Rn vs IJN (2 Viewers)

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The RN has been doing that stuff since Drake received his draft notice. Which navy had the most training and experience since, say about 1890? Tsushima? Manilla Bay? How does that compare to the experience of the Battles of the Dogger Bank, Jutland, Coronel, Falklands, Zeebrugge, ASW,...? Okay that's all I can think of now. My head hurts

Speaking as "a once upon a time" local legend myself, it really doesn't matter what you did "once upon a time". What matters in warfare, and many other things, is how good are you now. IMO the Japanese ability to develop such an excellent navy in such a short time, to go from basically "Yojimbo" to what they did at Pearl Harbor, Singapore, at Sajo Island etc., is pretty impressive. As is where they are at today, after going through the carnage of WW2.

In 1942 or 1943, the IJN looks plenty tough to me. It doesn't matter what RN did or was in WW1 or at Trafalgar. Both in terms of aircraft and aircraft carriers, and in naval warfare, the IJN looks the stronger force. They clearly have the edge in planes, in aircraft carriers, and they arguably have the edge in big guns, irrefutably in torpedoes, and it looks to me like probably in training and tactics as well, particularly for fighting at night.
 
The RN has been doing that stuff since Drake received his draft notice. Which navy had the most training and experience since, say about 1890? Tsushima? Manilla Bay? How does that compare to the experience of the Battles of the Dogger Bank, Jutland, Coronel, Falklands, Zeebrugge, ASW,...? Okay that's all I can think of now. My head hurts

... and on a more serious note, keep in mind that institutional memory is not experience.
 
Speaking as "a once upon a time" local legend myself, it really doesn't matter what you did "once upon a time". What matters in warfare, and many other things, is how good are you now. IMO the Japanese ability to develop such an excellent navy in such a short time, to go from basically "Yojimbo" to what they did at Pearl Harbor, Singapore, at Sajo Island etc., is pretty impressive. As is where they are at today, after going through the carnage of WW2.

In 1942 or 1943, the IJN looks plenty tough to me. It doesn't matter what RN did or was in WW1 or at Trafalgar. Both in terms of aircraft and aircraft carriers, and in naval warfare, the IJN looks the stronger force. They clearly have the edge in planes, in aircraft carriers, and they arguably have the edge in big guns, irrefutably in torpedoes, and it looks to me like probably in training and tactics as well, particularly for fighting at night.
Did we not just say, in this instance, no airplanes?
Now in full honesty, I kind of tune you out and I pretty much wait for SR6's summation. I wasn't keyed in to the whole thread. I noticed a post discussing performances of various the various navies. Experience was mentioned. I mentioned Drake, alluding to just how deep RN experience is. That was hyperbole and might have escaped the more pompous scholars of the world. As to the timeline, I don't know as much as I thought. I can't seem to remember any of the major Japanese fleet actions of the Great War. The experience garnered by the IJN senior and junior officers from those battles certainly would have offset the skill of the RN officers.
Again, I focused on a narrow set of posts. How and why of what may have happened was pretty much covered previously. The thread seemed to be focusing more on tactics.
 
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Especially since they did not have dive bombers at Trafalgar, at least that I know of ...

Oh yeah?

header-seagull-poop-1536x739.jpg
 
And how many hits did Exeter score in that time period? Or the three British destroyers? How many hits did Exeter score in the second engagement?

Exeter got hit by a torpedo from about 14,000 meters and got very lucky that it didn't detonate. A Dutch destroyer was hit and sunk around the same time. As it was Exeter was badly damaged, nearly crippled by gunfire by Japanese warships, not the other way around. Overall I don't think this engagement puts the RN in a good light by comparison with the Japanese.
I am sorry but this is lacking any sense of reality.

Four heavy cruisers, all of which are fresh into battle, as well as individually being bigger and considerably faster that the already damaged Exeter. In addition, lets not forget that the Japanese had an overwhelming tactical advantage, They take an hour to hit her and you think that shines a negative light on the RN!!

The Exeter would have been constantly switching targets as she couldn't let any of the Heavy Cruisers close the range. As well as manoeuvring to confuse the Japanese targeting plot as all she could do was buy time. The very fact that it took the Japanese as long as it did to hit her speaks volumes as to how well they did.
 
