So who did it, the Jug or the Stang?

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The P-38 was troubled by faulty turbo regulators and/or improperly rigged turbo controls for a considerable part of it's life.

Any more specific data you might have? The P-38 deserves a sub-forum on its own :)
 
Most U.S. and RAF heavy bomber sorties failed to hit anything of military or economic value. So it's pointless to speak of percentage of sorties committed to different target types. All that matters is when specific plants suffered significant damage.

Hydrogenation Plants. Aviation gasoline. Thousands of tons per month.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/MofFP/ger_syn_ind/mof-sectc1.pdf
165.8 Jan 1944
149.6 Feb 1944
153.5 Mar 1944
160.0 Apr 1944
147.8 May 1944
51.5 Jun 1944
31.0 Jul 1944
13.1 Aug 1944
2.8 Sep 1944
14.0 Oct 1944
33.2 Nov 1944
15.8 Dec 1944

Bombers which successfully attacked German hydrogenation plants from May 1944 onward are what broke the Luftwaffe's back. Who did that? It certainly wasn't P-47s and P-51s.
 
Any more specific data you might have? The P-38 deserves a sub-forum on its own :)

If you are really interested I suggest getting a copy of the "Torque Meter" Volume 1 no 2 by the AEHS for Danial Whitley's article "the Allison time bomb" . It goes 11 pages.

TMV1N2

It is available for purchase on line.

I hope this is not out of line but I don't feel like typing several pages ;)

Apparently the hydraulic control could be adjusted with a few turns on a control rod but the new electric control needed a few new control links and a wiring change.
 
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Most U.S. and RAF heavy bomber sorties failed to hit anything of military or economic value. So it's pointless to speak of percentage of sorties committed to different target types. All that matters is when specific plants suffered significant damage.

Hydrogenation Plants. Aviation gasoline. Thousands of tons per month.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/MofFP/ger_syn_ind/mof-sectc1.pdf
165.8 Jan 1944
149.6 Feb 1944
153.5 Mar 1944
160.0 Apr 1944
147.8 May 1944
51.5 Jun 1944
31.0 Jul 1944
13.1 Aug 1944
2.8 Sep 1944
14.0 Oct 1944
33.2 Nov 1944
15.8 Dec 1944

Bombers which successfully attacked German hydrogenation plants from May 1944 onward are what broke the Luftwaffe's back. Who did that? It certainly wasn't P-47s and P-51s.

Check Speer's remarks concerning the opening of 8th AF campaign against German synthetic fuel plants on May 12, 1944.

Page 346 "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich", by Albert Speer regarding the shock of May 12, 1944.
"on that day the technological war was decided... But with the attack by nine hundred and thirty five daylight bombers of the American Eighth Air Forces upon several fuel plants in central and eastern German, a new era of the air war began. It meant the end of German armaments production."

On May 19th in his meeting with Hitler, after surveying the damage and said "The enemy has struck us at our weakest point. If they persist at it this time we will no longer have any fuel production worth mentioning".

If you remain curious regarding the distinct probability that you are wrong about the strategic importance of daylight bombing, slip back to page 242-246. Perhaps you may find an authority whose POV was not only 'real time' but the single most credible authority on Germany's war production.

BTW the LW found a gap in the coverage between the Penertration Escort (P-47s of the 56, 78 and 353rd) and the Target Escort (P-51s of the 4th, 355th and 357th) when the Second Task Force went 20 miles south of R/V and were left uncovered from just west of Frankfurt all the way to Giessen - losing 41 B-17s. This was the last time the 8th lost this many B-17s in one mission.

From this point forward, except for a three week respite due to Normandy Campaign, the 8th and 15th were relentless against fuel and chemical industry - and, Yes, it was P-51s that made it possible.
 
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Most U.S. and RAF heavy bomber sorties failed to hit anything of military or economic value. So it's pointless to speak of percentage of sorties committed to different target types. All that matters is when specific plants suffered significant damage.

