So who did it, the Jug or the Stang? (1 Viewer)

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Dave - you might be getting pedantic.

I said the that the Russians had nothing to do with disrupting Fuel. The USAAF and RAF were the sole agencies charted with taking out fuel and chemicals. Does that definition Exclude, in your mind, Aviation Synthetics? Are synthetics fuels a hybrid Cool aid that has no relevance to 'fuel' or 'chemicals' ??
 
What percentage of German aviation gasoline was consumed on the Russian front during 1944? I suspect it was more then German aviation gasoline consumed fighting U.S. 8th Air Force during 1944.
 
Dont know how much it would figure in to the discussion, but when Gen Doolittle took command of the 8th AF, one of the first things he did was change the way the escort fighters behaved.
Instead of essing to stay with the bombers all the way to the target and back, a lot were cut loose to fly ahead of the bomber formations, breaking up enemy fighters in the process of forming up for an attack.
I guess you could call that "best defense is a good offense".
And on the way back, the fighters were free and encouraged to beat up targets of opportunity such as enemy airfields, trains, convoys and troop formations.


I remember reading about Gen. Doolittle modestly saying in a post-war interview that 'the P-51s made him look good' after he took command of the 8th BC. That definitely is true given that the Mustangs gave much more latitude to the strategic bombing campaign but I, to best of my knowledge, tend to believe that Doolittle's new strategies played a pivotal role in favor of the US 8th AF as well.
 
Dragondog,
Thank you for taking your time in explaining this rather complex subject in a very didactic way so a newbie like me can have an enhanced view of the rapid developments and transitions in the 8th AF that shaped the conduct of the daylight air war over western Europe.

In my honest opinion, it's quite palpable that P-51 units began in a serious numeric disadvantage against P-38 and P-47 units and yet, it's surprising how they managed to rack up so rapidly their reputation against LW opposition.
Without doubt the P-51 was a critical tool in ensuring air superiority over the LW during 1944.
If I'm not mistaken, P-38s enjoyed better endurance than P-47s from the outset and still, one can see by the tables posted by you that they never achieved the numbers P-47s and P-51s managed, in the 8th FC. Does that mean the P-38 was not up to the task against LW singe-engine opposition?
 
I don't think U.S. 8th Airforce was decisive and in any case they didn't arrive in strength until the war was over half over.

IMO Germany lost the air war because they couldn't produce enough aviation gasoline for operations and training. Consequently the 12,807 Me-109s and 7,488 Fw-190 fighter aircraft produced during 1944 were far less effective then they should have been. Forcing Germany to consume more fuel then they could produce was a group effort. They were steamrolled.

That's a fair pov Dave (may I call you like that?)

But, I don't think the US would have been willing to invest so much in the 8th AF in terms of men and equipment (and absorb their initial, terrible losses) just to run a sideshow without any clear importance or impact on German production.
Is it possible to attribute the acute shortages of German fuels during 1944-1945 to western Allied air power?
 
Is it possible to attribute the acute shortages of German fuels during 1944-1945 to western Allied air power?
RAF Bomber Command accomplished most of the 1944 destruction to German hydrogenation plants producing aviation gasoline. So if you want to credit a single aircraft type for bringing down the Luftwaffe during 1944 I recommend the Lancaster bomber.

BTW, Dave is fine.
 
In my honest opinion, it's quite palpable that P-51 units began in a serious numeric disadvantage against P-38 and P-47 units and yet, it's surprising how they managed to rack up so rapidly their reputation against LW opposition.
Without doubt the P-51 was a critical tool in ensuring air superiority over the LW during 1944.
If I'm not mistaken, P-38s enjoyed better endurance than P-47s from the outset and still, one can see by the tables posted by you that they never achieved the numbers P-47s and P-51s managed, in the 8th FC. Does that mean the P-38 was not up to the task against LW singe-engine opposition?

