It doesn't matter how many were knocked out, what matters in this argument is that the US allowed about 500 M3 tanks to be sent to Egypt between Pearl Harbor and Midway, plus hundreds of M3 light tanks. Plus other assorted material. WHich is hardly putting the Pacific first although I will grant is was little hard to figure out what to do with hundreds of 30 ton tanks in the Pacific in 1942.
Well there was always the Philippines. But my point is not that they didn't send any tanks before Midway or that the ones they sent didn't do any good, but rather that they would not have been able to send as much stuff after if they had lost at Midway. El Alamein is seen as such a major victory because in the words of Churchill "We never won a battle [in North Africa] before El Alamein and we never lost a battle after it." The second half of that statement had a lot to do with American support. After the M3s (which were good for a minute but quickly became obsolete) came M4s (which remained effective for a bit longer). And along with them plenty of artillery, self propelled howitzers, trucks, food, fuel, heavy machine guns, mortars, and of course, more and more aircraft - not just fighters but also far more effective bombers than had been used in Theater before.
After El Alamein the Allies won a series of victories in North Africa rapidly leading to the defeat of the Afrika Korps in Tunisia. Which was followed in fairly rapid succession by the neutralization of Pantelleria (the Axis Malta), the invasion of Sicily, the invasion of Italy, and the first capitulation of the Italian government. I'm not sure these things would have happened so swiftly without the enormous quantity of military assets and logistical support sent by the US from the second half of 1942 and arriving in the MTO in later 1942 and 1943.
I don't intend to discuss how good or bad the P-40 was in general or it's record. What is important to this discussion is that the P-40Fs with the Merlins went to NA (except for a few squadrons) while the Pacific had to get along with P-40Es and later Ks. Simplified logistics or sending the better P-40s to fight Germany first?
Well that is taking a rather linear approach, and I guess it hinges on what you think the importance of the P-40 was in general. But I do have a correction or two.
First - the P-40F was not a competitor with the P-40E in US service. The British and Commonwealth units were still using the equivalent of the P-40D and E in North Africa but the Americans had switched over to the K* and later the N in the Pacific. Second - P-40Ks did serve in the MTO for a while (with the 57th FG) due to a shortage of the Fs, and didn't seem to do terribly badly.
Second - this is somewhat subjective, but I would not argue that the P-40F/L was automatically the better version of the plane. The F was the better version
to fight the Germans and Italians, with their DB 600 series high flying, fast fighters. However the P-40K was probably the better aircraft for fighting the Japanese in the CBI and New Guinea and so on. It was faster down low and the engine seemed to do better in the Tropical environment (that is the real reason why only a small number of F models were ever deployed to the South Pacific).
Just look at the distance involved. Japanese reaching Karachi means by passing the Indian peninsula or taking a large part of southern India?
I admit it's a stretch - it's certainly speculative. But I don't really see why the Japanese should be able to overrun China and Burma would have necessarily been unable to conquer large parts of India (say the coastline) if they had a free hand (i.e. if the US had been beaten back to a defensive posture on the mainland). Again, granted, it's pure speculation I have little to base that on.
The Japanese had over 20 years to preposition supplies/base materials at Truk, No such time (or shipping) was available to stage intermediate bases from Malaysia and while Rangoon did fall in March of 1942 pushing thousands of miles beyond that might have been beyond the capacity of the Japanese,
Well one thing they could do in Burma that they couldn't in Truk is get a lot of supplies there by rail. If they weren't contending with intensive US support for China (including all the US air units) they may not have had much to hold them back. If there were a bunch of USN debacles in 1942 I don't see why the Japanese
Also lets keep in mind, again admittedly in the land of speculation - if the Japanese military had all the resources of mainland China plus the Pacific Rim available to them more or less free and clear, i.e. without much US interference and only whatever the British could do from India, they would concievably have had resources and assets comparable to what was available to the US, albeit without anywhere near the same industrial capacity. It's still a sizeable economic base.
* or E's re-engined to the K standard (V-1710-73) which is basically the same thing