The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war. (1 Viewer)

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WW2 we did not have a united Public School system. It was piece meal.
City kids military could get Recruits with a 7th grade to HS education.
Farm boys barely a 3rd grade education.

Gee, My father, from Belfast Maine, population under 5,000 during WW II and the Biggest town in the county, graduated HIgh school (as did my mother), He went to the west coast to an "aviation school" for about a year and then to Stratford CT, where he worked at Sikorsky and Vought on the assembly lines before his deferment ran out and he joined the marines.
He wasn't a pilot. He also wasn't quite the "farm boy" you portray despite being from a rural area. His local grade school was a two room school house but the town high school was 3 story brick.
My mother (who graduated a few years after him) went to Bates College for one year after graduating from the same high school.

I think your perception of what the local education systems were like in the 30s is a bit off. My father went to night school in the 50s while working at WInchester and was only a few credits away form getting his bachelor degree, he had the associates degree, and worked as a production engineer for WInchester and Colt.

I think that Biff is right, the requirement for "college education" was not what knowledge the person may have acquired, but as a general indicator in the selection process before the army (or navy) spent thousands of dollars per pupil in instruction.
 
We were using compasses like this

in the early 60s in the Boy scouts, partly because you could get military surplus ones cheap.
Other guys had this type.


If you can teach basic map reading and compass skills (short 3 leg course) to kids under 14 years old then what is need for a college education for such basic skills?

Please show where the requirement for pilots was any particular field of study. A guy with a degree in Art history might be totally useless trying to interpret engineering drawings.
Couple of teachers living up the road from us in 60s, both with doctorates, could NOT fix a flush toilet.
 

Nothings changed. LOL.
 

And you again are wrong. Have you ever heard of the Army's High School to Flight School program that is used today?

I have 650 combat hours in Iraq (although only as a Crew Chief), and the majority of the pilots I flew with had a high school diploma. A close friend of mine that used to fly Blackhawks in my unit, had a high school diploma (now an A.S.) and currently flies the A-10 in the US Air Force.

You don't learn to read maps in college. Anybody can learn to read a map. Stop insulting the intelligance of the backbone of the Military (NCO's) who actually read the damn maps, and make the college grad officers look competent.

You don't need to know Assy processes, machine tooling, blue prints etc to fly an airplane. You don't need to know those to be an officer.

Is it preferred that pilots have a college degree? Sure, but it is not what makes them a good pilot. A person with a HS degree can be as good as a pilot with a Doctorate in Aerospace, who can be as good as a pilot with a BS in Basket Weaving. The instincts cannot be taught, and the necessary skills are learned in the cockpit not in a college classroom. College does not make someone more intelligent than a non college educated person. It makes him or her more educated, not more intelligent.

Its like economics. A college diploma is used as a rationing device to weed out the number of candidates. The piece of paper does not make the pilot.
 
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Your 'requirements' to understand navigation, cockpit procedures, control management (Feet, eyes and hand co-ordination), reading a compass and computing a flight plan (over terrain while taking into account windage) are easily grasped by an intelligent high school graduate with algebra and Trig. The USMC makes Bravo 11's masters of map reading and plotting a 'course' with less than the above math.Time and position of Sun are used by astrologers and computing a chart by hand is probably about the same.

Why in hell would any WWII pilot need to know machining, blueprint reading, airframe design, powerplant, and mechanics of flight? Push stick forward, things get bigger, pull stick back, things get smaller.
 
Dan

My advice at this point is that you crank it back a few notches. you are entering dangerous territory here my friend.

Respectful debate is the way to go. I sense some anger and frustration building. best to take your hands off the wheel and step back until full control is restored.


Just giving friendly advice.
 

Good advice, to all of us actually. I too had to catch myself...
 
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My grandfather graduated from the USNA in 1921. However, the Academy did not equal a College degree . . until the 1950s, when he received notification/paperwork giving him a Diploma as a full college graduate. The Academies were considered 'trade schools' at the time.
 
I agree with those who don't think turning the tide of war can be assigned to a specific type of aircraft, for the very simple reason that the war was much too large and complex for that to happen.
Absolutely agree. No one plane or any piece of equipment can be credited with turning the tide of the war. The opening question of the thread however, is posed in relative terms i.e. yes no one aircraft turned the tide but some did more in this respect than others.
 

