Singapore hold on for three more months

[Admiral Beez]

15 Feb 1942, Percival and his 85,000 men surrender to a much smaller, and resource depleted Japanese force of 36,000 men. How is the SEA/Pacific war impacted if the British manage to withstand the Japanese siege for an additional 90 days, to May 15, 1942? This would be after the US surrender of the Philippines. If he can protect his water supply, I'd argue that Percival can hold out, especially as the IJA is dangerously low on ammunition and supplies of their own. With Singapore holding out, do the Philippines still fall? What about Coral Sea and the PNG ops? What does Britain do with Singapore, is Percival relieved? Is Sommerville's Far East fleet from Ceylon moved forward?

Looking at aviation, does Japan have the airpower to keep up the offensive? Can the RAF get reinforcements to Singapore? Where would the RAF operate from? In March Sommerville is at Ceylon with three carriers, maybe they'll carry the air defence load?

 

[Glider]

It would never happen for one reason that has little or nothing to do with military power.

Ask yourself this question, If you want to hold on for three months, where are you going to get the food and water to supply the population of a large city?

 

[Admiral Beez]

It would never happen for one reason that has little or nothing to do with military power.

Ask yourself this question, If you want to hold on for three months, where are you going to get the food and water to supply the population of a large city?

Water will be the trouble, with only about two weeks supply. Food can be shipped in. Convoys were arriving right up to the last day. Hopefully those ships as they leave will remove many nonessential drinkers/eaters.

 

[Dimlee]

If convoys can be protected, the water can be brought in as well. If there are sources outside of Japanese control. Across the Straits, in Batam?
Coastal tankers could do the job.

 

[buffnut453]

Frankly, Percival didn't need to hold on for 3 months. If he'd just held the line for a few more weeks, the outcome may have been very different. The extended Japanese logistics chain led all the way up to Thailand. At the time of the British surrender, the Japanese forces were running dangerously short of ammunition, particularly artillery shells. Replacement of air combat losses was also problematic.

 

[Peter Gunn]

15 Feb 1942, Percival and his 85,000 men surrender to a much smaller, and resource depleted Japanese force of 36,000 men. How is the SEA/Pacific war impacted if the British manage to withstand the Japanese siege for an additional 90 days, to May 15, 1942? This would be after the US surrender of the Philippines. If he can protect his water supply, I'd argue that Percival can hold out, especially as the IJA is dangerously low on ammunition and supplies of their own. With Singapore holding out, do the Philippines still fall? What about Coral Sea and the PNG ops? What does Britain do with Singapore, is Percival relieved? Is Sommerville's Far East fleet from Ceylon moved forward?

Looking at aviation, does Japan have the airpower to keep up the offensive? Can the RAF get reinforcements to Singapore? Where would the RAF operate from? In March Sommerville is at Ceylon with three carriers, maybe they'll carry the air defence load?

I'm not sanguine on "What If's", too many variables to have any definite outcome.

That being said, I always enjoy your prospective scenarios Beez, they are well thought out and very thought provoking, and while I don't feel qualified to really add anything, I'm always keen on reading what posters contribute to these threads.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If convoys can be protected, the water can be brought in as well. Coastal tankers could do the job.

Was that ever done? How did the Americans hold out at Corregidor until May? In 2019 I visited the Battle Box at Singapore. It was a great guided tour, and the guide told us how the water supply wasn't protected during the siege, that burst water pipes drained into the streets, the reservoirs were not repaired, etc. I imagine had the water supply been better maintained and protected, and if every non-combatant civilian was taken away on the transports that arrived throughout January and well into February, that the water supply might have held out.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Frankly, Percival didn't need to hold on for 3 months. If he'd just held the line for a few more weeks, the outcome may have been very different. The extended Japanese logistics chain led all the way up to Thailand. At the time of the British surrender, the Japanese forces were running dangerously short of ammunition, particularly artillery shells. Replacement of air combat losses was also problematic.

I think had the British understood their fate they might have held on. The Chinese could have told the British to expect no quarter if they surrendered. Churchill's orders were to fight to the last man, but Percival surrendered to an under-equipped, nearly broken army nearly three times as small as his own.

