Some thoughts on "combat effectiveness/performance" factors that are often hidden.

[GregP]

The survival of American pilots and the death of the Japanese pilots may very well be due more to WHEN in the war you are talking about, and in what situations they fought. Right about the introduction of the F6F and, slightly later, the F4U, the US Navy was coming into a superiority situation. Earlier, when we encountered superior Japanese forces, we had to run beacuse we needed to preserve our ships that were still there after Pearl Harbor. Later, were essentiall hunting the Japanese Navy, and THEY had to run to survive.

Perhaps in these encounters you mention above, there were American ships around and our pilots mostly all had radios, so we would be looking for them if they called out for help. Conversely, the Japanese fleet might be running to survive and not have ships or other craft to rescue their pilots, who were largely considered "expendable."

Not saying it was that way for everyone. I'm saying it started to be that way about mid-1943 or thereabouts, and COULD have been a factor in a pilot's survival or lack thereof.

I'm not too sure about 5 - 10% estimates in your points above. Sounds like a SWAG, without any way to verify if it's even in the ballpark. I also doubt anyone was memorizing tail numbers in aerial combat. They were trying to attack and not get killed rather than flying around gathering intelligence. But, repeated exposure might very well result in familiarity, though more than a few encounters with the same aircraft would mean the pilots were very well-matched. I don't believe that happened too often.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The survival of American pilots and the death of the Japanese pilots may very well be due more to WHEN in the war you are talking about, and in what situations they fought. Right about the introduction of the F6F and, slightly later, the F4U, the US Navy was coming into a superiority situation. Earlier, when we encountered superior Japanese forces, we had to run beacuse we needed to preserve our ships that were still there after Pearl Harbor. Later, were essentiall hunting the Japanese Navy, and THEY had to run to survive.

Perhaps in these encounters you mention above, there were American ships around and our pilots mostly all had radios, so we would be looking for them if they called out for help. Conversely, the Japanese fleet might be running to survive and not have ships or other craft to rescue their pilots, who were largely considered "expendable."

Not saying it was that way for everyone. I'm saying it started to be that way about mid-1943 or thereabouts, and COULD have been a factor in a pilot's survival or lack thereof.

I'm not too sure about 5 - 10% estimates in your points above. Sounds like a SWAG, without any way to verify if it's even in the ballpark. I also doubt anyone was memorizing tail numbers in aerial combat. They were trying to attack and not get killed rather than flying around gathering intelligence. But, repeated exposure might very well result in familiarity, though more than a few encounters with the same aircraft would mean the pilots were very well-matched. I don't believe that happened too often.

Nah, you missed my point. Or just don't want to see it.

Claringbould keeps a running total of lost aircraft and aircrew casualties in a couple of his series (Solomon's Air War and South Pacific Air War for example) and the disparity in crew losses vs aircraft losses is consistent in all of them - the Japanese lost about twice to three times as many crew per aircraft shot down as the US. This was for land battles as well as naval.

By 1943 in two of those series, by the way, the US lost more aircraft than the Japanese. But a lot of those are just due to weather, accidents, navigation problems etc.

This disparity in casualties was for a variety of reasons but one of the big ones is the Japanese didn't have the same kind of assets in place to rescue pilots. The US had twice as many seaplanes and PT boats and subs etc. out picking up friendly aircraft crew. They were more or less bribing natives in the Solomons and New Guinea to help downed pilots. Another issue is probably the lack of armor on a lot of the Japanese planes. They didn't fall apart every time they got hit per the old legends, but if the pilot got hit it seemed more likely to be fatal. Another big one is that for a while Japanese fighter pilots were not even wearing parachutes!

But this is a minor aside to the main point. In incident after incident of these types, if the claims were accurate, there would be no Japanese unit left. The same was true on the other side. If there are 40 aircraft flying in Rabaul, and the Allied pilots claim 27 of them shot down on Tuesday, and 39 are flying that Wednesday, it means 26 of those claims weren't real. The pilots are still accounted for, the aircraft are still taking off on missions, still using billets, still drawing rations, the planes are still flying missions, using up fuel, using up ammunition. They didn't get shot down.

And no I am not claiming that somebody is memorizing serial numbers in combat, I'm referring to the admin officer of the unit who allegedly took the losses. They report tail numbers when the plane is shot down. "One aircraft tail number 81-113 returned damaged from mission, pilot Takishida injured." They report on their strength on hand - "How many aircraft do you have available for a mission tomorrow?" - "39 A6M2 type 21 available."

