SHOULD the P39 have been able to handle the Zero? Was it training or performance?

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"But probably the tricicle undercarriage, that required this markedly nose-up attitude was one of the reasons responsible for the bad handling of P-39 at low speeds."

You don't go to a nose high attitude until you flare, and that is a few feet above the runway. You are trying to stall it at that point.
 

Of course. The problem is if how many are "a few". That measure could be different between and experienced and unexperienced pilot.
 

Wagner was not at Pearl Harbor. He was the commanding officer of the 17th Pursuit Squadron in the Philippines before being evacuated to Australia.
 
From what I have read on this thread you are desperately trying to remember how many rounds of ammunition are still in the nose at that point.
 
To, summarise, the P-39N introduced in 1943 gave performance similar to the Spitfire V of 1941, in some areas better and others worse, and inferior to the Spitfire IX in 1942?

Many P-39Ns were delivered with less fuel capacity than the Spitfire V, though some had more and others could be fitted with extra tankage in the field, but how many were?

Oh, the P-39 drove like a limousine on the ground, which must have been comforting to the pilots struggling to reach an altitude where they could engage the enemy aircraft sent to bomb the shit out of the airfield.
 
U-2, the trickiest plane to land, has a "chase-car" with a another U-2 Pilot inside, telling his Colleague when to stall the plane.

Up close with the U-2 Dragon Lady

And inside a U-2 cockpit just la crème de la crème of the Pilots are admitted...

At his first flight with a Typhoon, Clostermann nearly destroyed the plane as he tought that the big wings of the Tiffy had a lot of lift...
 
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At the first flight with a Typhoon, Clostermann nearly destroyed the plane as he tought that the big wings of the Tiffy had a lot of lift...

You cannot see lift, you must be told in some way that you are close to being out of it, Clostermann spent a long time on Spitfires.
 
A friend got to fly an F-106 simulator, and got the plane to stall at 35,000 AGL. The instructor said he did well; it only took 50,000 ft to recover.

Many aircraft had horrifyingly bad stall-spin characteristics, even by the standards of combat aircraft. With the reduced training frequently inherent in rapid military expansions, predictable behavior near stall is crucial, unless one wants to lose more pilots to accidents than combat.
 


In general, pilots report that tricycle gear aircraft are much easier to land. I would be very surprised were the P-39 was an exception.
 
"The problem is if how many are "a few"."

Yes, that's among the key things to learn. Making a perfect landing 15 ft off the runway is unpleasant. Making a landing which was meant to be 15 ft below the runway is even less pleasant. With over 700 hours in my personal airplane I can't say all of them are either perfect or even exactly the same.

"In general, pilots report that tricycle gear aircraft are much easier to land."

Yes, I have flown both and trikes are easier to land. Where they are really easier, though, is if you land and then give it the power to do a touch and go.

As for the comparison to a Spitfire V, I believe a Clipped and Cropped Spit V would blow away a P-39 at low altitude.
 
P-39N in production between December '42 and April '44 was faster and climbed faster at all altitudes than the Spitfire V. The Spitfire IX was superior in speed and climb to the P-39N and entered full series production about the same time. The comparison I'm making is between the P-39N and the German fighters. Everyone else seems to have me in an argument over the Spitfire.

Regarding fuel, the P-39N carried 120 internal and the Spitfire carried 100 US gallons. During N production the Russians requested that we start deleting the wing guns from the factory and reducing internal fuel capacity. The N and Q gradually reduced capacity to as little as 86 gallons. The wing guns stayed until the late Q models. Apparently less fuel and no wing armament worked for them.
 

While you're focusing on direct comparisons with German fighters, I think others are extending the discussion to the next logical step. Even if the P-39N is better than German fighters in early 1943, is it sufficiently better to warrant the Allies changing from the fighters that were actually operated to the P-39N? The consensus answer seems to be that, no, the P-39N didn't offer enough of an advantage over contemporary German fighters to merit the change, whereas other types like the P-51 and Spitfire had more "grow room" to allow them to keep up with German aeronautical advantages.



Reducing fuel works when you're in a land war where you can establish airfields near the front line. It won't work so well for western Europe in 1943 where airfields were stuck in the UK and hence the only way to extend reach into the enemy's back yard was via longer-range airframes.
 