Hydrogenation Plants. Aviation gasoline. Thousands of tons per month.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/MofFP/ger_syn_ind/mof-sectc1.pdf
165.8 Jan 1944
149.6 Feb 1944
153.5 Mar 1944
160.0 Apr 1944
147.8 May 1944
51.5 Jun 1944
31.0 Jul 1944
13.1 Aug 1944
2.8 Sep 1944
14.0 Oct 1944
33.2 Nov 1944
15.8 Dec 1944

Bombers which successfully attacked German hydrogenation plants from May 1944 onward are what broke the Luftwaffe's back. Who did that? It certainly wasn't P-47s and P-51s.

The P-47s and P-51s doing a good job, enabling the heavies do their job good, with only minor attrition? Plus the night bombing by the RAF in 1944?
 
Gentlemen, once again I express my gratitude for your active and knowledgeable contributions to this thread. :D

Milosh, great link, thank you for posting it. :thumbleft:

Dave, many thanks for your link as well. :thumbleft:
By the numbers in it, the contribution by Allied heavy bombers was quintessential in seriously weakening German war making capacity; however, do you think escorts were irrelevant and not at all important when it comes to their effectiveness protecting heavy bombers on deep penetration raids inside German air space, specially American bombers.
Many USAAF veterans of the air war over Europe would clash with your point of view.

Drgondog, when did this gap in escort coverage, found and exploited by LW fighters take place?
To my rationale, this is evidence of the increasing effectiveness in escort coverage of heavy bombers and thus a tremendous improvement for the bombing force to pursue its target directive.
 
Hello guys.

I am aware that the P-47 had a tremendous impact in the air war over Nazi-occupied Europe but I'm also aware it was notoriously short-ranged during 1943 and part of 1944 and eventually it was the P-51 that took primarily the duties of fighter escorts for the 8th Air Force heavies.

Of note is that on the 8th AF first escorted mission to Berlin P-38's, P-47's and P-51's were present; and from N. Australia the P-47's flew very long missions. Apparently the old Thunderbolt got some legs somewhere.
 
Of note is that on the 8th AF first escorted mission to Berlin P-38's, P-47's and P-51's were present; and from N. Australia the P-47's flew very long missions. Apparently the old Thunderbolt got some legs somewhere.

But the P-47s did not escort the bombers all the way to Berlin like the P-38s and P-51s did.
 
Gentlemen, once again I express my gratitude for your active and knowledgeable contributions to this thread. :D

Milosh, great link, thank you for posting it. :thumbleft:

Dave, many thanks for your link as well. :thumbleft:
By the numbers in it, the contribution by Allied heavy bombers was quintessential in seriously weakening German war making capacity; however, do you think escorts were irrelevant and not at all important when it comes to their effectiveness protecting heavy bombers on deep penetration raids inside German air space, specially American bombers.
Many USAAF veterans of the air war over Europe would clash with your point of view.

You are being too polite. EVERY veteran that survived as a daylight bomber crew during ops in 1944 and 1945 would clash with his view.

Drgondog, when did this gap in escort coverage, found and exploited by LW fighters take place?
To my rationale, this is evidence of the increasing effectiveness in escort coverage of heavy bombers and thus a tremendous improvement for the bombing force to pursue its target directive.

May 12, the 2nd Task Force/3rd BD was 20 minutes behind and 20 miles south of the course to a waypoint between Frankfurt and Koblenz, then up towards Kassel and over to Brux, etc, etc. The 1st Task Force/1st BD was already past Koblenz at 1200. The Second was supposed to be in trail.

The 56th was sweeping east, ene and ne of Frankfurt when the Luftwaffe slipped in behind them. The 355th was orbiting just south of Bonn, the 4th was further east, north of Giessen and the 357th was ne of the 4th. the track was supposed to be just south of Koblenz and the 355th was to pick up ass end charlie - the 9th box, the 357th the lead box and the 4th had the 'middle four'.

