The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

buffnut453 said:

But that's my whole point. At no stage during the war, nor under any conceivable set of circumstances was the US in a "death struggle" with Japan. Japan was in a death struggle with the US but not vice-versa. America was never under threat of defeat, so any action by the IJN would probably have extended the war but it's very doubtful, IMHO, that it would have altered the result.

I think we need to stop talking about fish-heads and get back to aircraft, though.

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Let me explain my point, I thought it was obvious but I'll spell it out:

• We all know that Midway was a very close run thing, in fact not a little bit of luck was involved as well as leveraging of every available asset to the maximum possible, from things like radar to the capabilities of the Allied aircraft involved: SBD, F4F, TBF, B-26, PBY etc.
• If Midway had gone the other way, as it very well could have, and instead it had resulted in a major US defeat, that would have had serious repercussions.
• If due to losses at Midway, subsequent battles had also gone against the US, the knock-on effects would have been substantially more drastic.

Perhaps, ultimately the US would have won the war due to economics. Maybe they would have rallied in 1943 or 1944. But all it would take is a few serious setbacks, which without any doubt could easily have happened - and the US would have felt sufficiently threatened to seriously diminish the support which could have been sent to the other Allies and the timetable of their tras-Atlantic participation could have been pushed back substantially.

If Midway had failed torch wouldn't have been as robust and may have failed altogether. This extends the timeline of the war substantially. Extending the timeline of the war could have had unforseen outcomes of many kinds.

If for example, the US had been equipped with Fairey Swordfish (or say, Skuas) instead of SBD Dauntlesses I am confident they would have lost Midway and Coral Sea both and the Pacific War would have gone quite differently.

rednev said:

All well and good saying this aircraft sank x amount of destroyers or so many battleships but what aircraft sank the most freight tonnage or troopship tonnage .

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I posted the estimate (not my estimate) of 300,000 tons by the SBD and almost 2,000,000 tons by the US Navy aircraft in general (from two sources). How does this compare to the Swordfish?

When I point ed this out incidentally I was told by somebody upthread that tonnage didn't count and "what battles and major victories were won?" so I pointed out the number of CV, Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers and so on.

(double post)

Shortround6 said:

AS M4s showed up in North Africa the M3s were taken out of service and shipped to the Far East.
about 200 Grants were shipped before Gazala, another 250 showed up in June of 1942 (shipped when?) and by 2nd Alamein over 600 Grant and Lee tanks were in the Mideast along with about 300 M4 tanks (270 in service for the Battle). This does not count Stuart light tanks or any other vehicles (1/2 tracks?)
The P-40F was 2nd best US army fighter available at the time after the P-38. The vast majority went to North Africa as fast as deliveries would allow.
Before Torch all aid/material (except aircraft) that went to NA had to go around Africa and up to Egypt which meant a supply line measured in weeks and often several months.

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The US made tanks were generally attributed as a major factor in victory at 2nd El Alamein. They were better against the German tanks and probably more important, much better against AT guns, artillery and infantry etc. In spite of this of course I think almost all of them were destroyed.

The P-40F may have been 2nd or 3rd best US Army fighter (don't forget US Army Air Force also operated two Spitfire groups) but it was the one they were most able to use as air cover over the battlefield. P-38s had a tough time in low altitude combat and, after one group had to be shut down, they were utilized mainly to escort heavy bombers in Theater at high(ish) altitudes. This was an important role but it wasn't, arguably, the most important role. The Spits were as always limited by range and weren't ideal in the ground attack role. The P-40F had the range and was equally proficient in ground attack or escort / fighter sweep duties. So it was pretty important. I don't know if I'd go all the way to crucial or vital for the MTO alone, but if you added up P-40 roles in South Pacific, MTO, Russia and CBI it becomes more significant.

Using the benefit of hindsight the Japanese ability to operate in either the Atlantic Ocean or western Indian Ocean for any period of time would have been severely hampered by fuel shortages. it is about 2000 miles from Ceylon to Somalia where the choke point is. It is about 1800-1900 miles from Singapore to Ceylon.

