Russians didn't need Allied help for victory

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We've had this conversation before IIRC. I said then and I say now ....Hitler's Nazi would have never broken through the Urals ... the war without help would have been 2-3 more years and millions more dead.

Russia held at Moscow ... the regime held at Moscow ... and that is the key to Russia's victory. By Stalingrad it was clear that Nazis could be bled white ... by Kursk the Russians knew how to play and win ... their way.

The war in the East was ideological in a way the western front never was .... and Communism as a means of social organization triumphed. The food and equipment was much appreciated by those who used it and were fed by it ... and it would have been tougher without, but there is no doubt in my mind that Russia would have held at the Urals.

MM
 
Wow. How anyone could look at the true statistics of WW2 and assume it was a possibility that Germany would lose to Russia is beyond me.

Lets assume US never enters, Hitler makes peace with Britain and continues the war against Russia. TO make it easier for Russia, We'll assume the Japanese threat to Siberia is removed.

Let's look at the GDP

Country 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
USA 800 869 943 1094 1235 1399 1499 1474
UK 284 287 316 344 353 361 346 331
France 186 199 164 130 116 110 93 101
Italy 141 151 147 144 145 137 117 92
USSR 359 366 417 359 274 305 362 343
Germany 351 384 387 412 417 426 437 310

Germany out produces Russia here. Not by a huge margin, but they still do. And this is with constant US and GB bombing of Germany, which would not happen if they were neutral.

Also look at wartime expenditures in billions of US dollars:
artime expenditures during the Second World War 1939-1945

Country Billion U.S. dollars
(for prices in 1946: $ 1 = approximately £ 0.25 = approximately RM 2.22)
U.S.A. $ 341.491
Germany $ 270.000
Soviet Union (Russia) $ 192.000

AFV Losses on the Eastern Front:

Year German Losses Russian Losses
1941 2,758 20,500
1942 2,648 15,000
1943 6,362 22,400
1944 6,434 16,900
1945 7,382 8,700
Total 25,584 83,500

Russia out produced Germany in WW2 in regards to AFV's, but Russian AFV's were lost at a much higher rate. Reasons - better infantry anti tank capabilities by German infantry, better tactics by armored commanders, and the fact that the T-34, while a very good tank was inferior in many ways to German tanks, it's 76mm and 85mm performed far worse than German tank guns of similar power.

Germany marginally out produced Russia - and on the battlefield had a clear superiority when and if combatting an equal number of soviet forces. It would not have been easy, by German definitely would have won.
 
stona said:
One word....manpower.

Cheers

Steve
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If you compare the populations and GDP of the European Axis countries and the Soviet Union then its a lot closer than you think. Approximate 1940 figures Axis population (not including Japan) 200 million to 190 million Soviet. Axis GDP 1940 (not including Japan) 550 billion $ to 417 billion $ Soviet.
 
The Romanians and others proved themselves to be utterly irrelevant, as at Stalingrad. It is only necessary to compare Germany to the Soviet Union. By 1943 the USSR already had nearly 3 million more people under arms than Germany.
Cheers
Steve
 
I can understand that the Soviet Union had a good reserve of manpower to draw on and after regrouping and grinding down Germany's initial assault, were able to mount a counter-attack and eventually drove the Germans back to Berlin. That also came at a terrible cost in the way of lives lost.

However, consider that if Germany were not involved in North Africa and if there were no assets engaged in the southern and western frontiers, then those assets would have been dedicated to the initial invasion. If, historically, Germany were able to drive as far and as hard as they did with the assets actually employed, how much more of a success would Germany have enjoyed with the additional land and air units of the Afrika corps as well as the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht units from continental Europe?

This means that the Afrika corps (with or without Rommel) would have been available. Add to that the assigned transport and supply units of North Africa and the Mediterranean. Also add to that, the Luftwaffe units that were assigned to North Africa and the MTO. This alone is a substantial amount of men and equipment.

We can also look at the Kreigsmarine operating without challenge from the Royal Navy, so this would supplement the invasion by way of lending full support to the Crimea and Sevastopol as well as Leningrad and other key targets.

With all of these additional assets, it seems to me that the Red Army would have been horribly bled from the onset, much worse than it actually was. The push by the Wehrmacht would have been much harder and key positions where the Red Army was able to historically make a stand would have been overwhelmed...
 
The Romanians were good and brave soldiers, they just suffered from poor leadership, antiquated tactics and lack of proper Art and AT guns. German leadership realized too late it has to prep up their Allies with some modern heavy equipment they couldn't build or afford themselves. More or less the same could be said about Hungarians and Italians.
 
As it was Germany came very close to winning the war in the east. If Russia hadn't had the support of Lend Least there is a very good chance they would have lost. Russian transport was very dependent on Allied equipment. The Hurricanes and Valentines may not have been class leading but they helped hold the line until more modern equipment came on stream. In other areas such as radar and communication equipment to help with command and control western equipment was very valuable, indeed irreplaceable.
The numbers game is always interesting but war is far more complex than that.
 
