Stretching German Gasoline Supply.

[stona]

That's not surprising since the Wehrmacht had few combat aircraft or motor vehicles during 1939. By 1941 German military production had increased enough to cause fuel shortages. Those shortages should have been predictable.

I don't know about motor vehicles but your staement is incorrect regarding combat aircraft.

In 1939 the luftwaffe had 2,916 combat aircraft,out of the 2,950 "authorised" (98.9%).

In June 1941 it had slightly more,3,451 (81.6% of the 4,228 authorised)

By March 1942 the Luftwaffe actually had LESS combat aircraft than in 1939,only 2,876 ( 62.2% of the 4,623 authorised).

If you include operational ready rates the picture is even worse. For example,in December 1941 the bomber force only possessed 47.1% of its authorised strength. Only 51% of that force was in commission. This means that from an authorised strength of 1,950 bombers only 468 were in commission in December 1941. This represents a mere 24% of authorised aircraft!

I'm not sure where your argument is going,but this is sure a sh*t one of the reasons that Germany lost the war.

These maybe boring facts and statistics but that's the best way we have,seventy years later,of establishing what really happened rather than making assumptions about aircraft numbers and fuel consumption.

Steve

 

[parsifal]

Similar arguments arise for motor vehicles. Germany entered the war with over 750000 motor vehicles from memory. by June 1941 that figure had slumped to 550000 and by June 1944 to less than 200000.

The reasons for German fuel shortages in 1942 was due mostly to the levels of activity.....offensive activity sucks out more fuel than defensive activities, and 1941-1942 were the years of offensives for the germans. There was a slight pause in 1943, which led to a slight improvement of fuel stocks, and then a plummet to the bottom of the ocean in 1944, as allied offensives strangled the reich of its fuel supplies

 

[Siegfried]

I don't know about motor vehicles but your staement is incorrect regarding combat aircraft.

In 1939 the luftwaffe had 2,916 combat aircraft,out of the 2,950 "authorised" (98.9%).

In June 1941 it had slightly more,3,451 (81.6% of the 4,228 authorised)

Your claim that the defeat of Germany does not lie on fuel shortages is based upon the assumption that as actual strength of the Luftwaffe did not match authorized strength and so their fuel consumption would have been below planed. This shortfall may be due to losses, or it may be due to planed production shortfalls.

However, the reality would seem to be that even IF they had the larger numbers they would not have been able to generate an increased number of missions as there WAS a shortage of fuel.

The Role of Synthetic Fuel In World War II Germany
As a highly developed industrial state, Germany was dependent even in peacetime on external sources for an adequate supply of oil. Even though Germany's 1938 oil consumption of little more than 44 million barrels was considerably less than Great Britain's 76 million barrels, Russia's 183 million barrels, and the one billion barrels used by the United States, in wartime Germany's needs for an adequate supply of liquid fuel would be absolutely essential for successful military operations on the ground and, even more so, in the air.1 For Germany, it was precisely the outbreak of the war in 1939 and the concurrent termination of overseas imports that most endangered its ability to conduct mobile warfare.

German oil supplies came from three different sources: imports of crude and finished petroleum products from abroad, production by domestic oil fields, and syntheses of petroleum products from coal.

In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels), this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them.2

At the outbreak of the war, Germany's stockpiles of fuel consisted of a total of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added another 5 million barrels in booty, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941. Yet a High Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels and imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941. The 26 percent shortfall could only be made up with petroleum from Russia. The need to provide the lacking 1.9 million barrels per month and the urgency to gain possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus mountains, together with Ukrainian grain and Donets coal, were thus supposedly prime elements in the German decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941

 

[stona]

Your claim that the defeat of Germany does not lie on fuel shortages is based upon the assumption that as actual strength of the Luftwaffe did not match authorized strength and so their fuel consumption would have been below planed. [/I]

I claim no such thing. A lack of fuel was a critical factor in the defeat of Germany.

I didn't say that a decrease in the number of available combat aircraft resulted in the use of less fuel than planned. I don't even know what the planned fuel consumption for the Luftwaffe at various times was and certainly can't be bothered to spend a day trying to find out! I'm sure that the OKL planners worked on actual rather than authorised numbers and I know that they would have been aware of the various units operational ready rates,that's how we know today.

