Spitfire mk VB/Seafire vs Zero

[HoHun]

Hi Renrich,

>Full deflection shooting was mainly used against enemy bombers because it gave the defensive gunners almost impossible firing solutions.

Hm, what exactly does he mean by "full deflection shooting"? It could apply to temporary firing solutions or to tracking shots, or (obviously to both.

I'd tend to think that the US Navy thought of tracking shots because they were emphasized at the time, and virtually required against bombers, but temporary firing solutions (Shaw calls them snapshots, I believe) are of great value in fighter-vs.-fighter combat, especially if using a highly effective battery of four or six 12.7 mm machine guns against an unprotected target like the A6M. (Though high-deflection shots tend to attack from angles not usually protected by armour anyway.)

Of course, gunnery training has a huge impact on combat success, and a pilot trained for "full deflection" tracking shots would probably be able to apply his skills to snapshot situations, too. However, it would be interesting to know if there was a doctrine covering snapshots, too.

>I wish that all the members who are biased toward the point of view that the ETO was the "only war" could read them.

I never thought the war in Europe was the "only war", just the "only war that counted" Only joking, of course, but I believe "Europe first" was probably the correct historical decision.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi John,

>For instance, in "Carrier Fighter", Hanson describes the standard ground-attack with guns doctrine as they were taught. Approach in a shallow dive, pull out into a low firing pass, then pull up slightly and depart the area.

Highly interesting - in "They gave me a Seafire", Mike Crosley describes how his squadron thought up a coordinated attack scheme that would have all of the Seafires of the formation over the target at the same time, coming from different directions and making exactly one firing pass. I think they had no losses to flak when applying these tactics over Japan, though he cautiously advises that one or two of their losses to unknown causes might qualify.

By the way, Crosley's "They gave me a Seafire" (about his war years in the Fleet Air Arm) and especially his "Up in Harm's Way" (he became test pilot after the war, flying a broad range of military and civilian aircraft - and he invented the head-up display) rank high on my list of favourite books. Judging from your area of interest, I'd say you would really enjoy these, too

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[renrich]

Henning, I said what I said about the members here with respect, not being critical. There is more emphasis on the ETO because many members are from Europe and there are few if any from Japan. Bill, thanks for your insight on gunnery training. As a matter of fact one of my uncles was an IP flying P39s, ugh, and P47s and he talked to me about gunnery training and the emphasis on it during the war. Interestingly his unit did their gunnery training on the Gulf Coast near Corpus. When one thinks about it I guess over the Gulf is a safe place to shoot live rds at a sleeve. He also told me that they often were jumped by F4Us while in gunnery training and his P47s stood no chance in the hassles. They could not get the Corsairs to go up real high with them. JD, I recently read a book by a Brit about the Battle of the Atlantic and he went into some detail about the difficulties the FAA had prewar as well as during the war getting good equipment. The sad thing is that, as you intimated, the RN was at the forefront of aviation combined with naval power when WW1 ended. As I remember the RN tried to utilise AC off of the Engadine during Jutland for scouting or maybe even bombing. However when the RAF took over all flying, against the strong advice of David Beatty, the FAA languished as well as Coastal Command. When WW2 began, the USN and IJN were light years ahead of the RN in most ares of naval aviation. Of course the US Army tried the same tactics of getting control of naval aviation but thoughtful heads prevailed. Even during WW2 Coastal Command and the FAA were treated like red headed step children and could not get the AC needed. An instance was the difficulty that Coastal Command had in getting VLR bombers for anti sub work. Bomber Harris said that it would detract from his bombing if a squadron or two were diverted to anti sub work. As you know the VLR patrol planes were really the antidote for the u-boat threat.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Renrich,

>Henning, I said what I said about the members here with respect, not being critical.

Well understood - I just couldn't resist trying to be funny

>However when the RAF took over all flying, against the strong advice of David Beatty, the FAA languished as well as Coastal Command.

Hm, I've just browsed into Brown's "Wings of the Navy", and he actually attributes a lack of boldness (or vision) on part of the institutions that drafted the specifications for naval aircraft for the poor state of the art in WW2. I'm not sure that this means he blames the RAF - it's my impression that the specifications were prepared by the Royal Navy, but I'll admit that I'm not really sure of that.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[JoeB]

>On F4F 'pin cushion' tactic, that's mentioned in enough places, sourced back to quotes and reports of the time, to be more than an 'anecdote'.

