The way I read it he thinks the Bf 109's contribution prior BoB wasn't significant enough, whereas the Spitfire's contribution in the BoB was. Granted the BoB was a pure air battle, I don't think the bigger picture would've changed that much with the RAF only operating Hurricanes. To see whatever happened in '41 in the air over western europe as a defeat of the LW or the Bf 109 in particular is extremely misleading, to say the least.
The 3 Fighters
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parsifal
Colonel
I am not claimig the 109 was not a capable aircraft or that it did not win victories. The key to my statements is the word "strategic". What, of strategic importance, did the me 109(or in fact, most fighters) actually achieve. There are not many events that it can be said they made a big difference.
People have zeroed in on the me109, but remeber i didnt isolate or single out the Me109 as anything unusual or peculiar. But it seems we are fixated on the me109 for reasons i dont understand, so i guess I will have to respond
Despit its obvious capability as apotent fighter, what did the Me 109 actually achieve? it has been suggested it was responsible for the victories in France and the low countries in 1939-40. I disagree. The fighter opposition was so weak in those countries that the Germans could have fielded just bombers and achieved the same outcomes. The fighters added froth and frill to the German victory, but the actual work was done by their flying artillery. There is one exception that i am prepred to concede......the defence of the bridges at Sedan, where the 109s were critical in defeating the allied interdiction attempts. even here, it may well have been the efforts of the flak forces that were critical compared to thyose of the fighter arm.
Some may argue that the 109s were critical in defending the german bombers. Well, to an extent, yes, but losses to german bomber forces remained heavy despite these efforts. the LW lost over 36% of its force structure in the six weeks of the french campaign....over Poland losses amounted to over 500 aircraft, most on combat operations, but around 40% to non-combat reasons.
Over britain, the Germans were effective, but they still failed to achieve anything of strategic importance. Things of strategic importance were, however, inflicted on them. They failed to achieve the neccessary air superiority to finish off the brits. The RAF remained a potent threat to the Lw, and shot down a lot of German aircraft to boot. The defeat over britain began the long slow steady slide to defeat for the LW.
The claim that the LW actually won their battles over france in 1941 is also untrue. The LW did not stop the RAF from mounting its attacks, and could not retaliate in kind. Losses for the RAF were heavy, no argument about that, but by years end, the RAF had achieved air superiority over most of western europe despite these losses. Before trying to argue, 'no they didnt" it would be wise to understand just what the term "air superiority actually means. The British did not enjoy "air suopremacy" which is a different concept, but they could conduct operations over france and western europe (except for Germany) with a fair degree of impunity. by comparison, and applying the theory correctly, the germans only enjoyed air parity. what this means is that they could inflict heavy losses on the RAF, but not heavy enough to claim superiority, they could undertake a limited number of mission types, but not all types of missions, and they had lost control of certain key areas of airspace, like those areas close to the channel and southern England.
In Russia, despite the impressive tallies chalked up by the german fighter pilots, they were largely irrelevant to the outcome. Russian aircrew were so badly trained at that time that no fighters in the eeast would have made no difference. Stukas could operate with virtual impunity for the first year of the war. The German fighters, moreover, had virtually no impact on reducing losses fior the LW. It was the conditions, rather than the opposition that caused the majority of the losses in that first year of the war.
So, to reiterate, victories there were a plenty for the 109, but strategic victories were virtually nonexistent. and, as i said, finding strategic victories for any fighter is actually difficult to find. they are a rare bird.
People have zeroed in on the me109, but remeber i didnt isolate or single out the Me109 as anything unusual or peculiar. But it seems we are fixated on the me109 for reasons i dont understand, so i guess I will have to respond
Despit its obvious capability as apotent fighter, what did the Me 109 actually achieve? it has been suggested it was responsible for the victories in France and the low countries in 1939-40. I disagree. The fighter opposition was so weak in those countries that the Germans could have fielded just bombers and achieved the same outcomes. The fighters added froth and frill to the German victory, but the actual work was done by their flying artillery. There is one exception that i am prepred to concede......the defence of the bridges at Sedan, where the 109s were critical in defeating the allied interdiction attempts. even here, it may well have been the efforts of the flak forces that were critical compared to thyose of the fighter arm.
Some may argue that the 109s were critical in defending the german bombers. Well, to an extent, yes, but losses to german bomber forces remained heavy despite these efforts. the LW lost over 36% of its force structure in the six weeks of the french campaign....over Poland losses amounted to over 500 aircraft, most on combat operations, but around 40% to non-combat reasons.
Over britain, the Germans were effective, but they still failed to achieve anything of strategic importance. Things of strategic importance were, however, inflicted on them. They failed to achieve the neccessary air superiority to finish off the brits. The RAF remained a potent threat to the Lw, and shot down a lot of German aircraft to boot. The defeat over britain began the long slow steady slide to defeat for the LW.
