The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

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Greetings All,

This has been a fascinating thread. So much so that I finally joined this forum to add my candidate.

My candidate for the plane that turned the tide of the war is the A6M Zero. Before you all laugh me out of the forum please hear me out. It was the Zero's phenomenal range and dominance that enabled The Japanese to conceive of the attack on Pearl Harbor. While there were three types of aircraft involved in the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese would not have taken the risk without the ability to project air superiority. The Pearl Harbor attack altered the course of the war not just in the Pacific, but in every theater. Pre-Pearl Harbor the United States had adopted the concept of Arsenal of Democracy, but public opinion was solidly against entering the fight. After December 7th, the United States was an enraged combatant committed to fully entering the war and rapidly transitioning to a war time economy. Lend-lease was accelerated and the vast quantities of materials delivered to Great Britain and the USSR were essential to the war effort. Lend lease to the USSR was especially important, not for planes and tanks, but for the raw materials and food that kept industry productive and the country from starving. Without the Zero and Pearl Harbor it is unlikely that the US enters the war and the risk of USSR collapse due to resource starvation rises significantly. It's a different take on the discussion, but I think the argument has merit.

My only comment - and not derogatory, is that if the A6M turned the tide of the war based on tactical footprint to enable Pearl Harbor, might we state that the F4F turned the tide back the other way based on the results at Midway?

I personally think that the A6M was a top choice (not the only choice) of 'best all around air supremacy fighter' in 1942, pilots being equal. That said, the P-40E and F6F although inferior in maneuverability, held their own in SWP and New Guinea against the best IJN fighter pilot cadre of WWII. Tactics introduced by Thach, exploited the A6M weaknesses while (mostly) avoiding overwhelming maneuverability. Speed and dive and tactics enabled SWP and CBI pilots to trade in P-40 vs A6M. After the P-38F and F6F entered the fray the only performance advantage remaining to the A6M was zoom climb from level medium speed and much better rate of turn at low to medium speeds.

Last comment. IMO the Bushido 'code' crippled the IJN 'top gun' pilots. The concept of teamwork and mutual protection offered by finger four and flight integrity of lead/wing never crossed or entered the mind of 'one against all'. AAF and RAAF and USN and USMC pilots were not hampered by that inspiration. The IJN 'kill 'em all' vs US 'kill 'em one at a time' failed them in the application of the very great A6M
 
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Greetings All,

This has been a fascinating thread. So much so that I finally joined this forum to add my candidate.

My candidate for the plane that turned the tide of the war is the A6M Zero. Before you all laugh me out of the forum please hear me out. It was the Zero's phenomenal range and dominance that enabled The Japanese to conceive of the attack on Pearl Harbor. While there were three types of aircraft involved in the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese would not have taken the risk without the ability to project air superiority. The Pearl Harbor attack altered the course of the war not just in the Pacific, but in every theater. Pre-Pearl Harbor the United States had adopted the concept of Arsenal of Democracy, but public opinion was solidly against entering the fight. After December 7th, the United States was an enraged combatant committed to fully entering the war and rapidly transitioning to a war time economy. Lend-lease was accelerated and the vast quantities of materials delivered to Great Britain and the USSR were essential to the war effort. Lend lease to the USSR was especially important, not for planes and tanks, but for the raw materials and food that kept industry productive and the country from starving. Without the Zero and Pearl Harbor it is unlikely that the US enters the war and the risk of USSR collapse due to resource starvation rises significantly. It's a different take on the discussion, but I think the argument has merit.
Resp:
I agree that at the time, circa 1940/41, that the A6M was a real threat. Gen Chenault submitted a detailed report to the British and USAAC/USAAF leadership in late 1940 or early 1941. I have not been able to determine the British reaction to the report, but the US leadership took one look . . . saw that Chenault wrote it . . . and dropped it in a desk drawer. Nothing was ever passed down to educate or evaluate its information. Chenault, while a Chinese General (civilian clothes) flew to Hawaii about 4 months before Pearl Harbor where he gave a 3 hour presentation on the Zero. If I remember correctly the range of the A6M was around 1.000 miles (?). The USAAC/USAAF had a written restriction of incorporating external fuel stores (drop tanks) on fighters since 1939. Bomber Command initiated the restriction that kept manufacturers that built fighters for the USAAF from making them drop tank capable. Combat Air Patrols around Hawaii would have been more practical (of course no one seemed to be thinking along this line) if drop tanks were available. Chenault was forced out of the USAAC circa 1935/36 for promoting/teaching modern fighter tactics . . . and for extending a fighter's range.
 