The Luftwaffe strength being less than authorised is obviously due to production shortfalls,production was not covering losses,another one of the many reasons that Germany lost the war.
In 1939 Germany produced 1,856 fighters and 2,877 bombers. In 1941 it produced 3,732 fighters and 4,350 bombers. Despite this increase in production it started operations in 1942 with less aircraft than it had in 1940. Another thread might discuss who was to blame. Much responsibility lies with Udet but Goering,Jeschonnek and many others must shoulder some of the responsibility too.

The appalling operational ready rates are harder to explain but must be at least partly due to a lack of preparation for a long conflict,a lack of spare parts,personnel,facilities for example. Also a lot of poor or muddled planning. Yet another reason that Germany lost the war.

I did say that the statement that the Germans had more aircraft in 1941-2 than in 1939 was incorrect. I posted the figures above (#61).

I also implied that the fact that Germany had far less combat aircraft in commission by 1942 than in 1939 (unlike her Western adversaries,don't know about the USSR without checking) was a factor in her eventual defeat and it certainly was.

I was interested to see how much importation was reduced by the (principally) British blockade. A reduction of 5 million barrels must have hurt.I often see it argued that the blockade had a minimal effect on the German war effort.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Siegfried]

One of the achievements of the Hitler since taking office in 1934 to 1939 was an increase in automobile production from 44,000 per year to 250,000 year. That is no chump change, the Germans certainly knew how to design and produce motor cars and trucks. The expansion is somewhat belated in comparison to the US however its worth considering that Germans invented the Otto cycle (4 stroke engine), invented the Diesel, invented high speed diesel injection (Robert Bosch) and invented the automobile (Daimler) and the high speed 4 stroke they even invented the woman driver when Emma Daimler had an argument with Gotlieb and took their child in the car to her mother.

1 Germany had a dense network of rail for urban and interurban transport and so was not reliant on the automobile.
2 Germany had coal but not oil, trains can run of coal or electricity.
3 The use of rail in transport of logistical supplies to the Soviet Union was essential as the unpaved roads turned into a quagmire for much of the year. One might have imagine 6x6 trucks but doing the job but because of the slowness of negotiating inadequate roads and the high fuel consumption of all wheel driving it would be a very expensive proposition. These were not commercial truck routes.

As for the delayed expansion of the German automobile industry into mass production that is easy to understand. In 1914 Germany was 15% of world GDP slightly ahead of Britain with 14%. Germany was an economic dynamo, Kaiser Wilhelm II plans for expansion rested on the Berlin Baghdad railway which was to exit into the Gulf of Persia at a purpose built port in what is now the British created Kingdom of Kuwait. The idea was to modernise the Turkish empire and the Arabs of the middle east to western levels. Laurence of Arabia and British gave the world Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and the Israel/Palestine abomination and created Kuwait to prevent the port.

After WW1 the treaty of Versailles
1 Scheduled reparation payments scheduled to 1988, not only for damages but they counted allied widows pensions and the lost incomes of fallen allied soldiers.
2 Prevented Austria and Germany from having a free trade zone amongst themselves.
3 Forced Germany to accept Allied goods without tariffs but applied tariffs on German exports.
4 Removed nearly 4 million ethnic Sudden Germans from the bordering Germany, forced them into Czechoslovakia, a country with 20% the population of Germany but almost its area where due to gerrymandering not one single ethnic German was ever elected to federal parliament. This was a economically dynamic people and heavily industrialized.
5 Several hundred thousand ethnic Germans lost private land in Poland and had to leave. Millions of Germans in land bordering Poland was removed.
6 The French marched into the Rhineland, tool control of the mines, and exported all the coal at a time there was a fuel shortage in Germany. (this leads to deaths in Europe, many on these news groups will be old enough to remember deaths of retirees, children or workers with pneumonia)

Essentially Germany was squeezed into semi-poverty and no concessions were given. Its why Hitler came to power, he was the only politician that was effective. Every German Democratically elected Chancellor was completely rejected and humiliated by the allies and France. The one prior to Hitler had rotten vegetables thrown at him in 1932 when he came back from his failed mission in France, which is why he lost.

In these circumstances one can certainly see why the German automotive industry did not take off sooner.

As far as reliabillity goes. Tanks like the Panther were very efficient to produce in terms of man hours more so than the lighter panzer Mk III and Mk IV. Early Ausf D had reliabillity problems in particular but the subsequent Ausf A and Ausf G were much more reliable with most problems fixed in Ausf G.