The first sign of 'problems' was a simultaneous cry for help on C channel and a series of explosions seen by JC Meyer at the head of the 352nd FG escorting the trailing boxes of the First Task force east of Koblenz. The visible explosions back to the southwest were multiple B-17s blowing up.

The 357th and 4th sent a squadron apiece back to the Southwest, Hub Zemke was trapped by Gunther Rall south of Frankfurt and called for help to the 56th north of him. Combined, those escorts destroyed about 50 109s and 190s between west Frankfurt, southeast Koblenz and Giessen between 1205 and 1240.
 
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It's funny to me to hear about the Allison time bomb.

We have several in the same aircraft running for more than 15 years with nothing more than normal maintenance. They were built bone stock except none we are aware of use the turbocharger today. Not becasue of anything other than availabillity of parts and the owner's desires to stay VFR where they can play in their warbirds. Who wants to spend piston warbird time flying straight and level IFR?

The jet guys might for fuel economy (think A-4 Skyhawk or F-86 / MiG-15/-17), but the piston guys ... I don't know any that fly IFR in their warbirds except as a last resort. Mostly the warbirds fly only in severe clear. If the weather is bad, they stay home. Well-built Allisons are some of the most reliable warbirds engines on the planet. Time bombs indeed ... they LAST for a long time.

Dan Whitney can't decide whether to praise or villify the Allison. He has one on a trailer and it usually runs when he tries to start it. So does ours, assuming the battery is charged. His is a right hand engine and ours is a left hand unit. We figured if we were going to have one, we might as well have the rare unit so a broken P-38 might be able to get home with the loaner engine. Almost everyone who has a running Allison has a right turner. The lefts are only used by the P-38 and so are much more rare.
 
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It's funny to me to hear about the Allison time bomb....

Dan Whitney can't decide whether to praise or villify the Allison.....

I reckon it you have read the article in the 'Torque meter' magazine, Greg?
 
Yah, tough to reconcile that article with his book, "Vee's for Victory" and his Allison on a run-stand trailer, at least for me. At one Planes of Fame arishow, we ran our engines almost side by side. His has a stub prop on it and so must be on the hot ramp. Ours runs with only the prop shaft since you don't need a propeller to run one as long as you don't overdo it. We weere across the crowd fence from one another had later had dinner together.
 
The P38 E was deployed by 4 different fighter groups in Sept 1943

Where is that information from?

According to AHT, there were about 210 "E"s built and the "F"s started coming off the line in Feb/March of 1942.

The P-38 was troubled by faulty turbo regulators and/or improperly rigged turbo controls for a considerable part of it's life.[/QUOTE]

There seems to be some argument as to whether it was the E or F model deployed with the 20th, 55th, 364th and 479th groups so I retract that, at least until or if I can find a more reliable source. The turbo issues have been talked about extensively, and like any combination of new technologies, there was a lot of guessing as to the cause and the fix. Proper regulation of the turbochargers really wasnt accomplished until the mid J to the L models-the L also getting more efficient scoops for the radiators as well. The buffeting issue was indeed solved by the wing filets, smoothing flow to the elevator, and the so called dive flaps as Ive seen them referred to many times kept the shock wave from moving backwards on the wing.
 
Havent been in on this tussle to this point. Intersting debate. My opinion, as far as "which a/c did it" well, my views have changed quite a bit thinking about this question. I would say "neither and both"

Luftwaffe in 1944 was being bled white from attrition. Too many fronts, too many responsibility, losses too high to be sustainable. losses to all air forces from enemy air activity was significant, but not the the domnant cause of losses. Luftwaffe lost 60000 a/c outright, with a further 30-40000 basically write offs sitting on the edge of the tarmac, never going to fly again. Of the 60000, 15-20000 were lost to air activity, the remainder were simply lost to other causes...things like flak, and non-operational causes, training accidents etc. It wasnt the direct losses that ruptured the LW, it was the constant, unrelenting pressure on all fronts, from all sources that caused the LW loss rates to become uncontrollable.


