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But there was some oil production in Persia, and they had struck oil in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the 1930s. ARAMCO was established in 1943.
Much information here about Middle East oil production.How long would it take to expand whatever was going in Iraq and Egypt? I.e. trying to assess the Axis chances of conquest in the Middle East.
I agree, but then again, I like a nice rear end...I think it looks slightly silly that the rear turret is so high, but yes, the Littorios are very pretty.
Much information here about Middle East oil production.
Problem for the Axis is how to get to the major ME oilfields in the Gulf and Iraq before the allies destroy the facilities. Look at the distances involved. Egypt is small in comparison.
Cairo to Abadan - 1000 miles
Cairo to Kirkuk in Iraq - 850 miles
All this largely over desert, with all the supplies having to be shipped from Italy or Greece. Bit of a nightmare even if the Med Fleet and RAF have to withdraw.
Alternatives?
Tripoli in Lebanon to Kirkuk - 500 miles. But how to get there? By sea? Sailing past British bases in Cyprus & Egypt?
By comparison Tripoli in Libya to Cairo is 1100 miles as the crow flies, 1300 by road.
Other options:-
Via Turkey? Big logistics problems there getting troops and supplies through the Balkans and Turkey due to lack of railways. Done to death on the Axis History Forum a couple of years back ISTR.
Via the Caucasus? First the Germans have to get there (capturing Soviet oilfields along the way)
In 1941, prior to the outbreak of war with Japan Britain occupied Syria & Lebanon and ,along with the USSR , Persia /Iran. It intended to reinforce military assets in the region against the possibility of invasion via Turkey or the Caucasus, the latter in the event of a Soviet collapse. Itvwas these assets that were diverted to the Far East in Dec 1941. The ME region would not be given up without a fight.
Well everything depends onOk but let me play devil's advocate here a bit.
First, there is some oil drilling going on near Cairo, right? So that is something right there. If there is already a refinery in Haifa that can be repaired too.
The main pipeline was as from Kirkuk in Iraq to Haifa with a spur to Tripoli (Lebanon) which was turned off after the French Armistice. There was no pipeline linking that to oilfields and refineries in the Gulf itself in WW2. There were also a dozen or so pumping stations along the route. Those would be less easy to replace. And 500 miles of pipeline are impossible to protect 24/7. That leaves it vulnerable to attacks by Special Forces (LRDG/SAS/SBS/Popski's Private Army were all active in the Middle East).Second, though those distances are indeed very long, and the Axis were limited in the amount of motor transport they had etc., they did manage to accomplish some extraordinary things in terms of projecting their armed forces quite long distances. Kursk is 1894 kilometers / 1180 miles from Dresden or Berlin, by road. Similar distance to Leningrad.
Budapest to Sevastopol is 2000 km / 1242 miles (again, by road).
Graz to Athens is 1670 km / 1037 miles
But they obviously managed to get a lot of men, weapons of war, materiel and supplies out to those distances.
Third, if there were already pipelines from Iran and Iraq, those could probably be repaired rather than built anew.
Fourth Abadan is 1000 + to Cairo over land. But if the Germans and Italians conquered Egypt, possibly the German or Italian navy could operate in the Persian Gulf and bring petrochemicals and oil through the Red Sea. Admittedly, that's a long and potentially perilous voyage, but might be easier to manage.
Second, though those distances are indeed very long, and the Axis were limited in the amount of motor transport they had etc., they did manage to accomplish some extraordinary things in terms of projecting their armed forces quite long distances. Kursk is 1894 kilometers / 1180 miles from Dresden or Berlin, by road. Similar distance to Leningrad.
Budapest to Sevastopol is 2000 km / 1242 miles (again, by road).
Graz to Athens is 1670 km / 1037 miles
But they obviously managed to get a lot of men, weapons of war, materiel and supplies out to those distances.
Third, if there were already pipelines from Iran and Iraq, those could probably be repaired rather than built anew.
Fourth Abadan is 1000 + to Cairo over land. But if the Germans and Italians conquered Egypt, possibly the German or Italian navy could operate in the Persian Gulf and bring petrochemicals and oil through the Red Sea. Admittedly, that's a long and potentially perilous voyage, but might be easier to manage.