But in his defence, Percival should never have been given this job. He had no combat experience and no experience leading a large force or directing any defence of this size. And, with the notable exception of Lt-General Health, all of Percival's subordinates were equally useless and inexperienced. Here's Malaya Command's esteemed general officers.

• CNC Malaya Command, Lt-Gen. Percival - no combat experience, only home guard and admin work
• Indian III Corps, Lt-Gen. Heath - some combat experience against the Italians, commanded the 5th Indian Division in the Sudan, forced the surrender of the garrison at Massawa in Jan 41.
• Australian 8th Division, Maj-Gen. Bennett - no combat since France, March 1916. Only home guard work since then, until arriving in Malaya in Feb 1941.
• Fortress Singapore, Maj-Gen. Simmons - no combat since France, WW1. A seemingly useless fool, IMO, "An ardent supporter of the concept that defence construction was detrimental to troop morale"
• Malaya Command Reserve, Brig. Paris - no combat since France, WW1, per wiki, "one of the few British commanders that put up a good fight against the Japanese"
• Sarawak Force (SARFOR), Lt-Col. Malet Lane - recently promoted, no apparent combat experience
• RAF Malaya, Air Vice Marshal Conway Pulford, no combat experience. Was commander of No. 26 Training Group RAF until deployment to Malaya in 1941.
• RN Far East, Vice Admiral Phillips. No command combat experience. Was chief of staff at RN HQ in London. Force Z was Phillip's first command.

Has there ever been a collection of more inexperienced, incapable commanders put in charge of such a critically important territory? Malaya produced most of the British Empire's rubber and tin, it was not a backwater for trainees and has beens. There's not one senior officer in Malaya suited to command its defence. We like to pick on the until now desk-bound Vice Admiral Phillips for muddling Force Z into range of IJN bombers without air cover, but Phillips was no worse than these other inexperienced senior officers.

If Singapore can hold out for another 90 days we can assume that Heath has taken command or someone like Monty's been flown in.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm not sanguine on "What If's", too many variables to have any definite outcome.

That being said, I always enjoy your prospective scenarios Beez, they are well thought out and very thought provoking, and while I don't feel qualified to really add anything, I'm always keen on reading what posters contribute to these threads.

What he said.

 

[yosimitesam]

I think had the British understood their fate they might have held on. The Chinese could have told the British to expect no quarter if they surrendered. Churchill's orders were to fight to the last man, but Percival surrendered to an under-equipped, nearly broken army nearly three times as small as his own.

But in his defence, Percival should never have been given this job. He had no combat experience and no experience leading a large force or directing any defence of this size. And, with the notable exception of Lt-General Health, all of Percival's subordinates were equally useless and inexperienced. Here's Malaya Command's esteemed general officers.

• CNC Malaya Command, Lt-Gen. Percival - no combat experience, only home guard and admin work
• Indian III Corps, Lt-Gen. Heath - some combat experience against the Italians, commanded the 5th Indian Division in the Sudan, forced the surrender of the garrison at Massawa in Jan 41.
• Australian 8th Division, Maj-Gen. Bennett - no combat since France, March 1916. Only home guard work since then, until arriving in Malaya in Feb 1941.
• Fortress Singapore, Maj-Gen. Simmons - no combat since France, WW1. A seemingly useless fool, IMO, "An ardent supporter of the concept that defence construction was detrimental to troop morale"
• Malaya Command Reserve, Brig. Paris - no combat since France, WW1, per wiki, "one of the few British commanders that put up a good fight against the Japanese"
• Sarawak Force (SARFOR), Lt-Col. Malet Lane - recently promoted, no apparent combat experience
• RAF Malaya, Air Vice Marshal Conway Pulford, no combat experience. Was commander of No. 26 Training Group RAF until deployment to Malaya in 1941.
• RN Far East, Vice Admiral Phillips. No command combat experience. Was chief of staff at RN HQ in London. Force Z was Phillip's first command.

