Escuadrilla Azul
Tech Sergeant
- 1,802
- Feb 27, 2020
That is a serious effort on your part.
Please, keep us informes about that proyecto. A bunch here are surely interesting in buying that book (or books)
A look at German fighter Ace kill claims
- Thread starter RCAFson
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Please, keep us informes about that proyecto. A bunch here are surely interesting in buying that book (or books)
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 912
- Sep 30, 2021
Allied combat air commands in Britain 1941 to 1943, 2nd Tactical Air Force, Army Co-Operation, Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands, Fighter Command mostly 10, 11 and 12 Group. 8th Air Force, 9th Air Force.
Any number of daily/weekly/monthly/annual reports in the archives, with overlapping statistics and different measuring criteria, night and day missions versus night, dawn, day and dusk missions. Given the British have made available online the squadron level records it sounds like an attempt to build up rather than locate the higher level reports and then use the lower level reports to add detail. Many RAF squadron records do not record serial numbers or alternatively individual letters.
Air 14/3364 picture 30, 59, 60
AIR 16/1036 picture 52, 206
AIR 22/307 picture 12
Richard Davis bombing spreadsheets have only a summary for 1941, then cover 2 Group operations to end May 1943 but can exclude missions where "nothing happened".
Mighty Eighth War Diary is not a great read, lots of data though.
Fighter Command Losses by Franks, use as a guide.
Bomber Command War Diaries, Middlebrook and Everitt
Fighter Command War Diaries John Foreman
RAF Fighter Command Victory Claims John Foreman
JG26 book, what I find interesting is what is not reported, even though it is obvious RAF records were consulted. One of the good stories is when Galland after picking up food and drink for a party detours via England where he shoots at three Spitfires, one "explodes", one "goes down in flames" and for the third the results are not clear, Galland then flies back to France to present the food. Looking at the RAF records indicates all three aircraft were hit, landed, and were repaired. (15 April 1941)
On 23 December 1944 JG26 hit a Lancaster formation, claiming 5 Lancasters and one Mosquito, and Caldwell states "The RAF raid was a complete disaster" Bomber Command war diaries confirms the claims tally but 2 were the result of a collision before the French coast, and flak played a hand in at least three of the other losses. The cloud had cleared so Oboe with its long straight bomb run could not be used, one Lancaster did not receive the message and used Oboe, with predictable results. JG26 is over credited here.
All in all if Caldwell mentions RAF losses he is usually right as far as numbers are concerned but not always right in attributing them by cause of loss.
Any number of daily/weekly/monthly/annual reports in the archives, with overlapping statistics and different measuring criteria, night and day missions versus night, dawn, day and dusk missions. Given the British have made available online the squadron level records it sounds like an attempt to build up rather than locate the higher level reports and then use the lower level reports to add detail. Many RAF squadron records do not record serial numbers or alternatively individual letters.
Air 14/3364 picture 30, 59, 60
AIR 16/1036 picture 52, 206
AIR 22/307 picture 12
Richard Davis bombing spreadsheets have only a summary for 1941, then cover 2 Group operations to end May 1943 but can exclude missions where "nothing happened".
Mighty Eighth War Diary is not a great read, lots of data though.
Fighter Command Losses by Franks, use as a guide.
Bomber Command War Diaries, Middlebrook and Everitt
Fighter Command War Diaries John Foreman
RAF Fighter Command Victory Claims John Foreman
JG26 book, what I find interesting is what is not reported, even though it is obvious RAF records were consulted. One of the good stories is when Galland after picking up food and drink for a party detours via England where he shoots at three Spitfires, one "explodes", one "goes down in flames" and for the third the results are not clear, Galland then flies back to France to present the food. Looking at the RAF records indicates all three aircraft were hit, landed, and were repaired. (15 April 1941)
On 23 December 1944 JG26 hit a Lancaster formation, claiming 5 Lancasters and one Mosquito, and Caldwell states "The RAF raid was a complete disaster" Bomber Command war diaries confirms the claims tally but 2 were the result of a collision before the French coast, and flak played a hand in at least three of the other losses. The cloud had cleared so Oboe with its long straight bomb run could not be used, one Lancaster did not receive the message and used Oboe, with predictable results. JG26 is over credited here.
All in all if Caldwell mentions RAF losses he is usually right as far as numbers are concerned but not always right in attributing them by cause of loss.
Attachments
I wouldn't see that at least most of these gentlemen's fates as having depended on telling the truth. Alksnis' fate was due being Latvian. A victim of one of those persecutions against nationalities. Two were victims of the purges of Baltic military district and in Baltic states in general, tens of thousands of Baltics were deported to Siberia just before the start of Operation Barbarossa. Could also be behind Smushkevich's fate, he was Lithuanian. Novikov, on the other hand, probably had to suffer, like Zhukov, from the "re-disciplining" of the soldiers, because the party was afraid that the heroes of the GPW (Great Patriotic War) had become too powerful. IIRC Zhukov being accused of "Bonabartism", the leaders of the USSR remembered well how the French Revolution had turned out.Your logic is perfect - for the system based on the logic. For VVS and the Soviet military in general your logic can be applied to some periods but not to others.