The early models of the P-38 had a lot of high altitude problems with the turbosupercharger control-it being hydraulically operated and the fluid congealing at altitude causing overspeeding of the turbo. Lots of blown engines over that. And because of the P-38's unique design there was compressibility issues which forced the early models to limit dive speed. The L model 38 was a much more capable fighter, with electric controls for the turbos, the intercoolers were moved from the wing leading edge to the radiator intake which boosted their efficency. The emply space left by moving the intercoolers was turned into fuel tankage and further extended their range. Dive flaps were incorporated which help to mitigate the issues with dive speed.

The late model 38s if they had been available in numbers, might have made a greater contribution to the air to air fight, but General Doolittle had to make a sensible decision and most figure it was the correct one. By trading off the 38s and 47s and going with mustangs, he got probably the best all around escort fighter the US fielded and he simplified his supply logistics as well.
 
Thank you for that information Dobbie :D

I know on a general basis that early P-38s had unreliability issues that were ironed out later in its operational life, making them not very suitable to be fielded on large numbers, and, as you pointed out perhaps it was the most logistic rational decision to streamline the types of a/c once the P-51 stood out as the best option for escort duties.

But while this happened during 1944-45, what about early in say, later 1942-1943?
Could have been possible to impose P-38 units to form the basis of 8th FC electing their superior range compared to Spitfires/P-47s over their high-altitude issues?
 
RAF Bomber Command accomplished most of the 1944 destruction to German hydrogenation plants producing aviation gasoline. So if you want to credit a single aircraft type for bringing down the Luftwaffe during 1944 I recommend the Lancaster bomber.

BTW, Dave is fine.

Cool, Dave :)

RAF BC did in fact inflict heavy losses to overall German industries taking advantage of the Lancaster bomber and its superior tonnage capacity compared to its American counterparts; however, didn't RAF BC commit most of its resources to nocturnal attacks on German cities save the ones you mentioned against German industrial targets like hydrogenation plants late in 1944?
Could you please, if possible, direct me to statistics highlighting the percentage of RAF BC and 8th/15th AF raids committed specifically to these kind of targets excluding raids against German morale?
 
Dont know how much it would figure in to the discussion, but when Gen Doolittle took command of the 8th AF, one of the first things he did was change the way the escort fighters behaved.
Instead of essing to stay with the bombers all the way to the target and back, a lot were cut loose to fly ahead of the bomber formations, breaking up enemy fighters in the process of forming up for an attack.

This was a big issue, for sure. Like the Luftwaffe bomber crews in the batle of Britain, the US bomber crews over Europe were convinced that a fighter could do them no good unless they could see it, and they hollered loud an long if any of the escorts took off chasing Germans. I don't recall the name of the guy making the decisions regarding fighter tactics at the time (anyone please?) but he backed the bomber crews and as he was a personal friend of Hap Arnold everyone had to suck it up.
After Doolittle took over, this guy was booted upstairs and the fighters got the green light to range ahead of the bombers and hit the LW fighters before they had time to form up. One result was the near decimation of the twin engine zerstoyers, which caught low and with full fuel loads were siting ducks. LW losses skyrocketted and bomber losses dropped.
A similar misunderstanding of the fighters role earned the RAF the ire of the British Expiditionary Force during Dunkirk. The RAF flew themselves to exhaustion covering the evacuation, but because the best place to intercept the attacking bombers was inland and away from the beach - before they could drop their bombs - the troops on the ground couldn't see the action and assumed the British pilots were back home drinking warm beer. New Zealand ace Al Deere was shot down over Dunkirk and had to put up with the unfair vitiole of the troops on the ground. When he tried to board an evacuation ship the supervising officer told him that as the RAF weren't doing anything to help, he wasn't welcome. By that time Dere had had enough; he settled the matter with a right hook and got on anyway.
 
The early models of the P-38 had a lot of high altitude problems with the turbosupercharger control-it being hydraulically operated and the fluid congealing at altitude causing overspeeding of the turbo. Lots of blown engines over that.