Has there ever been a collection of more inexperienced, incapable commanders put in charge of such a critically important territory? Malaya produced most of the British Empire's rubber and tin, it was not a backwater for trainees and has beens. There's not one senior officer in Malaya suited to command its defence. We like to pick on the until now desk-bound Vice Admiral Phillips for muddling Force Z into range of IJN bombers without air cover, but Phillips was no worse than these other inexperienced senior officers.

If Singapore can hold out for another 90 days we can assume that Heath has taken command or someone like Monty's been flown in.

Even better, fly in Bill Slim, one of the most tactically skillful commanders of the war, from any side. Just this Yank's opinion.

 

[buffnut453]

But in his defence, Percival should never have been given this job. He had no combat experience and no experience leading a large force or directing any defence of this size. And, with the notable exception of Lt-General Health, all of Percival's subordinates were equally useless and inexperienced. Here's Malaya Command's esteemed general officers.

• CNC Malaya Command, Lt-Gen. Percival - no combat experience, only home guard and admin work

Firstly, your statement about Percival's lack of combat experience is entirely inaccurate. While it's true he had no combat experience leading large-scale formations, he had a lot of combat experience, as evidenced by the award of MC, DSO+Bar for his service during the First World War. During that War, he rose to become a battalion commander and temporarily took over his brigade in May 1918. His first DSO was awarded during the German Spring Offensive of 1918 where he led a counter-attack that saved a French artillery unit from capture (the French Government awarded him the Croix de Guerre for this action).

Following the Armistice, Percival volunteered for service in Russia, where he earned his second DSO. His citation reads "He commanded the Gorodok column on 9–10 August 1919, with great gallantry and skill, and owing to the success of this column the forces on the right bank of the Dvina were able to capture all its objectives. During the enemy counter-attack from Selmenga on Gorodok he handled his men excellently. The enemy were repulsed with great loss, leaving 400 prisoners in our hands."

During WW2, Percival was a Brigadier in the HQ staff of I Corps as part of the BEF in France. While he didn't have actual command, he would have been intimately involved in planning and organizing the Corps for operations during the Phony War. This is not "admin work"

Your comment about "home guard" implies some association with the Home Guard, which may be inadvertent...but is equally wrong. He led the 44th (Home Counties) Division which had been part of the BEF in France and was reformed under Percival's leadership after the retreat from Dunkirk. Yes, the Division was charged with homeland defence but that's a very different proposition from the Home Guard.

One other point that needs to be acknowledged is the overall challenge of resourcing Far East Command Command when it wasn't an actual combat zone. We've acknowledged in other threads that Malaya/Singapore/Burma fell well down the pecking order when it came to allocation of resources. That problems is as true for personnel as it is for equipment. Bear in mind that there weren't actually that many general officers with recent combat experience, and those that were around, like Slim and Wavell, were actually doing the fighting during 1941. Pulling them to lead a backwater like Malaya is inconceivable because, in order to have any impact, they would have to be appointed in late 1940 or early 1941 at the absolute latest. Percival himself acknowledged this challenge. If the Japanese didn't attack, then Singapore was nothing more than a non-operational backwater and a career dead-end. However, if the Japanese did attack, then it was unlikely that Far East Command would have the resources to successfully defend the peninsula.

One final note about combat experience. Bear in mind that Norman Schwarzkopf, the Allied commander during Desert Storm, didn't actually have much combat experience. Yes, he had 2 tours in Vietnam, which totaled about 18 months in-country, and he also was put in charge of the invasion of Grenada at the last minute. However, the parallels with Percival are rather interesting. Most of his combat experience, like Percival's, took place when he was a relatively junior officer some 20 years before he assumed large-scale command during combat. Also, Schwarzkopf's experience in Vietnam was far from an ideal preparation for Desert Storm, just as Percival's experience in WW1 may not have been the best preparation for senior leadership in WW2. Percival did, however, spend at least 3 full years in combat-related roles during WW1, then went on to operational service in Russia before taking on an anti-terrorism role in Ireland between the wars. Compared to many generals, that's not a bad record of combat experience.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Firstly, your statement about Percival's lack of combat experience is entirely inaccurate. While it's true he had no combat experience leading large-scale formations, he had a lot of combat experience, as evidenced by the award of MC, DSO+Bar for his service during the First World War. During that War, he rose to become a battalion commander and temporarily took over his brigade in May 1918. His first DSO was awarded during the German Spring Offensive of 1918 where he led a counter-attack that saved a French artillery unit from capture (the French Government awarded him the Croix de Guerre for this action).