This is the crux of the whole discussion and what is slowly driving me nutz. The P 39N was in Production in December 1942 and the Spitfire mk IX was in squadron service during the previous summer. Would you replace Spitfire Mk Vs with P39-Ns or Mk IXs? and it isn't just a question of speed and rate of climb, it is also a question of serviceability, safety and loss rates. The P-39 was dangerous, relative to all other US fighters to its own pilots, even in training, I posted the stats and you made no comment. Using semantic tricks like "full series production" is not impressive, the fact is that the Mk IX was in production in mid 1942, there is a limit to how quickly any new type can be introduced and in terms of logistics switching all factories over when you don't have all the parts just means losing months of production. The Mk V may have been outclassed in 1942 but it was better than nothing.

Before the war started Hawkers were allowed to export Hurricanes because they could produce them faster than the RAF could train all their staff to use them. By 1940 production had doubled and each hurricane just got sent where it was needed because by that time everyone knew what it was, only pilots to fly them was an issue.
 
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U-2, the trickiest plane to land, has a "chase-car" with a another U-2 Pilot inside, telling his Colleague when to stall the plane.
NOT telling him when to stall the plane!! Telling him how high his forward "bicycle" main gear wheel is off the ground. The object here is to "roll it on" so the plane touches with zero sink rate and is flying level in ground effect with its forward main wheel lightly touching the runway as the wheel spins up. Then as the plane gradually slows the pilot can ease the nose upward until the rear main lightly rolls on. THERE IS NO STALL INVOLVED. It's like a taildragger pilot making a wheel landing, or a floatplane touching down.
If either of the U2s mains touches with any appreciable sink rate, the shock strut rebound and resulting AOA change of that monster wing WILL set up a porpoising/PIO sequence all the way to the smoking crater at the end of the runway.
Cheers,
Wes
 
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In general, pilots report that tricycle gear aircraft are much easier to land. I would be very surprised were the P-39 was an exception.
The P-39 quite likely was that exception. Ever try to transition a Cessna 180 pilot into a Mooney 231? Probably quite similar to AT-6 into P-39. Here's why. (drgondog, jump in if I'm wrong). The C-180 (and the AT-6) is a fairly powerful, but somewhat draggy tail dragger with predictable balanced control response and typical taildragger landing behaviour. The Mooney (and the P-39) is sleek and slippery with a nose-high tricycle gear, controls that are much lighter and more sensitive in pitch than in the other axis, a higher approach speed than other similar aircraft, and a low wing with flaps set deep in ground effect in touchdown configuration.
Can you spell FLOATER? That poor Cessna pilot sure learned how to spell that day. Fortunately we had 8700 feet of asphalt to play with. The average WWII fighter strip didn't.
The poor Mooney salesman was convinced we were going to wreck his demonstrator. Instead the Cessna guy bought it from him, and everybody lived happily ever after.
Cheers,
Wes
 
Third,we didn't have effective radar until after August 1942 so the raids were largely unopposed. These raids could come at any time from Lae only 200 miles away and their Zero escort didn't even need drop tanks. Later at Guadalcanal the Jap raids came from much farther away so they almost always came at noon making them very predictable.

Wrong. There was radar from March 1942, but it was not very effective radar until much much later, probably mid 1943 at the earliest.


Fourth, we were tremendously outnumbered. Japanese had functioning bases all along the NG coast backed up by their huge base at Rabaul. Their maintenance facilities were functional. Our maintenance/supply early on at Moresby consisted mainly of pulling a functional part off of one of the many wrecks at the end of the runway. By the time the P-38 appeared in the theater attrition at Moresby, Coral Sea, Midway and the first three months of Guadalcanal had seriously reduced the Japanese Navy pilot quality and our pilots were much better trained than in April '42.

Wrong. According to the translated "Japanese army Operations In the South Pacific 1942-3" there 43 land based planes under 17 Area Army based at rabaul and 14 flying boats. 20 of the land based a/c were fighters, of which 9 were detached to Lae. . By 1 August, on the eve of Watchtower these deployments had increased tp 63 land based and 13 flying boats. There was one bomber base, at Rabaul, and an auxiliary fighter strip at Lae. Airfileds were being constructed (by 1 august) at Gona, buin and Guadacanal. These strtength reports included IJN attachments to the 17Army.

The fact that the green outnumbered American kids kept the Japanese out of Moresby was a real tribute to their courage and tenacity. Lighter equipped P-39s and functioning radar would have made the job a lot easier. The later arriving Lightnings benefited from better pilots, declining Jap pilots, functioning radar and much more efficient maintenance.

Baloney......

They were not green, and they weren't solely American. in fact the majority of defenders, including air assets were Australian

Stop referring to the Japanese as "Japs', its rude and uncalled for. stop trying to claim credit for the defence of PNG. it isn't yours to claim.

and stop telling gigantic porkies, that would be a great start.
 
