Spitfire III vs Hurricane II - which was a better place for a Merlin XX?

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There were problems getting the Nuffield (Castle Bromwich) Spitfire II into production but the Spitfire I was no great shakes for production either. In July (June 22 to July 27)1940 166 Spitfires were produced of which 143 were Mk Is. In the same time frame 322 Hurricanes were produced.

Production for Aug - Oct. Hurricane/Spitfire 1 /SpitII (Spit II aprox due to monthly versus weekly figures)

June 22-Jul 27 322/143/23
Jul 28 - Aug 31: 277/153/37 (Some Hurricane Mk II included)
Sept 1 - Sept 28: 225/92/56 (32 Hurricane Mk II included)
Sept 29 - Nov 1: 239/120/ (All Spitfires listed together Some Hurricane Mk II included)
total during BofB: 1063/500/116
Data from Mason.

A slight revision to the above table is called for (from Price, The Spitfire Story, Haynes 2010 page 143:
Spitfireproduction-001.gif


August 163
September 156
October 149 = 468 + 166 (??) June- July 27: Total 574

An interesting comparison

Hurricane IIa first flight = June 1940 and production = Sept 1940.

Spitfire IIa first flight = summer 1939 and production = June/July 1940.

The reason for that was because it was recognised that the Hurricane needed an urgent power upgrade before it fell too far behind.

Secondly, of course the Merlin XII was slated for Castle Bromwich production Spitfires, the production of which, as is well known, lagged well behind its intended start by date so not quite valid or useful.
 
A slight revision to the above table is called for (from Price, The Spitfire Story, Haynes 2010 page 143:

August 163
September 156
October 149 = 468 + 166 (??) June- July 27: Total 574

Production figures will vary because there's always some ambiguity over delivery and production dates.
 
This myth about "complex construction" is just that, a myth: the most complex part of the Spitfire's construction was the wing, and that was mainly the spar, which required precision. Otherwise that elliptical wing and the parts used to build it were not much of a struggle - why?

IMO, some folks who put this out there either know nothing about aircraft construction or assume that aircraft are hand built. Jigs, fixtures and templates take much of the struggle out of aircraft construction. As stated earlier, it wasn't a matter of the Spitfire being difficult to build, it was a matter of the Hurricane being easier to build than the Spitfire.
 
it was a matter of the Hurricane being easier to build than the Spitfire.

These threads all seem to blend into one another... I agree, Joe and Aozora. The issue was as Aozora pointed out, the state of the British aviation industry at that time; not only the transition from biplane techniques to 'modern' construction, but also the fact that Britain in the late 1930s when the Hurricane and the Spitfire were being put into production for the first time, was not on a war footing, despite the Munich crisis, Rhineland occupation etc by the Germans, and it took a bit of time, even once war broke out for the country's industry to kick in. There wasn't a magical switch that could just put everything into the kinds of conditions in industry that war required. Within a number of arms producing factories, the workers rebelled against new conditions imposed by wartime effort; Avro, for example had a bit of trouble with striking workforce in its factories over conditions during the war.

Just getting back on thread, its worth noting that the Spitfire Mk.III prototype N3297 was the first fighter to be fitted with a two-speed, two-stage Merlin, effectively becoming the Mk.IX prototype and going to Rolls-Royce in early March 1941 for fitting of the Merlin 61. It flew for the first time so powered in September that year. There were two Mk.IIIs completed, the other was W3237.
 
OK, so early RAE data systematically underestimates Hurricane performance in comparison to the Spitfire.

Ahh here we go! The Hurricane was now officially discriminated against by organisations such as the RAE. Would really like to see genuine proof that this was happening. :rolleyes:
 
Ahh here we go! The Hurricane was now officially discriminated against by organisations such as the RAE. Would really like to see genuine proof that this was happening. :rolleyes:

You have official proof because the RAE re-calculated all their early Hurricane data based upon a revised PEC. However, they didn't do so for the Spitfire presumably because the data was calculated correctly to begin with.

The RAF released data (famously disputed by Dowding) showing that the maximum speed of a BofB Hurricane was 335 mph. The RAF figure is correct when the new PEC data is considered along with previous measurements for speed at 12lb boost at 5000 and 10,000ft.

The Hurricane error is not large and equal to about 6 mph on the Hurricane I and 12 mph on the IIB. This clears up the mystery of why Brown gives better level performance for the Sea Hurricane IIC than given in the RAE test; 322mph at 13500 ft and 342 at 22000ft.
 
The decision was political as much as anything else.

By the time these decisions were made Dowding and Park were out, Douglas and Leigh Mallory were in ... and they were a bit duff (well actually very duff).

They way their minds worked was like this:
No Spits anywhere else except the UK, which is why it took so long for Malta and North Africa to get them (and they fought to the bitter end to stop any going there).
Took until March 42 for Malta and the end of 42(!!!) for NA to get Spits there, despite the slaughtering of the Hurricanes and P-40s by the 109Fs and later 109Gs.

'Leaning forward to the enemy'. One of the most useless air tactical plans ever made (comparable to the Battle of Berlin), where they sacrificed vast quantities of pilots trying to gain supremacy over the Luftwaffe in France.
That was the main reason for their push for the Spit Mk V, to get something equal to the 109F quickly so they could send them over to France and engage.

They were impatient and really didn't have a clue what they were doing (and never seemed to learn).

But since the Hurri's were for the 'minor areas', it seemed like a good idea to give it a bit more poke to try and remain competitive (it didn't work), so they wasted the Merlin XXs.

In the end they got the worst of all possible worlds. Slaughtering in Malta and North Africa of the 2nd rate fighters there.
Slaughtering of Spit pilots in France (because the tactical plan was totally flawed).

Between 41 and 42 they were probably responsible for the waste of at least 1,500+ pilots and achieved very little for it (in France they achieved nothing).

The logical thing to do (and if Dowding and Park were still there it would have probably happened, since they were very logical people) was:

Spit III into production (LF and HF versions), upgraded engines over time for better prformance (ie 400mph), the original engine was the Merlin X, which I think those performance figures come from.
Spit IIs sent to Malta and North Africa in solid numbers in 41. Any Hurris and P-40s purely for ground attack.
I'd still make the Spit Mk Vs (in far lower quantities) for the overseas forces only, but still replace as sufficient IIIs came on-line.,
Maintain sufficient for home defence, but after June 1941 only a nominal force was required, so there was time to build up the MK IIIs.

Naturally bring in Merlin 60 series Spits as they became available.

Come up with a tactical plan to wrest air supremacy over France and the lowlands (yes it was necessary).
Make (or modify) the equipment to achieve it (which they didn't have), which meant longer ranged Spits and Mosquitos (and P-51As as they came on line), to fight the Luftwaffe in the air, chase them to their airfields and hammer them on the ground.
Create the force structure necessary, test of course with various trial operations. That would have taken 41. Then hammer the Luftwaffe in 42.

Results?
Malta: they would always have had air supremacy over it and that long bombing siege would never have happened.
Air supremacy in North Africa right from the beginning and would never have lost it.
Air supremacy over France (and the lowlands) by the end of 42, setting the scene for the 43 bombing operations of the US.

Far, far fewer pilots wasted needlessly.

I should add that the DAF was very lucky in North Africa that the opposing Luftwaffe fighters were idiots. If they had done their job properly they would have probably eliminated the DAF as an attacking force totally.
 
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