 
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Part II of II

Russia out produced Germany in WW2 in regards to AFV's, but Russian AFV's were lost at a much higher rate.
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Early on yes, later on, the actuall exchange rates I think became much closer, probably from 1944 on about 2.3:1, dropping to about 0.9:1 by the end of the war. Russians always (until the very end lost more tanks, but they could afford to. I dont count, incidentally a tank knocked out, recovered, and returned to service, exactly the same as the german statisitcs are presented. In 1941, for example, if the all AQFVs removed from the effectives list are applied to the heer, as this list appears to be doing for the Russian losses, then German AFV losses are closer to 5000. The daily situation reports in December 1941 were reporting daily runner rates down to about 0-10% for most formations. These, at that time, were effective losses, but by the following thaw, about 60-80% of German tanks that had been knocked out, had returned and were not included in the quarterly quarter master reports. Russians didnt worry about such reporting fripperies, hence in the post war re-writes of history, they dont look so hot.


True to an extent 1941-3, but not true 1943-5. gun power incidentally was a relatively minor course for losses, and the quality of German infantry compared to the better guards units a highly questionable claim. German artillery was the key to their defences, but far too thin, and unable to deal effectively after Kursk to "Zhukovs sympanies"...a reference to his (and others) repeated ability to catch the Germans off guard .....the Russians had learnt to hit the germans where they didnt expect, as witnessed in the Destruction Of Army Group Centre, and later on the Vistula.

OKHs inability to alter their tactics in the face of the new found Soviet flexibility is often blamed on Hitler. to an extent true, but its also a convenient cop out by the heer. Truth is, they grew to be inflexible in their respponses. The heer had had retreat as a military exercise eliminated from their training since 1938, and consequently when presented with a situation that required defensive thinking, proved unable to cope very well. Arras is one of the earliest examples of that. German reverses tended to take the form of hanging on doggedly until it was way too late, not making any contingency plans, and than collapsing in a heap when it all fell apart. That is hardly superior tactics. Where the Germans excelled was in their small and middle unit leadership levels, and this arose directly as a result of Von Seekts influences. The heer was a leader rich organization, whereas the Red Army had killed most of its potential leaders in the purges

Germany marginally out produced Russia
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not where it matter, and for germany it was difficult to convert certain milit6ary outputs to other more critical needs.

One area that is problematic are the air campaigns. Without the allies applying their airpower, and the sea blockade there are reall problems for the Soviets, but in the context of a continued allied presence in the skies and at sea, the gound campaigns like Normandy and italy become rather superfluous....provided the germans still think an invasion in the west is a possibility and retain garrison forces in the west. The dynamics do change if they dont need to worry about their western air and coastal regions.


- and on the battlefield had a clear superiority when and if combatting an equal number of soviet forces. It would not have been easy, by German definitely would have won.
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depends on where and where you are tlaking about.

Jim Dunnigan, who was a wargame designer, then a special analyst working for the Pentagon, working with Colonel Dupuy, a recognized expert in this kind of analysis, reckone that in June 1941, on average, each German soldier was worth about 4.5 Russian soldiers. By the following Dcember it had fallen to 0.9:1. in other words, the germans were struggling in the conditions and against the siberians looked pretty ordinary. By the following summer ('42), it was back up to about 3.2, before plunging again at Stalingrad to about 0.8:1. At Kursk, the advantage once again rose to about 2.2:1 before falling in the winter to about 1.0:1.....heer was faced with less severe weather, better supply and benefitted accordingly. By June 1944, the qualitative advantage for the heer was down to about 1.631, as they began to scrape the barrel for manpower and the small leaders and cadres began to be lost. By April 1945, it was down about par...1:1 as the heer threw old men, young boys and no artillery supported units into the fire.

Hardly a clear advantage.
 
stona said:
The Romanians and others proved themselves to be utterly irrelevant, as at Stalingrad. It is only necessary to compare Germany to the Soviet Union. By 1943 the USSR already had nearly 3 million more people under arms than Germany.
Cheers
Steve
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This is essentially the comments of the uninformed. suggest you read accounts like Axworthy's Third axis Fourth Ally before reaching conlsions like that. Also look at the exploits of certain units and leaders like Radu Korne, before making such sweeping statements.

For the record, it was german units that broke first in the opening offensives north of Stalingrad.....

A pretty good summary of radu Korne and the formations he led

WorldWar2.ro - Brig. general Radu Korne

Not all Rumanians were ignorant peasants with no stomach for the war
 
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Neither the United States nor Britain would have let Hitler have Russia without intervention .... the premise of this thread needs to be pinned down. Did France fall to the Nazis? Did Pearl Harbor happen?