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

There is a pair of monographs published in one book by the Harvard Business School in 1950, titled: The Development of Aircraft Engines, by Robert Schlaifer, and Aviation Fuels by S D Heron. It is usually known as Development of Aircraft Engines and Fuels. The sub-title Two studies of relations between Government and Industry. Between WWI and WWII at different times the radial or the inline looked to be the way of the future, the "lead" kept swapping.

In military use the bomber engines tended to be less stressed than the fighter ones, full power for take off then fast cruise, fighters did the same plus full power or close to it when encountering enemy aircraft. or ground attack Whether a radial is more reliable than an inline one in civil service depends more on the engines chosen. Today the power requirements mean smaller air cooled are good enough and means no cooling system to worry about.

Maybe a naive question in all this, but why ARE radials generally more reliable than inlines? You'd think efforts in the automotive segment would have translated pretty well into making more reliable aviation inlines, while radials didn't benefit from this at all (I don't think anyone was putting radials in cars) and they at least look much more complex with long, exposed pushrods, many cylinder heads, and the 'master rod' in the center of the crankcase negotiating all 7 or 9 cylinders attached to it.

Though I said air cooling above a lot of radial heat loss is through the oil system, lose that and the engine will fail. Liquid cooled engines look like they were more vulnerable to coolant loss via engine damage, and designs like the Spitfire, Bf109 and Mustang had a lot of piping to the radiators just waiting to have holes put in them.

But whether here with trustworthy data or in common anecdotes, it really seems that in wartime you'd want nothing but radials if you have models you can adapt to your needs - (apparently) they are easier to build, are lighter, and more resilient against battle damage than a comparable inline; all for a modest, but not impossible to overcome, increase in drag and frontal area (with the indirect benefit of forcing those pesky aircraft manufacturers to make cockpits for an entire person and not just 80% of one).

Easier to build and lighter is more a design issue. I have not done a systematic check but it looks like radials generally had a higher fuel consumption.

R-3350 in early 1943, about $25,000 each, R-1820/1830 for B-17/24 about $8,000 to $8,500, R-2800 $22,608, Allison in an A-36 $12,000, in P-40 $7,714, these are in theory average costs, in mid 1944 R-3350 still around $25,000, B-17/24 now over $8,500, R-2800 $24,313, Allison in P-39 $13,518, in a P-40 $13,905, P-63 $13,944, the A-36 still $12,000, while a pair for a P-38 is $21,096, P-51 probably Merlin engine $17,328.

 

[GregP]

Claringbould keeps a running total of lost aircraft and aircrew casualties in a couple of his series (Solomon's Air War and South Pacific Air War for example) and the disparity in crew losses vs aircraft losses is consistent in all of them - the Japanese lost about twice to three times as many crew per aircraft shot down as the US. This was for land battles as well as naval.

So, Steamed Bannana, we get right back to the primary question in MY mind, "What is his definition of a "loss?"

If it doesn't match whatever definition we perhaps can agree on, then Claringbould's list isn't of much use and will not be "accurate" with our list of losses that match ageeed-to criteria.

I'd bet he is on the side of, "if it isn't completrely destroyed, never to be flown again, or even to be used a parts, then it isn't a loss." But, I have no proof of same.

You last paragraph also confuses "losses" with "aircraft available for a mission." The two will not always add up, and there need be nothing wrong.

A plane can be written off for a bad landing that had nothing whatsoever to do with combat, but it isn't available for a mission. It can be so tired that it is written off as unserviceable. It can be fine, but the propeller can be damaged with no replacement available. It might have run out of gas and been lost at sea, but that is not a combat loss.

Your replies are generally pretty good, but we have never discussed or agreed to what we might accept mutually as a "loss."

Some categories tracked are:
1) awarded victories.
2) losses in combat (need a tight definition). What if a plane is damaged in combat, but later goes down on the way home. We have no idea if the root cause was combat-related or not, but the plane didn't return although it flew away from the fight in apparently flying shape.
3) Losses on ship or ground.
4) Operational losses while flying non-action mission and repositioning flights, patrols, etc, unrelated to combat.
5) "Other losses" covering mechanical failure, accidents while the engine is running, accidents while the engine is not running (fire, etc), several other thaings that can and did happen. One former WWII pilot I spoke with some 40 years ago lost a P-40 when a elephant took a dislike to it and essentially destroyed one wing and a rear fuselage. There were no spare around to fix it with, so it became a loss.