If the Japanese had not lost four carriers (well, maybe 3) at Midway, I don't think there would have been a Battle of Santa Cruz, because there would have been no American offensive at Guadalcanal. The Guadalcanal offensive was only possible because the shift in naval strength thanks to Midway. In the early summer 1942, The Saratoga came back from repairs in the States and the Wasp transferred from the Atlantic. This gave the Americans 4 carriers with which to conduct the Guadalcanal offensive. (Of these 4 they soon found it difficult to keep more than 2 on station at the same time.)

If Midway had been a draw or an American defeat in terms of numbers of carriers lost. The USN would likely have kept its remaining carriers busy defending the sea lane to Australia with maybe an occasional raid. Without SBDs taking out flight decks at Midway, the war against Japan would likely have been in a holding pattern for a year or more.

Ironically, I don't think the ultimate result would have been much different. The new fast carriers of the Essex and Independence class, with their newer aircraft models would still have been able to establish air supremacy wherever they congregated by early 1944. The Marianas would still have been assaulted in mid-1944, and the US would likely have won the war before the end of 1945.

Probably the biggest change if there had been no Guadalcanal or Solomon Islands campaign is the crucial role of the submarine fleet would come into sharper focus. Japan could assault Midway, but they would have had a hard time taking it, and an impossible time holding it. The submarines would be able to operate from Midway and Australia regardless of the outcome of the Battle of Midway.
 

You forget that the RN has armoured carriers, one of which actually served with the USN for a short time. The RN at this time was the largest navy in the World until US naval construction got underway.
HMS Victorious (R38) - Wikipedia
 
I think your right. Even without an American victory at Midway the war would have ultimately turned out the same way. I kinda doubt it would have only delayed Vj day by a couple months like late 45 though but who knows.
More importantly,likely alot more guys would have to die to achieve the victory.
 
Interesting thread, my marginal two cents:

It's been a while since I cracked open Shattered Sword ( so I did, damn good read ) but I believe one of the major blows to the IJN was not loss of aircrew but loss of trained aircraft mechanics and technicians. From Shattered Sword:
Aircrew lost = 121
A/C Mech/techs = 721 i.e. 40%

Regarding the mechanics/technicians and quoting Parshall and Tully, "these men were difficult to replace, given Japan's less-mechanized society than that of it's foe, the United States."

Also the bleeding of the Solomon's campaign effectively crippled the IJN with large numbers of both aircrew and mechanics/technicians being lost at Rabaul.

Again with Parshall and Tully, but in essence they say THOSE losses, combined with the support crews lost at Midway had "a direct impact on Japan's ability to field a modern carrier aviation force during the battles of 1944"

I've always felt that while Midway was a good shot to the snot locker for the IJN, the real bleeding however, was the attrition of the Solomon's Campaign, there was no coming back for them after that.

Also, yeah, there was no way Japan was going to win going up against one of, if not the worlds most powerful economy.
 
It is probably a combination of everything. However to show how things were stacking up against the Japanese just in the numbers of aircraft slots available on carriers. The Japanese got into service (of some sort) 11 carriers between 1942 and the summer of 1944 (not counting seaplane carriers or converted battleships) that could hold about 465 aircraft, many of these were converted merchantmen and some were actually used as aircraft ferries and not active carriers in part due to shortage of air crew (and support crew?).

The US had at least 16 fast carriers in service by the summer of 1944, granted 9 of the were the Independence class converted cruisers (270 flight deck slots) but 7 of them were Essex class carriers with about 90 planes per carrier for 630 planes or 900 total between the two classes. I am just using a cut off date of commissioning of Dec 31 1943 to give the Americans 5/6 months to train, work up the ships and get them to the Pacific. 3 more Essex class carriers commissioned between Jan 1st and the middle of May 1944.

Advantage is pretty much 2 to 1 for the Americans counting every flight deck remotely suitable for the Japanese and ignoring the US's 34 escort carriers commissioned before the end of 1943, granted many of them stayed in the Atlantic.

So even assuming the Japanese had saved or trained sufficient aircrew/support crew to fill every slot on every flight deck they were going to come up short in 1944.

The allies didn't know (unless revealed by code breakers) the extent of the Japanese crew losses after each battle and strategies/operational plans would be made on a simple flight deck count.
 

I worked at a few flight schools.

Hmmmm. I wonder where in the private pilot ground curriculum (or any other advanced flight rating) where it calls for knowing"Engineering, designing and machining parts. Reading blueprints understanding assembly processes."
 
