The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

[parsifal]

Considering that the Imperial Japanese Navy lost 4 of their Fleet Carriers at Midway out of 6 that were present - the two other carriers were light carriers, held in reserve. This was 4 of the 6 fleet carriers that the IJN possessed at the time - add to that the experienced pilots and aircraft that the IJN were hard-pressed to replace.

The two remaining fleet carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku both would be sunk 2 years later during the Battle of Philippine Sea without any real contribution during that battle.

So in the end, the loss at Midway was a tremendous setback for their force projection and they hobbled along with light carriers from that point onward.

Now when I say "turning point" of the Pacific War, I am not tossing that out there on my own accord, I am simply going by the word of historians, both civil and military, who have made that determination long before I was even born.

The problems facing the Japanese at that time was not deckspace, it was trained aircrew. It was not the loss of 4 out of 6 carriers, either, it was 4 out of 8. The loss of 250 aircraft at Midway was a serious blow, but the numbers of aircrew that survived was substantial. It was unrealistic to expect that the big fleet carriers of the USN could be engaged with few or no losses....what was needed was that the US carriers be engaged and written off whatever the cost to the Japanese. this the IJN failed to do at Midway. ,The IJN expended some of its precious elite aircrews but did not achieve the victory it was looking for. In reality even this was unrealistic as an objective by June.

Aircrew losses for the IJN were within the normal or expected range. The numbers of carriers lost were much higher than expected, Even with the normal or expected losses Japan was unable to bring the CAGs of the carriers up to full strength. After Santa Cruz, the last of the Pearl Harbor veterans had been expended with no decisive result inflicted on the USN. The Japanese Carrier fleets did not know it yet, but after Santa Cruz their bolt was shot.


So, Midway was an important attritional battle, but far from a pivotal battle. It was part of a larger strategy, brilliantly delivered by the USN leadership. Midway was part of that wider strategy, and a massive propaganda and morale coup, but not decisive for the reasons relating to carrier losses. It was more a missed opportunity for the Japanese, and a pattern of survival for the US aircrews and carriers. They had not been subjected to a one sided crushing defeat. They had suffered some losses, and this would continue until the end of the year, but the losses sufferd by both sides were closer than is often portrayed. The "victory" at Midway was firstly that the US carriers had survived, and secondly the diminishing asset of Japanese airpower had failed to achieve the decisive victory that they desperately needed

 

[drgondog]

The problems facing the Japanese at that time was not deckspace, it was trained aircrew. It was not the loss of 4 out of 6 carriers, either, it was 4 out of 8. The loss of 250 aircraft at Midway was a serious blow, but the numbers of aircrew that survived was substantial. It was unrealistic to expect that the big fleet carriers of the USN could be engaged with few or no losses....what was needed was that the US carriers be engaged and written off whatever the cost to the Japanese. this the IJN failed to do at Midway. ,The IJN expended some of its precious elite aircrews but did not achieve the victory it was looking for. In reality even this was unrealistic as an objective by June.

Aircrew losses for the IJN were within the normal or expected range. The numbers of carriers lost were much higher than expected, Even with the normal or expected losses Japan was unable to bring the CAGs of the carriers up to full strength. After Santa Cruz, the last of the Pearl Harbor veterans had been expended with no decisive result inflicted on the USN. The Japanese Carrier fleets did not know it yet, but after Santa Cruz their bolt was shot.


So, Midway was an important attritional battle, but far from a pivotal battle. It was part of a larger strategy, brilliantly delivered by the USN leadership. Midway was part of that wider strategy, and a massive propaganda and morale coup, but not decisive for the reasons relating to carrier losses. It was more a missed opportunity for the Japanese, and a pattern of survival for the US aircrews and carriers. They had not been subjected to a one sided crushing defeat. They had suffered some losses, and this would continue until the end of the year, but the losses sufferd by both sides were closer than is often portrayed. The "victory" at Midway was firstly that the US carriers had survived, and secondly the diminishing asset of Japanese airpower had failed to achieve the decisive victory that they desperately needed

FWIIW - I agree Parsifal. The "turning point" was a series of actions that in the whole, comprised the "turning Period". Coral Sea put a temporary hold on invading New Guinea and taking it easily, followed by rapid development of Port Moresby. Midway stripped IJN of a lot of airpower to support and defend New Guinea and Guadalcanal. The Aussies blunted the Japanese thrust to Port Moresby from the North - Had they penetrated it would have made Port Moresby untenable, making the assault on Guadalcanal even more difficult.