The Russians killed 4 out of every 5 Germans who died in WW2 .... and they themselves died by the 1,000's. But no other regime, including the Nazis, could accept the casualties that the Soviets were prepared to accept. I return to my belief that the December battle for Moscow is symptomatic of the ultimate outcome .... and the regime held. Had the battle gone to the Urals, strategic airpower would have become a factor, neither Russia nor Germany was in a strong position on that. Long/longer supply lines as Germany moved east would have been a great disadvantage for German planners .. especially as they alienated everyone they trampled over.
 
One of the problems with the absence of Allied material, is that Stalin would have to come up with a way to augment his food supply somehow. In 1936 and 1937, the Ukraine had a bountiful harvest of grain, and he moved in and confiscated it. The people protested and as a result, one of his many purges was a result. The following years saw a huge decline of harvest for a couple reasons, one being the weather and the other was, of course the half-hearted effort the farmers (peasants) put into the field. As 1941 dawned, the grain reserves were at a low and this put Stalin into a precarious position even if the Germans hadn't invaded.

As it happens, the Germans did roll in and guess where they rolled in through? You guessed it, they drove right in through the breadbasket of the Soviet Union...

There were other areas of agricultural output (near the Urals and southeast of the Black Sea) but this would be like the west coast of the U.S. trying to feed the whole country without the midwest's production.

I saw earlier, where there were industrial production figures for Germany versus the Soviet Union...are we factoring in the absence of Allied bombing? This would also take into consideration that the oil fields in Romania were left intact as well.

One other thing that crossed my mind, was when I had mentioned earlier that Rommel and his divisions would have been committed to the invasion instead of being sent to Africa...now just imagine how that would have played out at Kursk (unless he was deployed further north).
 

In other words they were more of an encumbrance than any use when push came to shove. I'm not blaming or demeaning the nationalities involved, there are any number of other reasons why this was the case....but it was the case.
Cheers
Steve
 
When the Soviet Union suffered a shortage of food then people starved, sometimes millions. If this had happened again on a larger scale due to lack of Allied aid then more would have starved, but there were still millions more.
The birth rates in agricultural countries were always higher than in the countries already industrialised. The analysis of the relative sizes of the 'birth cohorts' which would provide men of fighting age for WW1 was something that concerned France and Germany in particular.
The Germans were well aware that the French birth rate had collapsed even more dramatically than their own, post 1914 and in the interwar years. Combined with the acquisition of many more ethnic Germans (in their own racist terms) this was something that gave them some confidence when they kicked off WW2.
In the final analysis quality does not always overcome quantity, a lesson the Germans learnt the hard way. If I have the manpower then I'll take 500 Shermans or T-34s and their crews over 50 technically superior German tanks
Cheers
Steve
 

The Afrika Corp was only 2-3 divisions and was a side show compared to the numbers on the eastern front.

However a lot of the Leandlease aid was in things that were hard to either quantify or track down the effect of.

The Bulk of the lend lease aid came late in the war, the Russians pretty much stopped the Germans on their own but the advance to Berlin would have been much longer and more costly without lend lease aid, if it was possible at all.
If there was no lend lease and the Germans were NOT fighting in the west in 1943 things get a lot iffier.

Lead lease provided not only almost 500,000 trucks but 100,000 tons of rubber, 500,000 tons of nonferrous metals (including, copper, brass etc), 3 Billion dollars in machine tools including entire factories.

Some 'elements' that were important that do not include actual weapons include (and as delivered not lost en route)
129,667 tons of smokeless powder (propellant for small arms and cannon).
129,138 tons of TNT for shell and bomb fillings.
956,688 miles of field phone wire. (Russian make wire had poor insulation and tended to short out when wet)
1900 railroad locomotives, 9920 flat cars, 1000 dump cars, 685,740 tons of railroad rail acces.
40,766 tons of tool steel and 14,203 tons of high speed tool steel. + a lot of other steel types.

Having more men only goes do far. The "tactic" of sending in the first and second waves of infantry with rifles and limited amounts of ammo and the third wave with no rifles and a very limited amount of ammo (expected to scrounge/salvage rifles and ammo from dead/wounded 1st and 2nd wave troops) is only going to work for so long or if your opponent has limited amounts of ammo.

Somebody once made the comment that the Germans would run from "cold steel" (bayonets) but only after their machineguns ran out of ammo.
 
Could the US and UK defeat the Nazi's without Russia? Nope. Could the Russians defeat the Nazi's without the UK and USA? Nope. The looming invasion of Italy in the Summer of 1943 meant that the divisions Hitler needed to contain Russian offensives were now earmarked for the Med.

And only a fool would downplay the vital importance of train engines and heavy trucks for use in keeping the troops fed and supplied.
 
