Stretching German Gasoline Supply.

[bobbysocks]

like norab said, extreme cold temps cause diesel to gel. you need special additives to prevent that from happening. with the war being fought in some of the coldest weather in russia and europe...and with the supply lines being strained or cut...you would be hard pressed to keep diesels in action.

 

[tyrodtom]

Don't forget the T-34 had a diesel engine, so operating one in subzero weather can be done.

I know from experience with coal trucks, you can let them idle for hours, and they use very little fuel at idle, unlike a gas engine.

 

[Milosh]

The Russians somehow kept their tanks running despite the cold.

Syscom3 posted some pdf files on German fuel production. http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/german-oil-industry-ww2-analysis-report-15567.html

 

[Siegfried]

Where did German Diesel come from? Surely it came from the same oil plants that provided them with petrol?


Hydrogenation plants are very large targets, just ripe for aerial attack. It would take susained attacks to disable the plants, as was the case historically. Also, the transportation of coal to the plant is another area where the plants are vulnerable. Disruption to the coal supply through attacks on the transportation industry would also restrict the output of the hydrogenation plants.

Perhaps teh best method would have been to purchase larger quantities of fuel in the years leading up to war, creating a larger stockpile.

There were several types of synthetic fuel plant.

Firstly the Bergius hydrogenation plants, these pressurised a slurry of oil-coal with hydrogen at 700 atmospheres. The alloys and compressors developed were quite a technical achievement.

This distilled product of this process produced both diesel and gasoline of about 77 octane that was upgraded with TEL to B4 87 octane.

These were the main type of plant; they required rather a great deal of steel. The heavy steel used tended to make them bomb resistant however the syn gas plant that produced hydrogen via water gas shift reaction was vulnerable.

Secondly there were the Fischer-Tropsch plants, these produced ammonia via the Haber-Bosch process that was used to de-sulphurise the syngas. Coal was converted to syngas via passing steam and oxygen over it. It was de-sulphurised with ammonia then passed over catalysts. Iron for gasoline like products and cobalt for diesel. Gasoline product was essentially useless because of its low octane rating of around 45 RON. These plants were mainly used to produce chemical feedstocks. However the FT process tends to produce long linear chains and made an excellent diesel with a very high cetane rating. (A high cetane rating means the diesel will ignite easily but burn nice and slow). The cetane rating was rather too high and often the fuel did not complete combustion so it was generally blended with the inferior diesel from the Bergius hydrogenation plant.

Towards the end of the war Uranium based catalysts that produced good grade gasoline fuel were in a laboratory stage.

Thirdly there was the coal pyrolysis or Kerrick process where coal is heated and steamed to remove the volatile oils and tars for processing into fuel. It was used where heavy metal contamination of the coals was considered to expensive to remove due to its catalyst spoiling effects.

The Japanese also used the above process. Yields can be quite good. The Japanese received German help in the other processes but never succeeded since they never built a preliminary pilot plant and so their plants were so unreliable they never managed to clean up the mess.

Fourthly they had a process that synthesised iso-octane. Syngas was passed over chromium catalysts to produce butanol, this was dehydrated over aluminium chloride to n and iso-butylene which was then polymerised to iso-octane. 22% iso-octane added to B4 made C3.

The butylene was required for making n-Buna synthetic rubber and this seriously hampered production of high octane C3 aviation fuel and cost the Germans quite a bit of engine power.

To supplement or replace the synthetic iso-octane alkylation plants were started in 1940. This is the process the British used to make their 100/130. One was completed in 1943 but most weren't finished. Synthetic polymerisation plants remained the main process, more started coming on line anyway however the allied oil campaign of 1944 seems to have dashed German hopes of a smooth introduction of a new generation of powerful new engines.

The Friction Modification waxes the Germans came up with to solve their lubrication problems on the Russian front were seminal in the development of modern lubricants.

The USA used something called catalytic cracking via the Houdry regenerative catalyst. It made possible 100 octane fuel. The RON ratio was probably 100/120 or 100/125. US fuel shipments to Britain didn't initially meet RAF's 100/130 rich mixture response requirement. The US was more interested in producing lightweight powerfull engines for economic high speed cruise than a quick dash.

