Strategic bombing campaign in Europe: Targets

[parsifal]

No bomber, Axis or Allied including jet bombers deployed during WW2 were uninterceptable.

Some came pretty close. mosquitoes had a loss rate never exceededing 1.5 % in the last 1.5 years of the war. Dont know what the AR 234s were but it would have to be so low as to be virtually uninterceptbale. Virtually everybody could operate reecon aircraft throughout the war with a great deal of impunity. And in 1944 a few more high quality recon aircraft would have made a huge difference to the heer, by then needed all the intell it could get its hads on....

Germany's days of mounting massed raids were over by 1944. That was what hitler wanted, and it was as unrealistic as Gallands strategy. What strategies are open to a nation that can no longer make an effective challenge in the air? Certainly not massed fleets of bombers, but equally, certainly not spending more than half your national defence resources on building fighters that either never flew or were totally inneffective in their stated mission.

I think the Viet Minh had the right idea when faced with a similar situation...dont even try to challenge the enemy's control of the air. Make life uncomfortable for him, by all means, but why waste resources (masses of them) trying to achieve the impossible? Better to spend your money elsewhere.

There are obvious counter arguments to that, but none of them stand up to close scrutiny.

Argument 1: The Germans had no way of knowing the allies were coming in such force in 1944

Answer: yes they did....but all levels of their leadership, including the prefessional soldiers, chose to stick their heads in the sand and ignbore the cold hard reality they were facing. Germany had very good intel on US production from 1942, and knew what her industry was capable of. Yet they simply failed to plan out their response at all effectively.

Argument 2 : not building fighters would have see German industry decimated

Answer: Not true, at least, not much more true than happened historically. in fact the numbers of bombers arriving over Germany if there were no fighters, or few fighters, would be not much more than it was historically. if the monthly average of bombers being destroyed because of the massive effort by the Germans amounted to 1% of the bombers sent (with say 10% aborts due to the fighters) , then no fighters will see 100% of bombers arriving over the target....a paltry increase of just 11% of bombers stopped for all that effort. Fighters dont affect bombing accuracy as much as flak does (and cause a lot of bombers to actually release not over the target) , so why not abandon or severely cut back fighters, cut your losses (as the German) save what you can of your industry, and fight 3 or six months longer than historical.


The people who absolutely needed fighters werent the germans, it was the allies.....The unescorted raids in 1943 had shown what happened to their bombers if not provided with safe skies to fly in

 

[wuzak]

So, fighters which took a terrible toll on US bombers late in 1943 should have production cut and losses not replaced?

btw, in early 1944 with fighter escorts the 8th were still losing a lot of bombers. However, the Germans were losing more fighters and, more importantly, experienced pilots.

 

[Njaco]

Air superiority or air parity was not tyhe aim for the germans after Feb/May 1944, as winning it would not achieve anything for them.

I will agree as the German strategy IMHO was as tactical support for the Wehrmacht and not as an independant armed force as envisioned today. That did change as the war progressed. Hindsight through rose-colored glasses sometimes is hard to swallow!

I understand the logic you are using to answer the dilema, but I still see freedom of movement to reach those goals you posted as a major roadblock to success. Ok, strengthen industry but that industry is still scattered and time consuming. Micro-manage bombers and fighetrs for point defense goals but I still see that as unrealistic just based on the success of - not Allied bombers (4E type) but the Allied ground-attack that, no matter what type of base these certain German bombers/fighters would be operating from, they would still be restricted from freedom to complete missions.

While I understand the logic and we agree to disagree on bombers/ fighters, I whole-heartedly agree resources could have been better spent than they were. That really might have made a difference.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Some came pretty close. mosquitoes had a loss rate never exceededing 1.5 % in the last 1.5 years of the war. Dont know what the AR 234s were but it would have to be so low as to be virtually uninterceptbale. Virtually everybody could operate reecon aircraft throughout the war with a great deal of impunity. And in 1944 a few more high quality recon aircraft would have made a huge difference to the heer, by then needed all the intell it could get its hads on....