The most notorious problem was the final drive of the transmission which used straight cut gears unlike the lighter Sherman which had Herringbone cut gears. Now German engineers knew that Herringbone gears are much better due to the fact they engage multiple teeth at once. It's common knowledge. The reason they weren't allowed to use them was a shortage of machine tools or 'cutting time' in the Reich and Speer's department under Saur was ruthless in applying man-hour requirements. It can take years to get a machine tool ordered and delivered. The pressures were very high, even the engineers of the Jumo 004 and BMW 003 were forced to reduced turbine blade numbers to reduce production man-hours and therefore compromise other aspects of the engine.

Perhaps its worth considering that the Luftwaffe bombing of the aviation engine and machine tool industry in and around Coventry may have helped delay the Napier Sabre to such an extent that it was limited in production due to its unreliability. (eg they punched rather than machined sleeve valves)

 

[Siegfried]

The appalling operational ready rates are harder to explain but must be at least partly due to a lack of preparation for a long conflict,a lack of spare parts,personnel,facilities for example. Also a lot of poor or muddled planning. Yet another reason that Germany lost the war.

It took Germany 3 weeks to defeat France and throw Britain of the Continent. The French didn't have any modern aircraft, the small numbers of MS 520 was 30 mph slower and that barely reached production was inferior to the Me 109E3 then appearing with the DB601Aa replacing the DB601A (boosting speed to 355mph)

German planning was almost perfect.

There were no plans for war with Britain so no plans for a strategic war apart from contingencies. There weren't even plans for war with Poland, Hitler wanted the military Junta that ran Poland and was headed by their Pedophile President Beck as an Allie. Hitler was an Austrian with no particular bone to pick with Poles, Chamberlains badly communicated guarantee to Poland was a knew jerk reaction to fabrications of an imminent German invasion from a US Journalist and by Pressure from Churchill's goading. The badly communicated British guarantee was actually to grantee Poland independence not its territorial integrity (Chamberlain was happy to let Danzig go which was the only issue for Hitler but couldn't get the message across) but the result was that the Polish Junta became intransigent and a Franco-Polish-British allegiance that was sending feelers out to the Soviets (which the Poles scuttled). The resulting sense of encirclement only then triggered German planning for a wider longer war. War with Poland, was only possible because of the bizarre and improbable Soviet-Nazi friendship pact. A pact that delighted Stalin as it brought the Soviet Pariah state in from the cold.

German planning had to emphasize the Army. It's no good having a large air-force if a combined Polish and French army has marched halfway to Berlin.

The tendency to being derogatory towards the Nazis has obscured the real difficulties the Germans faced.

AFAIKT Luftwaffe expansion was restricted not by poor planing but inadequate resources which would have had to have been obtained by compromising expansion of the Army or the Navy. Jenkoschenks culd not have had more aircraft if he wanted them.

The big upswing in production in 1943-1944 was based on the fruition of careful technocratic improvements as well as aircraft plant investments coming on line.

It would have been difficult to expand production prior to this. This required automated factories with presses etc that don't build themselves. You can build cottage style aicraft industry (the French Nationalized industry was like this) but for mass production you need to wait.

I would agree however the Germans had problems with what would today be called risk management: the failures of the Me 410 and He 177 programs and the vain attempts to produce a 2000hp hyper engine to some degree at the expense of the more achievable engines such as the DB603 and Jumo 213.

 

[Juha]

...4 Removed nearly 4 million ethnic Sudden Germans from the bordering Germany, forced them into Czechoslovakia, a country with 20% the population of Germany but almost its area where due to gerrymandering not one single ethnic German was ever elected to federal parliament...)

First of all, Sudetenland had been part of Austria and later Austro-Hungarian since early 16th century, not part of Germany, so Sudeten were not removed anywhere, borderline remained in place, but the old Germany/Austria border became Germany/Czechoslovakia border. But its true that Sudeten wanted to be annexed to Germany or to Austria.