The Germans were always trying to improve their process and were on the cusp of major advances built around new catalysts and fluidised bed reactors that were promising major improvements in yields. fischer-tropsch.org has details if you have lots of time. There are microfilm based pdf and many are not ocr

Getting the coal out of the ground was also a problem even with miners getting extra rations and exempt from the draft.

 

[Juha]

Don't forget the T-34 had a diesel engine, so operating one in subzero weather can be done.

I know from experience with coal trucks, you can let them idle for hours, and they use very little fuel at idle, unlike a gas engine.

Yes, but one had to know how. Russian knew the tricks, Germans didn't at first, so during the winter 41/42 they were in deep trouble whether they used petrol or diesel and as bobbysocks wrote, normal diesel became rather unuseable in subzero enviroment.

Juha

 

[Siegfried]

Yes, but one had to know how. Russian knew the tricks, Germans didn't at first, so during the winter 41/42 they were in deep trouble whether they used petrol or diesel and as bobbysocks wrote, normal diesel became rather unuseable in subzero enviroment.

Juha

In many cases they used lubricant oils derived from marine mamals eg Whales and Seals not really available to the Germans, particularly important for guns. I think its fairly well known that you reformulate diesels for winter and add gasoline to sump lubricants to start an engine. Parts of Eastern Germany do get -40C; that is serious cold. There was little time to prepare for Barabarossa, I spoke to a German machine gunner (now deceased) who told me that he ended up on the cold Russian front in still in his summer uniform from France. One day he was getting out of a tent eating fresh snails that were crawling by (they had to be a certain type), a few days latter his urine was solid ice as it hit the snow. Apart from some silly mistakes like de lanolising wool to make lightweight garments the Germans knew what to do, in general they just didn't prepare enough. Few Ju 52's were equiped with winter pre-heating equipment for instance.

 

[Shortround6]

I agree. However it was fuel efficient which would make it look more attractive in this scenerio.

Fuel efficiency should not be the primary criteria of a fighter plane. The He 100 was fast, it was fuel efficient it had good climb. It was lacking in fire power, turn radius, load carrying ability and was more vulnerable to minor caliber gunfire than most other designs.

 

[Juha]

In many cases they used lubricant oils derived from marine mamals eg Whales and Seals not really available to the Germans, particularly important for guns.

Finns managed with fuels and oil products imported from west, and it was/is very cold up here during the winters.

I think its fairly well known that you reformulate diesels for winter and add gasoline to sump lubricants to start an engine.

IIRC Germans learned at least the diluting the motor oils with gasoline from Russians during the winter 41/42

Parts of Eastern Germany do get -40C; that is serious cold.

For what I have read troops from Eastern Prussian knew few tricks how to manage in subzeroenviroment, but for some reason this knowledge hadn't spread to the rest of Heer. Finns had to improvise crash courses to Germans on the basic skills of survival in subzero enviroment during the winter 41/42.

...a few days latter his urine was solid ice as it hit the snow.

IMHO that is an overstatement

Apart from some silly mistakes like de lanolising wool to make lightweight garments the Germans knew what to do, in general they just didn't prepare enough.

IMHO that is also an overstatement, there were lot of mistakes for ex. many machine gunners didn't know how to use oil in their mgs in subzero enviroment, how to warm engine before trying to start it. Even how to survive a night watch/sentry turn without frosbites etc

Few Ju 52's were equiped with winter pre-heating equipment for instance.

LW was much better prepared for winter than Heer.

Juha

 

[Siegfried]

Shortage of high octane gasoline was the single greatest obstacle to Luftwaffe effectiveness. Historically Goering recognized this to some extent with the largest synthetic fuel program in history. However the historical German efforts were inadequate for fighting a protracted war.

What might Goering have done differently as head of the German economic plan?

My ideas…..

Build two additional large hydrogenation plants. Theoretically Germany could produce an unlimited supply of synthetic gasoline from their bottomless supply of coal. However these plants were expensive to build and operate so two are probably the practical limit. This will significantly increase the aviation gasoline supply but it won't solve the entire problem. Germany must find other ways to reduce dependence upon gasoline.

German Army adopts diesel engines en mass for trucks, half tracks, field generators etc. This will make Daimler-Benz happy as they were the world leader for diesel truck engines during the 1930s. More importantly, diesel engines are inherently more fuel efficient then gasoline engines so the existing supply of petroleum will go further. This frees up a bit of low octane gasoline suitable for use in primary training aircraft.

