Spitfire mk VB/Seafire vs Zero

Hi Parsifal,

>What are "Drag tactics"

Drag tactics have the defensively engaged (=attacked) fighter in a section fly a path that enables the free fighter of the section to attack the bogey trailing the engaged fighter.

There are various implementation of these tactics like the sandwich and the half-split, but they work even if a section gets separated and re-joins during the battle.

It requires coordination between the pilots though and is facilitated by a performance advantage over the enemy. From what I heard from Clay and Kirby, they considered neither the P-39 nor the P-40 to have this kind of performance advantage over the Zero.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Hi Wildcat,

>AFAIK there were no Coast Watchers in the Darwin area from 1943 onwards. There were CoastWatchers on Bathurst Is in early 42, however they were only utilised until the Radar sites were up and running. I believe Radar was the only form of early warning from Jan 43 onwards.

Thanks for the correction - I'm afraid I must have confused a separate discussion of coast watchers with the Darwin raids history discussion. If I only had the original posts!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

slaterat said:

1...when cross referencing claims/kills from WW II. Sometimes you might not... like what you find.

2. The AVG did some shocking overclaiming in Burma too, that was often matched by their JAAF opponents.

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1. In all frankness that's what I see in statements that we're 'stuck' on Japanese fighter losses over Darwin. They are pretty clearly stated in quite detailed accounts, what would be necessary to get 'unstuck'; for them to agree better with Spit claims? I think that's actually the answer from some points of view.

2. That's a good comparison. Using the same kind of sources (the relevant vol. of the Japanese official history, in that case Vol.34, corroborated by research by people like Izawa etc among veterans) Japanese losses were on average around 40% of the AVG's claims for its whole period of operations, Dec '41 to early July '42. The overclaiming was much worse than that in some early combats in Burma (featuring such typcially overclaim increasing factors as: unit new to combat, big furball combats, actual kill ratio ~1:1 or even against the claimants), but their claims were considerably more accurate later on (more accuracy friendly situations: more AVG experience, smaller combats, real kill ratio considerably in favor of the AVG).

Counting the same way, what each side recorded as losses in specific combats for which both sides give a specific account, the AVG had about a 3:1 kill ratio v Japanese fighters, all of them JAAF, around 70% Type 97's (Nate), remainder Type 1's (Oscar) and a few Type 2 2-seat fighters (Nick). So IOW when we compare the AVG's or USN sdn's in Solomons or RAAF Kittyhawks in New Guinea 1942 v Spit results over Darwin, we are comparing apples and apples basically as long as we use comparable Japanese sources. Those who would claim this misrepresents the *relative* outcomes of different Allied units not only have to raise residual doubt about completeness of Japanese accounts at Darwin but show they are *less* complete than those in the other situations among which we're comparing Allied performances.

In fact Darwin is one of the cases where they are relatively more likely to be complete: mainly JNAF, more of whose original records survived (to be quoted in the official history) and simple set piece battles with units involved, even pilots involved, named in detail. Completeness of known accounts is a real issue in some cases, we touched on it already for August 15 1945 Seafire/Zero combat. The only accounts I've seen have 1 Zero lost and 1 pilot WIA plane not lost from two different Air Groups, but in that case it's more plausible other units might have been involved, losses the Japanese attributed to F6F's were really to Seafires, etc in multiple engagements of small formations of at least 3 air arms in the same area (still we can't state the 7 or 8 Zero losses to Seafires 8/15/45 as fact, or even some subset the claimants were *really* sure about; it just didn't work that way).

Joe

Wildcat said:

However when the 49th FG defended Darwin with P40's I have the following claims.

22 Mar 42 - 1 C5M Babs PO Shigiki Mari and PO Shinobu Nagasawa killed.

28 Mar 42 - 2 Apr 42 - 2 Bettys and 1 Zero for 1 P40 lost

4 Apr 42 - 2 zeros and 3 Bombers for 2 P40s lost

25 Apr 42 - 8 Bombers and 3 Zero's (PO1c Shiro Murikami killed)

27 Apr 42 - 3 bombers and 4 Zero's for 4 P40's lost

13 Jun 42 - 2 Zeros ( WO Katsuji Matsushima and Mikio Tanikawa killed) for 3 P40's lost.

14 Jun 42 - 4 Zeros for 1 P40 lost

15 Jun 42 - 6 Zeros for 2 P40's lost

16 Jun 42 - 1 Bomber and 1 Zero for 3 P40's

30 Jul 42 - 6 bombers and 3 Zero's for 1 P40 lost

23 Aug 42 - 7 Betty's and 8 Zero's (Lt Tanadsune Tokaji, PO Nobutoshi Furukawa, PO Isutzo Shimizu and PO Yoshijuki Hirata killed) 1 P40 lost.