The claim that the LW actually won their battles over france in 1941 is also untrue. The LW did not stop the RAF from mounting its attacks, and could not retaliate in kind. Losses for the RAF were heavy, no argument about that, but by years end, the RAF had achieved air superiority over most of western europe despite these losses. Before trying to argue, 'no they didnt" it would be wise to understand just what the term "air superiority actually means. The British did not enjoy "air suopremacy" which is a different concept, but they could conduct operations over france and western europe (except for Germany) with a fair degree of impunity. by comparison, and applying the theory correctly, the germans only enjoyed air parity. what this means is that they could inflict heavy losses on the RAF, but not heavy enough to claim superiority, they could undertake a limited number of mission types, but not all types of missions, and they had lost control of certain key areas of airspace, like those areas close to the channel and southern England.
In Russia, despite the impressive tallies chalked up by the german fighter pilots, they were largely irrelevant to the outcome. Russian aircrew were so badly trained at that time that no fighters in the eeast would have made no difference. Stukas could operate with virtual impunity for the first year of the war. The German fighters, moreover, had virtually no impact on reducing losses fior the LW. It was the conditions, rather than the opposition that caused the majority of the losses in that first year of the war.
So, to reiterate, victories there were a plenty for the 109, but strategic victories were virtually nonexistent. and, as i said, finding strategic victories for any fighter is actually difficult to find. they are a rare bird.
Hell No! The Russians would drink all the glycol and steal the fuel to sell on the black market, the Americans would complain about the tiny cockpit and lack of space for putting their lunch boxes and if the Bf 109 were British it would have only machine guns for armament and would be entirely made of wood!
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The Bf 109 was the main workhorse of the German fighter force from day 1 until the end of WW2. So unless you deny the LW fighter force any strategic importance it is, by this fact alone, of strategic importance.
You say the outcome of the battles prior BoB would've been the same without the Bf 109. Debatable. Replace all Spitfires in the BoB with Hurricanes and the outcome would also have been the same. But to you the Spitfire is significant whereas the Bf 109 is not?
You say the LW didn't "win" in the west in 1941, did the RAF "win"? There was no battle with strategic outcome over France in that timeframe it was all in all a pretty useless bickering that achieved nothing for either side in the strategical sense (except psychologically), but the RAF devoted significantly more resources and suffered significantly more losses. I won't even bother to challenge or discuss your defintions and points of view on who had air superiority / supremacy / whatever as that factor alone is useless unless you can exploit it effectively. Which the RAF clearly couldn't in 1941. And the "failure" of the LW to completely stop RAF operations (which wasn't their declared goal anyways), has much more to do with a) the little threat those operations posed at the time and b) the much more important front to the east that needed support. The fact that most of the fighter force could be removed without much worry (at that time at least) can be interpreted either way: As a success of the remaining (Bf 109-equipped) JG or as a failure of the RAF to conduct operations with any meaningful tactical or strategical outcome.
No Bf 109s in the east would first of all mean many more Soviet fighters, attackers and bombers not being destroyed in the first few weeks of the war. I would have to guess how many of the over 30.000 IL-2s built were shot down by Bf 109s (not even counting bombers, recce and other planes) but I have a feeling that the number is significant enough to say the Bf 109 had a strategic impact over that front. Even the Jabo support that is usually forgotten was of some importance.
You say the outcome of the battles prior BoB would've been the same without the Bf 109. Debatable. Replace all Spitfires in the BoB with Hurricanes and the outcome would also have been the same. But to you the Spitfire is significant whereas the Bf 109 is not?
You say the LW didn't "win" in the west in 1941, did the RAF "win"? There was no battle with strategic outcome over France in that timeframe it was all in all a pretty useless bickering that achieved nothing for either side in the strategical sense (except psychologically), but the RAF devoted significantly more resources and suffered significantly more losses. I won't even bother to challenge or discuss your defintions and points of view on who had air superiority / supremacy / whatever as that factor alone is useless unless you can exploit it effectively. Which the RAF clearly couldn't in 1941. And the "failure" of the LW to completely stop RAF operations (which wasn't their declared goal anyways), has much more to do with a) the little threat those operations posed at the time and b) the much more important front to the east that needed support. The fact that most of the fighter force could be removed without much worry (at that time at least) can be interpreted either way: As a success of the remaining (Bf 109-equipped) JG or as a failure of the RAF to conduct operations with any meaningful tactical or strategical outcome.
No Bf 109s in the east would first of all mean many more Soviet fighters, attackers and bombers not being destroyed in the first few weeks of the war. I would have to guess how many of the over 30.000 IL-2s built were shot down by Bf 109s (not even counting bombers, recce and other planes) but I have a feeling that the number is significant enough to say the Bf 109 had a strategic impact over that front. Even the Jabo support that is usually forgotten was of some importance.
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Glider
Captain
If I could throw in my tuppence worth.
I believe that without the Me109E the air battle prior to the BOB may well have resulted in a different outcome. The French and even the Poles believed that the Me 109 B-D were not a significant danger and the 109E made a significant difference to the Battle for Europe.
I also believe that the 109 in numbers made a significant strategic difference in the East until the Fw 190 arrived upon the scene. From then on in the Fw was a better aircraft for the war against Russia. That was also the case in 1941/2 in France. The RAF didn't have a major concern about the Me109, it was the FW190 they were worried about.