I think Hitler's biggest incorrect assumption was that Stalin would fold like the Czar did in WWI - threaten Moscow/St. Petersburg and he would sue for peace. Then Germany gets both food and oil production from Ukraine/Caucasus.I think the Axis powers in general may have really dropped the ball by not committing more assets to North Africa much earlier. Instead of - or at least before- say, conquering Yugoslavia and Greece.. (although those do go together with taking Egypt). Maybe a more focused and less wide invasion of Russia.
Maybe skip the Battle of Britain which was a massive drain of resources.
I don't know, but it seems like taking Egypt was closer to feasibility in 1941-42 than taking Stalingrad / Caucasus oil fields was, as we can see with the benefit of hindsight.
Whilst I agree wholeheartedly Stalin also wasn't fazed by casualty lists, military or civilian, human life meant nothing to him, maybe less than nothing if that's possible.Stalin wasn't a Czar's whose family had lived in Moscow/St. Petersburg for generations, so threatening those cities didn't faze him.
The torpedo boats in referenced in the original post,One reason was the greater range : diesel engined S-Boot compared to the US gasoline powered PTs.
The following graphs are fromMuch information here about Middle East oil production.
Problem for the Axis is how to get to the major ME oilfields in the Gulf and Iraq before the allies destroy the facilities. Look at the distances involved. Egypt is small in comparison.
Cairo to Abadan - 1000 miles
Cairo to Kirkuk in Iraq - 850 miles
All this largely over desert, with all the supplies having to be shipped from Italy or Greece. Bit of a nightmare even if the Med Fleet and RAF have to withdraw.
Alternatives?
Tripoli in Lebanon to Kirkuk - 500 miles. But how to get there? By sea? Sailing past British bases in Cyprus & Egypt?
By comparison Tripoli in Libya to Cairo is 1100 miles as the crow flies, 1300 by road.
Other options:-
Via Turkey? Big logistics problems there getting troops and supplies through the Balkans and Turkey due to lack of railways. Done to death on the Axis History Forum a couple of years back ISTR.
Via the Caucasus? First the Germans have to get there (capturing Soviet oilfields along the way)
In 1941, prior to the outbreak of war with Japan Britain occupied Syria & Lebanon and ,along with the USSR , Persia /Iran. It intended to reinforce military assets in the region against the possibility of invasion via Turkey or the Caucasus, the latter in the event of a Soviet collapse. Itvwas these assets that were diverted to the Far East in Dec 1941. The ME region would not be given up without a fight.
As for the weapons carried they were well matched with 4 x 4in each but the Type 39 was a lot faster, 33kts to 25kts.The torpedo boats in referenced in the original post,
"9/10 July 1943 3 Hunt class destroyers attacked a convoy protected by 5 minesweepers managing to sink only one minesweeper. In turn the Hunts were attacked by T-24 & T-25 (Type 39 "Elbing" class torpedo boats - small destroyers) and came off worst. All the Hunts were damaged, Melbreak badly, while the German TB escaped with splinter damage."
were small destroyers, not S-boats. They were actually larger than the Hunt Class destroyers they often faced.
View attachment 780596
But then they wouldn't be Nazis.A less destructive march through Belarus/arming Ukraine against Russia might have got Germans to Caucasus without 1/2 the effort. But that would require SS looking after the local populations from the Heer.
The same could be said for the IJN. Their record as night fighters supreme is distorted by the two spectacular victories at Savo Island and Tassafaronga , which are indeed two of the most one sided naval battles ever fought , but those two victories bookended three failures. The Japanese night fighting record in 1942 was far from perfect. Cape Esperance was clearly a loss for the Japanese despite the typical confusion on the American side. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was a loss for the Japanese despite having a far superior force and again while facing an extraordinarily disorganized American force. The follow up Second Naval Battle was a case of being overwhelmed by a far superior American force, but it still interesting to note that the one time the Type 93 torpedo had the chance to accomplish the mission it was designed for it failed to score a single hit on the American battleships.Taranto was aircraft only, launched at max range from off the Greek coast.
But sadly it was not all good news for the RN in its night surface actions in WW2, particularly in the English Channel.
9/10 July 1943 3 Hunt class destroyers attacked a convoy protected by 5 minesweepers managing to sink only one minesweeper. In turn the Hunts were attacked by T-24 & T-25 (Type 39 "Elbing" class torpedo boats - small destroyers) and came off worst. All the Hunts were damaged, Melbreak badly, while the German TB escaped with splinter damage.