Whether WATCHTOWER would be delayed is in no way dependant on how many Japanese carriers were lost. What made WATCHTOWER possible was a combination of several factors, none of which had anything to do with the loss of Japanese flattops

Planning for an offensive operation in the Solomons was well under way well before the victory at midway. It was approved and at an advanced stage of preparation, already having been approved by the Joint Chiefs. Some delays occurred whilst USS Wasp was lent to the Med TO for a spitfire reinforcement of Malta, and the repairs to USS saratoga was made urgent after the loss of the Lexington. Whilst on deployment with the British, the Wasp practised night carrier operations incompany with HMS Eagle.

Initially the plan was to take the island of Tulagi by assault and also occupy the essentially no-mans land of Santa Cruz. However on July 2nd, long range PBYs detected airfield construction on guadacanal and the targets were quickly adjusted

Enterprise Hornet and Saratoga were assigned as direct support units, and spent 3 weeks normalising and working up replacement air crews for the operation after midway. In this respect the results of Midway were relevant. Losses, or rather the absence of losses from the US carriers, along with the ability to draw in more reinforcements from the atlantic and Mediterranean, gave the US the numbers parity to attempt the operation with a reasonable chance of success.

After Midway, American intel was temporarily blinded by the Japanese changing their naval ciphers, this led to some minor adjustments to the US force components committed to Watchtower. Hornet was detailed to remain in Hawaiian waters and was replaced by Wasp . Wasp was unique in the USN inventory at the time in that she possessed some limited night strike capability in her air group, and I have no doubt this influenced the decision to insert Wasp in place of Hornet into the operation. Further, Wasps air group was made more effective by the embarkation of TBFs into the CAG, the first USN carrier to be brought up to strength with this new type. She also was considered better value with her F4F-4 fighters over the older more clapped out F4F-3s equipping the hornet. The amphibiouis operation was delayed by severe engine room troubles aboard the Wasp, which had not been fully resolved until the end of July.

In overall command was adm Frank j Fletcher, a much maligned individual in history but still very cautious in this operation.

The operation would still likely have failed but for the fact that the air assets based at Rabaul were fully occupied at Milne Bay and supporting the attacks across the owen stanleys. Allied resistance at Moresby in particular was occupying the full attention of the Japanese . If this had not been the case, chances are the Japanese would have inflicted far heavier losses on the invasion fleet

Despite being in excellent shape, TG61.1 under fletcher made the inexplicable decision to withdraw the carriers on the evening of 8th August. I get the impression that his caution was due to the intell blackout afflicting the USN at this time. The UsN had no idea of the whereabout of Combined Fleet, and were still very wary of its potential......the USN were under no illusions at that time that they needed to pay healthy respect to IJM capabilities still. The people who needed to know, knew that the loss of IJN cartriers at midway had virtually no effect on IJN fleet capabilities in August. If the IJN chose to commit, they could do a lot.


Some acknowledgement ought to be given to the role of the CVEs in WATCHTOWER. Though incapable of affecting the large scale sea battles, the arrival of these small carriers freed the USN fleet carriers from any need to provide ferryinh services to the island in later parts of the operation.

Regardless of whether the Japanese lost carriers or not at Midway, the operations in the Solomons were locked in to occur. The Japanese, with their dwindling carrier air fleets were simply not in a position to respond by then...…...they could not afford logistically to keep their carriers so far forward for a start. The carriers could be based as far forward as Truk and that was about it really.
 

I agree that the P51 only showed up after Midway after Battle of Britain after Kursk after El Alamein. So the Mustang was a nail in the coffin but other planes flipped the lid closed.
 
I'd have to give it to the C-47 by a longshot. It was the ability to quickly move troops and supplies all around the world that turned the tide of the war, and though the transport was an intermodal effort with vehicles from liberty ships to Deuce and a Halfs being standouts, since we are talking about aircraft, the C-47 stands out. There were aircraft that could carry more (eg C-54) and aircraft that performed better in particular missions and environments (C-46 over The Hump), in terms of sheer numbers employed, throughout all the theaters of operation, and versatility of mission, from cargo (including the spare parts and sometimes fuel to keep fighters and bombers flying), to medevac, to troop transport, to paratrooper deployment (both as a jump craft itself and a glider tug), and used by the US, UK, and USSR, no other aircraft could touch the Skytrain.
 
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