When you look at the ranges of the Gauntlet, Gladiator, Hurricane and Spitfire they settle on around 523 (Gladiator) to 626 miles (Gauntlet) or about the maximum distance between any two points of Great Britain mainland.
Firstly to get extra range into the Spitfire II and later requires extra fuel just to get back to where you started from given you are bolting on more powerful engines while tare weight went from 4,341 pounds in the mark I to 5,805 in the mark VIII.
The proposed Merlin powered mark III fighter enlarged the fuselage tanks to 99.5 gallons, up from 84. The Hurricane I range on 87 octane is put at 600 miles, the IIa with 100 octane at 524 miles, Spitfire I with 87 octane 575 miles, so as a crude approximation, (524/600)*575*(99.5/84) = 595 miles.
The proposed Griffon powered mark IV fighter had 101.5 gallons in the fuselage and a pair of 17.25 gallon wing tanks, total 135 gallons. The engine was rated at 1,445 HP, the Spitfire XII had either 1,720 or 1,735 HP, range 329 miles, another crude approximation (135/84)*329 = 529 miles, then deduct for the more powerful engine.
Spitfire Va range 480 miles, to get back to the 575 miles of the Spitfire I with 84 requires around 96 gallons.
The extra 30 gallons of the mark VIII (96 gallon fuselage and a pair of 14 gallon wing tanks) upped range to 660 miles compared to 434 miles of the mark IX, or 7.5 miles per extra gallon at economic cruise, meaning to maintain the range of the Spitfire I with 84 gallons of 87 octane the Merlin 60 series Spitfires needed around 113 gallons, Spitfire I economic cruise 8.9 miles per gallon.
Using the yardstick ranges from Francis Dean the Allison Mustangs came in at about 1,000 miles on 180 gallons, the Merlin types 1,250 to 1,300 miles with 269 gallons, 50% more fuel, 25% more range. Allison P-51 empty weight 6,433 to 6,550 pounds, P-51B/C 6,988 pounds then add another 250 pounds for the rear fuselage tank. (As an idea about fuel tank weights, Lancaster 580 gallon tank 702 pounds, 383 gallon 550 pounds, 114 gallon pounds or 0.83, 0.7 and 0.57 pounds per imperial gallon)
From mid 1940 onwards the British economy became highly stressed, to get something meant not getting something else. The British assumed the enemy would be coming for them "soon" to at least mid 1941 then assumed Barbarossa gave them under a year's reprieve from an even bigger air assault than in 1940. Range is not a big issue when you are on the defensive, getting quality aircraft is more important and in 1941 and 1942 that meant the Spitfire, which from say mid 1941 to mid 1942 had generally inferior performance than the fighters it was encountering but was better than the Hurricane, anything available from the US or anything Sabre powered, more so given the expected increase in average combat heights. So the Spitfire III was cancelled, and Fighter Command became close to an all Spitfire force during 1941, Hurricanes retained for ground attack and bomber destruction away from enemy fighters. All anticipating major air attacks in mid 1941 then mid 1942.
Adding weights to a lower performance aircraft is not a good thing even though a case can be made extra range would help as it gave a wider area to attack or alternatively allowed longer time in combat.
The Spitfire PR.IV wing tank was between ribs 4 and 21 and apparently non self sealing, essentially a sealed wing leading edge, the size and shape meant the pilots had to regularly switch from using one wing tank to the other while cruising
From 1940 to 1942 the RAF was in the position the axis powers ended up in 1944/45 it needed numbers and quality but had to trade off between the two. Odd question how far from where you live do you need maps to get around? Numbers and quality also apply to pilots, short range fighters means little need for pilot navigation training or extra wight/cost/complexity of navigation aids.
Yes the RAF ideas of long range were what the USAAF would consider medium range, even in 1943 and that played a part in fighter ranges, the war situation coupled with the engine upgrades played a much bigger part in Spitfire ranges. Also consider the industrial costs of bulk numbers of metal drop tanks, and how paper tanks changed the economics.
If the USAAF in Britain was determined to bomb Germany in 1943 nothing you could do to the Spitfire would enable escort to target, and until mid 1943 the USAAF was generally prosecuting an unescorted heavy bomber war and a separate fighter then fighter and medium bomber war. By interrupting supply of the one fighter every front from Britain to Australia was asking for in numbers with emphasis on the latest version you could put together and maintain a Spitfire escort force in Britain that could cross the northern German border to around the Ruhr, assuming relevant escort tactics. Or you could put together a similar sized longer ranged Mustang force in about the same time frame if delivery schedules could be kept. Would require additional pilot training and also a bomber force with acceptable numbers willing to stick to escort range. Even then you can make the case the Luftwaffe could concentrate more interceptors in Germany than the escort numbers needed to keep bomber losses down, plus not rebuild the twin engine day fighter force which required unescorted bombers to work, instead upping the single engine fighter force.
Of course the allied air situation swung from not enough to too many in 1944/45, the RAAF received 656 Spitfires, as of September 1946, 92 of them were still in their shipping crates.
Castle Bromwich produce its first Spitfire 21 in April 1944, then production July 1944 to January 1946, mark 22 from February 1945 to February 1946, the factory finished mark IX production with a final 1 in August 1945, mark XVI with a final pair in September. Supermarine series production of mark XIV finished in October 1945 (plus 1 more each in December 1945 and February 1946), mark XVIII production May 1945 to March 1946, mark XIX finished in November 1945 apart from 7 laggards January to May 1946, mark 24 production was at Supermarine, starting in February 1946.
Vickers produced Seafire 45 from February to December 1945, Supermarine mark 46 from January 1946 to March 1947.
British P-51 Allocations 1943, monthly, 10, 15, 25, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 60, 65, 85, total 600 (probably not including 50 P-51A in May)
1944, January to May, 90, 100, 100, 50, 50, 50, total 350
Merlin Mustang arrivals to RAF in Britain, Italy and India,
September to December 1943, 3, 74, 90, 105, total 272
1944 by month, 90, 105, 53, 60, 14, 70, 70, 81, 38, 109, 88, 80, 107, 41, total 811
1945, January to September, 53, 53, 211, 112, 86, 15, 90, 22, 46, total 688, grand total 1,771, from 1,781 delivered for RAF in US.
The 1943 difference is a combination of production delays, travel times and the USAAF changing its priorities. Through 1942 and into 1943 the British knew the USAAF was nowhere near as interested in the P-51 as they were, things like the A-36 order in August 1942. That started to change with the two big orders from Inglewood and Dallas in August and January 1943 respectively. It would be the second half of 1943 before the P-51 effectively displaced the Spitfire as "the" in demand fighter.
The RAF issued 947 Mustang III and 876 IV serials, total 1,823 remembering 35 RAF allocated aircraft were transferred to the USAAF in Britain in 1943 and 37 USAAF aircraft in Britain were transferred to the RAF in 1944.