Its also true to say that in the Middle East the 109 made a difference as it was much better than the Hurricane and P40 it was up against, until the Spitfire arrived upon the scene. Once that happened, RAF losses dropped dramatically and the balance of power changed.
As for the Strategic value of the Spitfire. Its main claim was that it stopped the Luftwaffe getting a techincal advantage from the BOB to the end of the war. Initially against the Me109 and later the Fw190. The Spitfire also gave the RAF a priceless but often forgotten strategic advantage, namely PR. From early in the war it flew over Europe and parts of Germany almost at will, even in daylight, recording every move the Germans made in Europe. There were Me109 PR versions but they had serious losses and the Luftwaffe were often stopped almost completely from completing their missions
The Spitfire was also a better GA aircraft, not a great one I grant you, but better than the Me109 and that flexibility in itself is a strategic advantage.
I believe that without the Me109E the air battle prior to the BOB may well have resulted in a different outcome. The French and even the Poles believed that the Me 109 B-D were not a significant danger and the 109E made a significant difference to the Battle for Europe.
I also believe that the 109 in numbers made a significant strategic difference in the East until the Fw 190 arrived upon the scene. From then on in the Fw was a better aircraft for the war against Russia. That was also the case in 1941/2 in France. The RAF didn't have a major concern about the Me109, it was the FW190 they were worried about.
Its also true to say that in the Middle East the 109 made a difference as it was much better than the Hurricane and P40 it was up against, until the Spitfire arrived upon the scene. Once that happened, RAF losses dropped dramatically and the balance of power changed.
As for the Strategic value of the Spitfire. Its main claim was that it stopped the Luftwaffe getting a techincal advantage from the BOB to the end of the war. Initially against the Me109 and later the Fw190. The Spitfire also gave the RAF a priceless but often forgotten strategic advantage, namely PR. From early in the war it flew over Europe and parts of Germany almost at will, even in daylight, recording every move the Germans made in Europe. There were Me109 PR versions but they had serious losses and the Luftwaffe were often stopped almost completely from completing their missions
The Spitfire was also a better GA aircraft, not a great one I grant you, but better than the Me109 and that flexibility in itself is a strategic advantage.
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parsifal
Colonel
Actual losses in Il-2s/Il-10s 1941-5 were about 10700: 533 in 1941, 1,676 in 1942, 3,515 in 1943, 3,347 in 1944 and 1,691 in 1945. According to Westermann ('Flak - German Antiaircraft in WWII) at least 35% of losses were due to the activities of the flak units on the Eastern Front. Sturmoviks suffered particularly badly at the hands of the flak arm because of the way they were used....flying low and in tight formation is a good way to get yourself shot down by flak. Sturmoviks had an average airframe life of only 26 sorties which equates to about 2-3 months flying on average. After that they tended to be no longer airworthy. That suggests in turn a relatively high attrition rate to non-combat causes. Possibly the attition rate might be 30-40% per month to non-combat sources. By comparison Allied non-combat attition was about 15-20% and German attrition on the eastern front was about 25-30% of the force structure every month (some airframes were repaired and returned). So if Westermans exhaustive study is even half right,m and the Soviets were suffering about 30% losses to other sources that leaves about 25-30% due to enemy (german) aircraft. Thats about 3-4000. however roughly half the fighters on the eastern front were FW190s. If we assume an even split of Soviet IL-2 losses between the Fw and Me units,m then the Mes were responsible for the loss of around 1500-2000 Il-2s and Il-10s during the war. A far cry from the claimed 30000.
Even German records dont claim that many losses. In 1943 the claimed total losses were 6900,m whilst in 1944 they claimed to have destroyed 7100. This number includes flak claims. So unless something really magical happened in 1942 and 1945 there simply is no possibility of 30000 Il-2s being bagged by the 109s on the eastern front.
now to shoot down that force of Sturmoviks along with the other Soviet Bombes that were lost the Luftwaffe had to make substantial committments on the eastern front and had to suffer exceptionally heavy attritional losses in the process. When Hitler turned his forces east in 1941, about 65% of the Luftwaffe was committed to the attack. There was a slight reduction towards the end of the year as forces were transferred west to counter the threats posed by the british on the western front and southern fronts. But even so,m for most of 1942,m about 50% of the LW was operating in the east. this continued into 1943,m at about 40% of the force structure. In 1944 and 45 it dropped to about 30%. The fighters committed to the Eastern Front were rather less than that.....in 1943 there were about 400 fighters on the eastern front and around 800 on the west,m over Germany and in the South. If we assume 25% of the fighters were deployed on the eastern front we would not be too far out. If 25% were deployed there, then roughly 25% of fighter losses are going to be suffered on that front. whilst the Soviets were less effective at shooting down the LW the weather and terrain was harsher so losses to other causes was higher....much higher
I do not know the precise extent of LW losses on the eastern Front. I do know that the Germans claimed to have destroyed 77000 Soviet Aircraft but Krivosheev only admits to 46000. The Soviets claim to have destroyed 52000 LW A/C due to combat to which should be added about another 30% or so due to non-combat attrition. Extrapolating we will find around 35-40000 LW aircraft lost on the eastern front to destroy around 46000 plus maybe another 20000 to noncombat causes for the Soviets.
