Strategic bombing campaign in Europe: Targets

FLYBOYJ said:

Depends - if you're talking something like a long milling machine, all you have to do is get it un-leveled and it would render it unusable. Assembly jigs are also precision made and any disruption of their foundation or un even movement could throw them out of tolerance.

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I would say you would have to do more than get it unlevelled.

You would have to get it to bend - I suppose you mean that will happen under its own weight.

Still, how close to teh machine would you have to explode a bomb to unlevel it?

Re-leveling the machine takes a lot less time/money than getting a new one.

even the repair of 'minor' damage is a whole lot easier. Scrap ways, replace handles/wheels, etc.

parsifal said:

The real "waste of time and resources" was the german decision to concentrate solely on fighter production. there were two problems. they built planes that were never used , because they failed to provide pilots and fuel for them. secondly building fighters only is highly wasteful and leads down a strategic blind alley for the germans. Fighters dont win wars, they dont even reduce damage or reduce losses. they just make it a bit harder for the enemy to complete their mission. A force without bombers, such as the luftwaffe largely was after 1943 was a huge waste of resources.

The german flak arm was better value, but still expensive. it absorbe over 80% of ordinance production, and ammunition expenditure required huge manning levels.

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That's pretty much Hitler's view, though by the time it came to a head it was too late for either.

So, speculatively - is it not easier to train a laborer to fill holes and re-bed track than replace a skill machinist or tool and die maker killed in a factory?

As to machine tools - the destuctive factors necessitating replacement would be damage from heat, blast effect knocking frames out of alignment, particularly axis centric tools like lathes and boring machines. What are the factors which make it equal or greater long lead time/difficult to fix for a marshalling yard after typical bombing? How long to build a new Cat cracker, transport, replace and bring a blend back on line for a refinery?

Jigs and fixtures are stout enogh to be stiff enough to hold a light wing or airframe to acceptable tolerances. Minor blast or heat damage can become major if the desired tolerances are not achievable without devoting significant skilled resources to restore it. One bin of long lead time castings or forgings is a major disruption - even if you can machine the part. To shift from casting/forging you need to set up the new battery of lathe/mill and different heat treat process to accomodate the 'new' part until the supply of new forgings are available. You can of course just develop a new process plan to route to existing work centers - but even that requires a.) transport and waiting time at the individual machine centers, and b.) tearing down and installing new set-ups/jigs to accept the new part, then break down and re-do for the next one.

I know of no comparable example in Germany, but if one plant's forging operation had been sabotaged in the 60's - the one supplying the swing wing/carry through forging for the F-111, the production schedule would have been toast (12-18 month) because of the long lead time to replace the capability. It was sole source.

Unless you have multiple sources for critical castings and forgings - each capable of ramping up to fill backorders created by the loss of another plant with such capability - your production schedule suffers unless and until you can re-manufacture the part with conventional bar stock and tooling - or re-design to same envelope with fabricated parts.

Out of curiosity, given that many, many marshalling yards were in place and capable of re-routing rail traffic around a damaged one - as contrast to only a few refineries, engine manufacturers, ball bearing plants, artilliary barrel makers - why pick marshalling yards as your first priority for Strategic bombing focus?

wuzak said:

I would say you would have to do more than get it unlevelled.

You would have to get it to bend - I suppose you mean that will happen under its own weight.

Still, how close to teh machine would you have to explode a bomb to unlevel it?

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I've seen machines move and end with normal ground movement. I worked around many machine shops in Southern California. A minor earthquake (2.0) could totally mess up precision machines and jigs. I think several 500 or 1000 pound bombs going off in close proximity to a precision machine could easily un-level it.

drgondog said:

I know of no comparable example in Germany, but if one plant's forging operation had been sabotaged in the 60's - the one supplying the swing wing/carry through forging for the F-111, the production schedule would have been toast (12-18 month) because of the long lead time to replace the capability. It was sole source.

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Bill, in your Lockheed days I don't know if you ever saw the cruciform forgings that attached the #2 engine intake on the L1011. Same thing, 12 month lead time.

Balljoint said:

That's pretty much Hitler's view, though by the time it came to a head it was too late for either.

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"The real "waste of time and resources" was the german decision to concentrate solely on fighter production. there were two problems. they built planes that were never used , because they failed to provide pilots and fuel for them. secondly building fighters only is highly wasteful and leads down a strategic blind alley for the germans. Fighters dont win wars, they dont even reduce damage or reduce losses. they just make it a bit harder for the enemy to complete their mission. A force without bombers, such as the luftwaffe largely was after 1943 was a huge waste of resources.