I'm sure I missed a category or two.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

So, Steamed Bannana, we get right back to the primary question in MY mind, "What is his definition of a "loss?"

If it doesn't match whatever definition we perhaps can agree on, then Claringbould's list isn't of much use and will not be "accurate" with our list of losses that match ageeed-to criteria.

I'd bet he is on the side of, "if it isn't completrely destroyed. never to be fly again, or even to be used a parts, then it isn't a loss." But, I have no proof of same.

You really ought to read a couple of those books, they are quite informative.

You last paragraph also confuses "losses" with "aircraft available for a mission." The two will not always add up, and there need be nothing wrong.

A plane can be written off for a bad landing that had nothing whatsoever to do with combat, but it isn't available for a mission. It can be so tire2d thath it is written off as unserviceable. If can be fine, but the propeller can be damaged with no replacement available. It might have run out of gas and been lost at sea, but that is not a combat loss.

Your replies are generally pretty good, but we have never discussed or agreed to what we might accept mutually as a "loss."

Some categories tracked are:
1) awarded victories.
2) losses in combat (need a tight definition). What if a plane is damaged in combat, but later goes down on the way home. We have no idea if the root cause was combat-related or not, but the plane didn't return although it flew away from the fight in apparently flying shape.
3) Losses on ship or ground.
4) Operational losses while flying non-action mission and repositioning flights, patrols, etc, unrelated to combat.
5) "Other losses" covering mechanical failure, accidents while the engine is running, accidents while the engine is not running (fire, etc), several other thaings that can and did happen. One former WWII pilot I spoke with some 40 years ago lost a P-40 when a elephant took a dislike to it and essentially destroyed one wing and a rear fuselage. There were no spare around to fix it with, so it became a loss.

I'm sure I missed a category or two.

It's a fair question, but it's one which is being addressed in these new types of war-histories. Claringbould and Shores and Michael Piegzik etc. all break these down into separate categories as appropriate. Operational losses where there was no combat are counted separately. All the different types of losses are counted in their own specific categories. In New Guinea IMO the weather shot down more aircraft on both sides than were lost in combat.

I think this is vital, it can't be opaque - the authors have to reveal the data that led them to their conclusions as to what category to put these planes and pilots and crew. And they are typically doing that. Everyone, including these authors, has their own definition of what constitutes a loss, but as long as you include the relevant details, (i.e. was it lost or damaged or missing after combat or not, as a big one, did it make it back to it's own base is another) then we can all add up our own little totals.

But the truth is, no matter what criteria you use, they won't be that different. They will not account for 10-1 or 5-1 victory ratios and other legends we believed during most of the 20th Century. Either for US uber weapons, or Axis uber-aces.

 

[SaparotRob]

.....

5) "Other losses" covering mechanical failure, accidents while the engine is running, accidents while the engine is not running (fire, etc), several other thaings that can and did happen. One former WWII pilot I spoke with some 40 years ago lost a P-40 when a elephant took a dislike to it and essentially destroyed one wing and a rear fuselage. There were no spare around to fix it with, so it became a loss.

I'm sure I missed a category or two.

That's a first for me. Did the mahout paint a flag on the side of the elephant?
Having been slapped in the face by a baby elephant (no shit), I find this utterly credible.

 

[JDCAVE]

GregP and Steamed Banana: You can "get to yes" if you cite your sources. I am no expert on overclaiming by the USAAF US Navy or Japan. However, I have spent some time going through RAF (RCAF) Bomber Command Claims and the Nachtjagd. The German claims are quite close to the actual losses by Bomber Command. That is because that conflict was over German occupied territory and the Germans had a rigid process for confirming claims. It sometimes took months for claims to be affirmed. My source for this is Theo Boiten and Rod McKenzie's work. Nachtjagd War Diaries:

Boiten, T and R. MacKenzie. 2008. The Nachtjagd War Diaries: An Operational History of the German Night Fighter Force in the West, April 1944-May 1945. Red Kite. 400 p.
Theo Boiten. Nachjagd Combat Archive. 24 July - 15 October 1944. Red Kite. 104 p.
Theo Boiten. Nachjagd Combat Archive. 16 October - 31 December 1944. Red Kite. 96 p.
Theo Boiten. Nachjagd Combat Archive. 1 January - 3 May 1945. Red Kite. 128 p.

