The A6M2 climbed at around 3,250 to 3500 ft/min, which is higher than any Allied fighter of the period.
As for turn performance, the Zero, throughout its versions easily outturns any Allied fighter.
Now a highly boosted Spitfire V should be able to follow the Hap through a sustained turn at high speed, no problem, there are other a/c capable of that as-well, but all the Hap pilot has to do is pull in tighter the stick and he's away, the Spitfire simply can't hope to follow.
The Zero turns a LOT tighter than any Spitfire, which is what the Japanese pilots took advantage of when fighting it, pulling such tight turns that the Spitfire pilots were forced to utilize energy tactics if they were to survive. Now unfortunately the British hadn't developed efficient tactics against a fighter like the Zero when they came to fight it in the pacific, and were forced to learn it the hard way just like the US years before.
I'm very sorry, but that's quite simply incorrect. Brown in "The Seafire", (Ian Allen, London, 1973), quotes the rate of climb figures for the Seafire LIII (the main variant used in the Pacific) as 4,160 fpm at sea level and 4,310 fpm at 6,000 feet, this powered by a Merlin 55M with its boost sytem optimised for low to medium levels. The FIII, the other version used in the Pacific, climbed at 3,650 fpm at sea level. Climb for 6,000 feet is not given. But anyway, the FIII slightly outperforms the climb figures for the Zero you give, and the LIII well outperforms them. The Seafire was remarkable not only for its high rate of climb, but its steep angle of climb, and was one of the very few allied fighters to nullify one of the Zero's main advantages; the Japanese pilots could no longer out-climb an opponent.
To add a little context to those figures, the Seafire LIIC, which as far as I know was only used in the European theatre, had a maximum rate of climb of 4,600 fpm, using a Merlin 32 with +18 lbs boost, which suggests a short life and a merry one for the engine!
The Zero did NOT out-turn the Seafire, easily or otherwise. What FAA pilots found was that the Zero had a tighter radius of turn, but the Seafire had a much higher rate of turn; i.e it was going around a larger circle, but going round it sufficiently faster to keep safely ahead of the Zero. In a full 360 degree circle, the Seafire would get all the way around first, but the Zero would travel a shorter distance, going around a smaller circle; but going around it more slowly.
Of course, this was not ideal. The Seafire pilot's aim was to get behind the Zero, to acheive a firing position, not hurtle merrily along in front. So the FAA used the tactic of alternate climbing and diving turns, in efect a series of near-stall turns, to get behind the Zero. These tactics worked from the first, so I am not sure why you suggest the British forces "had not developed efficient tactics".
Also, the Zero's best fighting speed was found to be about 180 knots. The Seafire's was anywhere between 220 and 280, which was a nice broad range giving lots of room for manoevre. FAA doctrine was to keep speed up into their own range. If the Zero pilot attempted to match this, his own manoeverability would degrade, and again give the Seafire the edge. The Zero was only really a very manoeverable aircraft at its best fighting speed. Controls, and especially ailerons, became much heavier at higher speeds. This greatly increased the effort needed to horse the aircraft about, and reduced rate of roll, vital in combat. In contrast, the Seafire excelled in the rolling plane. I'm sorry I do not have degree per second figures, but Brown does comment that it was exceptional in its ability to enter a hard roll sharply and positively, and reverse its turn quickly. The only enemy fighter which had an advantage was the Fw190, and even there, the advantage was not a large one.
"Proof of the pudding"? FAA Seafires shot down either 15 or 16 Zeroes for the loss of one of their own. The loss was because the pilot, Sub-Lt Hockley, suffered a radio failure, and was not aware of the need to break until it was too late. He had the appalling bad luck to be killed on the last day of the war.
BTW I know those kill figures are based on pilots combat reports. Brown's Appendix Three lists every Seafire combat individually, so I suspect when he was doing his research he simply went down to the Public Record Office and got the original squadron documents out. And I know everyone over-claimed, which does NOT imply dishonesty. In the heat and confusion of battle, it is impossible to be completely accurate, and all fighter pilots were optimists. If they weren't, they would never have been fighter pilots in the first place. But even allowing for a bit of over-claiming, it is clear that the variants of Seafire deployed in the Pacific enjoyed a decisive superiority over the Zero.
It has been suggested that a kill should only be regarded as authentic if it is confirmed by the documents of BOTH sides; one side's combat reports, and the other side's loss records. I'm sorry, but I am not going to go there. Even assuming that everyone's records are complete, accurate and available (a VERY large assumption), if we applied that consistently, we'd have to revise the combat totals for everyone; Hartmann, Kojedub, Bong, Johnson, Boyington, the lot. Safer, I think, to simply say that all combat reports overclaim a bit, and leave it at that.
Seafires did have some real weakenesses. They were a poor deck-landing aircraft, and short of range. Both these disdavatages were because the design was an adaptation of a land-based design. But by early 1945, FAA squadrons in the Pacific had to some extent overcome both problems. Deck-landing accidents were down to well under 2% of sorties, and by scrounging some 89 gallon drop tanks designed for P-40s, they had got the strike radius up to over 200 nautical miles, and patrol endurance on station up to over three hours; respectable figures by any standards.
The Seafire's reputation had been crucified by the fiasco at Salerno, where they were badly misused, resulting in a casualty rate of 10% of aircraft written off per sortie in deck-landing accidents, plus many more minor accidents. Understandably, it took a long time to recover.
As for what the RAF and RAAF's experience was with their Spitfires against the Zero; sorry, I haven't a clue! I'd suspect a lot had to do with the Mark (the Mark VIII, deployed late in the Pacific war, had a much higher performance than the Mark V), and the tactics used. I think the title of this thread can lead to some confusion, as it is about comparing both the Spitfire Mk V and the Seafire with the Zero. The fact is, the Sptifire Mk V and the Seafire LIII/FIII were very different aircraft; different performance, different tactical enviroments, different services, and very probably different tactics too. So comparisons which are valid for one will not be valid for the other.
The Seafire LIII and FIII were specifically optimised for performance at low to medium levels. They were very effective aircraft. Also, the FAA learned very fast, and as a "poor relation" service, was usually very good indeed at improvisation. It had to be; but in a war where the ability to learn and adapt fast often made the difference between life and death, this was no bad thing.