Greetings All,

Thank you for your replies. Admittedly, my proposal that the A6M is the plane the did the most to turn the tide of the war is based less on individual technical comparisons and more on how it influenced Japanese planning and tactical conceptualization. While not explicitly discussed in the linked article the Zero is the critical AirPower component that enable the IJN transform carrier operations.

Pearl Harbor's Overlooked Answer

One thing that I overlooked in my original post. The most immediate impact of the Zero on turning the course of the war wasn't in the Pacific, but in the eastern front. Soviet foreknowledge of the impending Japanese offensive allowed the USSR to relocate the forces needed for the winter offensive that pushed the Germans from Moscow and stabilized that front.
 
Are you saying that the Soviets knew about the Pearl Harbor attack? I though the "Siberian Transfer" was more to do with a treaty they had made with the Japanese due to the latter being miffed about the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact vis a vis Poland.
 
It was the Zero's phenomenal range and dominance that enabled The Japanese to conceive of the attack on Pearl Harbor. While there were three types of aircraft involved in the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese would not have taken the risk without the ability to project air superiority. The Pearl Harbor attack altered the course of the war not just in the Pacific, but in every theater.
IMO the Bushido 'code' crippled the IJN 'top gun' pilots.
First of all; welcome aboard NevadaK! You've brought to the table a broader perspective than our usual focus on performance, tactics, combat record and technology. Well done.
Drgondog, roger, concur. I think Bushido crippled more than IJN fighter pilots, it impeded the entire Japanese strategic approach to the war effort. The samurai sword fighter's dedication to the single swift decapitation stroke so dominated their culture that the necessity of planning and designing for a war of attrition completely escaped their thinking (With the exception of Yamamoto Isoroku).
This manifested in so many ways: failing to adequately protect the merchant shipping that carried the lifeblood of their economy; bypassing opportunities to attack enemy logistics transport because of a focus on primary combatants; a general neglect of defense in favor of offense; failing to put sufficient effort into developing the next generation of all nature of weaponry until the current one was disastrously obsolescent, and the list goes on. Any nation as resource constrained as Japan taking on a major power like the US could not afford such errors.
Cheers,
Wes
 
Are you saying that the Soviets knew about the Pearl Harbor attack? I though the "Siberian Transfer" was more to do with a treaty they had made with the Japanese due to the latter being miffed about the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact vis a vis Poland.
Yes, although there is uncertainty as to how detailed the knowledge was. They were at least aware that Japan was preparing for offensive actions against the US

Richard Sorge - Wikipedia
 
First of all; welcome aboard NevadaK! You've brought to the table a broader perspective than our usual focus on performance, tactics, combat record and technology. Well done.
Drgondog, roger, concur. I think Bushido crippled more than IJN fighter pilots, it impeded the entire Japanese strategic approach to the war effort. The samurai sword fighter's dedication to the single swift decapitation stroke so dominated their culture that the necessity of planning and designing for a war of attrition completely escaped their thinking (With the exception of Yamamoto Isoroku).
This manifested in so many ways: failing to adequately protect the merchant shipping that carried the lifeblood of their economy; bypassing opportunities to attack enemy logistics transport because of a focus on primary combatants; a general neglect of defense in favor of offense; failing to put sufficient effort into developing the next generation of all nature of weaponry until the current one was disastrously obsolescent, and the list goes on. Any nation as resource constrained as Japan taking on a major power like the US could not afford such errors.
Cheers,
Wes

My understanding of the Japanese post-War analysis for their failure was that their equipment lacked sufficient quality. My proof, Japanese automotive and electronic goods.
 
Yes, although there is uncertainty as to how detailed the knowledge was. They were at least aware that Japan was preparing for offensive actions against the US

Richard Sorge - Wikipedia
Resp:
Preparing for an offense is a far cry from knowing an attack was about to occur. Japan instigated a plan of attack after a German merchant raider boarded an Austrialian commercial vessel carrying a British assessment of Singapore defenses, noting the British's lack of advanced fighters and inadequate forces/equipment to defend an attack from inland. 6 mos from the assessment seizure Yamamoto set into motion the attack on Pearl Harbor. His prior assessment was that the two Allied forces were too much for Japan to take on, but when he found out that Singapore's defenses were weak, he ordered an attack plan be set in motion.
 
My understanding of the Japanese post-War analysis for their failure was that their equipment lacked sufficient quality. My proof, Japanese automotive and electronic goods.
Nothing wrong with the quality of their equipment. Their torpedoes were the best in the world, hands down, no contest. The Zero was a strong, well built aircraft with world class performance on a less than 1000 hp engine. It needed armor and self sealing tanks but it was not shoddily built.
 
The Japanese kit was first rate, they made a strategic error to do with attrition as some others have mentioned, the Germans basically made a similar error.