It makes my head hurt to try to define the 'aircraft that turned the tide of WWII' - It is hard enough to nominate five 'most important aircraft' . It is easy to define a series of 'influencers'.

 

[michael rauls]

FWIIW - I agree Parsifal. The "turning point" was a series of actions that in the whole, comprised the "turning Period". Coral Sea put a temporary hold on invading New Guinea and taking it easily, followed by rapid development of Port Moresby. Midway stripped IJN of a lot of airpower to support and defend New Guinea and Guadalcanal. The Aussies blunted the Japanese thrust to Port Moresby from the North - Had they penetrated it would have made Port Moresby untenable, making the assault on Guadalcanal even more difficult.

It makes my head hurt to try to define the 'aircraft that turned the tide of WWII' - It is hard enough to nominate five 'most important aircraft' . It is easy to define a series of 'influencers'.

Absolutely agree that no one aircraft or any type of equipment alone turned the tide of the war. That's why the thread titled is frased as a comparative" the airplane that did the MOST to turn the tide of the war".

 

[Shortround6]

Ok, lets try thinking about Santa Cruz, the Japanese had gotten "lucky" and taken out two US carriers with submarines.

What would the expected results of Santa Cruz have been if the Japanese had two of the carriers from Midway there plus planes and proportional air crew?
I am trying to split the difference between no Japanese losses at Midway and what historically happened. Aside form that I have no basis for picking the number 2.
I know that the Japanese didn't lose aircrew at Midway in proportion to the ship losses. But lets say the Japanese start Santa Cruz with 40-50 more veteran aircrew (110 lost at Midway?)

At Santa Cruz would the Enterprise have been lost too? Or would Santa Cruz have even happened if the Japanese had 5 fleet carriers at the time? Would even Halsey have pushed 2 US carriers to fight 5-6 Japanese carriers? Or would the US have waited until their carrier strength was better?

I am not claiming the Japanese could have ever won the war but Midway does mark a turning point. Had Midway not happened as it did the turning point would have been later.

The Essex doesn't show up until May of 1943 and the lIght carrier Independence doesn't show up until July/Aug 1943. Their classmates start showing up pretty quick after that but even the summer of 1943 doesn't see a 2nd Essex until late July or Aug after training cruises are completed.


The change over for the allies also took some time. As noted by others the real loss of Japanese air crew was at Santa Cruz.
Some Historians have said that Santa Cruz was victory for the Japanese, but it was a victory they could not afford.
Had the Japanese gone into Santa Cruz with two additional carriers and 40-50 more trained aircrew would the losses suffered, bad as they were for the Japanese, have been as bad in proportion? Or could the Japanese have had enough left for several more battles?

 

[drgondog]

Absolutely agree that no one aircraft or any type of equipment alone turned the tide of the war. That's why the thread titled is frased as a comparative" the airplane that did the MOST to turn the tide of the war".

Well, My vote would be the HurriFire in 1940. It isn't certain what the outcome of losing air supremacy over Great Britain would have been to knocking the Brits into suing for peace, but to me they were the Most important at any time during the war. Far more than SBD at Midway.

 

[michael rauls]

Well, My vote would be the HurriFire in 1940. It isn't certain what the outcome of losing air supremacy over Great Britain would have been to knocking the Brits into suing for peace, but to me they were the Most important at any time during the war. Far more than SBD at Midway.

Certainly great pics. Don't know if I could see my way to " far more" than the SBD" but they are certainly the other two most pivotal aircraft of the war in ny opinion.. Certainly couldn't blame anybody for picking them as tied for number one.

 

[parsifal]

I will have to go to shattered Sword and tally up the list given for Japanese aircrew losses. But more than half the aircrews were saved from midway and these were used to rebuild the shattered CAGs and put balnced CAGs on the Hiyo, Zuiho, Junyo and Zuikaku. None of these carriers ever had anything like a full complement in the latter half of 1942. .


Having an extra carrier or two would have been handy, but the fundamental issue eating away at IJN force projection was its pilot availability, and more specifically, trained and experienced pilot availability that determined the levels of Japanese success. They were never seriously constrained by the lift capacity of their carrier fleet. they just didn't have enough pilots and that's the end of it. But they also needed to expend pilots to win the decisive battle they were seeking. Every time they fought a battle and didn't sweep the USN carriers from the field the Japanese were losing.

