Rn vs IJN

[Thumpalumpacus]

If the Skuas attack without being spotted as per the Blenheims, or the SBDs at Midway, then it is a bad day for the KB. But maybe the SBD attacks at Midway were just flukes as well?

In one sense they sure were: Enterprise SBDs damned near missed the show, only finding the KdB due to the returning destroyer and McCluskey's inspired decision to follow it; and also in the sense that EAG SBDs arrived right as YAG strike package did. Luck played a good part in the American success that day.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Totally agree. By mid 1941 the UK had a good number of Spitfires which could have been sent to the Far East.

Agreed!

The Sterling bombers would be a difficult enemy for the IJAF of the time and even Wellingtons would be far from easy, but much easier to catch. Most Japanese fighters had 2 x LMG with little or no protection, and the quad LMG turrets would be a serious threat.

I'm not so sure about that. I posted a bunch of the military history of the Ki-43 in another thread, they only had two machine guns, but proved very capable of shooting down B-24s and B-17s, as well as B-25s and other bombers. Including Wellingtons. They shot down dozens of B-24s in particular.

On the Navy side, which would also be there, A6Ms of course had two machine guns plus two 20mm cannons, and they too proved capable of shooting down B-17s and B-24s. I really don't think they would have had any trouble with Sterlings and we know they could shoot down Wellingtons.

Wellingtons, however, also demonstrated in the Med that they were pretty good at sinking ships at night with torpedoes. The Japanese didn't have a lot of night fighters. Not sure about the Pacific, but maybe there too. Wellingtons also had the range to attack commercial shipping that was too far out to sea for air cover.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

If the Skuas attack without being spotted as per the Blenheims, or the SBDs at Midway, then it is a bad day for the KB. But maybe the SBD attacks at Midway were just flukes as well?

This is the kind of incredible post that I really love.

I admire your gall in pretending you don't know the answer to this.

I still feel a little embarrassed to repeat this very basic information here, because everyone reading the thread (including you) already know this very well, but the SBDs at Midway were able to attack without being intercepted because of the simultaneous attacks by multiple waves of land and carrier based torpedo planes, which were all destroyed and scored no hits. And because the timing of the attack coincided with rearming.

Unless the FAA / RAF had large volumes of torpedo planes with the range to hit the Japanese carriers, which could attack simultaneously, I don't think this is a likely scenario. And I don't, needless to say, believe that the Skua was even close to equivalent to a D3A or an SBD.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I kind of like the Skua, I think there should have been a MK III version, perhaps with a Pegasus engine and a 1000lb bomb load..

Agreed. Though given the focus on Atlantic and MTO ops perhaps a CAG of Albacores makes more sense. I wonder if any former Skua drivers moved over to RAF Vengeance squadrons. There can't have been many in the RAF with dive bomber experience.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

One problem with the Skua is very little armor and no SS fuel tanks. The whole "bag of corks" story kind of put me off of them...

 

[Glider]

Agreed!



I'm not so sure about that. I posted a bunch of the military history of the Ki-43 in another thread, they only had two machine guns, but proved very capable of shooting down B-24s and B-17s, as well as B-25s and other bombers. Including Wellingtons. They shot down dozens of B-24s in particular.

On the Navy side, which would also be there, A6Ms of course had two machine guns plus two 20mm cannons, and they too proved capable of shooting down B-17s and B-24s. I really don't think they would have had any trouble with Sterlings and we know they could shoot down Wellingtons.

Wellingtons, however, also demonstrated in the Med that they were pretty good at sinking ships at night with torpedoes. The Japanese didn't have a lot of night fighters. Not sure about the Pacific, but maybe there too. Wellingtons also had the range to attack commercial shipping that was too far out to sea for air cover.

I dont disagree with what you say but as in so many things, its when you draw the line. If we are mid 1941 Zero's and Ki43's are rare birds, whilst the A5M and Ki27 are very common, these would be pushed to shoot down the Wellingtons and Sterlings.

 

[Admiral Beez]

One problem with the Skua is very little armor and no SS fuel tanks. The whole "bag of corks" story kind of put me off of them...

True. Still, the Skua is the very first monoplane, twin-seat, retractible undercarriage, folding wing carrier strike aircraft. All others follow in the Skua's shoes, or webbed feet.

 

[Shortround6]

True. Still, the Skua is the very first monoplane, twin-seat, retractible undercarriage, folding wing carrier strike aircraft. All others follow in the Skua's shoes, or webbed feet.

That is because the TBD had three seats.
didn't have armor or self tanks either.
With tanks in the wings corks required very, very brave men with prehensile toes.
Corks were also standard kit for Swordfish.