Following the Armistice, Percival volunteered for service in Russia, where he earned his second DSO. His citation reads "He commanded the Gorodok column on 9–10 August 1919, with great gallantry and skill, and owing to the success of this column the forces on the right bank of the Dvina were able to capture all its objectives. During the enemy counter-attack from Selmenga on Gorodok he handled his men excellently. The enemy were repulsed with great loss, leaving 400 prisoners in our hands."

During WW2, Percival was a Brigadier in the HQ staff of I Corps as part of the BEF in France. While he didn't have actual command, he would have been intimately involved in planning and organizing the Corps for operations during the Phony War. This is not "admin work"

Your comment about "home guard" implies some association with the Home Guard, which may be inadvertent...but is equally wrong. He led the 44th (Home Counties) Division which had been part of the BEF in France and was reformed under Percival's leadership after the retreat from Dunkirk. Yes, the Division was charged with homeland defence but that's a very different proposition from the Home Guard.

One other point that needs to be acknowledged is the overall challenge of resourcing Far East Command Command when it wasn't an actual combat zone. We've acknowledged in other threads that Malaya/Singapore/Burma fell well down the pecking order when it came to allocation of resources. That problems is as true for personnel as it is for equipment. Bear in mind that there weren't actually that many general officers with recent combat experience, and those that were around, like Slim and Wavell, were actually doing the fighting during 1941. Pulling them to lead a backwater like Malaya is inconceivable because, in order to have any impact, they would have to be appointed in late 1940 or early 1941 at the absolute latest. Percival himself acknowledged this challenge. If the Japanese didn't attack, then Singapore was nothing more than a non-operational backwater and a career dead-end. However, if the Japanese did attack, then it was unlikely that Far East Command would have the resources to successfully defend the peninsula.

One final note about combat experience. Bear in mind that Norman Schwarzkopf, the Allied commander during Desert Storm, didn't actually have much combat experience. Yes, he had 2 tours in Vietnam, which totaled about 18 months in-country, and he also was put in charge of the invasion of Grenada at the last minute. However, the parallels with Percival are rather interesting. Most of his combat experience, like Percival's, took place when he was a relatively junior officer some 20 years before he assumed large-scale command during combat. Also, Schwarzkopf's experience in Vietnam was far from an ideal preparation for Desert Storm, just as Percival's experience in WW1 may not have been the best preparation for senior leadership in WW2. Percival did, however, spend at least 3 full years in combat-related roles during WW1, then went on to operational service in Russia before taking on an anti-terrorism role in Ireland between the wars. Compared to many generals, that's not a bad record of combat experience.

Good info and points, thanks. So, with Percival's not insignificant combat and command experience and abilities, to what can we attribute his lack of defensive preparations from his arrival in April 1941? For example, RAF airbases with no army defence, with no plans to blow up the bases upon retreat? When the IJA essentially walked onto RAF bases they would find intact bomb, ammunition and fuel stores. Same when Singapore fell, the IJA found tons of concrete mix intended for building defensive works, still in their sacks in warehouses. I suppose I was giving Percival the benefit of the doubt, that he failed because of inexperienced and being posted above his station. Instead should we conclude that he was just useless?

What of the other senior officers I list? We need to hold out for 90 days, who can take us there. I find it surprising that with the Battle of Britain now over that the RAF couldn't find one available Air Marshall who commanded combat units.

 

[MikeMeech]

15 Feb 1942, Percival and his 85,000 men surrender to a much smaller, and resource depleted Japanese force of 36,000 men. How is the SEA/Pacific war impacted if the British manage to withstand the Japanese siege for an additional 90 days, to May 15, 1942? This would be after the US surrender of the Philippines. If he can protect his water supply, I'd argue that Percival can hold out, especially as the IJA is dangerously low on ammunition and supplies of their own. With Singapore holding out, do the Philippines still fall? What about Coral Sea and the PNG ops? What does Britain do with Singapore, is Percival relieved? Is Sommerville's Far East fleet from Ceylon moved forward?