And to your latter claim, sorry, from Wiki, but it ws easier in this way:

Czechoslovakian Chamber of deputies 1920-1935 - German and German-Hungarian parties or lists[3][4]

Party/List ______________________seats 1920__ seats 1925__ seats 1929 seats 1935 votes 1935
Sudeten German Party________________ -_________ -__________ -________ 44____ 1.256.010
German National Party________________ -________ 10__________ 7_________ -______ -
German National Socialist Workers Party 15________ 17__________ 8_________-______ -
German Social Democratic Workers Party 31________17__________21________11______ 300.406
German Christian Social People's Party____7________13__________14_________6______ 163.666
German Union of Farmers ______________11_______ 24__________ -_________5______ 142.775
Hungarian Parties and Sudeten German
Electoral Bloc_________________________9_________4__________9_________9_______292.847
United German Parties _________________6_________ -_________16_________-_________-
Total (out of 300 seats)_______________79________ 85_________75________75

Hungarian Parties and Sudeten German Electoral Bloc (1935)[5]: German Democratic Liberal Party, German Industrialist Party, Party of German Nation, Sudeten German Land Union, German Workers Party, Zips German Party, Provincial Christian Social Party, Hungarian National Party

Perhaps its worth considering that the Luftwaffe bombing of the aviation engine and machine tool industry in and around Coventry may have helped delay the Napier Sabre to such an extent that it was limited in production due to its unreliability. (eg they punched rather than machined sleeve valves)

What I have read the main problem with Sabre was the company and its practices, in the end the authories put the Napier under control of another, bigger firm. In a way Napier seemed to have been GB's Brewster.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

One of the achievements of the Hitler since taking office in 1934 to 1939 was an increase in automobile production from 44,000 per year to 250,000 year. That is no chump change, the Germans certainly knew how to design and produce motor cars and trucks

.

Completely untrue. according to The german war economy - The Motorization Myth - a commercial edited version of the two chapters of the USSBS German mototr vehicle production in 1934 (the height of the depression) was just short of 248000 vehicles. In 1939 the figure had expanded impressively to 540000 vehicles, however nearly all this expansion was in types of very limited military application. whereas motor cycle production had expanded close to fourfold, and domestic passenger vehicles had doubled, truck production had moved by only about 50%. Military production was in deep trouble, the types being built were too numerous, they were too light to be considered optimal military adaptations.

The expansion is somewhat belated in comparison to the US however its worth considering that Germans invented the Otto cycle (4 stroke engine), invented the Diesel, invented high speed diesel injection (Robert Bosch) and invented the automobile (Daimler) and the high speed 4 stroke they even invented the woman driver when Emma Daimler had an argument with Gotlieb and took their child in the car to her mother.

you failed to mention that german auto industry languishged at the bottom of the industrialized world in terms of man hours needed to produce each vehicle. it was grossly innefficient, using more than twice the man hours to produce comparable vehicles. Costs were correspondingly inflated. The german auto industry was heavily subsidised, which as herman Schacht pointed out was driving the german economy to bankruptcy.

What successes that the german auto industry did enjoy had nothing to do with hitlers 'inspired leadership'....he in fact was one of the biggest problems as the regime he ran ran on nepetism and corruption. only the able intervention of germany's middle management class involved in the industry saved what would other wise have been an unmitigated disaster...


1

Germany had a dense network of rail for urban and interurban transport and so was not reliant on the automobile.

True, i agree, but this approach does not completely address the needs of the modern mobile battles being advocated prewar....to make that work the germans needed an efficient SUSTAINABLE truck pool to sustain the concept of mobile warfare. in the end, the german efforts in this area failed completely.

Its why Hitler came to power, he was the only politician that was effective.

Thats a new low, even for you. hitler btrayed his own people from the very beginning, and was NOT the panacea for germany's problem. he was a lie, his economic miracle for example was in relaity the steady de-construction of her limited assets, his drive to war flying in the face of military wisdom. his morale boosting exercises a temporary affair that completely was based on falsehood.

Every German Democratically elected Chancellor was completely rejected and humiliated by the allies and France. The one prior to Hitler had rotten vegetables thrown at him in 1932 when he came back from his failed mission in France, which is why he lost.

yeah, by Nazi thugs paid and recruited for that very purpose. Every one of those democrats had more morality and purpose and achievement than hitler achieved in his entire career

 

[Juha]

Siegfried
France had modern planes like LeO 451, Br 693, Bloch 174 Potez 630 series and even Bloch 152 was modern but not as good as 109E

Juha

 

[Tante Ju]

The Luftwaffe strength being less than authorised is obviously due to production shortfalls,production was not covering losses,another one of the many reasons that Germany lost the war.

Not neccesary. Lost aircraft replacements need time to get to units, especially if those units are 1000s of km from the factories...

