Stretching German Gasoline Supply.

Cutting the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and a couple of the Hipper class cruisers means no invasion of Norway.
Invading Norway was not part of pre-war German planning so it had no effect on ship procurement decisions.

It means unmolested Convoys to Murmansk.
I disagree. More fuel means convoys to Murmansk get clobbered by more numerous German airpower.

It means the British CAN interfere with the Swedish ore shipments more than was done historically.
I disagree. More fuel means more airpower. A far more effective deterrent then German capital warships.

It means the British don't have to build as Many KG V battleships and modern cruisers.
I doubt it. Italy and France were the major naval threats at the time the KGV battleships were constructed.

No Bismark and Tirpitz means the Hood lasts longer.
Unless it gets sunk by the stronger German airpower. Either way it makes no difference to the German war effort.

German truck production may not have been all that great because the factories needed to build LARGE quantities of trucks never existed.
Building truck factories is no more difficult in Germany then in the USA.

If the Heer adopt diesel they will probably pay to expand existing Mercedes L3000A production facilities. Or perhaps the Opel Blitz will be modified to accept the Mercedes 95hp diesel truck engine. The same diesel engine could also power German half tracks.
Engines of the Red Army in WW2 - Trophy "Mercedes L3000A", 3-ton, 4x4, Cargo Truck

German truck production may not have been all that great because the factories needed to build LARGE quantities of trucks never existed.
Building truck factories is no more difficult in Germany then in the USA.

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With all due respect it certainly was. The mechanical literacy of the average US male was much higher than the same factor among German males. You have a much smaller labor pool to draw on. If you impress large numbers of the civilian male population to build and work in factories, then the rest of German economy suffers. Tax revenues go down and the Reich loses vital economic resources needed for raw materials. If you use your troops to build and man the factories, they aren't available to fight. Couple this with the German reluctence to use women as a large scale industrial resource makes it even more difficult.

The factories and skilled operators already existed in the US prewar. One can not simply snap one's fingers and generate trained people and facilities out of the blue. and no one was bombing US factories and bottlenecking supplies. please look at this qoute from American Heritage.

In 1943 alone, Germany built 5,966 tanks of all types, while the U.S.S.R. produced an estimated 20,000 and the British 7,500. That year the United States built 30,000 tanks, most of them Shermans.

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that should give you a little idea of the difference in industrial capabilities. You can not just slap someone into overalls and have him instantly become a trained worker. There is a learning curve that is sometimes very steep. If your experienced personel are busy teaching new workers and trying to fix their mistakes, then the experienced workers productivity suffers accordingly. This is a very complex issue and you can't simply say, well they would just do " X " in a given situation without appreciating all of the interlocking factors involved in the issues.

davebender said:

Cutting the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and a couple of the Hipper class cruisers means no invasion of Norway.
Invading Norway was not part of pre-war German planning so it had no effect on ship procurement decisions.

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You are correct in that the invasion of Norway had no part in pre war ship procurement decisions. However you are wrong if you think the Germans could have invaded Norway without those ships. The Bulk of the German invasion forces were moved by ship. I don't know how much fire support the german navy gave but take that away, put fewer men in Norway and then see how far you get.

davebender said:

I disagree. More fuel means convoys to Murmansk get clobbered by more numerous German airpower.

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More fuel to operate the more numerous German airpower operating from Denmark and Finland? That's a lot of fuel.

davebender said:

I disagree. More fuel means more airpower. A far more effective deterrent then German capital warships.

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Not if they are flying from Denmark and Holland to try to cover the German convoys coming down the coast of Norway.

davebender said:

I doubt it. Italy and France were the major naval threats at the time the KGV battleships were constructed.

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Italy yes, France was a Naval threat to England in 196-39??? in what alternate reality???

davebender said:

Unless it gets sunk by the stronger German airpower. Either way it makes no difference to the German war effort.

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Maybe it does and maybe it doesn't. The point is things don't happen in a vacuum. Eliminating all German large Ships after the Graf Spee class WILL affect the British procurement program, it will affect German operations and British operations, it will affect force allocations (more British ships in the Med in 1940-41 Mucking up the supply lines to North Africa. yes they may take more losses but since there is no German surface threat to worry about they can take more losses if it strangles the Africa Corp.in the Far east

It may mean more ships in the Far East in Dec 1941. 4 Battle ships and a carrier of Singapore rather than 2 battle ships. This doesn't affect German plans directly but may affect WW II as whole.

You have also ignored the benefit the British get in not having to use battleships as North Atlantic and North Cape convoy escorts. Several thousand tons of fuel oil per trip per ship. The Cruisers are also needed in much fewer numbers, again at a savings of over 1000 tons of fuel per trip per ship. British may be able to lay up a few of those old WW I Battleships at about 1500men per ship.

you want to take advantage of all the "Benefits" of canceling the ships and pay none of the costs to the Germans of canceling them. Some of the German admirals knew very well what a "fleet in being" was worth.

davebender said:

Building truck factories is no more difficult in Germany then in the USA.