 

[ThomasP]

re

. . . a Fairey Swordish is not only very short-ranged compared to a D3A,

Unless the FAA / RAF had large volumes of torpedo planes with the range to hit the Japanese carriers, which could attack simultaneously, I don't think this is a likely scenario. And I don't, needless to say, believe that the Skua was even close to equivalent to a D3A or an SBD.

Swordfish Mk I (2x crew carried)
Vmax of 139 mph at 8,000 ft
Ranges at 125/105 mph cruise with 50 minutes reserve (34 USgal)
450/580 miles at 8250 lbs TOGW, 1x torpedo with 201 USgal full internal fuel
700/840 miles at 8750 lbs TOGW, 1x torpedo with 201 USgal full internal fuel + 72 USgal auxiliary fuselage tank
950/1050 miles at 8900 lbs TOGW, 2x 500 lb bombs with 201 USgal full internal fuel + 72 USgal auxiliary fuselage tank + 82 USgal external tank
Gun armament: 1x .303 cal fixed/forward, 1x or 2x .303 cal flexible defensive
NOTE
1. The auxiliary fuselage tank was carried in the navigator/observer position between the pilot and TAG
2. The auxiliary external tank was carried on the torpedo crutch


Skua Mk II (2x crew carried)
Vmax of 212 mph at 15,000 ft
Ranges at 193/157 mph cruise with 50 min reserve (24 USgal)
580/980 miles at 8225 lbs TOGW, 1x 500 lb bomb with 195 USgal full internal fuel
Gun armament: 4x .303 cal fixed/forward, 1x or 2x .303 cal flexible defensive

All of the above is from official Air Ministry documentation

 

[Shortround6]

If you put enough planes in air just about anything has shot down something (Anson vs 109 keeps coming to mind) but that is not the way the smart money bets.

All a power turret does (or several) is raise the cost of the interceptions. Maybe fewer bombers get got down with better defenses but it was not a shield anymore than more/better AA guns on ships were a shield. They changed the odds and increased the costs for the intercepting fighters.

Not all pilots were good shots. Not all air gunners were actually very good, some were. The good ones have their names written down.

 

[Admiral Beez]

That is because the TBD had three seats.
didn't have armor or self tanks either.
With tanks in the wings corks required very, very brave men with prehensile toes.
Corks were also standard kit for Swordfish.

I meant to add first all metal, folding wing, retractable undercarriage… of any seat number.

 

[RCAFson]

This is the kind of incredible post that I really love.

I admire your gall in pretending you don't know the answer to this.

I still feel a little embarrassed to repeat this very basic information here, because everyone reading the thread (including you) already know this very well, but the SBDs at Midway were able to attack without being intercepted because of the simultaneous attacks by multiple waves of land and carrier based torpedo planes, which were all destroyed and scored no hits. And because the timing of the attack coincided with rearming.

Unless the FAA / RAF had large volumes of torpedo planes with the range to hit the Japanese carriers, which could attack simultaneously, I don't think this is a likely scenario. And I don't, needless to say, believe that the Skua was even close to equivalent to a D3A or an SBD.

Sorry, but that's not an excuse to allow an unintercepted strike to destroy 3 fleet carriers in a few minutes. Even the final attack that destroyed Hiryu was not intercepted until the SBDs were in their attack dives

The IJN had no radar, poor radio coms and their consequent poor GCI capability was at the heart of their problems.

Coral Sea:

While enemy dive bombers milled about nearly overhead, the Japanese were oblivious to their presence. (First Team V1)

Midway: The IJN knew that the USN had more DBs than TBs yet their CAP at Midway seemed unconcerned about DBs and had no dedicated high CAP. Hiryu was destroyed, again by DBs when the CAP had no distractions.

Using binoculars and the Mk1 eyeball, the IJN's max detection range (if they were spotted at all) for incoming strikes was about 20nm (~25nm at best) and this gave them less than 8 minutes to direct their CAP onto an interception course at the correct altitude, before a DB would be in it's attack dive.

 

[RCAFson]

In one sense they sure were: Enterprise SBDs damned near missed the show, only finding the KdB due to the returning destroyer and McCluskey's inspired decision to follow it; and also in the sense that EAG SBDs arrived right as YAG strike package did. Luck played a good part in the American success that day.

I think we can also say that bad luck afflicted the SBDs that day, but these were problems of the USN's own making and not due to the KB's CAP. However, YAG's SBDs were not intercepted by IJN CAP either and they had essentially an uncontested attack phase.