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The Solomons etc. were also quite far for the Japanese, as you know to deal with this they pre-positioned supplies. Presumably if they could push into India, without US interference it's not beyond the pale that they could have reached as far as say, Karachi to use as a staging base. Of course it's all speculation which always gets us in trouble around here....

Shortround6 said:

I think we we need to see numbers that at least reflect some version of reality. I know you are just posting the tables and did not make them. but lets look at table 1 in your post.

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This is key. Were you referring to the table I posted as an image or the second one which was a link only?

The US Navy is supposed to have made attacks (total sorties) of 4989 against armored ships and 6582 against unarmored warships.

This paints a rather distorted picture as the same target was attacked many times and in fact could have been attacked multiple times (over the course of several years)

It could also be padded by counting the number of ships/hulks sunk in Japanese harbors at the end of the war. An ex Russian war prize of the 1904-5 Russian Japanese war may "count" as an armoured ship for statistical purposes but does skew the results

The Japanese Navy went to war with 6 battleships and 4 battle cruisers that dated to before 1922, (heavily upgraded) 13 light cruisers ( single 5.5 in guns for the most part) and about 50 destroyers of 859-1300tons. Whether they are "armoured" is certainly subject to question. A bit of bullet proof plating around the bridge?

The Japanese added from 1922 on (an some of the above were actually completed after 1922) 2 battleships. about 25 carriers (of assorted effectiveness and lineage) about 32 cruisers that ranged from repeats of the old 5500 tons ships to the modern 10 gun heavy cruisers. and about 155-160 destroyers, destroy escorts and steam torpedo boats. There were more escort and sub chasers but you get the idea.

The two charts also give no dates. a number of the numbers of ships sunk may date to the last few months of the war when the US carrier forces ravaged the Japanese home Islands.
View attachment 557370
The Izumo and her sister ship were both sunk at Kure by carrier aircraft in July of 1945 for example.



.

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I agree for the most part with your points, however the tonnage of shipping sunk is probably correct and I stand by my statement that the Japanese navy was the most dangerous on the Axis side, and the second most dangerous in the World in WW II.

That's a lot of ifs, buts, maybes, linear reasoning, rolls of dice and navy and army topics to get to the one plane you feel turned the tide of war, the SBD.

Your argument should then be extended to its inevitable outcome however: the plane that gave the US its headstart at Midway, the Catalina.

Although ... if we continue with what-ifs: the reason Japan came south was because that was the navy's master plan. And that became Japan's master plan after the army's defeat in the very early days of WW2 against the Soviets over Mongolia (in the most crowded dogfights ever). Had the army won that, its masterplan would have been followed, Japan wouldn't have sailed to Hawai and the Soviet Union might well have been attacked on both fronts, leaving the US out of it. The plane that had the biggest impact on that Mongolian conflict was the Tupolev SB, which thus must be the pivotal WW2 plane.

buffnut453 said:

Wes,

You beat me to the punch...and I agree wholeheartedly.

The point I was going to make was that, while Japan had the largest Axis naval fleet, the threat was almost entirely tactical in nature. It posed very little threat at the operational and strategic levels. For example, even if Japan had taken Guadalcanal, Midway and even Hawaii, it would not have resulted in outright victory for Japan because none of those geographic areas were critical to the survival of the US and its Allies. Yes, the threat to Australia would have increased but the likelihood of a successful attack by Japan is vanishingly small given the distances involved and the forces necessary for a power that was already stretched to breaking point. The use of the IJN to support operations into India was also unlikely to do much. As it was, the bulk of the Japanese Army was ground down in the jungles of Burma. Having even long-range fires from battleships and throwing in a number of aircraft carriers isn't going to change that, not least because the IJA and IJN just couldn't cooperate effectively. Japan was a regional power going up an established global power and an emerging global superpower. The ultimate end-state was predetermined.

Compare that with the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic and the story is very different. While the actual Axis force was smaller, the operational and strategic effect was disproportionately larger for both the US and the UK. The Battle of the Atlantic was a "must win" campaign whereas pretty much every battle in the Pacific could afford to be lost. Thus the actual threat posed by German convoy attacks was of far greater import than any number of Japanese aircraft carriers.