Imagine this situation: the sentence for sabotage is probably death but the sentence for reporting the truth is certainly death.
Imagine that you saw how your boss was taken out of the office by NKVD and disappeared.
(Just five examples from thousands)
Yakov Alksnis - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Aleksandr Loktionov - Wikipedia
Yakov Smushkevich - Wikipedia
Pavel Rychagov - Wikipedia
Or he was shot by a firing squad after a quick conversation with a Member of the War Council whom Stavka sent to the front lines to stop the panic and turn things around.
Alexander Novikov - Wikipedia
I mentioned those five officers because I said earlier this: "Imagine that you saw how your boss was taken out of the office by NKVD and disappeared." (sorry for self-quote). And those are just five from the very top of VVS. There were many others - and thousands and thousands of their subordinates who learned the lesson.
(As for the reasons for the arrests of VVS commanders, - this is another topic.)
Why I like this forum and keep it in my top bookmarks - by studying something new I understand the limitations of my knowledge and take (again and again in my life) a lesson of humility.
"As our circle of knowledge expands, so does the circumference of darkness surrounding it."
Hopefully, young and eager historians will take this lesson as well. But it takes time, we know.
Good thread. Over and out.
"As our circle of knowledge expands, so does the circumference of darkness surrounding it."
Hopefully, young and eager historians will take this lesson as well. But it takes time, we know.
Good thread. Over and out.
After 1918-22 Red Terror there had been many purges incl. series of show trials against engineers and technicians in 20s and early 30s. These caused a lot of insecurity among the Soviet citizens, especially since becoming targeted by terror seemed unpredictable. After the arrests and executions of Tukhatsevsky and his partners in 1937, it was clear that the officer corps was by no means a safe from terror. But in my opinion, and this is just an educated guess, not a scientific oppinion, the vast majority of officers thought that the best way to try to survive in a dangerous and unpredictable environment was to follow orders and instructions to the letter.
The Red Army was not a loss-minimizing organization. Its values were much in line with Trotsky's statements such as "The Red Army does not count its fallen". However, this mainly concerned infantry and cavalry, which were easy to replace at first. However, even USSR's human resources had its limits and the large-scale waste of men was no longer viewed favorably from the second half of 1943 onwards. Pilots were of course a bit different, they were specialists and so more difficult to replace and aircraft were more difficult to replace than infantry equipment. However, the VVS KA was not very worried about combat losses, as I understand it, like the British, for example, as was seen for example in the AVM Stevenson's/2 Group's anti-shipping Channel Stop campaign, which produced very heavy losses but rather meager results. That's why I doubt that someone would have started to cover up their combat losses, especially since one could quite easily exaggerate the air victories achieved and thus make the results of the battles look better.
In my opinion, the biggest disadvantage of the Kafka-like atmosphere in the USSR for warfare was the great reduction of initiative. This also started to decrease sometime in 1942/43 when the atmosphere improved. In the USSR, the situation developed in the opposite way to that in Germany. After causing a series of military disasters, Stalin began to listen to his generals and the war management became more professional. E.g. the system of political commissars was abolished in August 1942 and political officiers were subordinated to unit/ formation commanders.
The Red Army was not a loss-minimizing organization. Its values were much in line with Trotsky's statements such as "The Red Army does not count its fallen". However, this mainly concerned infantry and cavalry, which were easy to replace at first. However, even USSR's human resources had its limits and the large-scale waste of men was no longer viewed favorably from the second half of 1943 onwards. Pilots were of course a bit different, they were specialists and so more difficult to replace and aircraft were more difficult to replace than infantry equipment. However, the VVS KA was not very worried about combat losses, as I understand it, like the British, for example, as was seen for example in the AVM Stevenson's/2 Group's anti-shipping Channel Stop campaign, which produced very heavy losses but rather meager results. That's why I doubt that someone would have started to cover up their combat losses, especially since one could quite easily exaggerate the air victories achieved and thus make the results of the battles look better.
In my opinion, the biggest disadvantage of the Kafka-like atmosphere in the USSR for warfare was the great reduction of initiative. This also started to decrease sometime in 1942/43 when the atmosphere improved. In the USSR, the situation developed in the opposite way to that in Germany. After causing a series of military disasters, Stalin began to listen to his generals and the war management became more professional. E.g. the system of political commissars was abolished in August 1942 and political officiers were subordinated to unit/ formation commanders.