The anecdotal nature is due to the pilots who did not survive flying in the sights of a Zero for a prolonged time did not come back to have the 7.7 mm holes counted. (It would be interesting to know the number of holes in the machines that made it back, though.)

>how much such a tactic explains of the substantial superiority in realworld

Flying straight and allowing yourself to be shot at? I'd be delighted to see the cause-and-effect relationship of that move to a general "substantial" combat superiority explained

I think it should be obvious, the tactic wasn't 'to fly straight and allow yourself to be shot at' but that assuming a Japanese fighter got behind you don't try to turn, exposing the cockpit (and other vital parts) to deflection shots. If energy to dive do that, otherwise skid and bob up and down but again don't turn. By early 1944 the 5th AF's tactics manual had a similar admonition for P-40's out of energy with 'Zero' on tail, but the USN/USMC apparently reached the conclusion earlier. And there weren't necessarily a lot of unknown cause loss disappearances of F4F's in the Guadacanal campaign (as Renrich suggested it might be useful to actually read about it, to try to understand some of these issues). It's beyond what I would call anecdotal.

Joe

 

[HoHun]

Hi Joe,

>I think it should be obvious, the tactic wasn't 'to fly straight and allow yourself to be shot at' but that assuming a Japanese fighter got behind you don't try to turn, exposing the cockpit (and other vital parts) to deflection shots.

Even assuming the F4F could be exposed to fire of that sort for a longer period than the P-40, the Wildcat's markedly inferior performance meant it would be exposed for a longer period before being able to pull away from the Zero, so I don't see any actual advantage there. I certainly don't see the cause of the "substantial" combat superiority my question actually aimed for in these "pincushion tactics" either.

>And there weren't necessarily a lot of unknown cause loss disappearances of F4F's in the Guadacanal campaign (as Renrich suggested it might be useful to actually read about it, to try to understand some of these issues). It's beyond what I would call anecdotal.

If there are statistics on the number and calibre of hits the F4Fs that went down during the Guadalcanal campaign received in that book, please quote it. Without these, I'm afraid the idea that the F4F was impervious to 7.7 mm bullets is in fact a textbook example for anecdotal information. I fully appreciate that 7.7 mm was a rather ineffective calibre in general, and I certainly believe that "pincushion tactics" were sound advice for F4F pilots who where outflown by an A6M, cannon shells or not, but I don't think we even have clear evidence that the durability of the F4F was above average, much less that its survivability was a war winning attribute that made up for its inferior performance.

If you'd ask me for the likely reason of the good results of the USN's F4F units, I'd suggest that the extensive gunnery training as well as the realization that they would be up against an opponent dissimilar to their own fighters - which lead to the development of cooperative tactics to counter a superior enemy - are high on the list of suspects.

I think the good combat results of the P-40-equipped American Volunteer Group, which was based on Chennault's accurate analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese aircraft, show that the P-40 was able to achieve similarly good results against the Ki-43, which had characteristics comparable to the A6M even if it lacked the latter's cannon armament.

However, while the Navy adjusted their tactics according to the information they had about the A6M, the USAAF seem to have ignored Chennault's findings ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Glider]

Hi Renrich,

>Henning, I said what I said about the members here with respect, not being critical.

Well understood - I just couldn't resist trying to be funny

>However when the RAF took over all flying, against the strong advice of David Beatty, the FAA languished as well as Coastal Command.

Hm, I've just browsed into Brown's "Wings of the Navy", and he actually attributes a lack of boldness (or vision) on part of the institutions that drafted the specifications for naval aircraft for the poor state of the art in WW2. I'm not sure that this means he blames the RAF - it's my impression that the specifications were prepared by the Royal Navy, but I'll admit that I'm not really sure of that.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

I would agree with what Brown says, the evidence is there in the designs. Why did anyone design the Albacore to replace the Swordfish? its basically the same with a cockpit.
Why did anyone design the Fulmar, probably one of the worst fighters introduced after the war began, and then to replace it with another two seater, the Firefly when everyone had more than sufficient experience with single seaters.
Even the Walrus was replaced with the Sea Otter, again basically the same aircraft with the engine turned around.

 

[parsifal]

Why did anyone design the Albacore to replace the Swordfish? its basically the same with a cockpit.

To improve crew conditions mainly, and slightly improve the serodynamic qualities of the FAAs TSR A/C

Why did anyone design the Fulmar, probably one of the worst fighters introduced after the war began, and then to replace it with another two seater, the Firefly when everyone had more than sufficient experience with single seaters.