One could take a look at tests here, F and G series were never able to develop the sea level power at 25000 ft due to the high carburetor temperatures (CAT). The CAT was too high because the intercoolers were not capable to cool the air compressed by turbo. Due to high CAT, the planes that should be cruising in ETO at 25-30000ft were to use combination of lower boost and higher RPM, instead of vice versa. The 'E' and earlier models might be suffering from faulty turbo regulator, but were never deployed in abroad, so that is kinda moot point for the wartime use.
The 'blown engines' started to appear mostly in ETO once the model with improved inter-cooler arrived, the 'J', in late 1943. That model was to cruise on higher boost and lower RPM, yet pilots, both new and old, were doing it the old way. Now since the intercooler was more efficient, at higher altitudes in winter, ETO, the fuel-air mixture was getting over-cooled, leading to fuel congealing in intake tubes, and to the blown engines. Engine shared it's part of the blame, Allison knew that and was developing a new intake tube for the engine as early as mid 1943, retrofitting starting in 1944 (in all US planes with V-1710, not only P-38s), by what time the P-51 was proven to be a tool for the job.

And because of the P-38's unique design there was compressibility issues which forced the early models to limit dive speed.

The 'unique design' of the P-38 have had nothing to do with compressibility, that was due to the wing profile and, probably, size. The wing was neither small, nor thin, nor of laminar-flow, and such planes were prone to compressibility issues. Eg. both P-47 and Bearcat were recipients of dive flaps, while Spitfire, P-51, Tempest and German fighters were renown as controllable divers 'as-is'.
The models prior L (dive flaps installed) were ill able to follow, let alone overtake the LW fighters at dive, at higher altitudes.

The L model 38 was a much more capable fighter, with electric controls for the turbos, the intercoolers were moved from the wing leading edge to the radiator intake which boosted their efficency. The emply space left by moving the intercoolers was turned into fuel tankage and further extended their range. Dive flaps were incorporated which help to mitigate the issues with dive speed.

The 'J' model was the one with chin inter-cooler and LE fuel tanks, L followed the suit.

The late model 38s if they had been available in numbers, might have made a greater contribution to the air to air fight, but General Doolittle had to make a sensible decision and most figure it was the correct one. By trading off the 38s and 47s and going with mustangs, he got probably the best all around escort fighter the US fielded and he simplified his supply logistics as well.

Well said.
 
RAF Bomber Command accomplished most of the 1944 destruction to German hydrogenation plants producing aviation gasoline. So if you want to credit a single aircraft type for bringing down the Luftwaffe during 1944 I recommend the Lancaster bomber.

BTW, Dave is fine.

Not according to the single most knowledgable authority on the subject, Albert Speer.

Nor to those that commanded the Luftwaffe, nor to those that flew in the West in 1944.
 
Dave - you might be getting pedantic.

I said the that the Russians had nothing to do with disrupting Fuel. The USAAF and RAF were the sole agencies charted with taking out fuel and chemicals. Does that definition Exclude, in your mind, Aviation Synthetics? Are synthetics fuels a hybrid Cool aid that has no relevance to 'fuel' or 'chemicals' ??

* caugh caugh*

Most of the Luftwaffe's bombers were on the Eastern front, flying an extremely high number of sorties and dropping more bomb tonnage until about late 1943 than the RAF and the USAAF combined. Fighter on the West were relatively few and consumed far less fuel than bombers in the East. I do not have a breakdown of fuel consumption, but I would guess around 80% of the German aviation fuel was consumed on the Eastern Front. Not to mention the Army there... And the Russian advance in Bagratyion cut off Germany's by far the largest supply of natural oil, Rumania.
 
[QUOTEThe 'E' and earlier models might be suffering from faulty turbo regulator, but were never deployed in abroad, so that is kinda moot point for the wartime use. ][/QUOTE]

The P38 E was deployed by 4 different fighter groups in Sept 1943

The design of the P38 had everything to do with compressiblitiy. because of the way the air was forced to flow between the engine nacelles and the cockpit gondola, it was discovered that the airflow locally went supersonic in that area before the wings and rendered the tailplane ineffective. The tailshake reported by test pilots was deemed a balance issue instead of the real cause, and even Kelly Johnson could not convince the AAF otherwise. So they hung the horn balance weights on the vertical stabilizer which did nothing to solve the problem. The limiting mach speed of the P 38 was much lower than the P 47 or the P 51, or the 109/190.
 