If you look at the issue in those terms all of a sudden the vaunted superiority of the Jagdwaffe and indeed the effectiveness of fighters to achieve a strategic advantage becomes highly questionable. oh they are needed alright but only because the opposition is bound to have them. But for the eastern front,m the fighters of either side never dominated the battlefield. They inflicted some losses but not catastrophically so. The Russians realized this halfway through the war and proceeeded to only put enough effort into the air battle as to keep losses tolerable. They were never interested in achieving air superiority after 1943. They just wanted to bomb the crap out of the Germans and keep the german fighters off their backs long enough to do that. The distances the scarcity of forces enabled them to do just that....which is why fighters on the eastern front were not strategically relevant. Necessary,m like air and petrol,m b ut they were never going to achive anything of strategic significance
Even German records dont claim that many losses. In 1943 the claimed total losses were 6900,m whilst in 1944 they claimed to have destroyed 7100. This number includes flak claims. So unless something really magical happened in 1942 and 1945 there simply is no possibility of 30000 Il-2s being bagged by the 109s on the eastern front.
now to shoot down that force of Sturmoviks along with the other Soviet Bombes that were lost the Luftwaffe had to make substantial committments on the eastern front and had to suffer exceptionally heavy attritional losses in the process. When Hitler turned his forces east in 1941, about 65% of the Luftwaffe was committed to the attack. There was a slight reduction towards the end of the year as forces were transferred west to counter the threats posed by the british on the western front and southern fronts. But even so,m for most of 1942,m about 50% of the LW was operating in the east. this continued into 1943,m at about 40% of the force structure. In 1944 and 45 it dropped to about 30%. The fighters committed to the Eastern Front were rather less than that.....in 1943 there were about 400 fighters on the eastern front and around 800 on the west,m over Germany and in the South. If we assume 25% of the fighters were deployed on the eastern front we would not be too far out. If 25% were deployed there, then roughly 25% of fighter losses are going to be suffered on that front. whilst the Soviets were less effective at shooting down the LW the weather and terrain was harsher so losses to other causes was higher....much higher
I do not know the precise extent of LW losses on the eastern Front. I do know that the Germans claimed to have destroyed 77000 Soviet Aircraft but Krivosheev only admits to 46000. The Soviets claim to have destroyed 52000 LW A/C due to combat to which should be added about another 30% or so due to non-combat attrition. Extrapolating we will find around 35-40000 LW aircraft lost on the eastern front to destroy around 46000 plus maybe another 20000 to noncombat causes for the Soviets.
If you look at the issue in those terms all of a sudden the vaunted superiority of the Jagdwaffe and indeed the effectiveness of fighters to achieve a strategic advantage becomes highly questionable. oh they are needed alright but only because the opposition is bound to have them. But for the eastern front,m the fighters of either side never dominated the battlefield. They inflicted some losses but not catastrophically so. The Russians realized this halfway through the war and proceeeded to only put enough effort into the air battle as to keep losses tolerable. They were never interested in achieving air superiority after 1943. They just wanted to bomb the crap out of the Germans and keep the german fighters off their backs long enough to do that. The distances the scarcity of forces enabled them to do just that....which is why fighters on the eastern front were not strategically relevant. Necessary,m like air and petrol,m b ut they were never going to achive anything of strategic significance
1. I never claimed the LW (let alone the Bf 109) shot down 30000 IL-2s.
2. The rest had little to nothing to do with the significance of the Bf 109.
parsifal
Colonel
Ah, so now you do want to talk to me....
You did say "I would have to guess how many of the over 30.000 IL-2s built were shot down by Bf 109s (not even counting bombers, recce and other planes) but I have a feeling that the number is significant enough to say the Bf 109 had a strategic impact over that front".....now you dont have to guess, Me 109s were responsible for the destruction of about 1500 IL-2.....so the committment of up to 65% of the LWs fighters (at the beginning of the war....overall it was about 30% of their fighter strength) was able shoot down 5% of the total production run of IL-2s.
How is that of strategic importance??
Oh, and my statements were never specifically about the Me109, yours were. my statements were about the ability of fighters generally to win strategic advantage. One of your responses was that the me 109 was able to win strategic advantage, and you implied that they achieved that by shooting down large numbers of IL-2s on the Eastern Front. You made that claim by "guessing". I just relieved you of the need to guess....
You did say "I would have to guess how many of the over 30.000 IL-2s built were shot down by Bf 109s (not even counting bombers, recce and other planes) but I have a feeling that the number is significant enough to say the Bf 109 had a strategic impact over that front".....now you dont have to guess, Me 109s were responsible for the destruction of about 1500 IL-2.....so the committment of up to 65% of the LWs fighters (at the beginning of the war....overall it was about 30% of their fighter strength) was able shoot down 5% of the total production run of IL-2s.