The german flak arm was better value, but still expensive. it absorbe over 80% of ordinance production, and ammunition expenditure required huge manning levels."

Absent day fighter strength, German production capability would have been destroyed long before de-centraliztion took place. Those might be Hitler's sentiments but not Speer's - who knew one helluva lot more than Hitler. The set back for the 8th AF after August 17 and October 14, 1943 was long enough for Speer to repair Schweinfurt and de-centralize ball bearing production enough to be able to avoid shutting down german mechanization. Had 8th not suffered day fighter losses the Oil industry could have benn hit just as hard in September 1943 in parallel with Ploesti Tidal Wave in August, 1943. The losses at Ploesti were 75% due to to day fighters despite the low level attacks being at the worst possible altitude to avoid flak.

Germany was in pure survival mode with inability to stabilize East front - period. Only fighter aviation kept Russian airpower from completely denying German mobility to manuever during the day. It was the combination of flooding Luft Reich with replacements from East and South, combined with ramp of fighter production that kept the 8th AF from destroying Schweinfurt in fall 1943 as well as attacking refineries and disrupting fuel supply 8 month earlier than May 1944.

Joe - I only saw Burbank during initial HR processing before off to Skunk Works for my short but great experience with The Man.
It was also after the last of the SR-71s were produced. Having said that I do not believe that a team exists in the world today which could take a concept to final design like Kelly. If the state of the art in Titanium and high temp metallurgy was as it existed in early 60.

drgondog said:

Joe - I only saw Burbank during initial HR processing before off to Skunk Works for my short but great experience with The Man.
It was also after the last of the SR-71s were produced. Having said that I do not believe that a team exists in the world today which could take a concept to final design like Kelly. If the state of the art in Titanium and high temp metallurgy was as it existed in early 60.

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Agree 100! BTW, that part was made from titanium and i think some Skunk Works folks helped develop it before it was farmed out to a vendor.

drgondog said:

Germany was in pure survival mode with inability to stabilize East front - period. Only fighter aviation kept Russian airpower from completely denying German mobility to manuever during the day. It was the combination of flooding Luft Reich with replacements from East and South, combined with ramp of fighter production that kept the 8th AF from destroying Schweinfurt in fall 1943 as well as attacking refineries and disrupting fuel supply 8 month earlier than May 1944.

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If I recall accurately, about mid1943 Galland declared that the LW had completed its offensive mission and needed to switch to defense of the homeland. He was overruled by Hitler who had no use for defense. Instead, a futile effort to counter bomber offense with bomber offense was initiated.

During 1943 US bombers were flying with escort fighter only providing partial escort. Galland would have taken a tremendous toll.

Absent day fighter strength, German production capability would have been destroyed long before de-centraliztion took place.

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Fighters dont reduce the effcts of bombing. Thats a myth that sprang up in the post war analysis. What they could do was to make the cost of the bombing prohibitive, because bomber losses would go beyond a certain level. Once the Americans gained air superiority that was never going to happen.

Flak plays a much more critical role in disrupting the bombing, because it forces the bombers to fly high and the fire tends to throw the bombers off aim.

Moreover, whilst winning air superiority was critical for the allies, becaise once achieved it gave them carte blanche to range freely and attack freely. Once the Germans lost air superiority, or more correctly, air parity, their fighters became largely poitless, and very costly. They didnt achieve anything of strategic importance after about May 1944.

Moreover winning air superiority is not the end gamne for air power....you have to be able to do something with it once you have won it. Without bombers, you cant do squat with your airpower, even if you hold air supremacy. Fighters without strike aircraft, is like having no bacon for your eggs and bacon.....

This is what the Germans found in the East....after Kursk, the Russians realized that winning air superiority off the Germans on that front was a near impossible task for them, so they went about the problem somewhat differently to the way we approched it. They put enough fighters in the air to maximise the mission success of their strike aircraft....but they never really attempted to gain complete control of the air. They cpould put so many strike aircraft into the air that it didnt matter that the germans wer busy shooting them down....they just couldnt shoot enough down to make a difference. Same thing, but for different reasons, happened in the west.

Those might be Hitler's sentiments but not Speer's - who knew one helluva lot more than Hitler.

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Hitler was a nutter, and Im certainly not spruiking his theories. but I do pay attention to STAVKHA and to Richthofen who certainly diod not agree with the germanmania for gaining complete air supremacy. He wanted to maintain the potency of his strike wings, and have enoigh fighter power to gain local air parity only. More oftyen than not he would use German Fighter assets in the JABO role. And Richthofen was avery capable commander. The Germans used similar methods in Italy.....the few aircraft they had in that TO did not try to slug it out pointlessly with the allied air forces. Having conceded they had lost air parity, they used their available forces for nuisance raids, and attacking targets of opportunity

Germany was in pure survival mode with inability to stabilize East front - period. Only fighter aviation kept Russian airpower from completely denying German mobility to manuever during the day.