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* caugh caugh*

Most of the Luftwaffe's bombers were on the Eastern front, flying an extremely high number of sorties and dropping more bomb tonnage until about late 1943 than the RAF and the USAAF combined.

What was the LW Tonnage all in for 1943?

Fighter on the West were relatively few and consumed far less fuel than bombers in the East. I do not have a breakdown of fuel consumption, but I would guess around 80% of the German aviation fuel was consumed on the Eastern Front. Not to mention the Army there... And the Russian advance in Bagratyion cut off Germany's by far the largest supply of natural oil, Rumania.

I don't disagree the allocation of resources to East. Having said that, the USAAF started bombing Rumanian oil in 1943 and sustained a campaign against the Rumania refineries until the Russians over-ran them in mid 1944. No question that the Ost Front consumed more fuel than West - but that is different from having fuel deprived through strategic action - which was my only point.

Tante Ju - this is what I said earlier..
"Yes we know fuel was a strategic bottleneck - but nobody except RAF and US were doing anything about it until mid 1944 when the Russians over ran the Ploesti complex - which had already been bombed nearly into oblivion. USSTAF (8th and 15th) were decisive. The outcome of the war was already set, but a lot more more Allied lives were lost because of Chemical and Fuel shortages throttled the German Mobile Forces (air and land)."
 
The P38 E was deployed by 4 different fighter groups in Sept 1943

The design of the P38 had everything to do with compressiblitiy. because of the way the air was forced to flow between the engine nacelles and the cockpit gondola, it was discovered that the airflow locally went supersonic in that area before the wings and rendered the tailplane ineffective. The tailshake reported by test pilots was deemed a balance issue instead of the real cause, and even Kelly Johnson could not convince the AAF otherwise. So they hung the horn balance weights on the vertical stabilizer which did nothing to solve the problem. The limiting mach speed of the P 38 was much lower than the P 47 or the P 51, or the 109/190.

Compressibilty had everything to do with the airfoil. The P-38 airfoil had a high Thickness to Chord ratio and the onset divergence drag, then local supersonic drag occurred at lower Mach number than ALL its contemporaries. The area "between the nacelle's" is Part of the wings. The Lockheed team first thought that the issue of buffeting encountered, causing horizontal tail flutter, was the issue and added wing fillets, then the control horn - which did not solve the pitch down problem at all.

True, the wake turbulence behind the inner wing caused issues with Horizontal stabilizer pitch control, but the primary issue was that the critical mach shock wave moved aft of the aerodynamic center and the resultant change to Pitch Moment caused a nose down force until the aircraft reduced speed below critical mach.
 
Compressibilty had everything to do with the airfoil. The P-38 airfoil had a high Thickness to Chord ratio and the onset divergence drag, then local supersonic drag occurred at lower Mach number than ALL its contemporaries. The area "between the nacelle's" is Part of the wings. The Lockheed team first thought that the issue of buffeting encountered, causing horizontal tail flutter, was the issue and added wing fillets, then the control horn - which did not solve the pitch down problem at all.

True, the wake turbulence behind the inner wing caused issues with Horizontal stabilizer pitch control, but the primary issue was that the critical mach shock wave moved aft of the aerodynamic center and the resultant change to Pitch Moment caused a nose down force until the aircraft reduced speed below critical mach.

Yes! And the "dive brakes" weren't used to limit speed but to maintain the pressure center in the appropriate location.
 
[QUOTEThe 'E' and earlier models might be suffering from faulty turbo regulator, but were never deployed in abroad, so that is kinda moot point for the wartime use. ]

The P38 E was deployed by 4 different fighter groups in Sept 1943
[/QUOTE]

Where is that information from?

According to AHT, there were about 210 "E"s built and the "F"s started coming off the line in Feb/March of 1942.

The P-38 was troubled by faulty turbo regulators and/or improperly rigged turbo controls for a considerable part of it's life.
 

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