Rn vs IJN

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That's a trip man. Is there some reason that actually makes sense that I'm missing? So many died in bomber command.
 
Flying at night in often very poor weather was considered to be the most difficult type of flying. In Coastal Command it being able to fly with precision for many hours. As a result they had the best pilots
 
Bombers usually (or often) have separate navigators though right? I think there are different versions of what a "best pilot" is, but in terms of flying the plane, maneuvering etc., it seems like you want people very skilled to fly the fighters.
 
Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
The British, kind of riffing off of the French so to speak, also kind of saved or created a lot of what turned out to be very good US aircraft designs which the US military itself was not very interested in. P-51 of course is the most famous case, but also things like the PBY, the Boston, the Hudson, the Baltimore and many others. I'm going to do a separate thread on this.
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Looking forward to it.
 
Somewhere . . . on the internet, I ran across a wright-up re the selection of pilots in the RAF during WWII. It might have been in a RAFHS publication, but I am not sure.

In the article it was mentioned that the most technically proficient pilots (during the basic/advanced flight training) were assigned to BC. The reasons given were:

1. The more technically proficient pilot was less likely to crash the aircraft during normal flight operations.
2. The more technically proficient pilot was more likely to be able to maintain proper flight procedures during emergencies.
3. The more technically proficient pilot was more likely to have the faith of his crew - something very important in multi-crew aircraft.

re #3 - I go the impression that it was a case of if a fighter pilot was not particularly proficient then the rest of hw Sqn mates would figure 'well if he crashes he will only kill himself'. Whereas if the bomber pilot lacked the confidence of his crew, they might actually refuse to fly with him.

There was more to the article.

As a side note, re #1 - In the USAF, the pilots of the B-1/-2/-52 bomber aircraft tend to be majorly senior in comparison to the pilots of the other aircraft in inventory. The last I heard the requirements were the strictest in terms of high technical proficiency, and high number of flight hours, in the USAF system.
 
Well in the case of the B-1 or B-2, that is because the single aircraft costs hundreds of millions of dollars, so that totally makes sense.

All three of those aircraft also at least at some point carried nuclear weapons, which is another 'extra' level of responsibility.

Putting super highly trained pilots in charge of a Blenheim, a Battle, or a Wellesley on a high risk mission seems a bit of a waste.

Fighter pilots are not exactly the run of the mill though in the USAF or USN.

I'd also point out that fighter pilots have to be good leaders quite often, as well. From flight leader to squadron to group. Fighter combat since the 1930s has been very much a coordinated group activity, at least in theory. It certainly was the case for the RAF in the Middle East.

There are also a lot of individual skills that a fighter pilot needs to master. Navigation and fuel and engine management 'all by yourself', because you don't have a navigator or flight engineer. Same for radio communication.

Gunnery, is another a really big one which takes a while to learn.

And I actually think takeoff and landing can be harder in some of the lighter planes with higher power-to-weight ratios.
 
Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
Well in the case of the B-1 or B-2, that is because the single aircraft costs hundreds of millions of dollars, so that totally makes sense.

All three of those aircraft also at least at some point carried nuclear weapons, which is another 'extra' level of responsibility.

Putting super highly trained pilots in charge of a Blenheim, a Battle, or a Wellesley on a high risk mission seems a bit of a waste.

Fighter pilots are not exactly the run of the mill though in the USAF or USN.

I'd also point out that fighter pilots have to be good leaders quite often, as well. From flight leader to squadron to group. Fighter combat since the 1930s has been very much a coordinated group activity, at least in theory. It certainly was the case for the RAF in the Middle East.

There are also a lot of individual skills that a fighter pilot needs to master. Navigation and fuel and engine management 'all by yourself', because you don't have a navigator or flight engineer. Same for radio communication.

Gunnery, is another a really big one which takes a while to learn.

And I actually think takeoff and landing can be harder in some of the lighter planes with higher power-to-weight ratios.
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Your points are apt, but it's still true that bomber pilots in the USAF tend to be more senior nowadays. 1st lt for an F-16, captains or majors for BUFFs at my base, never had B-1s or -2s on my base. 301st TFW CO was an LtCol. 7 BW CO was a full-bird. Reserve status of the 301st may have played a part too.
 