Speaking as "a once upon a time" local legend myself, it really doesn't matter what you did "once upon a time". What matters in warfare, and many other things, is how good are you now. IMO the Japanese ability to develop such an excellent navy in such a short time, to go from basically "Yojimbo" to what they did at Pearl Harbor, Singapore, at Sajo Island etc., is pretty impressive. As is where they are at today, after going through the carnage of WW2.

In 1942 or 1943, the IJN looks plenty tough to me. It doesn't matter what RN did or was in WW1 or at Trafalgar. Both in terms of aircraft and aircraft carriers, and in naval warfare, the IJN looks the stronger force. They clearly have the edge in planes, in aircraft carriers, and they arguably have the edge in big guns, irrefutably in torpedoes, and it looks to me like probably in training and tactics as well, particularly for fighting at night.
Go back a page, 'Professor.
 
Did we not just say, in this instance, no airplanes?
Now in full honesty, I kind of tune you out and I pretty much wait for SR6's summation. I wasn't keyed in to the whole thread. I noticed a post discussing performances of various the various navies. Experience was mentioned. I mentioned Drake, alluding to just how deep RN experience is. That was hyperbole and might have escaped the more pompous scholars of the world. As to the timeline, I don't know as much as I thought. I can't seem to remember any of the major Japanese fleet actions of the Great War. The experience garnered by the IJN senior and junior officers from those battles certainly would have offset the skill of the RN officers.
Again, I focused on a narrow set of posts. How and why of what may have happened was pretty much covered previously. The thread seemed to be focusing more on tactics.

I could care less on what you were focused on, you clearly and obviously don't know anything about the subject, which is why I typically tune you out too. You are usually good for a joke but you don't even always pull that off "professor", and this here is just a turgid jumble.
 
I am sorry but this is lacking any sense of reality.

Four heavy cruisers, all of which are fresh into battle, as well as individually being bigger and considerably faster that the already damaged Exeter. In addition, lets not forget that the Japanese had an overwhelming tactical advantage, They take an hour to hit her and you think that shines a negative light on the RN!!

You seem to be confused. There were 5 cruisers (2 heavy and 3 light) on the Allied side, plus 9 destroyers, vs 4 cruisers (2 heavy, 2 light) 14 destroyers and 10 transports on the IJN side.

The results were 2 CL sunk, 3 DD sunk, and 1 CA (Exeter) badly damaged and just about crippled. You may be thinking of the second battle in which she was finished off.

The Exeter would have been constantly switching targets as she couldn't let any of the Heavy Cruisers close the range. As well as manoeuvring to confuse the Japanese targeting plot as all she could do was buy time. The very fact that it took the Japanese as long as it did to hit her speaks volumes as to how well they did.

I'd say they did pretty well in this battle, compared to the Allied forces.
 
Then Japanese sighted the rest of the Allied force at a distance of 16km, and launched torpedoes, and float planes (take note, Shortround6). These then dropped flares just behind the heavy cruisers HMAS Canberra and USS Chicago, perfectly silhouetting them. Chicago was then hit by a torpedo, and a shell hit the mainmast, and Chicago retreated (without notifying other US ships). Canberra was hit by IJN heavy cruisers 24 times within two minutes, crippling the ship, leaving her listing to starboad. She was then possibly hit by a US torpedo.

Ultimate result - four Allied heavy cruisers and two destroyers sunk, 1,000 Allied sailors killed. 2 IJN cruisers and 1 light cruiser damaged, 58 killed.

Notice you left the range out of the shooting at the Canberra.
Shooting at 9000yds is a whole lot different than shooting at 18,00yds.

You might also want to find out when they launched the float planes, it sure wasn't at the same time they were launching torpedoes.
The Japanese did an excellent job with the floatplanes, it was creative. Apparently it was NOT Japanese doctrine to catapult launch floatplanes at night. An account by Captain Ohmae claims that the floatplane crews who did the work at Savo had never catapult launched at night before. It was thought that stopping to hoist the planes over the side for a water take-off would disperse the formation and take too much time. It was a risky bit of improvisation that paid off due to good crews.

The battle of Savo was marked by extreme ineptitude by Allied commanders. And radar operators. Expecting the RN to perform that badly is like expecting to win millions buying one scratch lotto ticket.

Even the Japanese admiral in charge says that things could have gone much differently.