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They were not green, and they weren't solely American. in fact the majority of defenders, including air assets were Australian
It wasn't the "green young American" P-39 pilots that kept the IJA out of Port Moresby, it was the not-so-green, but even younger Aussie Marines fighting an outnumbered and unsupported desperate defensive action against the Japanese in the stinking jungles of the Owen Stanley Mountains. If the Japanese had broken through that, all the skimpy assets available in Oz at the time could not have kept them out of Port Moresby. Let's not be patting ourselves too much on the back, here. Grunts on the ground carried the day.
Cheers,
Wes
 
The US marines fighting on Guadacanal is their own story known reasonably well to most Americans. The story of the fight across the Owen Stanley ranges is not a fight known well to the US.

The story of this fight is invariably an account of the 39th Battalion. A militia formation, it was known as a 'choco" outfit......chocolate soldiers that would melt at the first sign of any heat being applied to them. they were to prove this label utterly without foundation . 809 went into action, 25 came out at the end, with the formation still in the front line leading the ferocious assaults on the Japanese in the buna-gona battles.

Its story can be found at the AWM research site:

"Following Japan's sudden entry into the Second World War, a new 39th was raised as part of the 30th Brigade to garrison Port Moresby. The 39th joined the 49th Infantry Battalion, already in Moresby, and the 53rd Infantry Battalion, which had been quickly formed in Sydney. The 39th arrived in Moresby at the start of January 1942, with little military training.

The 39th was initially used for garrison duties and working parties. In June it was ordered to proceed up the Kokoda Trail to block any possible Japanese overland advance. The 39th B Company and troops from the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) reached Kokoda on 15 July. Japanese forces landed at Gona, on the north coast of Papua, a week later and quickly moved inland.

The first clash occurred at Awala on 23 July and the Australians fell back to Kokoda. On 29 July the Japanese attacked Kokoda and the Australians were forced to withdrawal to Deniki early the next morning. On 8 August the 39th launched a counter-attack at Kokoda but, outnumbered and short of ammunition, fell back to Deniki after two days of fighting. The Australians eventually managed to repeal the ongoing Japanese attack and on 14 August the 39th and PIB fell back to Isurava.

Fighting ceased for almost two weeks. During this time the 39th was joined by the 53rd and the headquarters of the 30th Brigade. On 23 August the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions from the 7th Division 21st Brigade also reached the area. The Japanese resumed their advance on 26 August. Despite hard fighting the Australians were forced back to Eora Creek on 30 August, Templeton's Crossing on 2 September, and Efogi three days later.

Exhausted, the 39th was relieved and sent down the track to Koitaki to rest. The 7th Division 25th Brigade (comprising the 3rd Infantry Battalion and the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion) came in to reinforce the Australian effort. Bitter fighting ensued and the Australians withdrew to Imita Ridge on 17 September. However, the Japanese had reached their limit and on 24 September began to withdrawal. The Australians reoccupied Kokoda on 2 November.

Meanwhile, after a month at Koitaki, the 39th returned to Port Moresby in mid-October, where it prepared defensive positions at Pyramid Point. The interlude from fighting was brief.

Having pushed the Japanese back across the Kokoda Trail, the 16th and 25th Brigades and two inexperienced American regiments were engaged in the "battle of the beachheads" at Buna, Gona, and Sanananda. The Japanese positions were well-prepared and heavily defended. At the end of November the 30th Brigade was flown across the Owen Stanley's to reinforce the attack. The 39th became attached to the 21st Brigade.

The 21st Brigade captured Gona village on 1 December and the Japanese withdrew to Gona Mission. The Australians advanced on the Mission on 6 December but were stopped by the Japanese. The 39th D Company was "literally shot to pieces". The combined fighting strength of the 21st Brigade was now down to 755 men, of whom 403 were from the 39th. Nonetheless, on 8 December the 39th attacked again and captured half of the Japanese defences by nightfall. Gona Mission was captured the next day and on 18 December the 39th took the last Japanese position at the creek west of Gona.

Fierce fighting continued further along the coast and on 21 December the 21st Brigade and 39th moved to the Sanananda Track. The next morning the 39th moved into a forward position called Huggins' Road Block. The 39th defended the area and attacked nearby Japanese positions. In the New Year it withdrew to Soputa and returned to the 30th Brigade.

The 39th had suffered heavily. When the battalion was flown to Moresby on 25 January it mustered a mere handful of soldiers - 7 officers and 25 men. It rested at Morseby and gradually gained strength as men returned from hospital".
 
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