Today's flight screening, training, and selection programs, are much more extensive than in WWII - for a variety of reasons.

Part of it is (as you mention above) due to the cost of the systems, as well as the potential political fallout involved due to a loss of the aircraft and/or loss of life.

Part of it is due to the historical operational learning curve of most of the modern air forces, which has resulted in a reduction in the number of accidents per flight hour that would be seen as impossible by WWII standards.
 
re
Thumpalumpacus said:
1st lt for an F-16, captains or majors for BUFFs at my base, never had B-1s or -2s on my base. 301st TFW CO was an LtCol. 7 BW CO was a full-bird.
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My understanding is that the ranks, technical proficiency qualifications, and level of flight experience requirements, for the B-1 and B-2 pilots are similar to the B-52 requirements.
 
1 XPBY-1/XP3Y-1, 60 PBY-1/P3Y-1 1936/37, 50 PBY-2 1937/38, 66 PBY-3 1938, 33 PBY-4 1938/39. With a pattern of a single acceptance a few months before the rest of the production run, USN PBY-4 acceptances ended in June 1939, the XPBY-4/XPBY-5A prototype was accepted in December 1939.

PBM-1 USN contract for 21 dated 28 December 1937, first acceptance September 1940
PB2Y-2 USN contract for 6 dated 31 March 1939, first acceptance December 1940
PBY-5 USN contract for 200 dated 20 December 1939, first acceptance September 1940
Giving a gap of 14 months between PBY-4 and PBY-5 production for the USN/USCG.

After the initial orders were completed the next PBM was accepted in April 1942, the next PB2Y in June 1942.

Catalina I French contract for 30 dated 12 December 1939, to 40 in May 1940,
Catalina I British contract for 30 dated 27 January 1940, to 50 in April 1940 then to 59 by transferring an Australian order.
Catalina I production began in November 1940
Catalina II British contract for 7 dated 19 November 1940, same month as first acceptances.
 
PBY-6A was in production till the end. PBYs served for air sea rescue when the PBMs began to arrive.
 
Shortround6 said:
Well, if the other US commanders had been as good as Lee or even close, Iron bottom sound would have a different name. Like Japanese bottom sound.
Just how many time in row did it take for the Japanese to steam into an area, get spotted on radar, get to rifle distance of American ships and turn what should have been a crushing ambush into a catastrophic defeat for the Americans.

Not looking for "suspect". How about some actual facts.
Scoreboard stats don't tell you how it was done.

You are correct, however, since most of the Battles in the Guadalcanal area took place at 10,000 yds or under, the extra range of the Japanese torpedoes didn't make much difference to that series of battles. Believing that the Japanese could not make a 10,000yd torpedo was just stupid. Both the US and Britain had 10,000yd (and over) torpedoes in 1916. Believing the Japanese could not equal that 24-26 years later was just stupid.
As we now know the 13,000-15,000yd torpedo wasn't even close to what the Japanese could do but to believe the Japanese were stuck at 1910-1914 levels took an extra level of stupidity.

Everybody wants the best equipment they can get. Radar was a big help but it could not give accurate enough range and bearing for firing alone for much of the war. But knowing where to look was a big advantage, so was having a pretty good idea of how many enemy ships there were and where they were even if you can's see all of them with you binoculars was a big advantage.
Taking losses is one thing, things can happen. But snatching defeat from the Jaws of Victory because of stupid decisions, repeatedly, takes the total opposite of genius.

The "Battle of Friday the 13th" might not have been a huge victory for the US but it should not have been the colossal screw up it was. Better night glasses for the US would not have improved much. About 1/2 of the US ships knew where the Japanese were minutes before either side opened fire. They may not have known exactly what they were, but they knew were they were and pretty much the course and speed. Problem was the US commander didn't know (because he was on the ship with crappy radar) and he didn't believe the reports he was getting from the other US ships.
Japanese night glasses weren't "all seeing" either or the Laffey would never have passed the Hiei at 20 feet.