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/ar-234-losses-5230.html#post194775

And we do know that Mossies were intercepted and shot down. 1.5% based on sorties, aircraft deployed or missions Bottom line pretty close didn't cut it, as ststed no aircraft during WW2 was uninterceptable. It wasn't so much "if" but "when."

The only uninterceptbale to ever be operated was the SR-71 and even then it sometimes self-destructed for one reason or another!

 

[drgondog]

Argument 2 : not building fighters would have see German industry decimated

Answer: Not true, at least, not much more true than happened historically. in fact the numbers of bombers arriving over Germany if there were no fighters, or few fighters, would be not much more than it was historically. if the monthly average of bombers being destroyed because of the massive effort by the Germans amounted to 1% of the bombers sent (with say 10% aborts due to the fighters) , then no fighters will see 100% of bombers arriving over the target....a paltry increase of just 11% of bombers stopped for all that effort. Fighters dont affect bombing accuracy as much as flak does (and cause a lot of bombers to actually release not over the target) , so why not abandon or severely cut back fighters, cut your losses (as the German) save what you can of your industry, and fight 3 or six months longer than historical.

Parsifal -Had German fighters not inflicted the losses caused from August through October 1943 the 8th and 9th AF (Africa based B-24s) would have been able to sustain and intensify strategic attacks against Schweinfurt and Ploesti - and Brux, Stettin, etc would have been wide open to expanded campaign against Oil and Chemicals in 1943 instead of a.) waiting until May 1944, and b.) giving Germany time to de-centralize. German flak was only a deterrence.


The people who absolutely needed fighters werent the germans, it was the allies.....The unescorted raids in 1943 had shown what happened to their bombers if not provided with safe skies to fly in

The Allies wouldn't have needed long range escorts if Axis fighters were not a threat.

Curtis Lemay changed the mindset of early 8th AF pilot/bombadier 'aversion' to flak in several important ways to eliminate the problem. One, he proved mathmatically that the AAA of 1943 was not a serious threat to 25000 feet bombers (statistically). Two, he instilled lead crew concept to put the best in the lead squadron aircraft to improve group performance based on the best and brightest being located in one ship rather than let 12 aircraft do their own thing. Third, The Automatic Flight Control was installed in every US heavy bomber and the aircraft was slaved to the sight - pilot was 'hands' off'.

The Germans innovated and several times clobbered lead formations bombing on Pathfinder H2X by setting targeting and fusing on the radar - and their computer controls got better but they waere far less effective than fighters between June 1943 and April 1944.

 

[Gixxerman]

Virtually everybody could operate reecon aircraft throughout the war with a great deal of impunity. And in 1944 a few more high quality recon aircraft would have made a huge difference to the heer, by then needed all the intell it could get its hads on....

Isn't this one of the LW's biggest problems by the start of 1944?
They (as far as I'm aware) couldn't operate recon aircraft over England with impunity so were incapable of revealing much about the impending invasion.
Surely it is this crucial failing more than anything which facilitated the (from the German POV) utter disaster of the XX network, the various radio spoofing regarding fake units the whole idea of a fake Normandy attack a 'real' Calais attack to follow?

 

[parsifal]

Isn't this one of the LW's biggest problems by the start of 1944?
They (as far as I'm aware) couldn't operate recon aircraft over England with impunity so were incapable of revealing much about the impending invasion.
Surely it is this crucial failing more than anything which facilitated the (from the German POV) utter disaster of the XX network, the various radio spoofing regarding fake units the whole idea of a fake Normandy attack a 'real' Calais attack to follow?

i will have to check, but from memory, I think there were a couple of nervous flights during the final buid up for the invasion.

But I agree with you to this extent (and stand corrected)....the LW was as a general observation unable to get really goo or comprehensive information on the buid up of the forces in England in theSpring and early summer of 1944. If they could have recveved even a moderately better advance warning of Allied operations (not just Normandy....even tactical operations), they may have been able to pull of a bit of an upset somewhere. as it was, they had no idea really of the precise timing and location of the blow(s) and suffered accordingly

 

[Milosh]

The Germans must have got some recon photos as were they not worried about Patton's phony army.