Fulmars for the RN represented a cheap and easy expedient. based on a twin seat bomber, discarded by the RAF, it was an easy excercise to convert it to a fighter. At the time the conventional wisdom in the FAA was that you needed a navigator for over water flights.

Despite this, the Fulmar was operationally an outstanding success. RN carriers were generally required to operate outside the primary range of the Axis fighters. Against the lumbering torpedo and D/B ranged against it they were quite effective, and contributed to the RNs ability to maintin a logistic lifeline to malta, and other places. later they fulfilled a valuable F/B role as well.

The Firefly was an altogether different, and superior machine, that unfortunately never really got the chance to show its potential. It was an impressive machine, with good payload, performace and range capabilities, that postwar made it an ideal ASW and surface strike machine, again with the backdrop of cheap development costs looming as a factor.

 

[Glider]

I don't disagree with most of what you say but the comment was that Brown in "Wings of the Navy", and he actually attributes a lack of boldness (or vision) on part of the institutions that drafted the specifications for naval aircraft

The examples I believe prove that point. To design the Albacore at almost the same time that the USA are designing the Avenger alone proves the point.

To call the Fulmar a success is stretching it more than a little and to even consider an abandoned bomber design to be the basis of a fighter again proves the point. The Wildcat had a similar development timescale to the Fulmar as did the Zero, would anyone seriously back the Fulmar?
Any success that the Fulmar achieved was despite its performance not because of it. I do know that the FAA preferred the Buffalo in every way to the Fulmar.

The Firefly was a great success that is true, but not as a fighter which it was designed to be. Can you name any other fighter introduced in any couuntry in late 1942 that only had a max speed of 316mph?

 

[parsifal]

Points taken and acknowledged. However, ther are a few mitigating circumstances that perhaps are worth noting.
Firstly, RN control of the FAA was not restored until 1938. that left them with precious little time in which to develop decent types, and undertake a proper expansion program. At the outbreak of the war, the FAA was receiving the grand total of 16 pilots per year. Moreover, there just was not the time, or the money, to invest properly in new types.

However, the FAA had a few key advantages over that of the other naval air services. The first and most important was their ability to strike at night. Admittedly this was more a function of the aircrew, rather than the aircraft, but the slow speed of both the swordfish and the Albacore made it that much easier to adpt to Night Flying. Moreover, from 1941 onwards, both the Albacore and the Swordfish were fitted with ASV radar, something not even considered at the time by the USN, and which further enhanced their ability to locate targets, and attack them at night or poor visibility.

Lastly the Albacore was almost as good as the Swordfish at foul weather flying. I am reading a book at the moment "Arctic Convoys" by Richard Woodman, in which he describes both the Albacores and the Swordfish flying off from carriers in conditions where ther were waves more than 50 feet high. This was an issue considered in the prewar planning 9and hence design) by the RN

 

[Glider]

The tragic thing is that if they had trusted the designers and given them free reign we may well have had something special. Look at the Sea Fury just after the war. We went from designing/building some of the worlds worst carrier aircraft, to one regarded as a classic in one mighty bound.

 

[renrich]

Another tragic "anecdote" was that on some arctic convoys the AC used to protect the convoy was the MkI Hurricane which was outclassed by the opposition while in the holds of the merchant ships, being shipped to the Soviet Union, were later Mks of the Hurricane, much more suited to the task of protecting the convoy.

 

[parsifal]

Another tragic "anecdote" was that on some arctic convoys the AC used to protect the convoy was the MkI Hurricane which was outclassed by the opposition while in the holds of the merchant ships, being shipped to the Soviet Union, were later Mks of the Hurricane, much more suited to the task of protecting the convoy

Yes Woodmans book makes that observation as well

 

[JoeB]

1. Even assuming the F4F could be exposed to fire of that sort for a longer period than the P-40, the Wildcat's markedly inferior performance...

2. If there are statistics on the number and calibre of hits the F4Fs that went down during the Guadalcanal campaign received in that book,

3. If you'd ask me for the likely reason of the good results of the USN's F4F units, I'd suggest that the extensive gunnery training...

4. ... that the P-40 was able to achieve similarly good results against the Ki-43, which had characteristics comparable to the A6M even if it lacked the latter's cannon armament.

