parsifal
Colonel
In fact the majority of losses were due to reasons other than being shot down, for both sides. landing accidents, structural failures, navigational errors, the list is almost endless. So of course a side with more numbers is going to suffer a higher attrition rate.
In air to air combat, Germany continued to display superiority over the VVS until the very end. However, from a very early point this was realised by VVS and it ceased to be a priority for them to defeat, or even attempt to defeat the LW by gaining air superiority by means of air combat. Novikov issued orders to that effect from April'42 and they were never rescinded. Shooting down German a/c was a "nice to have" bonus that VVS would avail themselves, if the opportunity presented itself but it was not something the VVS went after as a priority. for them, the priority was influencing the ground battle and ensuring ones own strike aircraft were able to survive long enough to carry out that function. Once a breakthrough had been achieved on the ground, German losses to their by now exhausted and usually grounded aircraft would go through the roof as their frontline airfields were overrun and the aircraft trapped on those airfields destroyed, often by own forces. these write offs of non operational aircraft could often not appear on LW loss returns, as often such aircraft were awaiting return to depots for major overhauls and repairs, and often were removed from the LW effectives lists whilst in that condition. Moreover LW supply problems and an overall shortage of spares led to abnormally low operational rates close to the front, usually below 40% of total strengths. When the airfields these non-operational aircraft were overrun, they of course became losses, though often not reported as such.
In air to air combat, Germany continued to display superiority over the VVS until the very end. However, from a very early point this was realised by VVS and it ceased to be a priority for them to defeat, or even attempt to defeat the LW by gaining air superiority by means of air combat. Novikov issued orders to that effect from April'42 and they were never rescinded. Shooting down German a/c was a "nice to have" bonus that VVS would avail themselves, if the opportunity presented itself but it was not something the VVS went after as a priority. for them, the priority was influencing the ground battle and ensuring ones own strike aircraft were able to survive long enough to carry out that function. Once a breakthrough had been achieved on the ground, German losses to their by now exhausted and usually grounded aircraft would go through the roof as their frontline airfields were overrun and the aircraft trapped on those airfields destroyed, often by own forces. these write offs of non operational aircraft could often not appear on LW loss returns, as often such aircraft were awaiting return to depots for major overhauls and repairs, and often were removed from the LW effectives lists whilst in that condition. Moreover LW supply problems and an overall shortage of spares led to abnormally low operational rates close to the front, usually below 40% of total strengths. When the airfields these non-operational aircraft were overrun, they of course became losses, though often not reported as such.