When you consider just two generations earlier they were still walking around with Samurai swords, it's really astonishing.
 
Yes, although there is uncertainty as to how detailed the knowledge was. They were at least aware that Japan was preparing for offensive actions against the US

Richard Sorge - Wikipedia

This is interesting and somewhat popular theory... but still just a theory, based on speculations of various authors in the post Soviet period and on the whole legend about Richard Sorge as the "Soviet James Bond" who allegedly informed Moscow about Barbarossa, etc. Many facsinating stories and "memoirs" but no documented evidence so far.
 
My understanding of the Japanese post-War analysis for their failure was that their equipment lacked sufficient quality. My proof, Japanese automotive and electronic goods.
It's much easier to blame the equipment than to acknowledge the shortcomings of your culture. But it sure did result in a fanatically quality conscious industrial system.
Cheers,
Wes
 
My understanding of the Japanese post-War analysis for their failure was that their equipment lacked sufficient quality. My proof, Japanese automotive and electronic goods.

It's much easier to blame the equipment than to acknowledge the shortcomings of your culture. But it sure did result in a fanatically quality conscious industrial system.
Cheers,
Wes

"Many in Japan credit Deming as one of the inspirations for what has become known as the Japanese post-war economic miracle of 1950 to 1960, when Japan rose from the ashes of war on the road to becoming the second-largest economy in the world through processes partially influenced by the ideas Deming taught"

W. Edwards Deming - Wikipedia
 
"Many in Japan credit Deming as one of the inspirations for what has become known as the Japanese post-war economic miracle of 1950 to 1960, when Japan rose from the ashes of war on the road to becoming the second-largest economy in the world through processes partially influenced by the ideas Deming taught"

W. Edwards Deming - Wikipedia
Modern mechanization and an embracing of the ideas of others is what made Japan a world economic power.
The idea of the old farmer plodding down the "road" (we might call it an easement or a driveway) on a cart pulled by an ox ended with the war, although changes didn't exactly happen over night.
 
Modern mechanization and an embracing of the ideas of others is what made Japan a world economic power.
The idea of the old farmer plodding down the "road" (we might call it an easement or a driveway) on a cart pulled by an ox ended with the war, although changes didn't exactly happen over night.

I believe it's more to do with their culture.
The strict schooling and education system (did you ever see the tv series about young Japanese school children, particularly doing mental Maths using just an abacus and the teacher was speaking to the kids in quickfire order giving them several seven figure numbers to add and they were right with it. Try doing that with Western kids just using two figure numbers).
The self discipline, the commitment to work and to do a good job and the pressure to get it right first time and not fail.
Their mentality is serious, they are put under pressure to learn to do things correctly from a young age and instilled with it, much like the Germans were (or maybe still are).
This to me, as I understand it is what makes Germany and Japan different.
Just look at the crime rate in Japan now in comparison to any other country: Crime Index by Country 2019 Mid-Year

Back in the time we are talking about (WW2) .......the West portrayed Japanese people as small, yellow skinned, sub-human and incapable. There were propaganda posters made at the time showing a Japanese man wearing glasses with really thick lenses (because their eyesight "apparently'' was so poor).
They were vastly under-rated.

As for the thread, if there was anything that made a difference in the war, it wasn't a particular plane. It was military intelligence IMO.

:salute:
 
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Back in the time we are talking about (WW2) .......the West portrayed Japanese people as small, yellow skinned, sub-human and incapable. There were propaganda posters made at the time showing a Japanese man wearing glasses with really thick lenses (because their eyesight was so poor).
They were vastly under-rated.

I'm afraid such racism continues to this day, albeit less overt. Most books about the Malayan Campaign focus on how the British "lost Singapore", the inference being that the British should have won. That view completely ignores the fact that British forces in the theatre were third rate at best but they were confronted by well-led, first-rate Japanese forces which, at point of contact, almost always outnumbered and out-gunned the defending British forces.

The British didnt "lose" Singapore. The Japanese won through superior training, ability to bring greater power to bear at decisive points, and better generalship.
 
The British didnt "lose" Singapore. The Japanese won through superior training, ability to bring greater power to
General Yamashita Tomoyuki, "the Tiger of Malaya" was an anomaly in the Japanese military, as a non samurai with enlisted experience who rose to high rank in a class conscious institution. He was such a brilliant leader and tactician that he scared MacArthur (who was responsible for post-war governance of Japan) into executing him through a "kangaroo court" proceeding in the Philippines outside of the regular war criminal trial system. Mac didn't trust the trial system to get rid of him, and feared him as potential political dynamite if he ever got back to Japan.
Cheers,
Wes
 

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