Then Japanese sighted the rest of the Allied force at a distance of 16km, and launched torpedoes, and float planes (take note, Shortround6). These then dropped flares just behind the heavy cruisers HMAS Canberra and USS Chicago, perfectly silhouetting them. Chicago was then hit by a torpedo, and a shell hit the mainmast, and Chicago retreated (without notifying other US ships). Canberra was hit by IJN heavy cruisers 24 times within two minutes, crippling the ship, leaving her listing to starboad. She was then possibly hit by a US torpedo.
Ultimate result - four Allied heavy cruisers and two destroyers sunk, 1,000 Allied sailors killed. 2 IJN cruisers and 1 light cruiser damaged, 58 killed.
Notice you left the range out of the shooting at the Canberra.
Shooting at 9000yds is a whole lot different than shooting at 18,00yds.
You might also want to find out when they launched the float planes, it sure wasn't at the same time they were launching torpedoes.
The Japanese did an excellent job with the floatplanes, it was creative. Apparently it was NOT Japanese doctrine to catapult launch floatplanes at night. An account by
Captain Ohmae claims that the floatplane crews who did the work at Savo had never catapult launched at night before. It was thought that stopping to hoist the planes over the side for a water take-off would disperse the formation and take too much time. It was a risky bit of improvisation that paid off due to good crews.
The battle of Savo was marked by extreme ineptitude by Allied commanders. And radar operators. Expecting the RN to perform that badly is like expecting to win millions buying one scratch lotto ticket.
Even the Japanese admiral in charge says that things could have gone much differently.
"The element of surprise worked to our advantage and enabled us to destroy every target taken under fire. I was greatly impressed, however, by the courageous action of the northern group of U. S. cruisers. They fought back heroically despite heavy damage sustained before they were ready for battle. Had they had even a few minutes' warning of our approach, the results of the action would have been quite different.
Prior to action I had ordered the jettisoning of all shipboard flammables—such as aviation fuel and depth charges—to reduce the chance of fire from shell hits. While my ships sustained no fires, we observed that U. S. ships, immediately they were hit, burst into flames which were soon uncontrollable."
from
The Battle of Savo Island
As has been noted before, the HMAS Hobart with the Eastern Screen was able to plot the Japanese advance, movements and retreat from it's location on eastern side of the transports. But the Hobart was not in the chain of command of the Northern or Southern force.
The Japanese did excellent work with what they had. They were also very afraid of getting caught at daylight by US carrier strikes. They also did not know the number and type of ships they were dealing with as the Japanese reconnaissance was not that good.