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There was one other relevant engagement, and another Zero loss in one engagement you mentioned:
March 14 '42 Japanese raid on Horn Island, the 49th claimed 4 and actually downed 2 Zeroes, of the 4th Air Group (Ltjg Nobuhiro Iwasaki, PO1c Genkichi Oishi) for 1 loss. The Zero opponents in all other engagement were 3rd Air Group.
Jul 30: PO Shigeru Mukaki was lost ("Soleil Levant sur L'Australie" by Baeza)
August 23: "3/202 Kokutai" by Pajdosz/Zbiegniewski says another Zero was lost whose pilot survived, not named, but "Soleil" doesn't mention it.
Otherwise the apparent Zero losses were the pilots you named.
Other losses of non-fighters:
March 28: 1 Nell, not escorted so not counted below
April 4: 3 Betty's lost (7 were claimed, also 4 Zeroes damaged).
April 25: 4 Betty's outright 1 ditched 1 forcelanded due to combat, 2 others operational
April 27: 1 Betty lost
Aug 23: 1 Betty plus 1 destroyed in a crashlanding

The 49th FG's total record in the period was 10-11 Zeroes and 12 escorted bombers per Japanese accounts for 19 P-40's, while Spits downed 5 fighters (4 Z's+1 Oscar) and 14 escorted bombers (including all 'force lands'/'crashlanded' in both cases) for mid 20's+ Spit combat losses, again not counting interceptions of unescorted non-fighters in either case.

Joe

Joe, great info mate, thanks for the input. I've been looking at the claims made by the Spits against Japanese Dinahs over Darwin and was wondering if you had any others to add. AFAIK Dinah's weren't encountered by the 49th ??

6 Feb 43 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Lt Kurasuki Setaguti Lt Fumio Morio)

7 Mar 43 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Lt Yutaka Tonoi Lt Chokiti Orihara)

23 May 43 - 1 Ki-46 damaged

18 Jul 43 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Capt Shunji Sasaki Lt Akira Eguchi)

17 Aug 43 - 4 Ki-46's destroyed ( Lt Kyuichi Okomoto Lt Yasuro Yamamoto).
(Lt Saburo Shinohara Lt Hideo Ura). (Lt Shir-Ichi Matsu-ura Lt Kiyatoshi Shiraki) and (Sgt Tomihiko Tanaka Sgt Kinji Kawahara)

6 Nov 43 - 1 Ki-46 damaged

12 Jun 44 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Lt Katsutoshi Tsutsui Lt Keisuke Shimazaki)

20 Jul 44 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Lt Kyoshi Iizuka Lt hisao Ito)

All Japanese aircrew KIA.

I think a lot was expected from the Spit Vs at Darwin and consequently , that political pressure may have lead to some of the above average overclaiming.

Although the Trop Spit V was faster than some of the other allied fighters that had struggled against the Zero, it wasn't enough to dominate the Zero. The Spit v still had to deal with the same problems of the other RAF fighters combating the zero; How to extract oneself from a bad situation. The 20 mph speed advantage of the trop spit V over the zero wasn't enough to guarrantee an escape. The zero isn't really dominated until it goes up against the big fast American iron.

Slaterat

It also had an altitude performance advantage.

David Brown's book "The Seafire" (Ian Allan, 1973) is interesting here. On p156, he gives a comparison of the Seafire and Zero. The Fleet Air Arm recognised that at its best fighting speed, around 180 knots, the Zero would certainly turn inside the Seafire. Standard doctrine was therefore to keep speed up between 220 and 280 knots, alternately climbing and diving in a series of near-stall turns that would change the Seafire's direction more rapidly than the Zero's, and eventually enable a firing position to be reached. If the Zero attempted to increase speed to match the Seafire, it would lose enough of its manoeverability to allow the Seafire to keep its edge. Combat records show that these tactics were pretty successful. if I read Brown's figures aright, the kill ratio was about 10:1 in the Seafire's favour.

But while the seafire was an excellent aircraft in the air, it was not a good naval aircraft. Losses in deck-landing accidents were another matter entirely, of course! The basic Spitfire airframe had never been designed for the regular crunch and violent decelleration that was a carrier fighter's lot, and if you wanted to ship an air wing which would stay mostly airworthy, you probably needed to shop with the Grumman Ironworks.