Aerodynamics to lower drag and thereby increase fuel mileage becomes a major criterion to determine which aircraft enter mass production. Light weight also becomes more important. He-100 is likely to be an early beneficiary. So will the DB603 engine, at the expense of the large and heavy BMW801 radial.

Development of diesel aircraft engines receives the highest priority. Perhaps they will be suitable for transport aircraft and heavy bombers. Any 4 engine aircraft that doesn't use diesel engines is unlikely to be approved for mass production. The 26 liter Jumo 208 aircraft diesel program starts in 1936 (3 years earlier then historical) and is pushed to completion (if it works). I suspect Daimler-Benz would also compete for the aircraft diesel contract. If one of these powerful aircraft diesel engines works they will power the He-177B heavy bomber (4 engines). Otherwise the He-177 program will be shelved in favor of a DB603 powered Do-217.

Jet engines use low octane fuel so jet engine development receives the highest priority. The Jumo 004A engine will enter mass production during 1943.

What are your ideas for reducing the German aviation gasoline shortage?

I think there might be several ways though I suspect the Germans had already considered some of them and did the best they could.

Firstly they might try and improve the efficiency of high octane aviation gasoline production. Making C3 was apparently 30% more expensive than 87 octane B4. The alkylation process the allies used might have helped here and such plants were started in 1940 so for some reason the Germans made a belated start. As it was German engines performed superbly on ordinary 87 octane aviation fuel though they were still disadvantaged.

Diesel, Kerosene and Jet fuel is relatively easy to make in the smaller fisher-tropsch plants (which were unable to make gasoline in any significant way at that time) as well as the bigger Bergius hydrogenation plants will make good gasoline and diesel.

This suggests:
1 Diesels which are however heavier and more expensive.

2 Hesselman spark ignition engines these run of diesel and/or kerosene but are easier to make than diesels though not as efficient. Hesselman engines were widely used in prewar Swedden and in 1960 Saab produce a few hundred cars designed to run of Fischer-Tropsch Kerosene.

3 Gas turbines, in fact the Anthony Kay book "German Gas Turbines and Jet engines 1932-1945" covers a multitude of these that were under development for ships, patrol boats, locomotives and tanks. AFAIKT a scaled down BMW 003 known as the GT100 was built and tested on a Panther tank It used direct drive with an automatically clutched two stage gearbox. It was noted that the direct drive gave enormous engine braking force. GT101 was to have a separate power turbine and GT102 a ceramic heat exchanger recuperator.

I would say the Germans need to treble fuel production. They need to double it for themselves and provide what they were producing again for their Italian colleagues.

German production of oil was about 15-20 million tons per year from all sources compared to over 220 million of the US alone. To do that they need major investment or greatly improved efficiency.

This was an energy war, had the Germans managed to capture, hold and exploit the Caucuses oil fields they would have had all the energy they needed. Ironically this involves Hitler following Halders advice and taking Moscow and destroying the Soviet Army rather than turning Sth and heading for those oil fields and the granary that was the Ukraine.

At the end of the war the Germans initiated the Geilenberg Plan of disperse mini plants and at least one bomb proof underground plant.

Speer had eschewed building bomb hardened plant as he had calculated that it was better to devote resources to winning a short term were than dedicated them to fighting a long term war not in Germany's favour.

In general I think your ideas are good and would have been achievable. Two additonal hydrogenation plants means 33% more production. The mass production of the DB603 by or before 1942 would have been critical. It saved fuel by providing 1750hp without high octane gasoline or it provided 1900hp with high octane gasoline (DB603G). BMW801, running of B4 would still have been usefull eg for the various transports such as the Ar 234 or Me 323.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Heinkel jet engines were designed to burn Kerosene. That was a huge plus, regarding the fuel situation...

 

[stona]

It is perfectly possible for urine to freeze "en route" to the snow if the air is cold enough. I was working,in Canada,many years ago,in some God forsaken town who's name I have forgotten. It was as cold as I have ever experienced in my life! A local stage hand showed me a party trick whereby he threw a cup of warm water (not cold) into the air which almost instantly froze into a sort of snow.
Cheers
Steve

 

[mhuxt]

Betcha there weren't snails crawling across that ground a few days prior though.