Just my two penn'orth.

Cheers,
Mark

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Very interesting analysis. I hadn't actually thought about it that way before.
Just thinking out loud here but maybe the dynamics are actually similar in that either way nobody is going to invade the mainland U.S., at least not successfully so the similarity is if the Germans win in the Atlantic its Europe that suffers from lack of U.S. help, if the Japanese do in the Pacific it's China, Burma, Philippines etc. That suffer.

Beejay said:

The plane that had the biggest impact on that Mongolian conflict was the Tupolev SB, which thus must be the pivotal WW2 plane.

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I'm not sure about "the biggest impact". There was one impressive raid of SB bombers on 20th August and that was it. Flights of all bombers (not just SB) - about 10% of all VVS flights during the conflict. Share of flights assigned to interdiction and to support of ground troops was about 20%.

European Theatre of Operations---Avro Lancaster
Asiatic Pacific Theatre---B-29
John

pinsog said:

Not sure that would apply against Germany due to the amount of planes on all sides. Japan might be different due to the much smaller, early war, number of planes. McClusky is a pretty good choice. I'll toss in:
1. Richard Best at Midway scoring the only hit on Akagi, single handedly sinking a major fleet carrier
2. Shooting down Yamamoto

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Resp:
2. Shooting down Yamamoto.
I have read two different sources that indicate the mission planning by the actual P-38 pilots was done in less than 24 hrs. That three B-24s flew in special drop tanks (one 310 and one 165 gallon) for the P-38s the night before, to go the distance. Ground crews worked thru the night fitting the oversize 310 gal tank w special brackets. Washington leadership spent time deciding if an attack such as this was even legal. However, military experts worked out the numbers to determine whether it could be done, and . . . how it could be done. So the decision also included a flight plan.
So given so little time, it is just mind boggling that it was so successful. My hat is off to the men involved.

XBe02Drvr said:

Empty, except for a bored young fighter pilot who was not fully qualified to stand that watch, but was covering for somebody else. He was at least well enough informed to know about the incoming B17 flight, and when the radar guys reported their returns, he figured that was what they had seen. Radar was new and mysterious, and procedures not very sophisticated. If this had been a BoB type sophisticated radar early warning system he could have been fed enough detailed information to smell a rat. Numbers of targets, direction of approach, and closing velocity would have been inconsistent with a few B17s from California. The mindset just wasn't there to be suspicious. Besides, when have the peacetime Army and Navy ever worked together on intelligence and force protection matters?
Kudos to LCDR Outerbridge and the crew of USS Ward, who drew the first blood of the Pacific war. BTW, three years to the day after Pearl Harbor, Ward was hit by a kamikaze, burned out, and abandoned, but the tough old gal refused to sink. CDR Outerbridge, now in command of another ship, was assigned the task of scuttling her by gunfire.
Cheers,
Wes

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Agreed. Today, most int ops are joint service manned. Threats are looked at from many angles.

Schweik said:

Let me explain my point, I thought it was obvious but I'll spell it out:

• We all know that Midway was a very close run thing, in fact not a little bit of luck was involved as well as leveraging of every available asset to the maximum possible, from things like radar to the capabilities of the Allied aircraft involved: SBD, F4F, TBF, B-26, PBY etc.
• If Midway had gone the other way, as it very well could have, and instead it had resulted in a major US defeat, that would have had serious repercussions.
• If due to losses at Midway, subsequent battles had also gone against the US, the knock-on effects would have been substantially more drastic.

Perhaps, ultimately the US would have won the war due to economics. Maybe they would have rallied in 1943 or 1944. But all it would take is a few serious setbacks, which without any doubt could easily have happened - and the US would have felt sufficiently threatened to seriously diminish the support which could have been sent to the other Allies and the timetable of their tras-Atlantic participation could have been pushed back substantially.