The Sea Hurricane was better in that respect, wasn't it? Though the liquid cooled engine was still a disadvantage. (though the Merlin was used on several FAA a/c, like the Fulmar, Airefly, and Baracuda)

A bit off topic, but Gloster's F.5/34 fighter is an interesting possibility... (though a more powereful engine, Pegasus/Taurus would be needed)

The real ultimate development of the British carrier Fighter par excellance was the Sea Fury, which is the logical successor IMO to the F/5 a spec

It certainly was, but it came a bit late, and with all the ultimate piston engined fighter developments it was soon superceded by jets. (though like the USN's Corsair's they stayed around longer than the land based fighters, particularly in fighter-bomber roles)

The two major limitations of the Sea Hurricane were its short range and non folding wings. Being liquid cooled wasn"t a problem as the merlin was very reliable. It had a sturdy undercarriage , a strong airframe nice handling and a good view over the nose for carrier landings.


Slaterat

The reasons the USN disliked liquid cooled engines iirc, wasn't the reliability (actual reliability of contemporary liquid and air cooled engines of the period being pretty similar) but the need to store large amounts of glycol coolant (admitedly not really more dangerous than aviation fuel) and, more importantly, the need to use fresh water. (an important, and limited resourse at sea)

With reliability in mind, the Taurus (for the Gloster fighter), with its troubled development, would probably be out anyway, and it would probably be best off with the Pegasus, or an American engine (preferably the R-1830, like was preferred on the Beaufort) though overall the Hercules would probably be the best, assuming there wouldn't be problems meeting the larger engine to the airframe. (with the necessary weight gain of further development, and increased fuel, armament, and external stores, more power would be needed to keep performance up)

But if this is going to be discussed further a separate topic should be started. (a very interesting topic though, a few older threads on it -both alternate FAA fighters and the Gloster plane-, but not very in depth or long discussions)

gloster F.5/34 - Google Search

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/gloster-f-5-34-a-3606.html

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/alternate-faa-fighter-3009.html

Going back to the tactics Seafire pilots used against the Zero, a number of points emerge.

Firstly, the Zero could turn inside the Seafire, so the solution was not to engage in a turning battle, instead to alternately climb and dive, effectively changing direction more rapidly than the Zero until a firing position was achieved. At the top of a near-stall turn, where G is very low, effective wing loading is also very low, and as long as there is enough airflow over the control surfaces for them to work, very rapid changes of direction are possible. The Seafire/Spitfire airframe had controls that stayed effective at low airspeeds, which today's pilots say makes it one of the nicer warbirds to land, in spite of its narrow-track undercarriage.

Secondly, combat effectiveness is not solely a function of the theoretical performance of the airframe; in this case which could turn tighter. It is a function of many things, among them both the performance of the airframe, and the tactics used to exploit both your strengths and the enemy's weakensses. (Plus maintenance, levels of pilot training, pilot experience, morale, good leadership, and a whole lot else!)

Thirdly, FAA tactics were designed to make sure they fought on their terms and not on the enemy's. FAA pilots were instructed never to allow their speed to decay into the Zero's best fighting range (about 180 knots), and engage in a turning battle. That would be fighting on the enemy's terms, and a recipe for defeat. Instead, they were instructed to keep the speed up, between 220 and 280 (a nice broad range giving lots of room for manoevre) and "boom and zoom". The 10:1 favourable kill ratio shows it worked.

Finally, presumably Spitfire pilots fighting Zeroes could have used the same tactics, and probably did. Fighter pilots are intelligent and resourceful people, and would soon have found out what worked. If the Seafire could obtain a very favourable 10:1 kill ratio over the Zero, Australian Air Force Spitfire claims are probably quite reliable, and may not be inflated at all.

John Davies said:

If the Seafire could obtain a very favourable 10:1 kill ratio over the Zero, Australian Air Force Spitfire claims are probably quite reliable, and may not be inflated at all.

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The 10:1 you cite is a claim. I don't see how one claim can measure or validate the accuracy of another claim.

Seafire v Zero was covered earlier in this thread (or anyway several times counting all related threads ). There was only one combat between the two types that be documented from two sides. That was morning of August 15 1945: Seafires in rare use as escorts on offensive mission were credited w/ 7 Zeroes for 1 loss. But known Japanese accounts gives losses to Seafires that morning as: Lt. T Honma of the 252nd Air Group bailed out WIA, and CPO S. Yamada of 302nd Air Group WIA but apparently landed safely. A number of other losses were attributed to F6F's (which also made a lot of claims similar time and place, overlapping combats). Source is Maru Special, "Pacific War Sea-Air War Series". Honma's detailed account is given in "Sky of August 15" by Hata.

However the real comparison to make in trying to figure out real results is the relative clarity of the situation and completeness of opposing accounts. In August 15 '45 case there's some room for doubt about completeness, and room for confusion about losses due to Seafires or F6F's, though the full claims of the Seafires are hardly likely (nor the full F6F claims, nor any typical WWII claims).