You can answer if there was production shortfall only if you find

In 1939 Germany produced 1,856 fighters and 2,877 bombers. In 1941 it produced 3,732 fighters and 4,350 bombers. Despite this increase in production it started operations in 1942 with less aircraft than it had in 1940. Another thread might discuss who was to blame. Much responsibility lies with Udet but Goering,Jeschonnek and many others must shoulder some of the responsibility too.

I think this goes long for playing with numbers and picking a date ... in the spring of 1942 it is well known the whole Wehrmacht was in poor shape. It was fighting in Russia, at the end of the supply line, in a conquest country in which much of railroad and infrastructure was destroyed in advance, and primitive to start with, and locomotives not converted for Eastern European gauge standard.

I think its unfair to blame on industrie or leaders the appaling supply situation in Russia 1941.

The appalling operational ready rates are harder to explain but must be at least partly due to a lack of preparation for a long conflict,a lack of spare parts,personnel,facilities for example. Also a lot of poor or muddled planning. Yet another reason that Germany lost the war.

Rates? You pick a single date, then apply it for the whole war, the error is obvious is in logic... how do srping 1942 readiness have to do anything with readiness rates for summer 1942, winter 1944 etc.?

I did say that the statement that the Germans had more aircraft in 1941-2 than in 1939 was incorrect. I posted the figures above (#61).

I also implied that the fact that Germany had far less combat aircraft in commission by 1942 than in 1939 (unlike her Western adversaries,don't know about the USSR without checking) was a factor in her eventual defeat and it certainly was.

What is 'in commission'? All figures I have seen LW strenght steadily increased through war..

I was interested to see how much importation was reduced by the (principally) British blockade. A reduction of 5 million barrels must have hurt.I often see it argued that the blockade had a minimal effect on the German war effort.

The question is how much oil Germany was importing from overseas. I believe they relied on Rumania and USSR for oil imports, unlike Britain which was main importing from USA I believe.

 

[Njaco]

....to make that work the germans needed an efficient SUSTAINABLE truck pool to sustain the concept of mobile warfare. in the end, the german efforts in this area failed completely.

I have to agree with this. Almost every account I have read states that much of the transport for 39-40 campaigns were horse-drawn. Fuel only counts if you have a vehicle to use it.

AS far as German planning, my impression has always been that actual aggression from Germany was planned for 1942 - not 1939. Hitler caught many of his military planners off-guard with that one.

 

[stona]

It took Germany 3 weeks to defeat France and throw Britain of the Continent.
German planning was almost perfect.

If only that had been the end of it.
The Luftwaffe had no long term plan for an extended conflict. Hundreds of aircraft were unserviceable for the want of basic spare parts that were not available. There was no equivalent of the British civilian repair units. Aircraft were entrained and sent hundreds of miles back to repair facilities. Poor planning.
Having a couple of thousand fighter aircraft of which barely half are seviceable is also down to poor planning. Logistical support is essentially planning!

A schematic of the Luftwaffe aircraft repair system,unwieldy and,as it turned out,inefficient. It was at OAC level that the system really failed,the parts were just not available resulting in aircraft being transferred into the "Industry" side of the scheme or,where transport was unavailable,being canabalised to keep others in service. Many were eventually abandoned,something the RLM complained about,demanding that they be salvaged. The problem was that the infrastructure to do so didn't exist.

Repeatedly stripping training schools of experienced pilots to bolster other operations resulting in a lack of properly qualified pilots,poor planning.

I could cite many more examples of short term fixes to long term problems which resulted in disaster for the Luftwaffe and defeat for Germany.

The confused and muddled system of Luftwaffe procurement also deserves a thread of its own. The Me 210/410 debacle is one of many.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Tante Ju]

There was no equivalent of the British civilian repair units.

What was so special about them..?

I am sure you agree that the British enjoyed advantages because they had very different position. After Britain ground troop left the continent, they were always fighting from their own bases in England, which meant that civillian infrastructure was natural available for repairs. That's an advantage of retreat and falling back to your own center of operation.

It is only natural that the Germans did not found nearby 'German civillian repair' units in France, Yugoslavia, Africa, Russia etc.

Aircraft were entrained and sent hundreds of miles back to repair facilities. Poor planning.

Uhm, this was necessary because Wehrmacht Heer tended to advanced hundreds of miles into enemy territories and the owners forgot to prepare these territories with sufficient repair facilities to the advancing enemy... Seriously, I am not certain what alternative you see to sending seriously damaged aircraft back to Germany. Building an aircraft factory (years..) just to repair planes in Russia sounds like a good idea to you? Getting aircraft mechanics from German factories to frontline sounds like a good idea to you?