If Midway had failed torch wouldn't have been as robust and may have failed altogether. This extends the timeline of the war substantially. Extending the timeline of the war could have had unforseen outcomes of many kinds.

If for example, the US had been equipped with Fairey Swordfish (or say, Skuas) instead of SBD Dauntlesses I am confident they would have lost Midway and Coral Sea both and the Pacific War would have gone quite differently.

Click to expand...

Again, lots of "what ifs" in all of that. Loss of Midway was not critical to the defence of the USA. What does Japan get out of a Midway victory? Yet another small island that has to be resupplied by transport vessels that are already over-tasked. The fundamental war-winner for the Allies was the plain and simple fact that they were out-producing the Axis by a significant margin while the Axis had extremely limited capabilities to address that deficit. The U-boat campaign was one of the most successful. Nothing Japan did, or could do, came close.

Yes, loss of all US aircraft carriers would extend the war but that still doesn't help Japan when it's being outproduced hand over fist. Japan couldn't resupply the islands they did have, so adding yet more transportation needs isn't going to help. At the end of the day, those great WW2 maps showing a big red swath of Japanese-occupied geography was, in reality, a few, relatively small islands entirely separated, which allowed the Allies to defeat them in detail...or simply move past them and let them wither away.

None of the vessels engaged in Midway had any impact on actions in Europe or North Africa. The Allies could afford to let Japan take Midway and just wait until production replaced any losses. Again, that was why the "Germany First" strategy was enacted...because Japan wasn't an existential threat.

Schweik said:

The US made tanks were generally attributed as a major factor in victory at 2nd El Alamein. They were better against the German tanks and probably more important, much better against AT guns, artillery and infantry etc. In spite of this of course I think almost all of them were destroyed.

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It doesn't matter how many were knocked out, what matters in this argument is that the US allowed about 500 M3 tanks to be sent to Egypt between Pearl Harbor and Midway, plus hundreds of M3 light tanks. Plus other assorted material. WHich is hardly putting the Pacific first although I will grant is was little hard to figure out what to do with hundreds of 30 ton tanks in the Pacific in 1942.

The P-40F may have been 2nd or 3rd best US Army fighter (don't forget US Army Air Force also operated two Spitfire groups) but it was the one they were most able to use as air cover over the battlefield. P-38s had ................................, but if you added up P-40 roles in South Pacific, MTO, Russia and CBI it becomes more significant.

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I don't intend to discuss how good or bad the P-40 was in general or it's record. What is important to this discussion is that the P-40Fs with the Merlins went to NA (except for a few squadrons) while the Pacific had to get along with P-40Es and later Ks. Simplified logistics or sending the better P-40s to fight Germany first?

The Solomons etc. were also quite far for the Japanese, as you know to deal with this they pre-positioned supplies. Presumably if they could push into India, without US interference it's not beyond the pale that they could have reached as far as say, Karachi to use as a staging base. Of course it's all speculation which always gets us in trouble around here....

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Just look at the distance involved. Japanese reaching Karachi means by passing the Indian peninsula or taking a large part of southern India?

The Japanese had over 20 years to preposition supplies/base materials at Truk, No such time (or shipping) was available to stage intermediate bases from Malaysia and while Rangoon did fall in March of 1942 pushing thousands of miles beyond that might have been beyond the capacity of the Japanese,

buffnut453 said:

Again, lots of "what ifs" in all of that. Loss of Midway was not critical to the defence of the USA. What does Japan get out of a Midway victory? Yet another small island that has to be resupplied by transport vessels that are already over-tasked. The fundamental war-winner for the Allies was the plain and simple fact that they were out-producing the Axis by a significant margin while the Axis had extremely limited capabilities to address that deficit. The U-boat campaign was one of the most successful. Nothing Japan did, or could do, came close.

Yes, loss of all US aircraft carriers would extend the war but that still doesn't help Japan when it's being outproduced hand over fist. Japan couldn't resupply the islands they did have, so adding yet more transportation needs isn't going to help. At the end of the day, those great WW2 maps showing a big red swath of Japanese-occupied geography was, in reality, a few, relatively small islands entirely separated, which allowed the Allies to defeat them in detail...or simply move past them and let them wither away.