If the Heer adopt diesel they will probably pay to expand existing Mercedes L3000A production facilities. Or perhaps the Opel Blitz will be modified to accept the Mercedes 95hp diesel truck engine. The same diesel engine could also power German half tracks.
Engines of the Red Army in WW2 - Trophy "Mercedes L3000A", 3-ton, 4x4, Cargo Truck

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Rather ignores the fact that many of the US factories already existed.

See: U.S. Automobile Production Figures - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Just for 1938 (well before the war) the top EIGHT US car makers made over 1,697,000 cars in one year.

It would also mean the British could build more anti submarine ships and man them

List of Nobel Laureates by Country - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia

Then why did Europeans receive most Nobel Prize awards during the 1930s?

davebender said:

List of Nobel Laureates by Country - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia

Then why did Europeans receive most Nobel Prize awards during the 1930s?

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How many of those NLs could fix an engine?

Then why did Europeans receive most Nobel Prize awards during the 1930s?

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you are trying to compare apples to oranges by combining all europeans Nobel prizes and attributing them all to Germany and comparing that to the United States. In the list you cite as evidence, not including peace prizes, durings the years 1930-1945 there are 12 German winners and 13 Unted States winners, hardly an overwhelming difference.


the following qoute is from National D-Day Museum sources. The bold face is my addition

Any discussion of the scientific and technological advancements during WWII must acknowledge the important developments in the field of training. It was one thing to design and build thousands of new, high-tech weapons and produce wondrous new medicines, but without people trained to use them, they would be worthless. New technologies – from moving pictures to new kinds of projectors and even simulators – allowed the military to train thousands of men and women quickly and efficiently (and formed the predecessors to modern technologies like PowerPoint presentations). At the end of the war, one frustrated Nazi general remarked that he and his fellow officers were not surprised that American industry could mobilize for war as quickly as it did. What was surprising and ultimately a major element of Germany's undoing was how quickly American industry and the American war machine could train its people

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There are way too many variables in trying to compare the top 1/10 of 1/10 of 1% of one nation to another.

America had several advantages over Germany, one was a much larger population which means, even if the people are NOT as smart on the average, it is more than likely the larger population while have more geniuses just due to numbers. I am not putting the Americans down, just pointing out how the numbers work.

The second advantage was that America, ON THE AVERAGE, was the most technically advance nation in the world. By that I mean that that the AVERAGE American was more exposed to technology than any other nation. The US had a higher percentage of cars per 100 people, a higher percentage of tractors and power driven farm machinery, more telephones, radios and other devices. Now, not every American had these things or even every other american but take 100 Americans and 100 citizens from any other nation and see which group had the most people who could drive cars, do minor repairs, had used phones or typewriters, had done more than just listen to a radio (like change a tube/valve) and so on. I am not saying they were smarter, just that they had a head start in dealing with certain mechanical and electronic devices ON AVERAGE. It does NOT mean an American machinist with 5 years experience was better than a German machinist with 5 years experience or anything like that.

The essential difference between German skilled workers and their US contemporaries was quantity not quality.

Steve

Siegfried said:

You don't get it. The German army had to destroy the Soviet Army when it had the chance in 1941 and only then turn South. It turned Sth too soon, against Halders advice, and let the Soviet army escape and recover.

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Sorry for that, not being native speaker sometimes produces misunderstandings. But anyway, Hitler wasn't fixed with oil, not at least initially. Originally Hitler had demanded more powerful northern attack towards Leningrad than what OKH had planned and Barbarossa Plan was modified accordingly. July/August he changed his mind, but that wasn't only because of economic factors, both AG North and South had run into troubles and were lagging behind, especially AG South was too weak to fulfil its main 1st phase object, the capture of Kiev. So the turning of the PzGr 2 / 2nd PzA temporarily to South had also clearly military aims and it produced the Kiev encirclement and so produced enormous losses to Soviet army. In theory using mobility of mechanized forces to deliver attack to unexpected direction and so destroying was that 3 enemy armies sounds good, but it probably wasn't worth of lost time. Germany needed Caspian oil but was it realistic to hope that they could capture the Baku oilfields in such conditions that they would have been able to utilise them in that war? IIRC Maikop oilfields were so thoroughly destroyed that Germans could not utilize them during the time they occupied them. And anyway Baku was far away from the Reich.

Juha

http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp905.pdf
Most WWII era weapons were made by unskilled workers and they became less skilled as the war continued. The above paper documents this trend for the Ju-88 aircraft program but the story was essentially similiar for other major firms such as Boeing, Daimler-Benz, Tankograd etc.

Engineers and machine tools are the critical components for mass production (plus raw materials). Germany was (and probably still is) a world leader in both areas.

Duplicate post

"A" world leader.

"THE" world leader?

If the US has twice the engineers and twice the capacity to make machine tools even if the German ones are a bit better on average the US still comes out on top.

in 1940 the population of the US was 132 million, the population of German ( including annexed Austria, Memelland, and the Sudetenland) was 80,600,000.

Look at car production,in 1938 Plymouth was the 3rd place maker of cars in the United States, and they made more cars by themselves than all 35 car companies in Germany put together. And 1938 was a bad year for the US car companies.

you seem to like things like the US Strategic bombing survey.

