Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
That's a trip man. Is there some reason that actually makes sense that I'm missing? So many died in bomber command.
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You want the best handling the most complex machines. Also, offense wins wars. Defense at best keeps you from losing.That's a trip man. Is there some reason that actually makes sense that I'm missing? So many died in bomber command.
The British, kind of riffing off of the French so to speak, also kind of saved or created a lot of what turned out to be very good US aircraft designs which the US military itself was not very interested in. P-51 of course is the most famous case, but also things like the PBY, the Boston, the Hudson, the Baltimore and many others. I'm going to do a separate thread on this.
Well in the case of the B-1 or B-2, that is because the single aircraft costs hundreds of millions of dollars, so that totally makes sense.
All three of those aircraft also at least at some point carried nuclear weapons, which is another 'extra' level of responsibility.
Putting super highly trained pilots in charge of a Blenheim, a Battle, or a Wellesley on a high risk mission seems a bit of a waste.
Fighter pilots are not exactly the run of the mill though in the USAF or USN.
I'd also point out that fighter pilots have to be good leaders quite often, as well. From flight leader to squadron to group. Fighter combat since the 1930s has been very much a coordinated group activity, at least in theory. It certainly was the case for the RAF in the Middle East.
There are also a lot of individual skills that a fighter pilot needs to master. Navigation and fuel and engine management 'all by yourself', because you don't have a navigator or flight engineer. Same for radio communication.
Gunnery, is another a really big one which takes a while to learn.
And I actually think takeoff and landing can be harder in some of the lighter planes with higher power-to-weight ratios.
1st lt for an F-16, captains or majors for BUFFs at my base, never had B-1s or -2s on my base. 301st TFW CO was an LtCol. 7 BW CO was a full-bird.
The Japanese realized later on in the war that great range was not all that useful and reduced the range of both the Type 93 and 95 torpedoes in favor of larger warheads.Well, if the other US commanders had been as good as Lee or even close, Iron bottom sound would have a different name. Like Japanese bottom sound.
Just how many time in row did it take for the Japanese to steam into an area, get spotted on radar, get to rifle distance of American ships and turn what should have been a crushing ambush into a catastrophic defeat for the Americans.
Not looking for "suspect". How about some actual facts.
Scoreboard stats don't tell you how it was done.
You are correct, however, since most of the Battles in the Guadalcanal area took place at 10,000 yds or under, the extra range of the Japanese torpedoes didn't make much difference to that series of battles. Believing that the Japanese could not make a 10,000yd torpedo was just stupid. Both the US and Britain had 10,000yd (and over) torpedoes in 1916. Believing the Japanese could not equal that 24-26 years later was just stupid.
As we now know the 13,000-15,000yd torpedo wasn't even close to what the Japanese could do but to believe the Japanese were stuck at 1910-1914 levels took an extra level of stupidity.
Everybody wants the best equipment they can get. Radar was a big help but it could not give accurate enough range and bearing for firing alone for much of the war. But knowing where to look was a big advantage, so was having a pretty good idea of how many enemy ships there were and where they were even if you can's see all of them with you binoculars was a big advantage.
Taking losses is one thing, things can happen. But snatching defeat from the Jaws of Victory because of stupid decisions, repeatedly, takes the total opposite of genius.
The "Battle of Friday the 13th" might not have been a huge victory for the US but it should not have been the colossal screw up it was. Better night glasses for the US would not have improved much. About 1/2 of the US ships knew where the Japanese were minutes before either side opened fire. They may not have known exactly what they were, but they knew were they were and pretty much the course and speed. Problem was the US commander didn't know (because he was on the ship with crappy radar) and he didn't believe the reports he was getting from the other US ships.
Japanese night glasses weren't "all seeing" either or the Laffey would never have passed the Hiei at 20 feet.
1942 communications were not good enough to pass targeting information from one ship to another.
Ships had star shell, but, a big but, you need to decide which ships or which guns on a ship, are going to provide star shell illumination for the formation as whole. The guns have to loaded with star shell to begin with or the shells handy for fuse adjustment when ordered. You need standard battle orders and you need specific battle orders, Ship X which was supposed to provide star shell, is down for refueling or repair, which ship/s take over the star shell job that night? Are the captains supposed to guess? This is so every ship/crew knows their job before the enemy shows up.
In the Spring of 1941 the British not only had the battle of Cape Mattapan, they had the Bismarck chase, which was greatly assisted by radar. Yes the cruisers lost the Bismarck at times but contact was held for considerable amounts of time by radar. In 1941 the British may not have been giving all of their secrets away to the Americans. There is a difference between giving away the radar itself and giving away the tactics/techniques or in some cases, just getting the tactics/techniques distributed.
Agreed. Those that are actually interested in the night fighting capacities of the RN rather than pontificating that the British were bad at because they were ...British, should read this:The RN was also far ahead of the USN in night fighting training and technology. Radar was icing on the cake of the RN's intensive night action training.
I will add another link to this dissertation which carefully explains how far behind the curve the USN was in terms of night fighting:
The Evolution of the U.S. Navy into an Effective Night-Fighting Force During theSolomon Islands Campaign, 1942 - 1943
The Japanese realized later on in the war that great range was not all that useful and reduced the range of both the Type 93 and 95 torpedoes in favor of larger warheads.
The track of the torpedo that sank the USS Strong vs the track of the Strong itself shows how fluky it is to obtain hit at 20,000 yds.
View attachment 770519
From:
Agreed. Those that are actually interested in the night fighting capacities of the RN rather than pontificating that the British were bad at because they were ...British,
should read this:
After the failure at Jutland the RN became very interested in night fighting. In 1929 they introduced the ALR plotting table to increase situational awareness. This was very successful and actually displayed the position of the ship via a circle on light on the plotting paper an advanced technique for the time.
In 1925 The Naval War Manual stated "If contact between capital ships has not been made during the day or if the day action has been indecisive, the Admiral will decide whether or not to seek to seek a night action between ships..."
Admiral Chatfield became commander of the Mediterranean fleet on 1930. He wrote "that night fighting will be our great opportunity in the next war. We would surprise the enemy by our proficiency."
Admiral Cunningham commanding the destroyers in the Med from 1934 to 36 practiced night expecises even resulting in a collision between Echo and Encounter as well as many close calls.
Admiral Drax in 1932 " It is fundamentally wrong that officers should afraid of or be taught to avoid, night action."
In 1937 the Amtaey issued a silent film on controlling night torpedo firing based on the results of an exercise.
The combined fleet maneuver of March 1934 showed that the RN was very serious about night fighting and had developed a significant capability:
"With his battleships deployed on a line-of-bearing to keep their "A" arcs open , Fisher closed on the Blue forces until, at a range of just under seven thousand yards he ordered simultaneous illumination by star shell and searchlight. The effect was devastating and there was never any doubt on either side that that Fisher would have achieved the complete destruction of the of the Blue main body with little loss."
The revised Battle Instructions of 1934 stated "nights action between heavy ships ....must be taken advantage of when circumstances require." The Royal Navy was the only navy in the world that entered WWII with the expectation that their battle fleet would fight at night. The Japanese did expect their Kongos to fight at night but not their battleships.
In part because of the scarcity of actions involving battleships. Which kind of skews the evaluation.Aircraft carriers, and at night - destroyers and light cruisers armed with long range torpedoes ended up being more decisive than battleships, though it was hard to see that coming in 1934.