None of the vessels engaged in Midway had any impact on actions in Europe or North Africa. The Allies could afford to let Japan take Midway and just wait until production replaced any losses. Again, that was why the "Germany First" strategy was enacted...because Japan wasn't an existential threat.

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Resp:
The notion that they US would 'let' Japan do/have anything after Pearl Harbor is a 'false notion.' Logic was out the window! Roosevelt wanted 'satisfaction.' ADM King flew out to California to see Nimitz. Their conversation went something like this; King to Nimitz: 'we (US Navy) aren't defending anything (meaning the craze in California), I want you to attack (Japanese Naval Forces), attack . . . attack!! Do you understand? Nimitz: Yes air! A USN Submariner assigned to Norfolk, VA was reporting to duty one cold day when he spotted a 'painted outline of an aircraft carrier' on the Tarmac. For some reason, a B-25 (PBJ) Mitchell was parked nearby. He forwarded his idea of the possible launching of Mitchells from an aircraft carrier. Two launches were done off the coast of New England. However, each time there was only one Mitchell onboard. Training and problem solving soon began at Elgin Field, Florida. The rest is history.

Schweik said:

Let me explain my point, I thought it was obvious but I'll spell it out:

• We all know that Midway was a very close run thing, in fact not a little bit of luck was involved as well as leveraging of every available asset to the maximum possible, from things like radar to the capabilities of the Allied aircraft involved: SBD, F4F, TBF, B-26, PBY etc.
• If Midway had gone the other way, as it very well could have, and instead it had resulted in a major US defeat, that would have had serious repercussions.
• If due to losses at Midway, subsequent battles had also gone against the US, the knock-on effects would have been substantially more drastic.

Perhaps, ultimately the US would have won the war due to economics. Maybe they would have rallied in 1943 or 1944. But all it would take is a few serious setbacks, which without any doubt could easily have happened - and the US would have felt sufficiently threatened to seriously diminish the support which could have been sent to the other Allies and the timetable of their tras-Atlantic participation could have been pushed back substantially.

If Midway had failed torch wouldn't have been as robust and may have failed altogether. This extends the timeline of the war substantially. Extending the timeline of the war could have had unforseen outcomes of many kinds.

If for example, the US had been equipped with Fairey Swordfish (or say, Skuas) instead of SBD Dauntlesses I am confident they would have lost Midway and Coral Sea both and the Pacific War would have gone quite differently.

Click to expand...

Actually the majority of the follow on battles did go against the United States. People over look the fact that the USN lost as many fleet carriers in 1942 as the IJN. 4 each. With the damage to Enterprise the USN had one fleet carrier left in the Pacific in December 1942. They had to borrow HMS Victorious and modify it a fair bit to match American procedures. It served in the Pacific alongside Saratoga for the first half of of 1943. The Japanese also gave several kickings to the USN surface fleet. The naval battles off Guadalcanal were brutal affairs. Fully half of the US heavy cruisers were sunk or knocked out for months (6 sunk and 3 very heavily damaged). Most of 1943 was a period of recovery for the US.
While Midway was obviously very important Guadalcanal was the true turning point where the Japanese offensive was finally stopped at great cost to the USN and the USM. On the other hand without Midway Guadalcanal likely falls to the Japanese.

Navalwarrior said:

Resp:
2. Shooting down Yamamoto.
I have read two different sources that indicate the mission planning by the actual P-38 pilots was done in less than 24 hrs. That three B-24s flew in special drop tanks (one 310 and one 165 gallon) for the P-38s the night before, to go the distance. Ground crews worked thru the night fitting the oversize 310 gal tank w special brackets. Washington leadership spent time deciding if an attack such as this was even legal. However, military experts worked out the numbers to determine whether it could be done, and . . . how it could be done. So the decision also included a flight plan.
So given so little time, it is just mind boggling that it was so successful. My hat is off to the men involved.