1942 communications were not good enough to pass targeting information from one ship to another.

Ships had star shell, but, a big but, you need to decide which ships or which guns on a ship, are going to provide star shell illumination for the formation as whole. The guns have to loaded with star shell to begin with or the shells handy for fuse adjustment when ordered. You need standard battle orders and you need specific battle orders, Ship X which was supposed to provide star shell, is down for refueling or repair, which ship/s take over the star shell job that night? Are the captains supposed to guess? This is so every ship/crew knows their job before the enemy shows up.

In the Spring of 1941 the British not only had the battle of Cape Mattapan, they had the Bismarck chase, which was greatly assisted by radar. Yes the cruisers lost the Bismarck at times but contact was held for considerable amounts of time by radar. In 1941 the British may not have been giving all of their secrets away to the Americans. There is a difference between giving away the radar itself and giving away the tactics/techniques or in some cases, just getting the tactics/techniques distributed.
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The Japanese realized later on in the war that great range was not all that useful and reduced the range of both the Type 93 and 95 torpedoes in favor of larger warheads.

The track of the torpedo that sank the USS Strong vs the track of the Strong itself shows how fluky it is to obtain hit at 20,000 yds.
1711369580840.png

From:
 
RCAFson said:
The RN was also far ahead of the USN in night fighting training and technology. Radar was icing on the cake of the RN's intensive night action training.

I will add another link to this dissertation which carefully explains how far behind the curve the USN was in terms of night fighting:

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy into an Effective Night-Fighting Force During theSolomon Islands Campaign, 1942 - 1943

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Agreed. Those that are actually interested in the night fighting capacities of the RN rather than pontificating that the British were bad at because they were ...British, should read this:
After the failure at Jutland the RN became very interested in night fighting. In 1929 they introduced the ALR plotting table to increase situational awareness. This was very successful and actually displayed the position of the ship via a circle on light on the plotting paper an advanced technique for the time.

In 1925 The Naval War Manual stated "If contact between capital ships has not been made during the day or if the day action has been indecisive, the Admiral will decide whether or not to seek to seek a night action between ships..."
Admiral Chatfield became commander of the Mediterranean fleet on 1930. He wrote "that night fighting will be our great opportunity in the next war. We would surprise the enemy by our proficiency."
Admiral Cunningham commanding the destroyers in the Med from 1934 to 36 practiced night expecises even resulting in a collision between Echo and Encounter as well as many close calls.
Admiral Drax in 1932 " It is fundamentally wrong that officers should afraid of or be taught to avoid, night action."
In 1937 the Amtaey issued a silent film on controlling night torpedo firing based on the results of an exercise.
The combined fleet maneuver of March 1934 showed that the RN was very serious about night fighting and had developed a significant capability:
"With his battleships deployed on a line-of-bearing to keep their "A" arcs open , Fisher closed on the Blue forces until, at a range of just under seven thousand yards he ordered simultaneous illumination by star shell and searchlight. The effect was devastating and there was never any doubt on either side that that Fisher would have achieved the complete destruction of the of the Blue main body with little loss."
The revised Battle Instructions of 1934 stated "nights action between heavy ships ....must be taken advantage of when circumstances require." The Royal Navy was the only navy in the world that entered WWII with the expectation that their battle fleet would fight at night. The Japanese did expect their Kongos to fight at night but not their battleships.
 
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Reluctant Poster said:
The Japanese realized later on in the war that great range was not all that useful and reduced the range of both the Type 93 and 95 torpedoes in favor of larger warheads.

The track of the torpedo that sank the USS Strong vs the track of the Strong itself shows how fluky it is to obtain hit at 20,000 yds.
View attachment 770519
From:
Click to expand...

That assumes they only fired one torpedo, when in fact it was more typical for each ship to launch a dozen or more, and the entire formation to shoot a spread of dozens or scores of torpedoes toward the apparent destination of the enemy ships. This often worked, as we know.

The Italians actually had a fairly successful type of air launched torpedo which ran in ever widening spirals, with the goal of hitting ships in the vicinity.