5. However, while the Navy adjusted their tactics according to the information they had about the A6M, the USAAF seem to have ignored Chennault's findings ...

1. Back to a common theme, 'markedly inferior' isn't well grounded in fact when it comes to *combat effectiveness v the Zero* which is what we're talking about. The F4F was slower than the P-40 but turned better (your 'calculated' graphs showed IIRC P-40 and F4F as similar, both much inferior to Zero, but that's at odds with tests v captured Zeroes which showed the F4F's turn performance closer to the Zeroes than other US fighters, though still inferior). There's no formula to resolve a speed disadvantage/turn advantage into a *quantified* combat effectivness advantage/disadvantage.

2. Such stats are virtually never available which means all discussion of 'tactics' is therefore 'anecdotal'. The idea of not turning when trapped by a Zero, but rather skid, bob up and down and/or cut throttle to make the enemy overrun (again not 'fly straight and level') is still one of a few specific USN/USMC tactical adjustments *to the Zero* that can be found to been employed *in 1942* by more than a few people.

3. That was almost surely one factor, but how do we establish its relative weight among all factors?

4. But flown by a different air arm, one with no more (or even less) in common with the JNAF than the USN had with the USAAF. It doesn't seem to help much in trying to resolve a difference in result by P-40 and 'markedly inferior' F4F v the Zero said to be caused by the difference between USN and USAAF. Also, 3/4 of the AVG's fighter kills were Type 97's and they met no Type 1's at all until they'd been fighting mostly successfully for several months: stuff like morale, confidence in teammates and leaders etc are also huge factors in fighter combat effectiveness, but aren't 'tactics', nor are they even the same as individual pilots' technical skill.

5. Again, you're repeating a statement not supported by references actually studying that question, which you admit you haven't read (a basic though not only one is Lundstrom).

Chenault's only impact on the USN was that one USN officer, James Thach, developed a unique tactic (quite different from AVG's) inspired in part by Chennault's reports (though the Zero wasn't a particularly 'dissimilar' plane to the F4F). He tested it in combat at Midway, but it was not widely used until 1943. USN and USMC units in combat made tactical adjustments to Zeroes, the 'pin cushion' idea was one, shaking a Zero by high speed roll was another that seemed to be learned in actual combat. However systematic feedback of specific anti-Zero lessons into the training system was again, post 1942, a *result* of the 1942 campaign (including evaluation of the Ryujo Zero captured during it, F4F v captured Zero report only published in early Nov 1942), not an explantion of it.

The JNAF itself concluded from ops in China that the highly aerobatic and idividualistic tactics it often displayed there were not optimum, and JNAF fighter doctrine by 1942 emphasized coordinated firing runs by the 3 plane shotai; USN documents from late 1942 say the Zeroes in the Solomons favored hit and run attacks with initial altitude advantage. Again, there is a real historical topic of tactics, not 'tactics' as all purpose fudge factor to make opinions of combat effectiveness based on 'calculated' graphs of performance match uncooperative actual combat results.

Joe

 

[renrich]

Joe, you make some good points. Glad you mentioned the 3 plane shotai and the hit and run tactics of the IJN. The popular conception of Japanese tactics with the A6m was the dogfight which we know, by way of Lundstrom, is not true with the well trained IJN pilots of 42 and early 43. To me, it is interesting that the IJN was using formations similar to the vic of the RAF. Of course their pilots during the time mentioned were, on the whole, much more experienced and better trained than the RAF. The Thach Weave was brilliant and was used with modification in later wars, I believe.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Joe,

>1. Back to a common theme, 'markedly inferior' isn't well grounded in fact when it comes to *combat effectiveness v the Zero* which is what we're talking about.

I wrote "markedly inferior performance", and you know it. You even quoted it verbatim.

This is the n-th time you're opposing something I never said. Classical trolling technique, called "strawman" in internet communities, and "manipulation technique #1" by the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer when he summarized the 38 most common trolling techniques back in 1831.

Either you stop that **** and keep it honest, or you're on my ignore list. Last warning.

Just so that this is clear: I think your posts are pretty interesting, that you know your stuff, and I actually agree with a lot of what you say - certainly with more than you appreciate -, and I'm ready to concede that some of my points are personal opinion that no-one is required (or expected) to agree with.

