The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

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Stick a 1000hp Wright R-1820 (TO) into the Skua instead of that 830hp Perseus (TO) and I wonder if the Skua couldn't have carried somewhat more fuel and and bigger bomb?

timing counts, The Skua was older and lower powered, of course it couldn't do some of what the SBD did. But at Midway many of the SBDs that attacked the Japanese carriers used 500lb bombs and only some used 1000lb bombs, so the SBDs 1200 or 2250lb bomb load was irrelevant to the battle.

I think the 1,000 lb bombs counted, but more importantly on the very long flights the Skua would have been limited to a 250 lb bomb. And as we have discussed before, the size of the bomb does matter when you are trying to sink big ships, especially big ships with armor.
 
The British were also aware of the Skua's shortcomings, this is why it didn't remain on carrier decks for long. The RN's acquisition policy and ownership of fleet responsibilities between the wars makes it all a complex situation that could have been avoided and it meant aircraft like the Skua and Swordfish were in service for longer than need be and that the latter's replacement wasn't much of an improvement when aircraft like the B5N and Devastator was on carrier decks when the Albacore was in service.

To be honest, I don't think the Devastator was that good or much better than a Swordfish really, despite having a slightly more modern appearance.

The RN had put out specifications to industry for modern single-seat fighters in 1939 before the war broke out, that the Firebrand was a dog was down to the manufacturers, also the RN was very keen on a Sea Spitfire at this time too, making it clear that was what was wanted.`In 1937 a modern eplacement for the Swordfish was tendered for, as an 'all singing all dancing' dive bomber, torpedo carrier, reconnaissance type spec S.24/37, which through much prevarication over the years ended up being the Barracuda. Again, that it took so long to enter service was down to design issues.

The Barracuda was one of many aircraft given that dreadful multi-role mission, this was the death-knell of a lot of other attack aircraft, both during WW2 and to this very day. It's very difficult to make a plane that can be both a successful dive bomber and a torpedo bomber, and still fly with a reasonable speed and combat range. Very few designs pulled that off.

In some ways the Barracuda suffered from similar problems to the SB2C meant to replace the SBD. They made a lot of demands which resulted in a plane that was too heavy and too big to fit on the carrier elevators and they squished the tail to be too short so that it could fit, cursing it with stability problems and bad handling.

I do think the FAA had some issues with procurement policies. Their insistence on putting a low altitude rated engine in the Barracuda (and a lot of other naval aircraft) also caused a lot of problems. Similar for their demand for a second-seater on their fighters which plagued the Fulmar and the Firefly.
 
I do have books describing these, but in the past when I have taken the effort to transcribe this kind of data it has not resolved the discussion to any kind of reasonable conclusion,

As long as you transcribe the data correctly, there's no problem.
 
As long as you transcribe the data correctly, there's no problem.

Oh sometimes there is, trust me. Somebody always has a different idea of how you ought to do it. And regardless of how obviously the data refutes their claims, some people will display the courage of the genuine fanatic to resist reality.
 
Oh sometimes there is, trust me. Somebody always has a different idea of how you ought to do it. And regardless of how obviously the data refutes their claims, some people will display the courage of the genuine fanatic to resist reality.

This is your assertion, so the onus is on you.
 
Schweik,

When did the big wing, welded wingmen give way to the pairs and finger fours? Those two types of formations, and ensuing tactics were the proverbial recipe for disaster when fighting a combat experienced adversary.

Cheers,
Biff

In a comedy only the British could produce the big wing actually came after some squadrons were using finger fours.

Big Wing did not mean welded wingman. The battle pair and finger four was being adopted piecemeal as early as May 1940. The objective of the Big Wing was to get a large mass of fighters into position to attack the enemy. Once sighted, the wing would dissolve into tactical units. It was not intended to attack masse as a wing, with everyone following one formation leader. A Big Wing would typically involve grouping squadrons together but the squadrons themselves would already be divided into finger-four sections. The Big Wing was supposed to be a large, but tactically flexible formation.

