubishi F1M, which was a biplane with a relatively short range, but apparently quite maneuverable and equipped with forward firing guns, it proved capable of shooting down enemy scouts like those OS2Us etc. , and sometimes sinking PT boats and so on.
I am hoping to get to the subs at some point. Here is a major difference in the Japanese and everybody else's subs.If SR6 continues this, I'm interested to see how the IJN vs. RN submarines match up. The IJN had planes on some of their submarines too.
Which escorts are you thinking about?The need to concentrate on escort production delayed the completion of many larger ships.