When it comes to "sources" I am much more partial to primary source material and peer reviewed papers. The only source I have on the claims by USAAF is Richard G Davis, Bombing the European Axis powers, who on page 180 states claims by gunners on heavy bombers exceeded by "eight or nine to one" the actual German losses. However, WRT claims by escorting fighters, these seem to be more accurate. Page 349 on 12-May-1944 "Fifteen combat wings--886 heavy bombers and 735 escorting fighters--left Britain to bomb their targets...The American escort lost four P-47 and 3 P-51s, but claimed 61 German aircraft destroyed and 11 damaged in the air as well as five destroyed and two damaged on the ground. German records confirmed the accuracy of the fighter claims. They counted 28 pilots dead, 26 injured and 65 aircraft lost." While a secondary source, Davis cites what I consider credible extant sources.

Jim

 

[JDCAVE]

I am no mechanic, however, I can relate my father's recollection on the reliability of engines. I posted a thread on some of these issues here:

Lancaster X aircraft, Packard Merlin 28, 38, and 224 engines

According to Harry Holmes book, "Avro Lancaster, the Definitive Record, the Canadian built Lancaster X aircraft were variously powered with Packard Merlin 28, 38, and 224 engines. I have examined the Accident cards available to review here...

ww2aircraft.net

It seems the a/c with the PM 38's were less reliable than the 224's. I am uncertain as to whether this was due to the age of the 38's as compared with the newer 224 aircraft or some other reason. The aircraft with 224's were definitely faster and more powerful and from what I can determine did not consume more fuel for the same rate of climb, IAS and loads. Aircraft with the PM 38's were not upgraded with the PM 224's later in their wartime service, as near as I can determine.

WRT Geoffrey's comment on the fuel consumption of radial engines: The fuel loads for the Halifax III's and VII's were higher. For Mainz 27-February-1945 the 6-Group Form B's stipulate the fuel loads for the Halifax III's and VII's was 1970 imperial gallons and bomb load of 7,640 lbs, mixed HE and Clusters and for Lancasters 1700 gallons and bomb loads of 10,740-11,000 lbs, mixed HE and Clusters. The flight plan was the same for both aircraft types, although the bombing heights for Halifaxes may have been lower. I would have to ascertain that.

Jim

 

[Steamed_Banana]

GregP and Steamed Banana: You can "get to yes" if you cite your sources. I am no expert on overclaiming by the USAAF US Navy or Japan. However, I have spent some time going through RAF (RCAF) Bomber Command Claims and the Nachtjagd. The German claims are quite close to the actual losses by Bomber Command. That is because that conflict was over German occupied territory and the Germans had a rigid process for confirming claims. It sometimes took months for claims to be affirmed. My source for this is Theo Boiten and Rod McKenzie's work. Nachtjagd War Diaries:

Boiten, T and R. MacKenzie. 2008. The Nachtjagd War Diaries: An Operational History of the German Night Fighter Force in the West, April 1944-May 1945. Red Kite. 400 p.
Theo Boiten. Nachjagd Combat Archive. 24 July - 15 October 1944. Red Kite. 104 p.
Theo Boiten. Nachjagd Combat Archive. 16 October - 31 December 1944. Red Kite. 96 p.
Theo Boiten. Nachjagd Combat Archive. 1 January - 3 May 1945. Red Kite. 128 p.

When it comes to "sources" I am much more partial to primary source material and peer reviewed papers. The only source I have on the claims by USAAF is Richard G Davis, Bombing the European Axis powers, who on page 180 states claims by gunners on heavy bombers exceeded by "eight or nine to one" the actual German losses. However, WRT claims by escorting fighters, these seem to be more accurate. Page 349 on 12-May-1944 "Fifteen combat wings--886 heavy bombers and 735 escorting fighters--left Britain to bomb their targets...The American escort lost four P-47 and 3 P-51s, but claimed 61 German aircraft destroyed and 11 damaged in the air as well as five destroyed and two damaged on the ground. German records confirmed the accuracy of the fighter claims. They counted 28 pilots dead, 26 injured and 65 aircraft lost." While a secondary source, Davis cites what I consider credible extant sources.

Jim

We are both referring to a (relatively) new series of popular history books which was brought up in another recent thread in here, in particular some books by Michael Claringbould on US and Allied air combat against Japanese Army and Navy air forces in the Solomons and New Guinea areas specifically, usually in short increments of time. Claringbould does cite his sources which are primary sources in Japan, the US, and Australia etc. I'm not really interested in trying to prove him right or wrong here.