 

[Hop]

From Hooton, Eagle in Flames:

The threat of an allied invasion loomed great in German eyes but the RAF clouded them from 1943 onwards. During the summer of 1943 there was a series of high-altitude reconnaissance sorties, possibly by JU86s, but from August 1943 fighters prevented daylight photographic reconnaissance over Great Britain until March 1944. In October FAGr 124 (Major Hans Wolff) had to abandon high altitude daylight recce in favour of low-level missions in cloud, but even these failed to succeed and the only images acquired were at night. By the spring of 1944 Sperrle, under considerable pressure from Fuhrer headquarters, was demanding reports and photographs of inland England from Wolff. The task was especially hazardous from mid April 1944, when the RAF had standing fighter patrols over shipping assembly areas, and even the Bf109H of 5. (F)/121, which could operate at 12,200m (40,000ft), encountered Spitfires, so most photographs were of targets within 40km of the coast. Shortly before D Day one of Wolff's Bf109s succeeded in photographic Portsmouth harbour, but the area controller of 11 Group, Squadron Leader Eric Holmes, had made a study of FAGr 123 operations and correctly deduced it would return to Cherbourg, where a Free French Spitfire destroyed it as it rolled along the runway. Nevertheless the Germans did acquire some pictures, apparently by using a captured Thunderbolt in Allied markings, while 1 (F)/120 conducted daylight patrols of the Channel and the Ju199Ds of Kammhuber's 1 (F)/120 probed northern Britain to detect shipping movements.

 

[wuzak]

The Germans must have got some recon photos as were they not worried about Patton's phony army.

If the Germans had no recon photos they would not have known about Patton's phony army and therefore would not be worried?

 

[drgondog]

I can't speak for German High Command but unless they had concrete intelligence that Patton was a decoy, I can't believe the resrves would not have been released from Calais immediately.

 

[Njaco]

I may be mistaken but I think the only real good recon that the Germans had of Normandy, etc only occurred a few days after the invasion with flight from the Ar 234 (Oblt. Sommer I think). Before that, they were almost blind.

 

[Gixxerman]

Indeed Njaco, that is my understanding of it......and it was this blindness that made Ultra, the XX network and maybe to a lesser extent the Calais/Patton ruse so enormously effective.
As it was there were elements of the landing establishing of the foot-holds that were very difficult, without that recon blindness I wonder?

I have always wondered how come the British could operate a variety of aircraft in a successful on-going recon operation over Europe including a lot of Germany (even with the size etc compared to the UK) and yet the Luftwaffe at that crucial time - and they must have known it was such a crucial time - appears to have failed so totally.

Sommer's flights in the prototype (skid equipped) Ar234 remind me of that interesting 'happenstance' thing, just 1 more week (or 2) it might have all been so very different - maybe also like the V1 (also a week or 2 late for D-day).
I wonder how Portsmouth or Southampton (or maybe the beaches themselves) would have fared had the V1 been available (with recon assistance) used to attack (and if nothing else surely disrupt delay) the pending invasion forces?

To link to another thread I imagine if that had actually happened we would ultimately be looking at either a Soviet western Europe or a nuclear attack on Berlin.

 

[parsifal]

I have always wondered how come the British could operate a variety of aircraft in a successful on-going recon operation over Europe including a lot of Germany (even with the size etc compared to the UK) and yet the Luftwaffe at that crucial time - and they must have known it was such a crucial time - appears to have failed so totally.

Sommer's flights in the prototype (skid equipped) Ar234 remind me of that interesting 'happenstance' thing, just 1 more week (or 2) it might have all been so very different - maybe also like the V1 (also a week or 2 late for D-day).
I wonder how Portsmouth or Southampton (or maybe the beaches themselves) would have fared had the V1 been available (with recon assistance) used to attack (and if nothing else surely disrupt delay) the pending invasion forces?