It appears that the Japanese CAP intercepted only about one third of the Enterprise dive bombers*, with the loss of perhaps two SBDs to Zeros or antiaircraft fire in the target area. The Yorktown's Bombing Three was not even bothered by fighters, either during or after its attack. (First Team V1)

*after their attack dives.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

IJN long lance torpedoes have a wander left/right of 1km @ 32km range - not exactly the most accurate weapon (goes up to 1.5km at the 40km max range)

They are fine when launched en mass against a long line of ships sailing in line - even a blind squirrel occasionally finds a nut - but too expensive to use on regular basis. You need to be within 5km to regularly hit a single battleship sized target. Which isn't really different from RN torpedoes.

As both UK and Japan are island nations, neither is going to be practicing USW so SS effectiveness is going to be low (on par with IJN historic)

The longest Type 95 hit is likely on the USS Strong

USS Strong (DD-467), Fletcher-class destroyer home page

The image from the above website shows the path taken by the Strong in the time it took the torpedo to hit. Note that it actually crossed the torpedo's path once before being hit.

That being said, as the great Wayne Gretzky once said "You miss 100% of the shots you don't take."

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Sorry, but that's not an excuse to allow an unintercepted strike to destroy 3 fleet carriers in a few minutes. Even the final attack that destroyed Hiryu was not intercepted until the SBDs were in their attack dives

No I'm sorry that you (at least appear to) struggle to understand this. They didn't allow anything. It was a strategy. They only had so much CAP flying, and those fighters were down on the deck chasing torpedo bombers. Their fighters also had limited ammunition capacity (especially for 20mm) at that time, and needed to rearm.

Sending torpedo and dive bomber attacks simultaneously was in fact the intention, there were a lot of accidents and issues going on that day, but it turned out basically as planned in that respect. The CAP cannot be in two places at the same time simultaneously, AA guns cannot shoot at sea level and 15,000 ft simultaneously. It is similar to using torpedo attacks from two different directions, or using torpedo + skip bombing + strafing attacks simultaneously or concurrently as 5th AF repeatedly did. It is a way to confound the defenses.

The IJN had no radar, poor radio coms and their consequent poor GCI capability was at the heart of their problems.

They didn't have it at Midway, but they actually did have radar, including on carriers. Shokoku got air search radar with a 100km range by August of 1942.

Their carrier fleet was superior in many ways to the USN fleet. It was vastly superior to the RN / FAA in almost every respect (number of aircraft carried, technical capacity to launch aircraft, quality and capability of naval aircraft etc.), and continued fighting effectively and posing a serious threat to the USN, which was their only serious opponent (or potential opponent) for a long time after Midway. Needless to say the RN needed to stay well away from them until the end of the war when they had already been beaten.

As we have already looked at in detail upthread. I can go revive some of those posts if needed.

Midway: The IJN knew that the USN had more DBs than TBs yet their CAP at Midway seemed unconcerned about DBs and had no dedicated high CAP. Hiryu was destroyed, again by DBs when the CAP had no distractions.

Their CAP at Midway was very concerned about torpedoes. Nobody on either side was yet aware that the US torpedoes didn't really work.

Using binoculars and the Mk1 eyeball, the IJN's max detection range (if they were spotted at all) for incoming strikes was about 20nm (~25nm at best) and this gave them less than 8 minutes to direct their CAP onto an interception course at the correct altitude, before a DB would be in it's attack dive.

USN and FAA CAP failed to intercept bombers too on several occasions Many of which have been posted in this and other recent threads.

 

[Shortround6]

Speaking of which, you had nothing to say about the Dutch aircraft?

Pretty much that the less said the better?
But since you asked.
The Japanese have to attack French Indo-China first so perhaps the time line is deferent.

Fokker D.XXI, which was the Dutch export fighter, is at least competent. It did pretty well for the Finns. Probably dead meat against a Zero but it could probably contend with Ki.27 or shoot down Ki-21 or G3M.
As a bomber interceptor it may do alright, It's problem against the Japanese is the same problem everybody else had. It won't outmaneuver the Japanese fighters. It can't out climb them (although close) it can't outrun them (also close) it's ability to out dive is about as good as a Hurricane. Talking about the Ki-27 here. A5M is a little slower.
Nobody has protection. The D.XXI has double the guns but 1/2 the guns of a Hurricane.

The Koolhaven F.K.58 was another export fighter, Dutch made but it had been sold to the French for overseas use. Faster than the D.XXI, it may have been competent. It was pressed into service in the Battle of France but they were just delivered and the French (and the Polish pilots who were assigned to them) had trouble arming them, so they never saw any action. Another question mark.
Well it is a bit faster, 10-20mph faster than the D.XXI but it is heavier and the slightly larger wing is not enough to compensate.
Fokker G.1, the Dutch twin engined 'heavy' fighter, was heavily armed and had a decent range. Might have been vulnerable to an A6M but it could provide long range escort or intercept bombers.
It might have been vulnerable to the fixed landing gear Japanese fighters. Depending on altitude it might be only 5-10mph faster than the Ki-27 and it won't outclimb the Ki-27 or out turn it. If the Ki-27 gets in front of it then it is in trouble. G.1 might have been good against Japanese multi engine aircraft.