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After reading Shattered Sword I've come to the conclusion that Yamamoto more valuable to the US alive than dead. It was his convoluted plan that lead to the loss of the 4 carriers at Midway.

buffnut453 said:

Again, lots of "what ifs" in all of that. Loss of Midway was not critical to the defence of the USA. What does Japan get out of a Midway victory

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Midway was the stepping stone to Hawaii.

Yes, loss of all US aircraft carriers would extend the war but that still doesn't help Japan when it's being outproduced hand over fist.

(snip)

None of the vessels engaged in Midway had any impact on actions in Europe or North Africa. The Allies could afford to let Japan take Midway and just wait until production replaced any losses. Again, that was why the "Germany First" strategy was enacted...because Japan wasn't an existential threat.

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I'm sorry but I really don't think it is that complicated. Midway was a very 'close run thing' - as it was it really could have gone either way, certainly it would have if the US had inferior planes (like a Swordfish) instead of the SBDs they used to sink the carriers.

If the US had lost Midway, despite your confident predictions that victory was inevitable, the US would have put a lot more effort into the Pacific War and therefore less of what they had to support England and Russia - and both El Alamein and Stalingrad were also close run things. The tipping point of the war could have been delayed a year or more.

And that definitely could have been trouble.

However this does not mean I think the SBD was the one and only MVP of WW2 aircraft, it does however contribute to my assertion that the Swordfish wasn't in the running.

Reluctant Poster said:

Actually the majority of the follow on battles did go against the United States. People over look the fact that the USN lost as many fleet carriers in 1942 as the IJN. 4 each. With the damage to Enterprise the USN had one fleet carrier left in the Pacific in December 1942. They had to borrow HMS Victorious and

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I don't think it's a correct statement to say that the majority of follow on battles went against the US, some did some didn't. Even some of the defeats involved substantial setbacks for the IJN.

A roughly even swap of carriers was 'Ok' with the US for 1942 because of the whole production / logistics advantage of the US, specifically their new Essex class ships were coming online quickly. However if the US had the exchange been more lopsided (i.e. a major defeat for the US at Midway), that would mean a lot longer before parity was reached and that the US would remain decidedly off balance. Resulting in the obvious scenario that the US military and industrial capacity would have been directed more into the Pacific than into any other Theater.

As it was Guadalcanal was slowly but steadily going the way of the US, albeit with several titanic naval battles far larger than any others which took place in the Atlantic, some of which were major defeats for the USN, sufficient damage was inflicted on the Japanese navy and the Marines did well enough in the land battle that the outcome was clear.

I don't believe HMS Victorious played any significant role in any major battles of the the Pacific War during it's brief service with the fleet. It had some involvement in the invasion of New Georgia I think that is about it.

While Midway was obviously very important Guadalcanal was the true turning point where the Japanese offensive was finally stopped at great cost to the USN and the USM. On the other hand without Midway Guadalcanal likely falls to the Japanese.

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The Navy actually lost more men at or near Guadalcanal than the Marines did.

Shortround6 said:

It doesn't matter how many were knocked out, what matters in this argument is that the US allowed about 500 M3 tanks to be sent to Egypt between Pearl Harbor and Midway, plus hundreds of M3 light tanks. Plus other assorted material. WHich is hardly putting the Pacific first although I will grant is was little hard to figure out what to do with hundreds of 30 ton tanks in the Pacific in 1942.

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Well there was always the Philippines. But my point is not that they didn't send any tanks before Midway or that the ones they sent didn't do any good, but rather that they would not have been able to send as much stuff after if they had lost at Midway. El Alamein is seen as such a major victory because in the words of Churchill "We never won a battle [in North Africa] before El Alamein and we never lost a battle after it." The second half of that statement had a lot to do with American support. After the M3s (which were good for a minute but quickly became obsolete) came M4s (which remained effective for a bit longer). And along with them plenty of artillery, self propelled howitzers, trucks, food, fuel, heavy machine guns, mortars, and of course, more and more aircraft - not just fighters but also far more effective bombers than had been used in Theater before.