How is that of strategic importance??
Oh, and my statements were never specifically about the Me109, yours were. my statements were about the ability of fighters generally to win strategic advantage. One of your responses was that the me 109 was able to win strategic advantage, and you implied that they achieved that by shooting down large numbers of IL-2s on the Eastern Front. You made that claim by "guessing". I just relieved you of the need to guess....
I never said the Bf 109 claimed or destroyed 30,000 IL-2. Period.
You relieved me of my need to guess with your "guesstimation"? Hardly.
The nature of the fighter aircraft will always place it in a secondary role in a war that is fought mostly on the ground, that doesn't mean they are not of strategic significance.
You relieved me of my need to guess with your "guesstimation"? Hardly.
The nature of the fighter aircraft will always place it in a secondary role in a war that is fought mostly on the ground, that doesn't mean they are not of strategic significance.
parsifal
Colonel
My figures arent guesses, the losses for il-2 are taken from Krivosheev. The figures for LW committment to the east is from a couple of sources, but the primary one is Hayward. My figures for German flak achievments comes from Westermann, who has written the best english work on the LW flak arm to date.
The only figure I have had to extrapolate is the division between Me109s, and the rest of the german fighters committed to the East. If you want to claim all 7000 or so of the IL-2s shot down by German aircraft as being attributable to me 109s, go ahead, but if you want to apply logic to the problem, you will concede that only a proportion of those losses are attributable to Me109s. The logical thing to do, when you have a large sample, is to split the losses proportionally, and since 109s were about 50% of the SE fighters on the eastern Front, it seems perfectly reasonable to me to attribute half the kills to them.
Or are you going to argue about that as well and try and say that is not logical to do that. If you have figures for 109 victories over Il-2s for the eastern front, I invite you to shut me up and produce them. if you dont, then dont try and argue that logical extrapolation of the known fact is somehow equivalent to your gratuitous "guesswork'. Or that somehow, my logic is "highly questionable" as you claimed some posts earlier. If you have facts produce them, if not, I suggest you leave the kitchen before your fingers are burnt.
I never said that fighters were not necessary, or not of strategic importance. What I claimed, is that fighters with one or two notable exceptions did not generally achieve strategic advantage. read the words carefully and understand the difference between the words you are attempting to attribute to me, and what i am actually saying. fighters dont win strategic victories, they just avoid strategic defeats. There is a difference, a big one. they were needed to avoid dfeat, but they seldom could achieve victory or significant strategic advantage. i did not single out the germans, or the Me 109, you did. You started this dialogue by attempting to claim that Me109s were responsible for the victories in the west, that somehow I was singling out the Me 109 and no others, and then stumbled blindly into a discussion about the eastern front, mouthing generalities and near political slogans without knowing the slightest facts about what you were actually talking about.
Didnt you.....
Now your position has changed. I see you are now saying they play a secondary role to other aircraft in achieving victory. that I can agree with. At last you are starting to look at the issue, and not the man, and using the grey matter between your ears to think about the problem.
Now, if you apply that position, which you have arrived at, hooray for that.....which is, that fighters, by themselves cannot achieve victories, they play second fiddle to other aircraft, then what were the germans exactly thinking in 1944 when they all but abandone production of bombers, so as to concentrate on fighter production. If they thought about the issue even a little, they would have realized that their production choices could not deliver them victory. the best they could hope for was a little time gained, but for what??????
As I said at the beginning of this little discussion, there is no strategic advantage for building fighters. Or at least mostly no advantage
The only figure I have had to extrapolate is the division between Me109s, and the rest of the german fighters committed to the East. If you want to claim all 7000 or so of the IL-2s shot down by German aircraft as being attributable to me 109s, go ahead, but if you want to apply logic to the problem, you will concede that only a proportion of those losses are attributable to Me109s. The logical thing to do, when you have a large sample, is to split the losses proportionally, and since 109s were about 50% of the SE fighters on the eastern Front, it seems perfectly reasonable to me to attribute half the kills to them.
Or are you going to argue about that as well and try and say that is not logical to do that. If you have figures for 109 victories over Il-2s for the eastern front, I invite you to shut me up and produce them. if you dont, then dont try and argue that logical extrapolation of the known fact is somehow equivalent to your gratuitous "guesswork'. Or that somehow, my logic is "highly questionable" as you claimed some posts earlier. If you have facts produce them, if not, I suggest you leave the kitchen before your fingers are burnt.
I never said that fighters were not necessary, or not of strategic importance. What I claimed, is that fighters with one or two notable exceptions did not generally achieve strategic advantage. read the words carefully and understand the difference between the words you are attempting to attribute to me, and what i am actually saying. fighters dont win strategic victories, they just avoid strategic defeats. There is a difference, a big one. they were needed to avoid dfeat, but they seldom could achieve victory or significant strategic advantage. i did not single out the germans, or the Me 109, you did. You started this dialogue by attempting to claim that Me109s were responsible for the victories in the west, that somehow I was singling out the Me 109 and no others, and then stumbled blindly into a discussion about the eastern front, mouthing generalities and near political slogans without knowing the slightest facts about what you were actually talking about.