OK, lets look at production but as opposed to something vague such as GNP let us make it specific, such as military hardware and other similar things-



Bear in mind Romania and Hungary have small amounts of hardware produced, maybe an additional 10% to the German numbers. But in Oil, I had to include this as they produced almost as much oil as Germany. And as long as Germany holds on to these countries, it is German production.

Biggest difference I see is in artillery in favor of the Russians, and Trucks favoring the Germans. I wonder if rocket launched artillery was included in artillery.

A few things I think need to be looked at. First, I think we need to define the scenario a bit better. Can Russia defeat Germany without Allied help is the question. I think what we have to do is make this starting with Operation Barbarossa. Gerany launches the invasion of Russia, France has surrendered, Great Britain has agreed to a lasting armistice, The US does not enter the war. Either no Pearl Harbor and the US and Japan are at peace, or the US only enters the war against Japan. I'd really have to say the first scenario for the US to truly not be involved in the European conflict.

Then let's look at a few other things. The work put into the V1/V2 programs would be directed at Russia. Would Germany focus harder on say jet fighters if not fighting Great Britain or the US? Or perhaps even devlop a 4 engine bombing force?

How about an Embargo of the Soviet Union, with Subs leading the way? The German Navy, while dwarfed by Great Britain and the US itself dwarfs the Soviet Navy. If not trying to starve Great Britain into submission, a lot more effort can be turned towards blockading the Soviets. German control of the Black Sea is another possibility, by sub and surface fleets. Even Amphibious invasions along the Black Sea, though as in the real war these would have to be smallish vessels. A German Naval offensive involving the Tirpitz and other capital ships including direct fire support in the siege of Leningrad would bode badly for the Soviets.

Germany would have no Allied Bombing raids. This would accomplish a few things - their synthetic oil plants would produce far more synthetic oil. Their pilots would not waste away in an attrition battle against allied air forces. Their pilots could train without fear of the allied airforces constantly being overhead.

There are many ways the Germans would benefit from facing the Soviets only. And as Stalingrad and Moscow were near-misses for the Germans, not having to worry about the Allies might have tipped these scales enough to ensure German victory in these campaigns.

Somebody once made the comment that the Germans would run from "cold steel" (bayonets) but only after their machineguns ran out of ammo.
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I guess here we have to ask, does Germany run out of machine gun ammo before the Russians run out of men?
 
I cant see any scenario that the Soviets would not benefit from Allied activities to a greater or lesser extent. There simply is no realistic scenario that ther would not be some impact.

The nightmare scenario from the allied perspective is that the Germans somehow win the air battle over Britain and then manage to get troops ashore. All of the post war analyses that have been done say this is an impossible scenario for the germans to win , but lets postulate for a bit as to how the odds might be defied, and at what cost. The first is that the LW would emerge from this battle a gutted force with a long recovery time needed. No invasion in June 1941 possible. The second is that getting troops ashore will come at a heavy cost to the germans, much as it did in the invasion of Norway. Then there is the cost in manpower and equipment in defeating the British Home Army, and then keeping it garrisoned. OKH estimated the loos of two complete Armies and the permanent loss of over 1000 tanks. A garrson force of 30-50 divs would be required.

Even this, the dream scenario for the Germans doesn't cause a cessation of allied resistance. the British planned to move to Canada to continue the fight, and the dominions would have been asked to mobilize their economies, which in the case of the Australians they partially did in 1942. At least 50 divs can be relied upon from the bigger dominions, and industry to back it up. almost certainly the US would step up with increased support for the allies.

So, barring the creation of unrealistic scenarios, like the British make peace with Germany after Dunkirk, there was never going to be a situation where there was no help from the allies. Even the German wet dream scenario has down sides to it, most notably that an attack would not be possible until 1942, and then with much reduced air and manpower, and not much of a surface fleet. There is no situation where the Germans can ignore to garrison its occupied lands.

In terms of the fleet ops in the Baltic, neither side could do much, but as a technical numbers exercise the German fleet was no match for the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. In 1941 the Soviets easily outgunned the forces the Germans could deploy, but suffered badly from the mine warfare which also affected axis movements in the Gulf of Finland. Neither side had freedom of movement in these constricted waters. If the germans wait, their ships get even more outclassed....the Soviets were building Soviety Soyuz class BBs and Knronstadt Class BCs, Chapayev Class Cruisers and about 50 DDs, over 1000 MTBs. It was one of Stalins main prewar aims....build a navy that could challenge the RN in blue water operations.

In the Black Sea, ther was a small problem of access. If nothing else, the Turks closed the Bosphorus to both sides during the war. In a previous war, attempts to force the Dardenelles had ended very badly so there is nothing here to suggest anything different in this hypothetical . Ther is no possibility of getting heavy ships into the Black sea without upsetting a whole bunch of neutrals....friends for the Russians in other words.
 
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