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No, it didnt. German fighters became a strategic irrelevance, because they could not shoot down enough aircraft to make a difference. moreover, for the Soviets , by far the majority of losses suffered had nothing to do with German fighter activities. There were far more losses due to non combat causes and flak

It was the combination of flooding Luft Reich with replacements from East and South, combined with ramp of fighter production that kept the 8th AF from destroying Schweinfurt in fall 1943 as well as attacking refineries and disrupting fuel supply 8 month earlier than May 1944.

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No argument that in 1943, German fighters were achieving something, but after May 1944 they were an uneconomic defence. It was the germans suffering the hrrendous losses by then. German industry by then was falling apart with or without german fighters. The Germans would have been better using the resources poured into other areas of the war effort. Allied losses would not have changed much after May 1944, with or without German Fighters, but German resources would have gone up greatly without the wated effort lavished on them after May.

Not until the atomic bomb could airpower 'win' a war. Troops had to be put on the ground, bombing alone was not going to 'win' the war in Europe. Remember, it was all out total war, no negotiated surrender was envisioned after what, 1942?

parsifal said:

Fighters dont reduce the effcts of bombing. Thats a myth that sprang up in the post war analysis. What they could do was to make the cost of the bombing prohibitive, because bomber losses would go beyond a certain level. Once the Americans gained air superiority that was never going to happen.

Fighters reduce the effects of bombing in two distinct ways. First they reduce the available tonnage on target by destroying bombers en route. Second they whittle at the political will of the attacking forces by continuously inflicting unacceptable losses. The RAF achieved this during the BoB and the LW achieved this between August and mid October 1943. For the latter, the LW set back the 8th AF's ability to inflict continous pressure on German industry for four months - enough time to de-centralize some key industry components

Flak plays a much more critical role in disrupting the bombing, because it forces the bombers to fly high and the fire tends to throw the bombers off aim.

It plays a role. 'critical'?? Not becessarily. Had German fighters not been available, flak would have been a non-factor for bombers attacking at 20K+ in context of acceptable losses.

Moreover, whilst winning air superiority was critical for the allies, becaise once achieved it gave them carte blanche to range freely and attack freely. Once the Germans lost air superiority, or more correctly, air parity, their fighters became largely poitless, and very costly. They didnt achieve anything of strategic importance after about May 1944.

Agreed - but needed to be crushed to re-pursue the goals of Daylight Strategic Bombing with acceptable losses

Moreover winning air superiority is not the end gamne for air power....you have to be able to do something with it once you have won it. Without bombers, you cant do squat with your airpower, even if you hold air supremacy. Fighters without strike aircraft, is like having no bacon for your eggs and bacon.....

Also agreed, Even Hitler knew that intellectually and insisted on devoting high percentage of aviation industry in continued bomber production - including the side trip with the Me 262

This is what the Germans found in the East....after Kursk, the Russians realized that winning air superiority off the Germans on that front was a near impossible task for them, so they went about the problem somewhat differently to the way we approched it. They put enough fighters in the air to maximise the mission success of their strike aircraft....but they never really attempted to gain complete control of the air. They cpould put so many strike aircraft into the air that it didnt matter that the germans wer busy shooting them down....they just couldnt shoot enough down to make a difference. Same thing, but for different reasons, happened in the west.

Not sure what you mean by 'same thing' in the West. It DiD matter that the Germans were shooting down too many bombers, and had the LW Day Fighters not been dealt with it is probable that 8th and 15th would have transitioned to night attacks deep into Germany while reserving Light/Medium/Heavy bomber ops for medium to short ranges as tactical assets.



Hitler was a nutter, and Im certainly not spruiking his theories. but I do pay attention to STAVKHA and to Richthofen who certainly diod not agree with the germanmania for gaining complete air supremacy. He wanted to maintain the potency of his strike wings, and have enoigh fighter power to gain local air parity only. More oftyen than not he would use German Fighter assets in the JABO role. And Richthofen was avery capable commander. The Germans used similar methods in Italy.....the few aircraft they had in that TO did not try to slug it out pointlessly with the allied air forces. Having conceded they had lost air parity, they used their available forces for nuisance raids, and attacking targets of opportunity

No argument that in 1943, German fighters were achieving something, but after May 1944 they were an uneconomic defence. It was the germans suffering the hrrendous losses by then. German industry by then was falling apart with or without german fighters. The Germans would have been better using the resources poured into other areas of the war effort. Allied losses would not have changed much after May 1944, with or without German Fighters, but German resources would have gone up greatly without the wated effort lavished on them after May.