The only problem I have with you is that while I pay you the respect you deserve, you keep consistently answering my posts as if I wrote something I never did - which is pretty low. Just stop that, and I'm sure we can be friends. I actually thought we had managed to overcome the "cheap rhetoric tricks" phase when you made your well-thought-out repsonse in that other thread, and I outlined where I agreed with you and where not. I thought this was a really good example for productive disagreement, even if it was a bit of an effort to summarize it that nicely - for both of us.

It's really a shame that you think it's necessary to attack another aviation enthusiast in such an abject manner when we could have a perfectly civilized discussion. I will certainly miss your better posts when you force me to put you on my ignore list, but I really, really tired of you trying to pull the same old transparent strawman trick on me again and again, so I guess I'll just live without the good bits in your posts.

I'll even assure you that in my opinion, you don't need any tricks to be give your opinion additional weight - your knowledge of aviation history is entirely undisputed, and I certainly listen to you carefully even where I disagree. You really don't need to act like one of the common "gottawin" players who crowd most internet fora because you have the broad knowledge that makes an informed discussion possible without any dubious districtations.

I certainly hope that you recognize that I'd never spend so many words of praise on anyone I'd consider a troll, so please take this as an offer to start our discussion over on a basis on mutual respect. However, I can promise you that if you use trolling techniques, I'll treat you like a common troll anyway.

So make your choice now - if you decide to start over, I'll gladly consider your above post to never have been written.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[John Davies]

One of the most surprising things about the FAA in WW2 was just what an effective fighting force it was, despite the limitations of its equipment. For instance, it was the Blackburn Skua which sunk the Koningsberg, the first time a major war vessel in commission had been sunk by air attack in WW2, or indeed at any time, unless I am very badly wrong. The Skua did not have an impressive performance, but on this occasion it certainly did the job.

The Fulmar shot down more enemy aircraft than any other FAA fighter, which is not a bad record for an aircraft with such poor performance figures. It is this sort of thing which often leads me to distrust paper comparisons.

It was certainly effective against bombers, and was well liked because it had excellent deck-landing characteristics. This had a worthwhile effect on attrition rates. Remember, FAR more Seafires were lost in deck-landing accidents than to enemy action, which in turn had a marked effect on squadron readiness and effectiveness rates. Good fuel and ammunition capacity enabled the Fulmar to mount standing patrols, and not necessarily to have to land after one combat.

With respect, I doubt if Fulmar/Buffalo comparisons have much validity. As far as I know, the Buffalo was never issued to front-line FAA squadrons.

Moving on, I have read that it was the success of the Taranto attack which led the Japanese to conclude this sort of thing was feasible, and thus indirectly inspired Pearl Harbour. The Swordfish was certainly a very effective aircraft. The RAF was using them as late as 1944, to hunt e-boats at night off the Normandy beaches, because they had nothing better. In this version, the "Stringbag" (so called because it could be used to carry anything) had a huge ventral radome and rocket rails under each wing, and was flat out at about 70 knots.

It was certainly a very difficult for an enemy fighter to shoot down. With is low speed and very docile handling, standard defensive doctrine was to go into a very tight turn just above the sea and try to tempt the enemy fighter to fly into the water, which is one reason why it survived fairly well in hostile environments like the Med.

The Swordfish's extreme docility also made it useful in other roles. It helped close the air gap above the Atlantic convoys, without which the war could not have been won. Many of the convoy carriers were really small; bulk grain ships and oil tankers with their superstructures razed and a flat deck constructed on top (because neither type needed derricks to discharge their cargo). With visibility down to about 50 yards, a gale blowing down the deck, and the stern rising and falling thirty or forty feet, a Swordfish could be landed, just about. It would have been certain suicide in a more modern, high-performance, aircraft.

These are probably the reasons for the Albacore, a biplane developed as late as 1939, and built as late as 1943. If the Swordfish concept had proved successful in service, why not just update it a bit? The Swordfish outlasted the Albacore in service, of course. The Albacore's modified Taurus engine had its problems. Also the aircraft was not nearly as "chuckable" as the Swordfish.

The Barracuda, the FAA's first monoplane bomber, was NOT well liked by its crews. Apart from being underpowered, it had a nasty habit of anaesthetising its pilots with a spray leakage of a hydraulic fluid containing ether, which led to a whole series of fatal crashes. But it still put the Tirpitz out of action for three months. (Operation "Tungsten")

FAA personnel were very good at improvisation. With their level of equipment, they had to be. One slightly incredible "secret weapon" defence, used by both Fulmar and Barracuda crews, if an enemy fighter got on their tail, was to throw out a bundle of a few hundred leaves of toilet paper, bound with a rubber band. When it hit the slipstream, the band would break, and the fighter pilot would be presented with a large and disconcerting cloud of "things" in his path. It seems this sometimes caused them to swerve and break off the attack. Of course, the fact that FAA crews even contemplated using such a defence is a measure of their desperation.