Motobomba - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org

Ultimately the thing that mattered most with torpedoes, as with guns and bombs, was range and accuracy, more than warhead size. That's why various types of self guided torpedoes became so common postwar.
 
Reluctant Poster said:
Agreed. Those that are actually interested in the night fighting capacities of the RN rather than pontificating that the British were bad at because they were ...British,
Click to expand...

I think it might help in understanding these matters, if you approach it from the perspective that "The British, like all other nations involved in the conflict, did have some limitations in their military capabilities, and did make significant mistakes during WW2. Rather than assuming complete perfection in all matters by our own country and see only the errors of others, it may be helpful to understand both our mistakes and our triumphs. This way we may win even more victories in the future."


View: https://youtu.be/akbzRuZmqVM?t=9

Rather than attack anyone who ever suggests that the Royal Navy was beyond reproach, doesn't it make more sense just to put the history into it's actual context? The US certainly made plenty of mistakes in WW2, and had plenty of limitations (torpedo immediately comes to mind). As did the Japanese, Germans, Italians, Russians and Dutch.

Reluctant Poster said:
should read this:
After the failure at Jutland the RN became very interested in night fighting. In 1929 they introduced the ALR plotting table to increase situational awareness. This was very successful and actually displayed the position of the ship via a circle on light on the plotting paper an advanced technique for the time.

In 1925 The Naval War Manual stated "If contact between capital ships has not been made during the day or if the day action has been indecisive, the Admiral will decide whether or not to seek to seek a night action between ships..."
Admiral Chatfield became commander of the Mediterranean fleet on 1930. He wrote "that night fighting will be our great opportunity in the next war. We would surprise the enemy by our proficiency."
Admiral Cunningham commanding the destroyers in the Med from 1934 to 36 practiced night expecises even resulting in a collision between Echo and Encounter as well as many close calls.
Admiral Drax in 1932 " It is fundamentally wrong that officers should afraid of or be taught to avoid, night action."
In 1937 the Amtaey issued a silent film on controlling night torpedo firing based on the results of an exercise.
Click to expand...

It's great that they practiced some night fighting.

Reluctant Poster said:
The combined fleet maneuver of March 1934 showed that the RN was very serious about night fighting and had developed a significant capability:
"With his battleships deployed on a line-of-bearing to keep their "A" arcs open , Fisher closed on the Blue forces until, at a range of just under seven thousand yards he ordered simultaneous illumination by star shell and searchlight. The effect was devastating and there was never any doubt on either side that that Fisher would have achieved the complete destruction of the of the Blue main body with little loss."
Click to expand...

During the war, searchlights generally came to be viewed as very risky to use. Aircraft carriers, and at night - destroyers and light cruisers armed with long range torpedoes ended up being more decisive than battleships, though it was hard to see that coming in 1934.

Reluctant Poster said:
The revised Battle Instructions of 1934 stated "nights action between heavy ships ....must be taken advantage of when circumstances require." The Royal Navy was the only navy in the world that entered WWII with the expectation that their battle fleet would fight at night. The Japanese did expect their Kongos to fight at night but not their battleships.
Click to expand...

And yet we can see, that though the Japanese focused on night combat late in the war, they clearly excelled at it.
 
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Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
Aircraft carriers, and at night - destroyers and light cruisers armed with long range torpedoes ended up being more decisive than battleships, though it was hard to see that coming in 1934.
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In part because of the scarcity of actions involving battleships. Which kind of skews the evaluation.

How many surface actions did the Japanese fight that involved battleships? (including Battle cruisers).
How many times did the Japanese even use BB as anti-aircraft support for the carriers (of course Japanese BBs had crap AA anyway).

The Japanese could not replace lost BBs and kept them away from risky areas (combat) for much of the war.
The British were not quite so risk adverse, maybe they should have been?

British fired off more BB ammo by the end of 1941 than Japan did either for the whole war or at least until Oct 1944. This is ship to ship, not shore bombardment.

In fact the Japanese may have only engaged in Ship to Ship combat using BB 3 or 4 times? Of course neither did the US, or not much more.
This is ship to ship, not Battleship to battle ship which may be even rarer.

With such a small data set it is hard to judge actual potential.
 
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