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The perspective of 'unnecessary' depends on whether Speer was comfortable with having Germany's assets pounded without real cost to the allies - and when he became comfortable. He was frantic regarding the Oil campaign and knew there was no hope whatsoever to stabilize the Eastern front absent fuel, armor, artillary and transport. He also knew full well what the indirect 'cost' of vastly increasing 88 and 128 mm tubes for air defense as contrast with anti tank capability (and personnel) in the East.

drgondog said:

So, speculatively - is it not easier to train a laborer to fill holes and re-bed track than replace a skill machinist or tool and die maker killed in a factory?

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drgondog said:

Out of curiosity, given that many, many marshalling yards were in place and capable of re-routing rail traffic around a damaged one - as contrast to only a few refineries, engine manufacturers, ball bearing plants, artilliary barrel makers - why pick marshalling yards as your first priority for Strategic bombing focus?

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Attacks on transportation would not only concentrate on marshalling yards - they would also include inland waterways - an important means of transportation in Germany during WW2, roads, bridges etc.

Since this is with hindsight, there's yet another approach. One of the key legs of strategic bombing is the demoralization of the civilian population. Douhet and Mitchell were wrong about this. Unlike the profound antiwar reaction of London to bombing, during WW I civilians reacted with a determined opposition to the bombers. Also, the distinction between tactical and strategic blurred in that transportation, for instance, could be economic infrastructure, or it could be the troop supply line.

That said, the object of the heavy bombers initially (mid1942) should have been the LW fighter pilot cadre. Hitler had expended what little strategic might the LW had during the BoB. The transport was gutted in Greece, Africa, and Stalingrad. Short of an A-bomb, the war was won by boots on the ground, and they were much more effective with air superiority.

Thus, from mid 1942 through 1943, the heavies should have gone only to the reach of heir fighter support and picked targets (not the sub pens) that would bring up the LW fighters. Even under these limited objectives, it would have been a tough time. Along with the Soviet efforts, the LW fighter pilot experience level would have thinned.

From early 1944 when the P-51B arrived, much the same should and did occur since Eisenhower drafted the heavies to take out transportation and communication primarily in
France preparatory to D-day. And Doolittle drafted them as bait for the LW fighters. By May 1944, the LW lost air parity and was pretty much a no-show for D-Day. While the heavies were used in an almost pure tactical role at the St. Lo breakout, they were finally in a position to get on with strategic objectives. By mid 1944 Hitler had given up on the LW and resorted to flak as the primary defense against the bombers. With fewer and more compact targets, flak was effective.

By this time the eastern oil had been cut off and the synthetic fuel and transportation were excellent targets with terror weapons also on the list. Alloying metals, mostly from Sweden, were cut off without bombing the source. And the end was in sight.

drgondog said:

<SNIP>
In hindsight the combined Planning for Operations would have been more effective if they reported directly to Eisenhower and priorities/conclusions regarding which targets to hit day and night should have been enforced - or fire the footdraggers.
harris is the one I had in mind. Spaatz, when told to stand down on the Oil Campaign to focus on tactical targets, did so with a salute and a 'Yes Sir".. Harris, wellllllllll.

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Pasted this from another thread - thought it very applicable to this thread.

parsifal said:

.......
The real "waste of time and resources" was the german decision to concentrate solely on fighter production. there were two problems. they built planes that were never used , because they failed to provide pilots and fuel for them. secondly building fighters only is highly wasteful and leads down a strategic blind alley for the germans. Fighters dont win wars, they dont even reduce damage or reduce losses. they just make it a bit harder for the enemy to complete their mission. A force without bombers, such as the luftwaffe largely was after 1943 was a huge waste of resources.......

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parsifal said:

.......
Moreover, whilst winning air superiority was critical for the allies, becaise once achieved it gave them carte blanche to range freely and attack freely. Once the Germans lost air superiority, or more correctly, air parity, their fighters became largely poitless, and very costly. They didnt achieve anything of strategic importance after about May 1944.

Moreover winning air superiority is not the end gamne for air power....you have to be able to do something with it once you have won it. Without bombers, you cant do squat with your airpower, even if you hold air supremacy. Fighters without strike aircraft, is like having no bacon for your eggs and bacon......