Didnt you.....
Now your position has changed. I see you are now saying they play a secondary role to other aircraft in achieving victory. that I can agree with. At last you are starting to look at the issue, and not the man, and using the grey matter between your ears to think about the problem.
Now, if you apply that position, which you have arrived at, hooray for that.....which is, that fighters, by themselves cannot achieve victories, they play second fiddle to other aircraft, then what were the germans exactly thinking in 1944 when they all but abandone production of bombers, so as to concentrate on fighter production. If they thought about the issue even a little, they would have realized that their production choices could not deliver them victory. the best they could hope for was a little time gained, but for what??????
As I said at the beginning of this little discussion, there is no strategic advantage for building fighters. Or at least mostly no advantage
If I'm reading this right, VVS their satellites have, as of summer 1945, some 19000 IL-2s on disposal, since, out of produced 30K, there was a loss of 10700, both in combat operationally? BTW, the Fw-190 appeared at East some 15 months after Barbarossa started - perhaps the ratio of flown sorties was 3:2 in Bf-109's favor, not 1:1?
parsifal
Colonel
Not sure how many Il-2s were available at the end of the war. You may be right to give some weighting towards the 109 because of its longer service.
I have some figures somewhere on Soviet air strength at the end of the war somewhere. might not be able to get a completely accurate number, but we would have figures on strike aircraft. Given that the majority of Soviet strike aircraft were either Lend Lease, Pe2s, Il10s, Il2s and a few Tu2s we can at least get an idea of how many Il-2s were left at the end.
According to Ellis, the VVs had about 17000 A/C on strength. Moyhnihan ("Claws Of the Bear") puts their frontline strength at well over 25000 a/c
This link may also be of some help
Íåêîòîðûå ñòàòèñòè÷åñêèå ìàòåðèàëû ïî èçó÷åíèþ èñòîðèè Âòîðîé ìèðîâîé âîéíû
I have some figures somewhere on Soviet air strength at the end of the war somewhere. might not be able to get a completely accurate number, but we would have figures on strike aircraft. Given that the majority of Soviet strike aircraft were either Lend Lease, Pe2s, Il10s, Il2s and a few Tu2s we can at least get an idea of how many Il-2s were left at the end.
According to Ellis, the VVs had about 17000 A/C on strength. Moyhnihan ("Claws Of the Bear") puts their frontline strength at well over 25000 a/c
This link may also be of some help
Íåêîòîðûå ñòàòèñòè÷åñêèå ìàòåðèàëû ïî èçó÷åíèþ èñòîðèè Âòîðîé ìèðîâîé âîéíû
FWIW, Soviets have produced, from (mid?)1941-(mid?)45, some 120 000 fighters , bombers and attack planes (37K just of those), while receiving (correct me if I'm wrong) ~ 20 000 LL planes of the same category. That makes 140K received. Now we subtract the number of available planes just post war (17K, or 25K+) and arrive at 123K, or 115K planes lost one way or another.
Attack planes make almost 25% of planes received (in 3 'combat' categories), so does it mean that those same attack planes make out 25% of all losses? If so, that's some 30K lost in that category.
Attack planes make almost 25% of planes received (in 3 'combat' categories), so does it mean that those same attack planes make out 25% of all losses? If so, that's some 30K lost in that category.
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parsifal
Colonel
Youve forgotten trainers in your totals. Soviets produced 157000 aircraft of all types during the war.
Trying to reverse engineer losses by looking at total numbers produced and then strengths at the end of the war doesnt work very well. as an example, US produced 324000 airplanes, and ended the war with about 60000 a/c on strength. they gave away about 50-60000 as Lend Lease. one could say if we were to base our calculations on numbers produced and numbers left at the end of it, that the US lost 200000 aircraft during the war. That however is known to be wrong. in Europe (which absorbed by far the majority of losses) USAAC losses to enemy action were about 20000. they lost another 18000 to non combat related causes. In the continental US they lost about 9500 a/c, mostly in training accidents. In all of the rest of the world they lost 4500 in combat, and about 5000 in non combat related incidents. if you add all of that up, total losses come to about 59000 a/c lost. What happened to the other 140000 US aircraft. The answer is....i dont know.
Same thing happens when you look at all the nationalities. Germany for example produced 189000 a/c during the war. most histories concede they lost at least 60000 a/c due to combat, and about another 50000 to noncombat related causes. that leaves 79000 aircraft unnaccounted for. were there 79000 aircraft in the LW, or even in the reserve stores at the end of the war. Answer is no. Where did they go. Havent a clue, but neither do i think they fell out of the sky as losses.
Krivosheev says the soviets lost 46000 aircraft during the war. I dont think he includes losses to non-combat causes in that total. if the Soviets suffered a similar attrition rate as the germans to non-combat related causes, then they are likely to have lost about another 30-35000 aircraft making a total of about 75-80000 a/c lost during the war. With the 20000 Lend lease aircraft thrown in, they should have 100000 a/c at the end of the war, but instead they have maybe 30000. What happened to the other 70000....same as the Americans, I dont have a clue. its just one of those statistical anomalies that I have never been able to answer.