How did the British solve this overseas in North Africa, Far East? I am quite sure they were forced to adopt the same procedure, when far from England industrie.

 

[davebender]

The Luftwaffe repair service had little to do with the German gasoline supply. Neither does Sudetenland.

 

[parsifal]

I

am sure you agree that the British enjoyed advantages because they had very different position. After Britain ground troop left the continent, they were always fighting from their own bases in England, which meant that civillian infrastructure was natural available for repairs. That's an advantage of retreat and falling back to your own center of operation.

German serviceability rates even for units based within the reich itself remained very low. There were a number of possible explanations for that. Low reserves of spare parts, a relatively lean repair and squadron support organization are the most obvious. later, poor quality of workmanships might also be a possible reason. earlier in the war, German units had a high sorie rate, which might also have contributed to the low readiness rates

It is only natural that the Germans did not found nearby 'German civillian repair' units in France, Yugoslavia, Africa, Russia etc.

Actuially, they did, Germans did not hesitate to press gang civilians into aircraft repair and salvage operations, as slave labour. in Russia they worked them to death, but thats another debate

The allies did not make much use of local populations for support work....part of the Marshall aid plan, but seviceability rates even in overseas commands were consistntly higher than for Axis air forces.

Uhm, this was necessary because Wehrmacht Heer tended to advanced hundreds of miles into enemy territories and the owners forgot to prepare these territories with sufficient repair facilities to the advancing enemy... Seriously, I am not certain what alternative you see to sending seriously damaged aircraft back to Germany. Building an aircraft factory (years..) just to repair planes in Russia sounds like a good idea to you? Getting aircraft mechanics from German factories to frontline sounds like a good idea to you?

How did the British solve this overseas in North Africa, Far East? I am quite sure they were forced to adopt the same procedure, when far from England industrie.

Britian did not use slave labour for salvage operationsl and did not ship aircraft back to the UK or even to depots (usually) for major repairs. They created mobile formations called SGSUs (squadron Support Units) which undertook major rebuilds in the field. This was a process utilized in New guinea, Burma, Northern Australia and North Africa that i know of. It was also used in Murmannsk for units deployed to that area. Britain enjoyed a considerable surplus of spare parts, so could afford to stock larhe amounts of spare parts away from a centralized point. Germany either voluntarily or was forced by spares shortages to nopt decentralise its erpair facilities. One effect of that was to lower serviceability rates...in the end, dramatically...

 

[parsifal]

In the RAAF, the maintence units were highly mobile and were called Repair and Salvage Units (RSUs). They were intended to provide repair services that the squadrons themselves could not handle.....anything with a category C level of damage or higher (category C was the terminaology used earlier in the war, and indicated damage levels of about 50% or higher).

I think the maintence and support echelons were a major contrast to the approaches. The British, with their extensive prewar experience of operating from remote locations, and their emphasis on providing strong spare parts support seemed to have seamlessly transitioned to a warime environment in places like Burma, New Gunea and North Africa.

The germans, seemed to have placed far less emphasis on spare parts support, and had a far more limited experience of operating in remaote locations. Whatever the explanation, their repair and salvage efforts, whilst adequate at the beginning of the war, were never fantastically outstanding, and as the war progressed degenerated to a fairly low level by wars end.

The following is an example (not especially picked out) of one RAAF RSU

"6 Repair and Salvage Unit RAAF (6 RSU) was established at Mt. Druitt in New South Wales on 10 April 1944. It was initially sharing facilities with 18 Repair and Salvage Unit, but took over the shared facilities when 18 RSU started to move out on about 26 July 1944.

One of the first tasks for 6 RSU was to recover a Beaufort bomber from Mascot airfield and relocate it to 5 Aircraft Depot at Wagga. This may have been Beaufort, A9-585, which crashed at Mascot at some time in July 1944. 6 RSU also undertook the relocation of 6 main-planes and and three fuselages for Wackett Trainers from the Newcastle Aero Club. They also carried out 240 hour services on Boomerang aircraft.

Sqn/Ldr V.H. Johns became the Commanding Officer of 6 RSU on 4 July 1944. He was replaced by Sqn/Ldr P.J. Allen on 1 November 1944.