I am just noting that other authors which I'd mentioned (Shores etc.) have also done the same thing in relatively recent times (last 20 years or so) and found very similar ratios of claims to losses. It seems to be pretty consistent in all Theaters, though personally I've never looked into heavy bomber raids on Germany in any detail.

 

[Engineman]

I am no mechanic, however, I can relate my father's recollection on the reliability of engines. I posted a thread on some of these issues here:

Lancaster X aircraft, Packard Merlin 28, 38, and 224 engines

According to Harry Holmes book, "Avro Lancaster, the Definitive Record, the Canadian built Lancaster X aircraft were variously powered with Packard Merlin 28, 38, and 224 engines. I have examined the Accident cards available to review here...

ww2aircraft.net

It seems the a/c with the PM 38's were less reliable than the 224's. I am uncertain as to whether this was due to the age of the 38's as compared with the newer 224 aircraft or some other reason. The aircraft with 224's were definitely faster and more powerful and from what I can determine did not consume more fuel for the same rate of climb, IAS and loads. Aircraft with the PM 38's were not upgraded with the PM 224's later in their wartime service, as near as I can determine.

Jim

Well, Lumsden lists the Merlin 24 that was also produced by Packard as the 224, with considerable improvements over the earlier Merlin 22/22A that were also produced by Packard as the 28 and the 38, so much so that the 24/224 had ratings for +18lb, more than the various ratings for the 22/22A or 28/38. Rolls-Royce development of these engines always strove for
improved power and reliability, so I would expect the 224 to be more reliable.

Cheers

Eng

 

[JDCAVE]

Well, Lumsden lists the Merlin 24 that was also produced by Packard as the 224, with considerable improvements over the earlier Merlin 22/22A that were also produced by Packard as the 28 and the 38, so much so that the 24/224 had ratings for +18lb, more than the various ratings for the 22/22A or 28/38. Rolls-Royce development of these engines always strove for
improved power and reliability, so I would expect the 224 to be more reliable.

Cheers

Eng

Yes. The 24 and 224 aircraft are "loosely" referred to in primary wartime RAF documents as 18+ boost aircraft. They were rated for an increased all-up weight of 68,000 lbs as compared to the 65,000 lb weight of the Merlin 38's.

Jim

 

[GregP]

You really ought to read a couple of those books, they are quite informative.

I have a LOT of books. Many never even define what the author considers a loss or a victory ... they just report numbers. And they get quoted in here as authoritative.

 

[GregP]

You really ought to read a couple of those books, they are quite informative.



It's a fair question, but it's one which is being addressed in these new types of war-histories. Claringbould and Shores and Michael Piegzik etc. all break these down into separate categories as appropriate. Operational losses where there was no combat are counted separately. All the different types of losses are counted in their own specific categories. In New Guinea IMO the weather shot down more aircraft on both sides than were lost in combat.

I think this is vital, it can't be opaque - the authors have to reveal the data that led them to their conclusions as to what category to put these planes and pilots and crew. And they are typically doing that. Everyone, including these authors, has their own definition of what constitutes a loss, but as long as you include the relevant details, (i.e. was it lost or damaged or missing after combat or not, as a big one, did it make it back to it's own base is another) then we can all add up our own little totals.

But the truth is, no matter what criteria you use, they won't be that different. They will not account for 10-1 or 5-1 victory ratios and other legends we believed during most of the 20th Century. Either for US uber weapons, or Axis uber-aces.

This is exactly what I am talking about. Suppose an aircraft gets damaged IN COMBAT, but flies away from the combat with his wingman or leader and returns to formation. Some time later, the engine develops an issue and he goes down.

There was nothing wrong with the engine BEFORE the combat, but it gets classified as an operational loss, despite the fact that the aircraft was hit in the engine DURING combat.

These are the things we sometimes see and gloss over without comment, but drive ME crazy. If there was nothing wrong with the plane before combat but he was lost on the way home AFTER sustaining damage IN combat, it should be a combat loss.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Claims vs actual will always be opaque because of issues like multiple shooters, a fleeting glimpse of a plane diving out and throwing smoke or vapor because of engine boost, the inadvisability of following a victim down, and so on. A round in a radiator downing an aircraft miles away from the fight. A plane never rises to fight again. Books showing losses that weren't claimed in combat at all.