Both the P-51 and the P-47 were very effective fighters, the P-51 had the advantage in range, but the Jug was a better FB roles. Both were very effective at just putting pressure on the Germans, and this, of itself, increased the german loss rates to unsustainable levels. But then, so too were the activities of thoise a/c like the Spit and the YAK that have been written off in this discussion as irrlevant. Without those very a/c, the P-51s and the P-47s would not have been able to operate as they did.
 
All too true. Tough to ignore 20,000 Spitfires and 4,838 Yak-3's and 16,000+ Yak-9's, not to mention 9,920 Lavochkin La-5's. Nevermind the rest of the Hurricanes, the MiG's, Typhoons, Tempests, etc.

And I haven't even touched on Lancasters, Halifaxes, etc.

They all did their part and no one plane did it all or could. Somebody, we all know who, will say the Mosquito could, but he would be wrong.

The Mosquito was never a great fighter against single engine counterparts, but was pretty good at most everything else, even target towing. I think it could have been a great blender if pressed into that service. Possibly the first Cuisinart of aerial wartime appliances. But a winner against the Fw 190D-9 or Bf 109K flown by a competent pilot without malfunctions? Maybe not ... depends on the relative hangovers of the respective pilots after last night's celebration ... or the phases of the moon.
 
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Yah, tough to reconcile that article with his book, "Vee's for Victory" and his Allison on a run-stand trailer, at least for me. ...

I'm good in English language, but this sentence puzzles me. Maybe elaborate it a little bit?
 
There seems to be some argument as to whether it was the E or F model deployed with the 20th, 55th, 364th and 479th groups so I retract that, at least until or if I can find a more reliable source. The turbo issues have been talked about extensively, and like any combination of new technologies, there was a lot of guessing as to the cause and the fix. Proper regulation of the turbochargers really wasnt accomplished until the mid J to the L models-the L also getting more efficient scoops for the radiators as well. The buffeting issue was indeed solved by the wing filets, smoothing flow to the elevator, and the so called dive flaps as Ive seen them referred to many times kept the shock wave from moving backwards on the wing.

The 20thFG began ETO Ops with some P-38H, but mostly P-38J-5. The 55th started with P-38H with mostly P-38J-5, the 364 and 479FG were all P-38J's.

The 78th FG started with F's but all went to Afrika in late 1942/early 1943 and the 78th converted to P-47C. The two P-38s lost ferrying in January were P-38F.

Net - zero P-38E operational in ETO, some P-38H's for 55th and 20th, all P-38J's for 364th and 479th. IIRC all the new P-38L were diverted to 367 and 474th FG in 9th AF in May and the 364/479th stayed with mostly J-25s until converting to Mustangs.
 
Both the P-51 and the P-47 were very effective fighters, the P-51 had the advantage in range, but the Jug was a better FB roles. Both were very effective at just putting pressure on the Germans, and this, of itself, increased the german loss rates to unsustainable levels. But then, so too were the activities of thoise a/c like the Spit and the YAK that have been written off in this discussion as irrlevant. Without those very a/c, the P-51s and the P-47s would not have been able to operate as they did.

Must admit head scratching trying to figure how Spitfire and Yak pressure enabled P-51s and P-47s (and P-38s?) to operate as they did in 1944 (or any other year), in any theatre much less ETO.

Suppose you eliminate Spitfires and Yaks from existence in January 1944. How does that change the Daylight Strategic campaign and the associated battles versus the LW between January 1 and D-Day?
 
Suppose you eliminate Spitfires and Yaks from existence in January 1944. How does that change the Daylight Strategic campaign and the associated battles versus the LW between January 1 and D-Day?

Recently I have started to wonder about what if the Germans simply transferred all of their fighters from the Eastern Front in 1944 to the Western Front. That would make about twice the number of fighters in West, quite possibly causing a very different situation...
 

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