Trying to reverse engineer losses by looking at total numbers produced and then strengths at the end of the war doesnt work very well. as an example, US produced 324000 airplanes, and ended the war with about 60000 a/c on strength. they gave away about 50-60000 as Lend Lease. one could say if we were to base our calculations on numbers produced and numbers left at the end of it, that the US lost 200000 aircraft during the war. That however is known to be wrong. in Europe (which absorbed by far the majority of losses) USAAC losses to enemy action were about 20000. they lost another 18000 to non combat related causes. In the continental US they lost about 9500 a/c, mostly in training accidents. In all of the rest of the world they lost 4500 in combat, and about 5000 in non combat related incidents. if you add all of that up, total losses come to about 59000 a/c lost. What happened to the other 140000 US aircraft. The answer is....i dont know.
Same thing happens when you look at all the nationalities. Germany for example produced 189000 a/c during the war. most histories concede they lost at least 60000 a/c due to combat, and about another 50000 to noncombat related causes. that leaves 79000 aircraft unnaccounted for. were there 79000 aircraft in the LW, or even in the reserve stores at the end of the war. Answer is no. Where did they go. Havent a clue, but neither do i think they fell out of the sky as losses.
Krivosheev says the soviets lost 46000 aircraft during the war. I dont think he includes losses to non-combat causes in that total. if the Soviets suffered a similar attrition rate as the germans to non-combat related causes, then they are likely to have lost about another 30-35000 aircraft making a total of about 75-80000 a/c lost during the war. With the 20000 Lend lease aircraft thrown in, they should have 100000 a/c at the end of the war, but instead they have maybe 30000. What happened to the other 70000....same as the Americans, I dont have a clue. its just one of those statistical anomalies that I have never been able to answer.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
I'm not sure I agree totally with this. In 1940, the Low Countries and France had effective fighters in the D.520, Fokker G1 and Fokker DXXI as well as few capable pilots. Unescorted LW bombers would have been hit hard. Rotterdam was hit only AFTER the skies had been swept clean of defending fighters.
And the attacks on the Maas by RAF Battles in May 1940 were decimated by Bf 109s and 110s.
The Bf 109 did its part very well in the early part of the war. But after 1942 and with the Fw 190 introduced, I think it was more of a band-aid on a gaping flesh wound.
parsifal, would you consider the air component of the Channel Dash as a successful strategic victory?
parsifal
Colonel
The Germans, like everyone else needed fighters , so in that sense they were of strategic importance. But the question is, did they achieve strategic advantage? Given the heavy losses sustained by the germans during the BOF and the Low countries, its hard to say they were needed to reduce losses. The majority of losses, when you factor in non-operational losses and flak losses, appear to occur regardless of fighters being there.
To me achieving an advantage of strategic proportions, the fighters would need to demonstrate they could deny airspace to an enemy at a lower cost than that which was meted out on themselves. Because most losses occur regardless of enemy action, this cannot be achieved, whatever the fighters are doing, and regardless of how good the fighters actually are. they are needed to avoid catqastyrophic losses, but they cant achieve one sided victories themselves (except if the enemy doesnt have them, and this almost never happened) .
I would consider the battles alsong the Maas the same part of the engagement I mentioned earlier.
The Channel dash is a hard classification. In many ways it was a retreat made out to look like a victory. If the british had managed to actually sink or disable one of the BCs it would have been an even bigger loss for the Germans than it actually was. In any event people forget what actually happened....the Gneisenau got back to port, went into refit, got bombed, and never went back to sea. Scharnhorst transferred to Northern Germany, became part of the fleet in being that certainly tied down resources, but did not achieve much of worth after thqat redployment.
So, applying the test of "was anything of strategic significance achieved, I would have top reluctantly say no. Reluctantly, because the other side of the coin is that on that day, viewed in isolation, the LW fighters were very effective at taking a piece of sky above the BCs and denying it to the British. It that narrow sense it was a victory, though I hesitate to call it a strategic victory, when it was working to achieve a defeat.
I have thought of another battle where fighters achieved a strategically important result. This time it was in the pacific, in the marianas in 1944. it was the battle tyhat destroyed the japanese carrier fleet, and allowed the establishgment of bomber bases that could hit Japan and broke the martianas barrier. A strategically important result
I agree - LW enjoyed a great level of air superiority in Poland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece, and Russia 1941. German fighters achieved this airsuperiority, which was key to German success in this campaigns. Fighter ensure own bombers can strike hard into enemy land, and enemy bomber cannot. Up to about 1943, German bomber could strike target hard, and enemy bomber cannot. I think this is summary of effectiveness of German fighter force very well.
Also unescorted German bombers - people forget how serious German air force losses were over France. Heavier than over England actual. So if one say there was no effective opposition in air - he is very wrong.
Also needs to think very careful about why there was very few British bomber seen in daylight over Europe through war.. German clearly had air superiority over Europe until about 1943, fighter were important in this. Then it slowly began to change. First they lost it in one front, than another front too, then in 1944 everywhere.