"The element of surprise worked to our advantage and enabled us to destroy every target taken under fire. I was greatly impressed, however, by the courageous action of the northern group of U. S. cruisers. They fought back heroically despite heavy damage sustained before they were ready for battle. Had they had even a few minutes' warning of our approach, the results of the action would have been quite different.

Prior to action I had ordered the jettisoning of all shipboard flammables—such as aviation fuel and depth charges—to reduce the chance of fire from shell hits. While my ships sustained no fires, we observed that U. S. ships, immediately they were hit, burst into flames which were soon uncontrollable."

from The Battle of Savo Island

As has been noted before, the HMAS Hobart with the Eastern Screen was able to plot the Japanese advance, movements and retreat from it's location on eastern side of the transports. But the Hobart was not in the chain of command of the Northern or Southern force.
-Battle_of_Savo_Island_map_-_disposition_of_forces.png

The Japanese did excellent work with what they had. They were also very afraid of getting caught at daylight by US carrier strikes. They also did not know the number and type of ships they were dealing with as the Japanese reconnaissance was not that good.
 
I could care less on what you were focused on, you clearly and obviously don't know anything about the subject, which is why I typically tune you out too. You are usually good for a joke but you don't even always pull that off "professor", and this here is just a turgid jumble.
You are the expert here at turgid jumble.

PS Love turgid jumble.
 
Notice you left the range out of the shooting at the Canberra.

I wasn't able to find that. I just read the Wiki I didn't take Neptune's Inferno down from the shelf.

Shooting at 9000yds is a whole lot different than shooting at 18,00yds.

You might also want to find out when they launched the float planes, it sure wasn't at the same time they were launching torpedoes.
The Japanese did an excellent job with the floatplanes, it was creative. Apparently it was NOT Japanese doctrine to catapult launch floatplanes at night. An account by Captain Ohmae claims that the floatplane crews who did the work at Savo had never catapult launched at night before. It was thought that stopping to hoist the planes over the side for a water take-off would disperse the formation and take too much time. It was a risky bit of improvisation that paid off due to good crews.

Well, this wouldn't turn out to be the last time they did it... it was just one example. The US did it too a few times.

The battle of Savo was marked by extreme ineptitude by Allied commanders. And radar operators. Expecting the RN to perform that badly is like expecting to win millions buying one scratch lotto ticket.

I never said that they would, and I agree the Allied leadership was particularly bad in this case, however, that's not why I brought it up. I mentioned it as 1) an example of obviously pretty good gunnery by the Japanese cruisers, 2) lethal torpedoes of course, kind of goes without saying, and 3) overall competence, which included 3a) the use of seaplanes to drop flares.

Even the Japanese admiral in charge says that things could have gone much differently.

"The element of surprise worked to our advantage and enabled us to destroy every target taken under fire. I was greatly impressed, however, by the courageous action of the northern group of U. S. cruisers. They fought back heroically despite heavy damage sustained before they were ready for battle. Had they had even a few minutes' warning of our approach, the results of the action would have been quite different.

Prior to action I had ordered the jettisoning of all shipboard flammables—such as aviation fuel and depth charges—to reduce the chance of fire from shell hits. While my ships sustained no fires, we observed that U. S. ships, immediately they were hit, burst into flames which were soon uncontrollable."

from The Battle of Savo Island

Absolutely agree that he was right. Jettisoning aviation fuel before surface combat became a common ploy for wise commanders in the Pacific War.
The Battle of Savo Island
As has been noted before, the HMAS Hobart with the Eastern Screen was able to plot the Japanese advance, movements and retreat from it's location on eastern side of the transports. But the Hobart was not in the chain of command of the Northern or Southern force.
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The Japanese did excellent work with what they had. They were also very afraid of getting caught at daylight by US carrier strikes. They also did not know the number and type of ships they were dealing with as the Japanese reconnaissance was not that good.

It seems like a few individual commanders did well in the battle. The DD Patterson seems to have done pretty well, and may have helped convince the Japanese to take off prematurely.

It is not unusual, in military history in general, for bad leaders to be exposed and filtered out, hopefully pretty early on. That definitely did happen with all major naval forces in WW2. Bode (the CO of the Chicago) ended up shooting himself in 1943, after getting a scathing review.
 

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