I wonder if you're confusing the Big Wing with the pre-war Fighting Area Tactics which did impose tight formation constraints with the intent of bringing an entire squadron's guns to bear on an enemy formation simultaneously. That was an unmitigated disaster which lacked tactical flexibility and removed formation situational awareness. It also presupposed a compliant adversary who would continue along a path, unperturbed, as RAF fighters lined up to shoot at him. Note that the Fighting Area Tactics only applied to squadrons: they were NOT intended for operation as a wing.
 
Big Wing did not mean welded wingman. The battle pair and finger four was being adopted piecemeal as early as May 1940. The objective of the Big Wing was to get a large mass of fighters into position to attack the enemy. Once sighted, the wing would dissolve into tactical units. It was not intended to attack masse as a wing, with everyone following one formation leader. .
The big wing, whatever it was supposed to do spent an unacceptable amount of time forming into one formation. Once the enemy was sighted it quickly descended into what a pilot described as chaos behind the leader , they may have spread out a little but were in the same area of sky and apt for 4 pilots to go for one enemy without being aware of the others.
 
The big wing, whatever it was supposed to do spent an unacceptable amount of time forming into one formation. Once the enemy was sighted it quickly descended into what a pilot described as chaos behind the leader , they may have spread out a little but were in the same area of sky and apt for 4 pilots to go for one enemy without being aware of the others.

I wasn't supporting the big Wing concept, simply observing that big Wing and finger four operated together at the same time.

The chaos you describe will happen whenever there are large numbers of aircraft in the same place at the same time. Doesn't matter whether a big Wing got them there or individual flights and squadrons were introduced piecemeal as was the case with 11 Group.
 
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To me the Hurricane, the Spitfire came comparatively late to the game.

The LW never recovered its bomber strength after the Battle of France throughout the whole war. If you consider the battles of Czechoslovakia Poland Norway Netherlands Belgium France and Britain as one battle of attrition then the Hurricane played by far the biggest single part, but not by any means the only part..
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The a hurricane also served well as a night fighter in ETO. Its contribution in Africa and the CBI is often overlooked.
 
The Barracuda was one of many aircraft given that dreadful multi-role mission, this was the death-knell of a lot of other attack aircraft, both during WW2 and to this very day. It's very difficult to make a plane that can be both a successful dive bomber and a torpedo bomber, and still fly with a reasonable speed and combat range.

I agree. Designed around that big lounge below the wing with its massive picture window, then everything plonked around it in a vaguely aeroplane shape, the Barra was an odd looking fish, although suffering severe tailplane buffetting to begin with before the hori stab was relocated near the top of the fin, and a rather sudden and uncommanded dive in a particular flight regime, low and slow, which our man Brown was tasked with investigating and finding a solution, it was nowhere near the SB2C in being so problematic - in fact it was appreciated in service and gave unspectacular service; being noted for being rather strong and robust. Here's what Brown thought of it (again, these are his thoughts and not last words, but they are noteworthy!)

"I was serving with the Service Trials Unit at Arbroath in September 1942, when our first Barracuda arrived. As it entered the airfield circuit, it could be seen that its contours were nothing if not unprepossessing. Here were no rakish lines such as those of its namesake, that voracious West Indian fish. Then it turned onto approach and disgorged a mass of ironmongery from the wings and fuselage transforming the pedestrian and unappealing into what could only be described as an "airborne disaster!" The old adage, 'If it looks right...' inevitable sprung to mind and I concluded that there are events that I could await with rather more pleasure than taking this quaint contraption into the air.

"A high shoulder-wing all-metal stressed-skin monoplane, the Barracuda was something of an abortion on the ground. Indeed with everything folded it gave the impression of having been involved in a very nasty accident."

Ouch! And in case you're wondering about what he thought of the Skua... Not complimentary!
 
Yup, he did. What he comments on as being his all round favourites are not necessarily what one might think though - from his books, his fave has to be the F4F, but then the Bf 110 and Ju 88 left strong impressions on him. He also has much fondness for some rather peculiar choices, such as the Siebel 204. In the thoroughbred camp, the de Havilland Hornet was high on his list, as well as the Me 262 and F-4 Phantom.
 

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