Looking at aviation, does Japan have the airpower to keep up the offensive? Can the RAF get reinforcements to Singapore? Where would the RAF operate from? In March Sommerville is at Ceylon with three carriers, maybe they'll carry the air defence load?

Hi

If Singapore had held out another 3 months it would still have no impact on the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Borneo etc. The Philippines was already mainly held by the Japanese before Singapore surrendered, Manila was taken by the Japanese over a month before for instance, IIRC. The Japanese had landed on Borneo on 24th December 1941, and had landed on Sumatra on 14th February (Timor on the 20th). The Japanese operations were never contingent on the capture of Singapore they were all happening during the same time period, therefore, Singapore holding out for longer or not is irrelevant to their operations. We should also remember that in the 2-3 days after the 12th February the Japanese sank 40 ships, large to small, trying to evacuate from Singapore to Sumatra (the RAF were operating from Sumatra before the fall of Singapore), so unlikely to get ships into the place to supply water etc.
I don't know what 3 RN carriers could achieve by sailing to 'relieve' Singapore in March with both Malaya and Sumatra in Japanese hands, a suicide mission? Could 3 US Navy carriers have saved the Philippines? I doubt it.
Slim learnt about Japanese fighting abilities when he took part in the retreat through Burma, I doubt if he would have been that effective bottled up in Singapore. The population of Singapore in 1939 was around 1.3 million, how many 'useless mouths' could you evacuate, and where to and when do you do it?
Britain and the Commonwealth did not have the forces in 1941/42 to fight in 'shooting wars' in Europe, North Africa/Mediterranean theatres and in Asia. Any build up of forces in Malaya etc. before the Japanese attack would have had to be at the expense of the 'shooting wars' already engaged in, as it was the transfer and redirection of British forces from NA/Med to SEA had a negative effect on Brit/CW operations in the former theatre. The reason the Japanese attacked the British and Dutch colonies was because of the effects of the European War on those countries and the Japanese felt they could get away with it and solve their oil and other material shortages problem, so in many ways the Japanese were being opportunist. If Britain had, 'magically', the resources to have strong forces throughout SEA then the Japanese would probably never attacked.

Mike

 

[buffnut453]

For example, RAF airbases with no army defence, with no plans to blow up the bases upon retreat? When the IJA essentially walked onto RAF bases they would find intact bomb, ammunition and fuel stores.

Regarding airfield defence, bear in mind that the RAF selected the locations of the airfields with zero consultation on how the Army might defend them. Also, we're back into lack-of-resources territory. Defence of the Malay peninsular was deemed to hinge on the successful execution of Operation MATADOR. Simultaneously, the Army needed to defend potential invasion beaches to ensure the MATADOR force, moving north into Thailand, wasn't cut off by successful Japanese landings. With the forces available, Percival couldn't execute MATADOR, defend the beaches in northern Malaya, AND provide point defence for the airfields. There simply weren't the resources to complete all those tasks.

As regards plans to blow up the airfields and the leaving behind of materiel for the Japanese to capture, blame must be squarely shouldered on the shoulders of the RAF. Certainly it seems that a degree of panic set in during the initial phase of the Japanese assault. With little reliable information and only one telephone line connecting northern Malaya to Singapore, the knowledge vacuum was filled with rumour that led to overly-rapid, and sometimes unnecessary evacuation and abandonment of airfields and equipment.

So, with Percival's not insignificant combat and command experience and abilities, to what can we attribute his lack of defensive preparations from his arrival in April 1941?...Same when Singapore fell, the IJA found tons of concrete mix intended for building defensive works, still in their sacks in warehouses.

The military in Singapore and Malaya did not have a free hand to act as they wished. Local civilian leaders persisted in objections throughout 1941 to any and all activities by the military that might touch on civil or commercial affairs. Building of defences in rear areas was perceived as being defeatist, with the fear that it would have a negative impact on the morale of the civilian populace. There was also reluctance to pay for workers to actually build the defences, with civilian leaders fearing that any large-scale defence-based construction would claw workers away from other vital war effort activities like producing rubber and tin.