 

[Juha]

It is perfectly possible for urine to freeze "en route" to the snow if the air is cold enough. I was working,in Canada,many years ago,in some God forsaken town who's name I have forgotten. It was as cold as I have ever experienced in my life! A local stage hand showed me a party trick whereby he threw a cup of warm water (not cold) into the air which almost instantly froze into a sort of snow.
Cheers
Steve

I definitely have urined at -32deg C, and the urine was fluid all the way down to snow, did I urine at appr -45deg C, which is coldest I have experienced in wilderness, I cannot recall.

Juha

 

[Juha]

...had the Germans managed to capture, hold and exploit the Caucuses oil fields they would have had all the energy they needed. Ironically this involves Hitler following Halders advice and taking Moscow and destroying the Soviet Army rather than turning Sth and heading for those oil fields and the granary that was the Ukraine...

Now what you think AG South and PzGroup 1/1. PzA were doing in Ukraine in 1941, they got to Rostov, the gateway to Caucasus, but were then pushed some way back by Soviet counter-attacks. Hitler did another try in 42 but messed up that try with well-known consequences.

Juha

 

[davebender]

Historical German fuel production peaked during early 1944.

Annual production in tons.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/MofFP/ger_syn_ind/mof-secta.pdf
1,950,000. Aviation fuel. Almost entirely from hydrogenation.
1,595,000. Diesel.
1,145,000. Motor fuel.
1,110,000. Fuel Oil.
840,000. Lubricating oil.
290,000. Misc.

Gelsenberg Hydrogenation Plant. RM 208 million to build during 1939.
.....400,000 tons of aviation gasoline per year.
.....460,000 tons of motor fuel per year.

5 additional Gelsenberg size plants to double production @ a cost of about RM 1 billion.
Tripling production would require 10 plants @ a cost of about RM 2 billion.

As already noted, these plants require a lot of steel to build in addition to the high construction cost. The only way to obtain steel and money in that quantity without derailing the civilian economy would be to cancel construction of battleships, aircraft carriers and heavy cruisers. Personally I think that would be a great thing but it would require a change of German naval leadership during 1935.

 

[Milosh]

Don't know the source.

 

[davebender]

That doesn't help unless we also know gasoline requirements. I don't have that information but shortage of fuel is a common topic in most first hand accounts of German pilot training from 1941 onward. So the fuel shortage wasn't just a late war problem. You can bet the fuel shortage also had a lot to do with the Heer procuring so few motor vehicles. More 3 ton cargo trucks won't help without more fuel.

 

[Siegfried]

Now what you think AG South and PzGroup 1/1. PzA were doing in Ukraine in 1941, they got to Rostov, the gateway to Caucasus, but were then pushed some way back by Soviet counter-attacks. Hitler did another try in 42 but messed up that try with well-known consequences.

Juha

You don't get it. The German army had to destroy the Soviet Army when it had the chance in 1941 and only then turn South. It turned Sth too soon, against Halders advice, and let the Soviet army escape and recover.

 

[Shortround6]

The only ships that could be canceled without affecting the war much would be the Graf Zeppelin and Seydlitz. Is that enough steel?

Cutting theScharnhorst and Gneisenau and a couple of the Hipper class cruisers means no invasion of Norway. It means unmolested Convoys to Murmansk. It means the British CAN interfere with the Swedish ore shipments more than was done historically. The Lutzow was sold to Russia for raw materials.

It means the British don't have to build as Many KG V battleships and modern cruisers. Freeing up money (and steel) for more British aircraft and tanks.

No Bismark and Tirpitz means the Hood lasts longer. It means the British save 10s of thousands of tons of fuel oil. It means the RAF does something else with dozens or scores of bomb raids. It may mean no "X" class submarines

The German heavy ships caused the British (and the allies) lots of trouble, effort and money even if their combat results don't show very well on a "score board".

German truck production may not have been all that great because the factories needed to build LARGE quantities of trucks never existed. Private ownership of cars and trucks in Germany prewar was not as high as in some other countries although far ahead of most/all of eastern Europe or southern Europe.
America had factories that each could make 10s of thousand of cars/light trucks of a single model per year.

 

[stona]

Fuel has a shelf life, unfortunately. You cannot store the same fuel for years, so large stockpiles only make a sense up to a certain point.

I am not sure though it is same case with crude oil...

You can certainly store large quantities of oil. We did.

BBC News - Return to Highlands' Inchindown secret tunnels

Steve