Any attempt to parse claimed kills is perforce beset by the fact that combat is split-second, reliant on awfully faulty human observation and memory, and transitory.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I have a LOT of books. Many never even define what the author considers a loss or a victory ... they just report numbers. And they get quoted in here as authoritative.

yeah, but different books have different things in them mate. It's not always just the same shite over and over again.

That's really the point I'm trying to make. The story isn't over. Quite to the contrary. To me that's great news.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

This is exactly what I am talking about. Suppose an aircraft gets damaged IN COMBAT, but flies away from the combat with his wingman or leader and returns to formation. Some time later, the engine develops an issue and he goes down.

There was nothing wrong with the engine BEFORE the combat, but it gets classified as an operational loss, despite the fact that the aircraft was hit in the engine DURING combat.

If you are talking about the same sortie, that would typically be classified as a combat loss.

But even if it's listed as an operational loss, they tell you exactly the story you just read out - "reported engine failure 50 km south of Truk" or simply "Failure to return". Whatever is in the records.

These are the things we sometimes see and gloss over without comment, but drive ME crazy. If there was nothing wring with the plane before combat but he was lost on the way home AFTER sustaining damage IN combat, it should be a combat loss.

Like I said, in these types of books, it usually is, or more precisely, they just list it based on whatever the data says. You can count it how you want.

I saw some debates on here where 6 Bf 109s were lost after a combat with some US P-40Fs. Three of them were kind of mysterious, one of the forum guys was insisting, over and over and over, that these were not combat losses. But I mean, draw your own conclusions. Coincidences happen but 3 in one day? Just follow Ockham's Razor.

The key point though being the book did list the ambiguity and we can all tally up our own totals. I certainly wouldn't go by totals alone. It's clearly much better if they give you all the data that goes with it. I'd say Shores is a bit better about this than Claringbould but they both do include it in the vast majority of cases..

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Claims vs actual will always be opaque because of issues like multiple shooters, a fleeting glimpse of a plane diving out and throwing smoke or vapor because of engine boost, the inadvisability of following a victim down, and so on. A round in a radiator downing an aircraft miles away from the fight. A plane never rises to fight again. Books showing losses that weren't claimed in combat at all.

Any attempt to parse claimed kills is perforce beset by the fact that combat is split-second, reliant on awfully faulty human observation and memory, and transitory.

Reconciling specific claims to specific losses is often a fools errand, it's the last 20% of the data that you can't necessarily tick and tie in all cases.

In some cases you can, mind you, but in larger more chaotic battles it definitely can become impossible.

Recording the actual losses compared to the claims however, is a real thing and very valuable toward actually understanding what went on.

You might not know which squadron, aircraft type, or individual pilot shot down the 6 planes that were actually lost, but you know that 6 were actually lost, not 27 planes that were claimed.

I would also add, for all the reason you mentioned and others, most overclaiming was not intentional or deceptive. There are a few cases of this, even some prosecutions over it during wartime, believe it or not, but it seems to have been fairly rare. It's basically down to "Fog of War", which is a real factor in all military history, but exacerbated with aircraft.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Operational losses in these books are usually things like takeoff crashes, ferry flights that never landed, friendly planes that collided, planes that mysteriously blew up en route for no apparent reason, planes seen to crash or which turned back with engine trouble before contact with the enemy (and disappeared), planes which navigated into a mountain or (in New Guinea or the Solomons, very routinely) flew into a typhoon and were just never seen again. etc. etc.

 

[GregP]

yeah, but different books have different things in them mate. It's not always just the same shite over and over again.

That's really the point I'm trying to make. The story isn't over. Quite to the contrary. To me that's great news.

To me, too. Many good things in most books on WWII aviation. Perhaps tghaht is why I have so many books ...

 

[GregP]

If you are talking about the same sortie, that would typically be classified as a combat loss.

Perhaps by you and me. But also perhaps not by the US Navy. If a plane was lost on the way home, it was an operational loss. Maybe that's why the kill ratios are a bit wierd and maybe that's why we lost so feweHellcats in actual combat report numbers. We only lost 270 in air-to-air combat according to the US Navy. Maybe the real number is a bit higher?

Reading between the lines, the people reviewing the combat reports for the end-of-war report summaries perhaps didn't quite classiy things tye way WE would today. They likely followed orders and made the Navy look good.

But, and here's the rub, I have no proof of that. Only my suppositions that are well-founded perhaps, but not backed by facts I can cite.