American problems were the reverse of the Japanese. They had plenty of pilots and not enough sea billets. Evry time a pilot was lost they could replace him pretty quickly. Every time they lost a carrier, there was one more hole in their force projection capability. The first Essex class were not ready for active opeerations until the middle of 1943, If the Japanese could remove the USN cxarrier forces from the equation and retain a credible seaborne structure of their own, they had a chance of disrupting allied counteroffensives. They wwere never going to win outright, and frankly that was not thir aim. They needed to knock the USN ofbalance, to give their forces time to consolidate fortify and reinforce their positions. They had no answer however to the merchant shipping losses being inflicted on them month after month.

 

[Shortround6]

I will have to go to shattered Sword and tally up the list given for Japanese aircrew losses. But more than half the aircrews were saved from midway and these were used to rebuild the shattered CAGs and put balnced CAGs on the Hiyo, Zuiho, Junyo and Zuikaku. None of these carriers ever had anything like a full complement in the latter half of 1942.
Having an extra carrier or two would have been handy, but the fundamental issue eating away at IJN force projection was its pilot availability, and more specifically, trained and experienced pilot availability that determined the levels of Japanese success. They were never seriously constrained by the lift capacity of their carrier fleet. they just didn't have enough pilots and that's the end of it.

I am assuming (and it could be a bad assumption) that had more Japanese carriers survived more aircrew would have also, even though The Japaneses didn't lose aircrew in proportion to the carriers lost. Having a higher percentage of veterans may have helped the replacement process, at least for a little while. Veterans can only shepard newbies to a certain extent.

They had no answer however to the merchant shipping losses being inflicted on them month after month.

I'm not sure how bad the Shipping losses were in 1942 what with the crappy US torpedoes, once that got fixed shipping losses sky rocketed.

 

[Navalwarrior]

The SDBs did not have a fighter escort at Midway( at least not with them when it counted) and not only got near the Japanese carriers but seem to have annihilated them. They were also successful on other ocassions with minimal or no fighter escort in a way other bombers didn't seem to be able to pull off.
As a matter of fact they were somewhat successful acting in the fighter role themselves( CAP) on several occasions.

Resp:
According to what I've read, the fighters (F4Fs) had to turn back as their fuel reserves would not allow them to make it back to the Fleet at Midway, forcing them to ditch. One point that escapes logic, is why didn't one carrier launched Fighters while the nearby carrier launched torpedo aircraft/bombers? (Two of the US carriers were within sight of each other). Instead, the initial aircraft launched had to burn fuel while the other launched! This used up precious fuel. It escapes all logic.

 

[Navalwarrior]

its the engine not the plane the merlin ruled ww2

Resp:
? ? There were plenty of fighters using the Merlin. So why couldn't they provide long range escort? Because it required a better platform that housed the Merlin! Merlin engine fighters had been around before 1940, so why couldn't any of them fly long distance at high altitude and take on the enemy over Germany?

 

[Shortround6]

(Two of the US carriers were within sight of each other). Instead, the initial aircraft launched had to burn fuel while the other launched! This used up precious fuel. It escapes all logic.

You are assuming the various groups from the different carriers had practised working together. Losing your shipmates in clouds/bad weather is one thing, losing a bunch of strangers from another ship is another. It also means altering the deck spotting of the aircraft, something that needs to planned out ahead of time. The US planned (not always achieved in practice) to fly off large groups of planes in quick succession.

You can't launch any Dauntlesses until the all the planes forward of them are launched or they are taken below by elevator, at least one of which is either under or in the middle of the Dauntlesses. To land a plane ALL of the planes would have to moved forward.
A lot depended on when the first location reports of the enemy fleet are received. DO you go with what's line up on the deck or do you take 20-30 minutes to reshuffle things. ?

 

[Shortround6]

Resp:
? ? There were plenty of fighters using the Merlin. So why couldn't they provide long range escort? Because it required a better platform that housed the Merlin! Merlin engine fighters had been around before 1940, so why couldn't any of them fly long distance at high altitude and take on the enemy over Germany?

The 1000hp Merlin or the 1500hp Merlin????

 

[davparlr]

Per Shattered Sword, 110 aircrews were lost, probably about 25% of the force at Midway. By the end of the Battle of Santa Cruz, 409 of the 765 aircrews at Pearl Harbor were dead.

The Navy was accepting non-graduate applicants to the Naval Aviation Cadet program as late a 1992. They were called Navcads, and the Marines, Marcads. They received their commission when they got their wings. Believe me, all the high school girls graduating in Pensacola in the mid sixties knew all the terminology and what they meant.