The Firefly was an update of the Fulmar concept, and was, again, a fairly effective aircraft, even if it didn't look too good on paper.

The FAA "two seat fighter" concept resulted from a design philosophy very different to that adopted by the USN. The FAA decided to make room for a navigator, considered essential for operations in the open ocean, even if this meant a performance penalty. USN doctrine was to make fighters comparable in their performance to the best land-based machines, and just make sure their pilots could handle the navigation. On balance, USN doctrine was much sounder, and the FAA's choice reflected the disarray caused by divided responsibilities between the RN and RAF in pre-war years. However, all things considered, the FAA really did not do too badly, despite the various deficiencies of its equipment.

On a different tack altogether, I was surprised to learn that the Japanese were still using something like the antiquated three-aircraft vic as late as 1942, or even 43. According to Johnnie Johnson, RAF's Fighter Command learned to abandon it, and copy the Luftwaffe's more flexible "finger four" formation, by the end of the Battle of Britain, i.e late 1940. That, of course, was the first occasion the Luftwaffe came up against thoroughly modern, professional, opposition, and in the high-threat environment that resulted, both sides had to learn very fast indeed. By 1941, I doubt if anyone in the world was more professional, or more battle-seasoned, than the two forces that had faced each other in that conflict.

 

[HoHun]

Hi John,

>The Fulmar shot down more enemy aircraft than any other FAA fighter, which is not a bad record for an aircraft with such poor performance figures. It is this sort of thing which often leads me to distrust paper comparisons.

"Paper comparisons" ... hm, you have joined only recently so you're probably not aware of this, but I have rejected that term as unprofessional a couple of times in the recent past.

Here is the relevent quote from the preface of Robert Shaw's "Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering". In case you do not know the book (since it's not really a book on historical air combat): It has been called the fighter pilots' bible - by fighter pilots.

"Much of what you will read here has been derived from personal flight experience, engineering analysis of fighter performance data, and 'bar talk' with other fighter pilots."

Shaw's "engineering analysis of fighter performance data" describes what often is called "paper comparison" in internet discussions. Obviously, such a comparison is an important tool - it's my impression that the undeserved bad reputation it seems to have with internet communities is mostly built upon the popularity of comparisons with other aircraft types that the type in focus would not realistically be likely to meet in actual combat.

>According to Johnnie Johnson, RAF's Fighter Command learned to abandon it, and copy the Luftwaffe's more flexible "finger four" formation, by the end of the Battle of Britain, i.e late 1940.

Bader in "Reach for the Sky" modestly points out that unlike sometimes reported, it was not his idea to adopt the Luftwaffe formation, and in his "Flying Start", Bader's long-time wingman Hugh "Cockie" Dundas admits to having actually made that suggestion. Dundas proceeds to explain how Bader went up with a flight of four to test the idea immediately, braving the cannon fire from the Luftwaffe fighters in their quest for better tactics. They did in fact find out that their first attempt had not been quite perfect when Dundas' aircraft got shot up - ironically, after the war he learned that his attacker had been Mölders, allegedly the original inventor of the Finger Four formation (though it has also been suggested that the invention actually goes back to Lützow, not Mölders).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Glider]

John
I agree with nearly everything you say but feel the Skua had a poor press. I think it it was a good match to the Ju87B and was possibly better at looking after itself against fighters.
Re the Fulmar/Buffalo comparison, I based it on 805 squadron who were equipped with both aircraft on Crete. Lt Cdr Black the squadron leader comments
The Buffalo was a delight to fly - very manoeuvrable (compared to the) Fulmar.
He continues by saying that at no time did he request that Buffalos be replaced by Gladiators, but he did request that in the light of the inadaquacy of Fulmars against CR42's that any spare Gladiators should be sent to the support of 805 squadron.
The Buffalo didn't take much part in the action due to a lack of spares.

Source Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete. 1940-41

 

[John Davies]

I never knew the FAA had taken the Buffalo into combat. Learn something new every day! As for Shaw's book, is it still obtainable, or do I seach s/sources?