After El Alamein the Allies won a series of victories in North Africa rapidly leading to the defeat of the Afrika Korps in Tunisia. Which was followed in fairly rapid succession by the neutralization of Pantelleria (the Axis Malta), the invasion of Sicily, the invasion of Italy, and the first capitulation of the Italian government. I'm not sure these things would have happened so swiftly without the enormous quantity of military assets and logistical support sent by the US from the second half of 1942 and arriving in the MTO in later 1942 and 1943.

I don't intend to discuss how good or bad the P-40 was in general or it's record. What is important to this discussion is that the P-40Fs with the Merlins went to NA (except for a few squadrons) while the Pacific had to get along with P-40Es and later Ks. Simplified logistics or sending the better P-40s to fight Germany first?

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Well that is taking a rather linear approach, and I guess it hinges on what you think the importance of the P-40 was in general. But I do have a correction or two.

First - the P-40F was not a competitor with the P-40E in US service. The British and Commonwealth units were still using the equivalent of the P-40D and E in North Africa but the Americans had switched over to the K* and later the N in the Pacific. Second - P-40Ks did serve in the MTO for a while (with the 57th FG) due to a shortage of the Fs, and didn't seem to do terribly badly.

Second - this is somewhat subjective, but I would not argue that the P-40F/L was automatically the better version of the plane. The F was the better version to fight the Germans and Italians, with their DB 600 series high flying, fast fighters. However the P-40K was probably the better aircraft for fighting the Japanese in the CBI and New Guinea and so on. It was faster down low and the engine seemed to do better in the Tropical environment (that is the real reason why only a small number of F models were ever deployed to the South Pacific).

Just look at the distance involved. Japanese reaching Karachi means by passing the Indian peninsula or taking a large part of southern India?

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I admit it's a stretch - it's certainly speculative. But I don't really see why the Japanese should be able to overrun China and Burma would have necessarily been unable to conquer large parts of India (say the coastline) if they had a free hand (i.e. if the US had been beaten back to a defensive posture on the mainland). Again, granted, it's pure speculation I have little to base that on.

The Japanese had over 20 years to preposition supplies/base materials at Truk, No such time (or shipping) was available to stage intermediate bases from Malaysia and while Rangoon did fall in March of 1942 pushing thousands of miles beyond that might have been beyond the capacity of the Japanese,

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Well one thing they could do in Burma that they couldn't in Truk is get a lot of supplies there by rail. If they weren't contending with intensive US support for China (including all the US air units) they may not have had much to hold them back. If there were a bunch of USN debacles in 1942 I don't see why the Japanese

Also lets keep in mind, again admittedly in the land of speculation - if the Japanese military had all the resources of mainland China plus the Pacific Rim available to them more or less free and clear, i.e. without much US interference and only whatever the British could do from India, they would concievably have had resources and assets comparable to what was available to the US, albeit without anywhere near the same industrial capacity. It's still a sizeable economic base.

* or E's re-engined to the K standard (V-1710-73) which is basically the same thing

Beejay said:

That's a lot of ifs, buts, maybes, linear reasoning, rolls of dice and navy and army topics to get to the one plane you feel turned the tide of war, the SBD.

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Actually not. At least not just the SBD. I believe I posted my response to the OP many many pages upthread, can't be bothered to look for it but I think I remember suggesting a handful of options, the SBD was one of them but I also included several others.

My point in the discussion was simply that the SBD far exceeded the value of the Swordfish.

Your argument should then be extended to its inevitable outcome however: the plane that gave the US its headstart at Midway, the Catalina.

Although ... if we continue with what-ifs: the reason Japan came south was because that was the navy's master plan. And that became Japan's master plan after the army's defeat in the very early days of WW2 against the Soviets over Mongolia (in the most crowded dogfights ever). Had the army won that, its masterplan would have been followed, Japan wouldn't have sailed to Hawai and the Soviet Union might well have been attacked on both fronts, leaving the US out of it. The plane that had the biggest impact on that Mongolian conflict was the Tupolev SB, which thus must be the pivotal WW2 plane.

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Interesting theory but it sure aint mine...