 

[Navalwarrior]

You are assuming the various groups from the different carriers had practised working together. Losing your shipmates in clouds/bad weather is one thing, losing a bunch of strangers from another ship is another. It also means altering the deck spotting of the aircraft, something that needs to planned out ahead of time. The US planned (not always achieved in practice) to fly off large groups of planes in quick succession.
View attachment 530322
You can't launch any Dauntlesses until the all the planes forward of them are launched or they are taken below by elevator, at least one of which is either under or in the middle of the Dauntlesses. To land a plane ALL of the planes would have to moved forward.
A lot depended on when the first location reports of the enemy fleet are received. DO you go with what's line up on the deck or do you take 20-30 minutes to reshuffle things. ?

You are assuming the various groups from the different carriers had practised working together. Losing your shipmates in clouds/bad weather is one thing, losing a bunch of strangers from another ship is another. It also means altering the deck spotting of the aircraft, something that needs to planned out ahead of time. The US planned (not always achieved in practice) to fly off large groups of planes in quick succession.
View attachment 530322
You can't launch any Dauntlesses until the all the planes forward of them are launched or they are taken below by elevator, at least one of which is either under or in the middle of the Dauntlesses. To land a plane ALL of the planes would have to moved forward.
A lot depended on when the first location reports of the enemy fleet are received. DO you go with what's line up on the deck or do you take 20-30 minutes to reshuffle things. ?

The SDBs did not have a fighter escort at Midway( at least not with them when it counted) and not only got near the Japanese carriers but seem to have annihilated them. They were also successful on other ocassions with minimal or no fighter escort in a way other bombers didn't seem to be able to pull off.
As a matter of fact they were somewhat successful acting in the fighter role themselves( CAP) on several occasions.

Resp:
All good points. Carrier tactics would evolve, with larger carriers enabling more flexibily in tactics, etc.. Glad we didn't have to sail with Battleships.

 

[Shortround6]

I would like to bring up another possible explanation for the US flying the planes off in the order they did.

It maybe that the F4Fs required less flight deck to get airborne and the loaded strike aircraft needed more flight deck.
once arranged in that fashion it takes a while to change.

Later on with more war experience (and more carriers ) certain carriers were tasked with CAP or fighter escort while other carriers were assigned strike missions. This might change form day to day so one carrier's air group wasn't worn out while others didn't do much.

 

[parsifal]

It is a myth that the IJN lost crushing losses to its aircrews at Midway. A comparison between midway, where four carriers were lost and Santa Cruz where no carriers were lost is very revealing actually.

Barrett Tillman's article "The Seeds of Victory Are Sown" (August 2017) is typical of the post war fiction that has come to pass as accurate in most post war accounts. . He states, "the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a crushing defeat at Midway, losing... four precious carriers and most of their aircrews." The problem with this statement is that the Japanese did not lose most of their aircrews at the Battle of Midway. Parshall and Tully, in Shattered Sword examine this issue in detail. The book documents that the Kaga suffered 21 aircrew deaths, Soryu lost 10, and the Akagi 7. Only the Hiryu's air group suffered casualties in excess of 50 percent, losing 72. This is a total of 110—compared to a Japanese loss of aircrew at the battle of Santa Cruz of 145, where the Japanese did not lose any of their four carriers that participated in the battle.

The myth of Midway is that the Japanese carriers' flight decks were covered with armed and fueled aircraft ready to launch to destroy the U.S. carriers when the U.S. SBDs hit. The resulting image is that a majority of the flight crews were killed in explosions from dropping bombs while sitting in their fully fueled and armed aircraft. The reality is that the strike aircraft were actually in the hangar decks being rearmed, and only a few CAP Zeros were on the flight decks when the SBDs from the Enterprise and Yorktown hit. As the ships went down it may be that priority was given to saving the aircrew, in particular the pilots, because the proportion of pilots lost compared to the overall percentage of losses aboard the ships was very low.

This is why so many Japanese flight crews survived the battle: They were not in their aircraft.

Note that the big loss in irreplaceable personnel was maintenance crews at the Battle of Midway, Parshall and Tully make a lot of this, but I just don't see it. I cannot find much loss of efficiency amongst the ersatz carriers that fought the remaining battles of 1942. There was however a visible and measurable loss of efficiciency amongst maintenance crews at Phil Sea. Perhaps there were some long term effects arising.

One of the reasons that we have the belief that the Japanese decks were covered with strike aircraft ready to take off and annihilate the American fleet comes from Mitsuo Fuchida's commentary about the battle. Japanese historians have commented that this misinformation may be a result of his desire to uphold the Bushido code. It makes a more heroic image that the killing blow from the SBDs hit an instant before the Japanese were to unleash the blow that would have led to their victory. It just doesn't sound as good that you got wiped out when you were down in the hangar deck getting your aircraft rearmed. That almost gets to the level that you got wiped out answering the call of nature, and no true warrior would ever admit that.