Fokker T.V. is a pretty reasonable bomber, at least as good as a Blenheim I'd say.
On average.......... maybe
The T.V was a 'medium' bomber, not a light bomber.
5 man crew, fat fuselage, 2 1/2 times the bomb load of the Blenheim.
Problems are it is slower 15-25mph depending on which Blenheim.
It isn't quite as maneuverable as a Blenheim.
It doesn't have the power dorsal mount of the Blenheim.
It also used "mixed" construction. Wooden wing, front fuselage duralumin, wood monocoque center section and metal tube and fabric tail.
Dutch stopped production well before the war.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The big factor at Midway of course was that we had cracked their code so we were able to prepare well in advance, and make the best use of our motley assortment of available aircraft, and they lost the element of surprise which they expected to have.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sorry, but that's not an excuse to allow an unintercepted strike to destroy 3 fleet carriers in a few minutes. Even the final attack that destroyed Hiryu was not intercepted until the SBDs were in their attack dives

The IJN had no radar, poor radio coms and their consequent poor GCI capability was at the heart of their problems.

Coral Sea:


Midway: The IJN knew that the USN had more DBs than TBs yet their CAP at Midway seemed unconcerned about DBs and had no dedicated high CAP. Hiryu was destroyed, again by DBs when the CAP had no distractions.

Using binoculars and the Mk1 eyeball, the IJN's max detection range (if they were spotted at all) for incoming strikes was about 20nm (~25nm at best) and this gave them less than 8 minutes to direct their CAP onto an interception course at the correct altitude, before a DB would be in it's attack dive.

None of this changes the flukish nature of the Midway strike, nor the role of luck involved. All such carrier battles in 1942 featured flukes like this. Until USN airplanes mounted radar and developed better fighter control, each side had a good chance of landing the first blow and carrying the day. On 4 June the Japanese simply reaped the results of a morning spent fighting off near-constant attacks.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think we can also say that bad luck afflicted the SBDs that day, but these were problems of the USN's own making and not due to the KB's CAP. However, YAG's SBDs were not intercepted by IJN CAP either and they had essentially an uncontested attack phase.



*after their attack dives.

HAG had the bad luck of being under an incompetent leader. YAG, and Scouting and Bombing 6 had the good luck of arriving almost simultaneously.

These are flukes, in that HAG acted contrary to Spruance's orders, that Japanese CAP got spent by fending off multiple uncoordinated attacks, giving their airedales no opportunity to rearm, that USS Nautilus would cause a distraction, that the DD keeping her down would lead EAG to the scene right as YAG arrived ... so yes, you are right: they were flukes that, luckily for us, went our way.

Such is war.

 

[RCAFson]

No I'm sorry that you (at least appear to) struggle to understand this. They didn't allow anything. It was a strategy. They only had so much CAP flying, and those fighters were down on the deck chasing torpedo bombers. Their fighters also had limited ammunition capacity (especially for 20mm) at that time, and needed to rearm.

Sending torpedo and dive bomber attacks simultaneously was in fact the intention, there were a lot of accidents and issues going on that day, but it turned out basically as planned in that respect. The CAP cannot be in two places at the same time simultaneously, AA guns cannot shoot at sea level and 15,000 ft simultaneously. It is similar to using torpedo attacks from two different directions, or using torpedo + skip bombing + strafing attacks simultaneously or concurrently as 5th AF repeatedly did. It is a way to confound the defenses.



They didn't have it at Midway, but they actually did have radar, including on carriers. Shokoku got air search radar with a 100km range by August of 1942.

Their carrier fleet was superior in many ways to the USN fleet. It was vastly superior to the RN / FAA in almost every respect (number of aircraft carried, technical capacity to launch aircraft, quality and capability of naval aircraft etc.), and continued fighting effectively and posing a serious threat to the USN, which was their only serious opponent (or potential opponent) for a long time after Midway. Needless to say the RN needed to stay well away from them until the end of the war when they had already been beaten.

As we have already looked at in detail upthread. I can go revive some of those posts if needed.



Their CAP at Midway was very concerned about torpedoes. Nobody on either side was yet aware that the US torpedoes didn't really work.



USN and FAA CAP failed to intercept bombers too on several occasions Many of which have been posted in this and other recent threads.

KB failure to intercept aircraft attacking KB fleet carriers at medium altitude:

9 April 1942
Coral Sea
Midway x 2

Without radar and efficient radio coms this was to be expected.