Its hard to imagine totally that just a little better recon might have made such a difference. Possible, but I have my doubts. The German insistence on keeping the bulk of their reserves was as much about paralysis in their thinking as it was about a shortage of inforamtion. The Germans had virtually convinced themselves that the main landings were likley to occur in the Pas De Calais area, and even weeks after D-Day refused to believe that Normandy was anything other than a diversion. Some of this inertia arose from a knowledge of their own strategic limitations.....the Germans gauged the difficulties the Allies would experience on their own limits. The biggest two problems afflicting a cross channel invasion in its opening weeks was twofold....reinforcement rates and resupply. Pas De Calais made sense because it was the easiest and best place to cross the channel and keep the salient open and expanding. The allies did after all under estimate the effect of ther bocage. The Germans gauged the resupply capabilities on their own more conventional supply methods, which were inherently, and significantly less efficient than the allies. The Mulberries, the beach control, the undersea fuel pipelines, the organization and readiness of the reserves were all factors not realized by the Germans, and upset their assumptions that led to the Pas De calais assumption. The lack of intell just made their conslusions that much more plausible to them in their own minds.

A more effective and sustained air reconnaisance over se england might have revealed the ruse sooner, but amything too early or too dramatic might have well been detected by the allies via enigma. But an early release of 15 Army and the remaining reeserves would have made life very difficult for the allies. On a more tactical level a knowledge of the Cobra build up of the dangers around the falaise pocket or any number of coutless other battles woould have been information gained more or less for free, and saved an enormous amount of resources for longer. that coupled with a better output of ground weaponary (brought about by the curtailment of the Milch Plan) may havbe given them sufficient resources to hang on through the summer of 1945. If they could get through the summer they might have solidified their defences at the frontiers before the invasion of Germany proper, and from their, with perhaps the removal of Hitler have achieved a better peace outcome than they did. A very long shot, I am not arguing that, but at least plausible.

 

[Gixxerman]

I agree parsifal, especially regarding the assessment of the allies abilities based on the Germans own experience (I would imagine that is a recurrent theme down through history, it being difficult to 'think outside your own box').
Good recon might have given at least a hint about Mulberries and the rest tho - although whether anyone would have believed the 2 huge prefabricated harbours were what they were is anyone's guess.....interestingly wiki mentions that German engineers also thought about prefabricated harbours for Sea Lion too, although I assume (perhaps incorrectly, perhaps not) that these were never dreamed of on anything like the same scale..

I aso totally agree Ultra was the key ingredient, it made it a 'closed feedback system' (especially by mid 1944 when almost all German coding was being read in real time, apparantly sometimes even faster than the intended recipients!).
At all stages (not just for the invasion) it must have been utterly priceless.......even if (as Market Garden proved) it could not always guarantee complete success in everything and at all times.

 

[stona]

I just read this thread for the first time and very interesting it is too. I have to say that I agree with Overy that when assessing the effects of the bombing campaign against Germany the wrong question is usually asked.

Overy wrote.

'The critical question is not so much "What did bombing do to Germany?" but "What could Germany have achieved if there had been no bombing?"…... Bombing was a blunt instrument. It was a strategy that had a long and painful learning curve. But for all its deficiencies the 125,000 men and women of Bomber Command made a larger contribution to victory in Europe than any other element of Britain's armed services.'

Albert Speer.

'It made every square metre of Germany a front. For us, it was the greatest lost battle of the war.'

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

As always steve, an excellent observation. I do have one reservation, however...

But for all its deficiencies the 125,000 men and women of Bomber Command made a larger contribution to victory in Europe than any other element of Britain's armed services.'

It was an important battle, I have no problem with that, and one that is frequently misunderstood, misquoted, and denigrated usually y people who have a very particular (and usually pro-german) bias to promote.

However I believe the battle that was of the greatest significance to the allies was the battle of the Atlantic. Without victory here no other progress on any front was possible

 

[stona]

I would share that reservation.

I would hesitate to quantify Bomber Command's contribution,no matter how effective and valiant,as larger than several others. I don't think that it is a particularly helpful excercise anyway.

Steve