We don't know the exact proportions of aircrew losses that occurred on the carrier decks, but it cannot have been high. Perhaps 5-10% of the total. If that guess is anywhere near correct, aircrew losses that can be attributed to the ship losses might amount to 5-10 pilots and gunners combined

 

[Navalwarrior]

It is a myth that the IJN lost crushing losses to its aircrews at Midway. A comparison between midway, where four carriers were lost and Santa Cruz where no carriers were lost is very revealing actually.

Barrett Tillman's article "The Seeds of Victory Are Sown" (August 2017) is typical of the post war fiction that has come to pass as accurate in most post war accounts. . He states, "the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a crushing defeat at Midway, losing... four precious carriers and most of their aircrews." The problem with this statement is that the Japanese did not lose most of their aircrews at the Battle of Midway. Parshall and Tully, in Shattered Sword examine this issue in detail. The book documents that the Kaga suffered 21 aircrew deaths, Soryu lost 10, and the Akagi 7. Only the Hiryu's air group suffered casualties in excess of 50 percent, losing 72. This is a total of 110—compared to a Japanese loss of aircrew at the battle of Santa Cruz of 145, where the Japanese did not lose any of their four carriers that participated in the battle.

The myth of Midway is that the Japanese carriers' flight decks were covered with armed and fueled aircraft ready to launch to destroy the U.S. carriers when the U.S. SBDs hit. The resulting image is that a majority of the flight crews were killed in explosions from dropping bombs while sitting in their fully fueled and armed aircraft. The reality is that the strike aircraft were actually in the hangar decks being rearmed, and only a few CAP Zeros were on the flight decks when the SBDs from the Enterprise and Yorktown hit. As the ships went down it may be that priority was given to saving the aircrew, in particular the pilots, because the proportion of pilots lost compared to the overall percentage of losses aboard the ships was very low.

This is why so many Japanese flight crews survived the battle: They were not in their aircraft.

Note that the big loss in irreplaceable personnel was maintenance crews at the Battle of Midway, Parshall and Tully make a lot of this, but I just don't see it. I cannot find much loss of efficiency amongst the ersatz carriers that fought the remaining battles of 1942. There was however a visible and measurable loss of efficiciency amongst maintenance crews at Phil Sea. Perhaps there were some long term effects arising.

One of the reasons that we have the belief that the Japanese decks were covered with strike aircraft ready to take off and annihilate the American fleet comes from Mitsuo Fuchida's commentary about the battle. Japanese historians have commented that this misinformation may be a result of his desire to uphold the Bushido code. It makes a more heroic image that the killing blow from the SBDs hit an instant before the Japanese were to unleash the blow that would have led to their victory. It just doesn't sound as good that you got wiped out when you were down in the hangar deck getting your aircraft rearmed. That almost gets to the level that you got wiped out answering the call of nature, and no true warrior would ever admit that.

We don't know the exact proportions of aircrew losses that occurred on the carrier decks, but it cannot have been high. Perhaps 5-10% of the total. If that guess is anywhere near correct, aircrew losses that can be attributed to the ship losses might amount to 5-10 pilots and gunners combined

Resp:
Interesting!

 

[Dan Fahey]

And no where does it actually require a college education to be a great pilot.

Yes it does requires a good education.
Have you ever been to flight school especially learning all the terms to keep a plane aloft.
Engineering, designing and machining parts. Reading blueprints understanding assembly processes.
Then there is the navigation and understanding a compass. Time, Distance, position of Sun and the time of year.
Triangulation, altitude, temperature, air density etc...All require a good bit of arithmetic and math.

It requires a good Education!

All the time!

 

[fubar57]

George Beurling, Canada's top WW2 ace quit school at age 15

 

[Shortround6]

Hmmm, I understood a compass when I was in the Boy Scouts.

Most college students wouldn't know a milling machine from a lathe so you can forget machining parts.

The question is whether you need a college education to fly a plane, not build one.

Engineering, designing and machining parts. Reading blueprints understanding assembly processes.

That can be two to four years of collage all by itself. At which point you are (or could be) a production engineer and might be more valuable to the war effort doing engineering that flying a plane.

Many liberal arts students have "college" educations and can't do either engineering or navigation.

Discussing Keats or learning Latin doesn't mean you can tear down an engine (or even change a fuel filter, if they could find it).

having one or two years of collage did mean (at the time) they may have been higher motivated or better at learning anything than non college students on average and when you are setting up training programs for thousands or tens of thousands of students that is what you go on, averages.