One of the most surprising things about the FAA in WW2 was just what an effective fighting force it was, despite the limitations of its equipment. For instance, it was the Blackburn Skua which sunk the Koningsberg, the first time a major war vessel in commission had been sunk by air attack in WW2, or indeed at any time, unless I am very badly wrong. The Skua did not have an impressive performance, but on this occasion it certainly did the job.
The Fulmar shot down more enemy aircraft than any other FAA fighter, which is not a bad record for an aircraft with such poor performance figures. It is this sort of thing which often leads me to distrust paper comparisons.
It was certainly effective against bombers, and was well liked because it had excellent deck-landing characteristics. This had a worthwhile effect on attrition rates. Remember, FAR more Seafires were lost in deck-landing accidents than to enemy action, which in turn had a marked effect on squadron readiness and effectiveness rates. Good fuel and ammunition capacity enabled the Fulmar to mount standing patrols, and not necessarily to have to land after one combat.
With respect, I doubt if Fulmar/Buffalo comparisons have much validity. As far as I know, the Buffalo was never issued to front-line FAA squadrons.
Moving on, I have read that it was the success of the Taranto attack which led the Japanese to conclude this sort of thing was feasible, and thus indirectly inspired Pearl Harbour. The Swordfish was certainly a very effective aircraft. The RAF was using them as late as 1944, to hunt e-boats at night off the Normandy beaches, because they had nothing better. In this version, the "Stringbag" (so called because it could be used to carry anything) had a huge ventral radome and rocket rails under each wing, and was flat out at about 70 knots.
It was certainly a very difficult for an enemy fighter to shoot down. With is low speed and very docile handling, standard defensive doctrine was to go into a very tight turn just above the sea and try to tempt the enemy fighter to fly into the water, which is one reason why it survived fairly well in hostile environments like the Med.
The Swordfish's extreme docility also made it useful in other roles. It helped close the air gap above the Atlantic convoys, without which the war could not have been won. Many of the convoy carriers were really small; bulk grain ships and oil tankers with their superstructures razed and a flat deck constructed on top (because neither type needed derricks to discharge their cargo). With visibility down to about 50 yards, a gale blowing down the deck, and the stern rising and falling thirty or forty feet, a Swordfish could be landed, just about. It would have been certain suicide in a more modern, high-performance, aircraft.
These are probably the reasons for the Albacore, a biplane developed as late as 1939, and built as late as 1943. If the Swordfish concept had proved successful in service, why not just update it a bit? The Swordfish outlasted the Albacore in service, of course. The Albacore's modified Taurus engine had its problems. Also the aircraft was not nearly as "chuckable" as the Swordfish.
The Barracuda, the FAA's first monoplane bomber, was NOT well liked by its crews. Apart from being underpowered, it had a nasty habit of anaesthetising its pilots with a spray leakage of a hydraulic fluid containing ether, which led to a whole series of fatal crashes. But it still put the Tirpitz out of action for three months. (Operation "Tungsten")
FAA personnel were very good at improvisation. With their level of equipment, they had to be. One slightly incredible "secret weapon" defence, used by both Fulmar and Barracuda crews, if an enemy fighter got on their tail, was to throw out a bundle of a few hundred leaves of toilet paper, bound with a rubber band. When it hit the slipstream, the band would break, and the fighter pilot would be presented with a large and disconcerting cloud of "things" in his path. It seems this sometimes caused them to swerve and break off the attack. Of course, the fact that FAA crews even contemplated using such a defence is a measure of their desperation.
The Firefly was an update of the Fulmar concept, and was, again, a fairly effective aircraft, even if it didn't look too good on paper.
The FAA "two seat fighter" concept resulted from a design philosophy very different to that adopted by the USN. The FAA decided to make room for a navigator, considered essential for operations in the open ocean, even if this meant a performance penalty. USN doctrine was to make fighters comparable in their performance to the best land-based machines, and just make sure their pilots could handle the navigation. On balance, USN doctrine was much sounder, and the FAA's choice reflected the disarray caused by divided responsibilities between the RN and RAF in pre-war years. However, all things considered, the FAA really did not do too badly, despite the various deficiencies of its equipment.
On a different tack altogether, I was surprised to learn that the Japanese were still using something like the antiquated three-aircraft vic as late as 1942, or even 43. According to Johnnie Johnson, RAF's Fighter Command learned to abandon it, and copy the Luftwaffe's more flexible "finger four" formation, by the end of the Battle of Britain, i.e late 1940. That, of course, was the first occasion the Luftwaffe came up against thoroughly modern, professional, opposition, and in the high-threat environment that resulted, both sides had to learn very fast indeed. By 1941, I doubt if anyone in the world was more professional, or more battle-seasoned, than the two forces that had faced each other in that conflict.
to both.
Only joking, of course, but I believe "Europe first" was probably the correct historical decision.