Glider
Captain
I agree with a lot of this apart from the last paragraph. No 2 Group flew regular missions over Europe with pretty light losses. They were well escorted and were often the bait to try and get the Luftwaffe to attack, but even so they could and often did fly more or less at will. Although rarer the main force sometimes took part in daylight missions. On 17th October 1942 94 Lancasters undertook a daylight raid on Le Creusot 300 miles inside France, no Lancasters were lost. You would be hard pressed to find any German raid in daylight that flew so far behind the front line.
Taking todays date as a marker.
In 1941 there were anti shipping flights no contact was made
In 1942 17 Bostons bombed power stations in France 1 was lost. A small force of 14 Wellingtons bombed Emden and Essen in Germany, 1 was lost
In 1943 there were no daylight raids
In 1942 the number of daylight raids was larger than most people realise.
In the week either side of the 31st October 1942 there were daylight raids on 9 of these days. They were small raids granted, but the point is made that the RAF flew over France and Germany in daylight on a regular basis. Pick any day as a reference point in 1942 and a similar picture will emerge.
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parsifal
Colonel
This is the problem with claiming the LW fighters reduced losses for theur bombers.......they didnt. The LW suffered losses of roughly 36% of their force structure in the BoF. Moreover, if you delve a little deeper than that, and compare the deep penetration, unescorted raids carried out by the LW to the shorter ranged escorted raids there is little difference in the loss rates. Most of the time, incidentally LW fighters werent even escorting the bombers in France, they were flying patrols over their own skies to deny the airspace to enemy strike aircraft. In this they were highly successful, but then Allied bombers were hardly of any strategic significance. There were about 200 french bombers at the beginning of the campaign and some further bomber numbers under RAF control. RAF bombers were mostly used to attack strategic targets in the Ruhr, with no results.
So, over france the German bombers operated generally without fighter escort, and suffered roughly 36% losses during the 5 week campaign. Compare that to the BOB, where the bomber forces of the LW were as heavily escorted as was possible. There were two distinct phases in the BoB, as far as the LW fighters were concerned, one where they operated free range, using the bombers essentially as bait,, and one where they were tied to close escort, with orders to provide direct close protection to the bombers, in order to reduce their losses
AFAIK, there was little difference in the loss rates for the German bombers in either phase, it didnt matter whether the fighters were flying aggressively or defensively the bombers were still suffering more or less the same loss rates. if we take a step back and say the Bob was different to the BOF, because during the BoB German bombers were escorted, and largely in the BoF they were not, there is not much difference in the loss rates. just looking roughly, during the Bob total losses (Fighters and Bombers) amounted to about 1800 aircraft over roughly 12 weeks, thats about 75% of the commencing force structure. If we adjust those figes down to equate to the 5 weeks of the BoF the loss rate is roughly 31 or 32% of the force structure. The efforts of the german fighters amounted to less than a 4-5% reduction of losses. If we look at the flip side, and look at the allied loss rates of aircraft lost in the air, loss rates are not much different either.
I'll say it again, fighters were needed as a defensive measure, but consistently failed to reduce losses for most situations, consistently failed to deny airspace to an enemy, and consistently fail to achieve numerical losses different to the losses suffered by their own side. They were necessary, but unable to achieve significant strategic advantage. Applies to everyone, not just the Germans
Bitter pill I know, but look at the numbers unemotively and you will come to the samer conclusions yourselves.
So, over france the German bombers operated generally without fighter escort, and suffered roughly 36% losses during the 5 week campaign. Compare that to the BOB, where the bomber forces of the LW were as heavily escorted as was possible. There were two distinct phases in the BoB, as far as the LW fighters were concerned, one where they operated free range, using the bombers essentially as bait,, and one where they were tied to close escort, with orders to provide direct close protection to the bombers, in order to reduce their losses
AFAIK, there was little difference in the loss rates for the German bombers in either phase, it didnt matter whether the fighters were flying aggressively or defensively the bombers were still suffering more or less the same loss rates. if we take a step back and say the Bob was different to the BOF, because during the BoB German bombers were escorted, and largely in the BoF they were not, there is not much difference in the loss rates. just looking roughly, during the Bob total losses (Fighters and Bombers) amounted to about 1800 aircraft over roughly 12 weeks, thats about 75% of the commencing force structure. If we adjust those figes down to equate to the 5 weeks of the BoF the loss rate is roughly 31 or 32% of the force structure. The efforts of the german fighters amounted to less than a 4-5% reduction of losses. If we look at the flip side, and look at the allied loss rates of aircraft lost in the air, loss rates are not much different either.
I'll say it again, fighters were needed as a defensive measure, but consistently failed to reduce losses for most situations, consistently failed to deny airspace to an enemy, and consistently fail to achieve numerical losses different to the losses suffered by their own side. They were necessary, but unable to achieve significant strategic advantage. Applies to everyone, not just the Germans
Bitter pill I know, but look at the numbers unemotively and you will come to the samer conclusions yourselves.