Ainslie Sharpe's father was a member of 6 RSU. From his papers it appears that he was transferred to 6 RSU on 7 August 1944 and did a Liberator course from 15 September 1944 to 6 October 1944 at the Mobile Technical Inst. Section at Tocumwal. This meant that he was not with 6 RSU from its inception, but from the time that it was taking over the facilities of 18 RSU. He was a Warrant Officer. His leave record states (under Leave in Lieu) that he started HLI Tropical Leave on 21 February 1945, which probably means he was in one of the main party of 300 men who left Mt Druitt on 9 February 1945.

On 13 December 1944, Flight Lieutenant R.H. Barnes and the first 45 personnel of 6 RSU boarded a train headed for Fenton airfield in the Northern Territory. They arrived at Fenton on 27 December 1944.

6 RSU's Unit Stores were loaded on to SS Helga Moller at Circular Quay in Sydney, enroute to Darwin accompanied by Flying Officer B.V. McAuley and 11 airmen. They arrived in Darwin on 15 February 1945.

The largest body of 300 personnel left Mt. Druitt by train on 9 February 1945, arriving at Fenton on 21 February 1945. The rear party of 40 personnel, led by Flight Lieutenant P.J. Willington left Mt. Druitt on 14 February 1945 and arrived at Fenton on 23 February 1945.

6 RSU carried out maintenance on B-24 Liberators at Fenton and carried out the salvage of crashed aircraft in the region.

Members of the unit severely bogged a Weapons Carrier in a location about 12 miles east of Adelaide River on 30 March 1945 while trying to salvage a B-25 Mitchell bomber. They were forced to return to Fenton on horse back. They recovered the Weapons Carrier on 2 April 1945.

Sqn/Ldr A.J. Brown became the Commanding Officer of 6 RSU on 27 May 1945.

It was decided to relocate 6 RSU to Morotai. They travelled to Darwin via 51 Mile Camp and boarded the ship "Luis Arguello" on about 17 June 1945. They arrived at Morotai on 30 June 1945. F/Lt Barnes and F/Lt Willington and 49 airmen went ashore to prepare the camp for the main body of men which came ashore on the 1 July 1945.

Sqn/Ldr J. Hearnden became the Commanding Officer of 6 RSU on 19 August 1945."

 

[stona]

Parsifal the RAAF system is broadly based on the British system. It obviously is more efficient to repair aircraft at relatively accessible Maintenance Units than to ship them back to the manufacturer or one of its sattelites. The pre-requisite for this is a proper supply of spare parts and other,basic,logistical support.
The Germans failed miserably at this.
This maybe partly due to political rather than military considerations.
There was something in the Nazi pshyche that refused to acknowledge the possibility of a long drawn out campaign. I recall Speer complaining as late as 1944 about the unwillingness of the Nazi leadership to release raw materials to his armaments program which were "required" for the manufacture of women's cosmetics!
Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

I think it was more about the "quick war" philosophy as much as anything. But there are a couple of other considerations.... It needs to be conceded that for the eastern front, the Germans suffered chronic supply shortage that probably made it more efficient for them to ship damaged aircraft all the way back to their supply heads, or even back to germany, rather than ship the spares and the personnel out to the front. The other issue is that conditions on the eastern front were probably harder than anywhere, so readiness rates for a nation like Germany, whose repair teams had never known or been as exposed to harsh conditions as other nations quite likely underestimated those connditions.

 

[Shortround6]

In some nations there are "political' considerations. AS in a factory manager being asked how many aircraft, tanks or trucks 'his' factory produced that month. A number very closely looked at and failure to meet quota could mean demotion and/or transfer, perhaps to a "re-education camp"? A much more seldom asked question is "how many spare parts did you make this month?"

The US could screw up on occasion too. The US planners only allocated 20% spares for the Merlin powered P-40s in North Africa. The British broke down several hundred of their Merlin engines to provide spare parts.

 

[tyrodtom]

In some nations there are "political' considerations. AS in a factory manager being asked how many aircraft, tanks or trucks 'his' factory produced that month. A number very closely looked at and failure to meet quota could mean demotion and/or transfer, perhaps to a "re-education camp"? A much more seldom asked question is "how many spare parts did you make this month?"

The US could screw up on occasion too. The US planners only allocated 20% spares for the Merlin powered P-40s in North Africa. The British broke down several hundred of their Merlin engines to provide spare parts.

I think the re-education camps or the gulag was the usual Soviet solution for poor performance. The German solution might be to fire you, which would make you eligible to be drafted, and off to the east front.