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Motor Vehicle Industry Report

a few observations about the side debate about overunning russia to get additional oil supplies.

1) Whilst halder intially advocated a rush on Moscow following Smolensk, after he had received the situatiuon reports on the supply situations, the aircraft readiness rates, the positions of the German supply heads, and above all the fitness rates of the german infantry, he realized that a "dash" on Moscow was virtually imppossible. All except 2 pz were down to about 40% effectiveness rates....a report by the chief inspector of the infantry forces states they needed 6 weeks for the troops and equipment to recover. The decision to send 2 pz south was the first signs of desperation by the germans, as ther supply lines were being harassed already by bypassed elements of the soviet army, who were receiveing some supply from Sth Front HQ. AGS was by this stage in deep trouble, virtually stalled and unable to cross the Dnieper. Hitler, always impulsive, wanted to at least do something, whilst Halder and most of the gerneral Staff, now realizing that a quick dash for moscow was impossible, favoured a period of rest and recovery, followed by a renewed ofensive effort. I actually think Hitler was more correct on this ocasion than halder. halders approach would almost certainly have seen AGS stalled and defeated in front of kiev, which would place germany's oils resourcess (the Ploesti Oil Fields) at great risk. A meat grinder in front of Kiev would have forced a dissipation of effort from AGC and AGN anyway, but with the soviets a million men stronger than they were , and with the AGC principal supply line under increasing threat from effectively supplied partisans

3) The germans were never going to capture the oilfields in the Trans-Caucasus in operational condition. The oilfields around Maikop that were captured were so comprehensively sabotaged that in the context of the war they would never be returned to operations. A report undertaken by the germans estimated that even with 40% of AGS supply trains diverted to the reconstruction effort, meaningful production would not be achieved until May 1944 at the earliest. The rreport further stated that no effective means existed to get the oil back to germany without severely compromising the military situation on the Eastern front as a whole.

There was never the slightest possibility of the germans returning any of the fields they did capture to anything like useful production for the duration of the war.

davebender said:

http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp905.pdf
Most WWII era weapons were made by unskilled workers and they became less skilled as the war continued.

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That is true but with qualification. You still need skilled workers(toolmakers,engineers etc) but much assembly can be,and was,done by less skilled people. You still have to have people available (one British manufacturer complained about having to use "infirm" workers in its factory) and they still need some training.
Someone had to show "Rosie the riveter" how to rivet.
A member of my own family went from serving in a shop to sewing the fabric on the control surfaces of Spitfires. Not a particularly "skilled" job but one that required training nonetheless.
Steve

Fuel shortages were not an immediate issue in the first 2 years of hostilities only failure to capture the oil rich areas of russia and romania prompted and accelerated the problem.In hindsight knowing what transpired on the Eastern front and after failure to win the skies over the channel thus scuppering an invasion of britain and if a looming shortage of fuel was becoming apparent i would have turned south through spain and portugal joining up with and massively re-enforcing Rommels victorious afrika corp.Then after capturing all the strategically important mediterranian ports and middle eastern oil fields and capturing control of the suez canal thereby cutting all allied means of re-supply.Now with a plentiful supply of fuel and with the allied means of resistance totally eliminated a very different warpath becomes clear.JUST A THEORY !

war eagle said:

Rommels victorious afrika corp.

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When was that then?
It never achieved its objectives,unless you count preventing the ejection of Germany's axis allies from Africa as the ultimate aim,and ended up being comprehensively defeated. The second battle of El Alamein took place more than a year AFTER the launch of "Barbarossa". Where were the resources to come from to bolster the Afrika Korps?
The Royal navy might have had something to say about "capturing all the strategically important Mediterranean ports." The Germans never even subdued Malta!
Steve

Then after capturing all the strategically important mediterranian ports and middle eastern oil fields

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The Germans tried maintaining an army a thousand miles from their main port in Tripoli. They failed.

To take the ME oil fields they would first need to succeed in capturing Egypt. Then they'd have to take Palestine. Then they'd have to march their army another thousand miles across the desert to Iraq and Kuwait. Again operating a thousand miles from their base, they'd have to defeat the British forces there. Having done that they'd have to restore production, then take all the oil back across a thousand miles of desert.

It's just not doable. To have access to ME oil the Germans would need to control the sea routes to the Persian Gulf. They simply didn't have the naval forces (or bases) to do that.

Similar difficulties arise with 'oh we will take the ME oilfields" school. Firstly, as indicated above there is the problem of actually capturing the oilfields, but not that, the ports to carry them. Suez has to be captured, intact, and a safe route for tanker traffic established....requiring reconquest of Abysinnia and most of Arabian peninsula. The oilfields have to be captured intact, the port capacities rebuilt and the tanker capacity found. It might be possible to build a pipleline to the med, but this would have taken years, and still does not gurantee the supply line.

Capture and use of Middle eastern oil is another pipe dream in the context of a wartime environment for germany. Even more remote than the possibility of using Soviet sources

That's not surprising since the Wehrmacht had few combat aircraft or motor vehicles during 1939. By 1941 German military production had increased enough to cause fuel shortages. Those shortages should have been predictable.