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I have to respectfully disagree here. The only way to win air superiority / air parity is through fighters. You can spend any percentage of aircraft production on bombers but if they can't fly, they're useless. It took awhile for Hitler to be convinced of this and allow Galland to develope Defense of the Reich measures (he didn't want any hint of 'defense' mentioned as, in his mind, that was defeatist) but you need fighters. Lesson not learned well from the BoB period. What may have been a bigger problem was the illogical use of resources on multiple and ded-end designs of fighters, etc. Germany wasn't alone in that respect ( i.e. USA and the many whimsical efforts put into aircraft carriers made of ice or concrete!) but she didn't have the luxury to pursue these endeavours. Germany needed fighters.

The only way to win air superiority / air parity is through fighters.

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Air superiority or air parity was not tyhe aim for the germans after Feb/May 1944, as winning it would not achieve anything for them. Neither were either two of these air states achievable for them. all they could do was try6 and make the cost of getting the allied bombers so expensive that the bombing was prohibitive. They never even came close to that after May. For the RAF/CW ( I only quote them because I know them better than the US) losses were below 1% by June, and had sunbk to 0.5% per month by December. US losses in bombers had to be similar. That sort of loss rate has no effect on the bombing campaign. Moreover, the challenge the Germans were mounting became increasingly hollow and increasingly useless as the year progressed.

Despite the pounding their industry was taking, its hard to justify the 68% of war production the Germans were pouring into Air defence by 1944. The allies were pouring a fraction of that into their strategic bombing forces.
If the construction of fighters was doing nothing to stop the bombers, foing little to divert Allied resources from other areas of production, but costing the germans a huge percentage of their war effort, why continue with a failed effort. The resources would have been better spent, bomb proofing their industries and strengthening passive and civil defences....moving industries underground, reducing (not increasing fighters, but husbanding those fighters for all but the most vital defence efforts....a sort of "air force in being" if you like.

I do know this, German concentration on fighters in 1944 was a very poor investment for them in their last year of war. Things could hardly have gone worse for them.

I would liken the final year of German resistance to the North Vietnamese in the 1960s. The Vietnamese never had anything like a coherent air defence system. They had a credible threat, but theyr never even attempted to challenge US air superiority. the US dropped more bombs on them than the whole of the second world war. They (the vietnamese) still survived, and were still in battle, despite that pounding. i know there were other reasons at work, but still nbot attempting a coherent air defence was their best strategy.....they used their resources elsewhere, where their strengths could be better put to use. the Germans needed to come up with something similar.

You can spend any percentage of aircraft production on bombers but if they can't fly, they're useless.

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I agree, but if the bombers can fly, and are uninterceptable, why worry about fighters. air superiority in 1944 was a distant memory for the germans, the best they could hope for by the second half of 1944 was to achieve some missions, like recon, and nuisance raids. For a fraction of the cost of the program they did try, they could have maintained a smaller force of bombers and high performance fighters for essential tasks only .

It took awhile for Hitler to be convinced of this and allow Galland to develope Defense of the Reich measures (he didn't want any hint of 'defense' mentioned as, in his mind, that was defeatist) but you need fighters.

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That is the conventional wisdom, but ask yourself why do you need fighters. The answer is to win air superiority....to allow your bombewrs freedom of manouver. Germany didnt have any bombers by 1944, and wasnt shooting many allied ones down either. They were spending huge amounts of their defence budgets t9o build planes that either never flew, or flew only to get themselves shot down. It was a crazy strategy if you ask me, and whilst I dont support Hitlers stupid ideas about 'building a bomber force to hit back" I do think the German defence dollars could have been spent far better than they were.

What may have been a bigger problem was the illogical use of resources on multiple and ded-end designs of fighters, etc. Germany wasn't alone in that respect ( i.e. USA and the many whimsical efforts put into aircraft carriers made of ice or concrete!) but she didn't have the luxury to pursue these endeavours.

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Agreed

Germany needed fighters.

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No, they didnt. what they needed was respite from the allied bombers. they werent getting that by building ever larger numbers of fighters that never flew, or were otherwise inneffective at stopping the bombers. so why continue to pursue a strategy that was so costly, for no real gain....other methods of survivavl had to be found.....not that there was any real long term solution for germany....by 1944, the war was well and tuly lost for them anyway.

Bomb proffing industry and/or moving it underground is costsly and time consuming.

They were never going to get enough of it done to overcome the effect of bombing.

And once they had done it, what would they make? Bombers?

And what were they going to fuel them with? The oil installations weren't going to be moved underground easily or quickly.

Fighters were the most effect way to "make the cost of getting the allied bombers so expensive that the bombing was prohibitive".

Far better than a few more bombers or V1 V2 weapons.

parsifal said:

but if the bombers can fly, and are uninterceptable, why worry about fighters.

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No bomber, Axis or Allied including jet bombers deployed during WW2 were uninterceptable.