In Darwin 1943 in contrast, detailed published Japanese losses mostly link back to a privately published monograph by a retired JMSDF officer, commissioned by a Western researcher. He compiled and translated the handwritten action reports of the 202nd Air Group over Darwin.
-those reports survived complete and intact for each Darwin mission
-the 202nd was the only Zero unit over Darwin per multiple Japanese sources (in the single raid by Army a/c, a 59th Fighter Regiment 'Oscar' was also downed)
-there were no other Allied units making claims at the same time
-they had a 500 mile return trip: fewer questions about damaged v lost than in actions right over their own a/f's as in 1945

There's little reasonable doubt about the Zero losses over Darwin or the high overclaim ratio by the Spits. Again the best recent published source IMO is Baeza "Soleil Levant sur L'Australie".

Besides Aug 15 '45, Seafires claimed a few other Japanese fighter types without loss (I think the claimed ratio was actually a little higher than 10:1, August 15 was IIRC their only air combat loss), but it's not clear if any of those other a/c were acting as fighters, rather than kamikazes: the Seafires were on defensive CAP missions. For comparison, the FM-2, which was mostly also used for carrier (CVE) defense in late war claimed 18[3] fighter type a/c for 7 air combat losses, 26:1, Sept '44-Aug '45 (Naval Aviation Combat Statistics). So even if we had enough of a sample to say much about Seafire v Zero (we don't) we'd have to put it in the context of the particular mission (with kamikaze/fighter confusion in some cases) and of 1945 Pac War air combat overall, very different, in many more ways than just tactics, from air combat v a still pretty first string Zero unit like the 202nd AG in 1943.

Joe

Hi John,

>Secondly, combat effectiveness is not solely a function of the theoretical performance of the airframe; in this case which could turn tighter.

Hm, turn rate was actually found to be one of the least important aspects of fighter performance in WW2. In fact, in marked contrast to the high-priority performance parameters top speed and climb rate, turn rate generally decreased as fighters were developed towards higher combat effectiveness during the war.

> It is a function of many things, among them both the performance of the airframe, and the tactics used to exploit both your strengths and the enemy's weakensses.

In this context, it's worth noting that not knowing the enemy's strenghts and your own (relative) weaknesses can have a negative impact on your combat record.

From two P-39 and P-40 veterans (both late re-equipped with P-38s), I heard that they considered themselves outperformed (at altitude) or at least well-matched by the A6M they met, and the P-40 pilot assured me that his unit was never informed about the test results and tactical conclusions the US Navy had gained from flight testing the Aleutian A6M. The P-40 pilot also told me that the RAAF Spitfire pilots were warned about the Zero's superior manoeuvrability, but refused to believe in these warnings as they considered the Spitfire to be superior to not only the P-40, but also to the A6M in any respect.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Roll rate is also an important component in maneuverability (in many ways more important than turning ability) and was something the Zero was lacking in. (particularly at high speeds) (though the Ki 43 is a different story)

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/f4f-wildcat-versus-p-40e-tomahawk-13281-2.html

The account of a Zero/Seafire combat which was recorded by both sides is fascinating, and I confess I wasn't aware of it. My figures were drawn from a few pages at the back of Brown's "The Seafire", in which he lists every Seafire combat.

I suppose the point here is that these were based on pilots' combat reports, and (as figures from the Battle of Britain show beyond all doubt!), even if everyone is being honest, and even if there are strict rules about what constitutes a valid claim, claim figures will still run well ahead of actual kills. But even allowing for that, I'd still maintain that the FIII and LIII, the marks used in the Pacific, had a quite definite edge over the Zero.

One point I was definitely wrong about, and on reflection should I certainly not have made; conclusions drawn from the performance of the Seafire are certainly not tranferrable to the Spitfire Mk V, and especially not if the Spitfire was burdened with the horrible big tropical filter, which knocked a chunk off its performance. While the first Seafires were basically adapted Mk Vs, by the time they got up to the LIIC, they had developed an aircraft with a much higher performance at low to medium level, especially in rate of climb and accelleration, and the LIII, used in the Pacific, had a higher performance again.

The US Navy had intel that described quite accurately the performance characteristics of the A6M in the fall of 1941, long before the Aleutian Zero was tested. I would like to see the statistics showing that Seafires had a 10 to one kill ration against A6Ms. The USN's preference for air cooled engines was at least partly based on the fact that a radial air cooled engine is much less likely to get disabling damage in combat than a liquid cooled engine.

Hi Koolkitty,

>The reasons the USN disliked liquid cooled engines iirc, wasn't the reliability (actual reliability of contemporary liquid and air cooled engines of the period being pretty similar) but the need to store large amounts of glycol coolant (admitedly not really more dangerous than aviation fuel) and, more importantly, the need to use fresh water. (an important, and limited resourse at sea)

Interesting background, I hadn't been aware of this! What's the source?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)