The lack of a clear command chain didn't help matters. Percival was GOC Malaya responsible solely for land defences. Brooke-Popham was the Commander-in-Chief of Far East Command but that only included the RAF and the Army. The Royal Navy maintained its own separate command chain that didn't flow through Brooke-Popham. Add to all that the confusion within the civilian side of things, and the addition of Duff Cooper as Minister Resident in July 1941 did nothing to improve things.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Regarding airfield defence, bear in mind that the RAF selected the locations of the airfields with zero consultation on how the Army might defend them.
As regards plans to blow up the airfields and the leaving behind of materiel for the Japanese to capture, blame must be squarely shouldered on the shoulders of the RAF..

I agree, and that's why I checked into and listed the backgrounds of the other senior officers at Malaya. The idea that Percival was to blame for it all is a myth, especially since he only arrived in April 1941. As for the air bases' placement and lack of evacuation plans, I put that squarely onto Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford and his predecessor, though to be fair to Pulford he also arrived in mid 1941.

That's my point above, none of these senior officers we're up to the task. If Singapore is going to hold out until May 1942 we must see some real changes in how Singapore is prepared and defended. For starters, anyone who suggests surrendering needs to resign, since surrender is death and torture, not a POW camp and later exchange.

The biggest leadership hinderance is the governor since 1934, Sir Shelton Thomas. He refused to allow defensive works to disrupt the rubber and other plantations, refused to make any preparations as the Japanese inched closer to the FIC and Thai frontiers.

 

[Dimlee]

The population of Singapore in 1939 was around 1.3 million,

Was it that high?
"The 1947 census reported a total population of 940,824 inhabitants compared to the 559,946 inhabitants in the 1931 census".

 

[Admiral Beez]

Was it that high?
"The 1947 census reported a total population of 940,824 inhabitants compared to the 559,946 inhabitants in the 1931 census".

I imagine many non-native civilians had fled by the time war was imminent. Though many seemed to wait until the last moment...

Singapore 1942: Civilian Evacuation list by Michael Pether
The Naval Evacuation of Singapore - February 1942 | Naval Historical Society of Australia

 

[Dimlee]

Was that ever done? How did the Americans hold out at Corregidor until May? In 2019 I visited the Battle Box at Singapore. It was a great guided tour, and the guide told us how the water supply wasn't protected during the siege, that burst water pipes drained into the streets, the reservoirs were not repaired, etc. I imagine had the water supply been better maintained and protected, and if every non-combatant civilian was taken away on the transports that arrived throughout January and well into February, that the water supply might have held out.

If pipes and other infrastructure are not repaired, then the new supply does not help, of course. Shipping water itself is not rocket science.

 

[Admiral Beez]

As an aside, I have to say I loved visiting Singapore and immediately thought I could live here. Where I live in Toronto, Canada we have crumbling infrastructure, beggars and vagrants in our parks and blocking sidewalks, graffiti, litter, drug addicts and robberies. No where near what Seattle or San Francisco has, nor the shootings of American cities like Detroit or Chicago, but still. In Singapore everything works, there's no litter, no graffiti, no beggars, no homeless (Singaporeans are guaranteed housing, if your a non-Singaporean you're taken to the border and deported), and a real sense of order and yet still freedom.

In August 2018 I attended service at St. Andrew's Cathedral, Singapore and the minister spoke of the Japanese bayoneting wounded soldiers and their attending doctors and nurses in this very church. I thought to myself, I hope some made it out before the final days.

I have to recommend a visit to the Battle Box and Fort Siloso to all history buffs.

 

[MikeMeech]

Was it that high?
"The 1947 census reported a total population of 940,824 inhabitants compared to the 559,946 inhabitants in the 1931 census".

Hi

As the same source mentions, the population had some reluctance to engage in the 1947 census due to the Japanese census during the occupation that was used to find 'anti-Japanese' elements, generally anyone Chinese I expect. That does mean many people were killed during the occupation plus others left never to return due to various reasons. The 1.3 million figure is from another 'online source' so it may or may not be totally correct, but if there were 940,824 inhabitants in 1947, I suspect that is less than in 1941.

Mike