Then from 5/6 Sept 1943 to 22/23 Oct 1943 the RN ran 10 Operation Tunnel sorties along the French Coast from Cherbourg to Brest. These used a mix of Hunt class and fleet destroyers and half included a cruiser. Only 2 engaged the enemy and neither represented success for the RN.
3/4 Oct 2 fleet & 3 Hunt were sent to attack a coastal convoy. Instead 4xT39 found them. In the following confused action the 2 fleet destroyers were damaged (partly blue on blue & partly enemy) while the Germans suffered splinter damage only.
22/23 Oct 2 fleet & 4 Hunt destroyers and the "Toothless Terror" Dido class AA cruiser Charybdis were again sent to intercept a convoy but instead ran into 5 T39 TB, who succeeded in getting the drop on the British force. The result was the cruiser Charybdis torpedoed & sunk, the Hunt, Limbourne, torpedoed and scuttled. The cause was a mix of things - poor planning at short notice, recent changes of command in some ships, CO of the operation in Charybdis had no experience of these operations as his ship had been operating in the Med and on the Gib convoy routes immediately prior to this assignment, disparity of speed amongst the RN ships, the "right" equipment was spread amongst the ships and communications were poor.
Operations began again in Jan 1944, with another 12 Tunnels through to the end of April 1944 of which only 2 met the enemy. These all involved the big Tribal class and after 4/5 Feb the Hunts were dropped. The ships also had the opportunity to work together regularly and practice Night Encounter Exercises. Better support was available from Coastal Command & Coastal Forces. Success came with the final Tunnel on 26/27 April when the cruiser Black Prince and 4 Tribals set out to intercept a convoy. This time the German commander made a mistake and his 3xT39 ran into the RN force. The T29 was sunk and the other 2 damaged. The T24 & T27 we're intercepted a couple of days later by the Tribals, then involved in another operation. T24 was sunk and T27 driven ashore for RAF to complete her destruction.
These operations set the scene for the more successful operations in the Bay of Biscay between June & Aug 1944.
From the German perspective, they had the advantage of their coastal radars being able to track the RN warships. And the routes used by the RN warships pretty much had to follow defined paths to avoid minefields and coastal gun batteries. And there were ports into which convoys could seek shelter if detected.
A perusal of the data on the NavWeaps site shows the motive performance of the British and Japanese aerial torpedoes to be similar. The Japanese have an advantage in warhead size over the Mark XII that the British entered the war with, but the British match the size when they introduce the Mark XV in 1943. This also has the much superior Torpex filling. Later in the war the Japanese trade speed for warhead as they did for their submarine and surface vessel torpedoes.They were all good but in different degrees.
Japanese 18in aerial torpedoes don't seem to have much advantage over British 18in Torpedoes for most of the war. Both types were modified several times during the war so let's make sure we are comparing the correct versions and not comparing 1944 specs for earlier battles, for both sides.
Here's an account of that action:The torpedo boats in referenced in the original post,
"9/10 July 1943 3 Hunt class destroyers attacked a convoy protected by 5 minesweepers managing to sink only one minesweeper. In turn the Hunts were attacked by T-24 & T-25 (Type 39 "Elbing" class torpedo boats - small destroyers) and came off worst. All the Hunts were damaged, Melbreak badly, while the German TB escaped with splinter damage."
were small destroyers, not S-boats. They were actually larger than the Hunt Class destroyers they often faced.
View attachment 780596
It's not that slim a record. It's an impressive list of warships attacked and even sunk, It's a better record if you compare it with the RAF and FAA record, surely?The combat record of the Japanese aerial torpedoes is surprisingly slim. Note that the larger warships sunk were also struck by bombs and/or submarine launched torpedoes
Not including the Pearl Harbor attack:
Sunk by aerial torpedoes
Aircraft Carrier
Lexington
Yorktown
Hornet
Battleship
Prince of Wales
Repulse
Heavy Cruiser
Chicago
Destroyer
Meredith
Twiggs
ADP
McKean
Damaged by aerial torpedoes
Battleship
Maryland
Light Carrier
Independence
Heavy Cruiser
2nd Houston
2nd Canberra
Light Cruiser
Denver
Birmingham
Destroyer
Jarvis
La Vallette