The mid Atlantic gap was a gap in coverage in the air, not on the sea itself. The significance of that is another part of the discussion, that gap could only be closed by an aircraft.
The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war. (2 Viewers)
- Thread starter michael rauls
- Start date
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
The air coverage helped.
In 1943 the Germans lost 18 boats in Feb, 15 boats in March, and 17 boats in April. They lost 44 in May alone and they pulled out of the North Atlantic and deployed elsewhere, at least temporarily.
The first escort carrier showed up late May of 1943, I think they damaged one boat and sank other so the Escort carrier didn't "end" the problem either.
There were 4 (?) aircraft ship combos in May.
It looks like 18 aircraft kills (?) but only 4 are by B-24s.
Ships scored 14(?) in May. Feb/March/April saw ships sink 18 in the 3 months. Something else was going on? Or B-24s were that good at directing surface ships to the subs?
Same bomb. The US renamed the bomb T-10
If the LW had gained Air Superiority in the UK, the invasion still would have not been possible because of the RN.
But the defeat ended the myth of German invincibility.
Simply put, Hitler could gain nothing from the BoB and should have stuck to anti shipping and spent more on U boats.
Could do Okinawa to Japan, but even 2 stage Merlins might not get you to a safe height and Fat Man couldn't be carried internally, but Little Boy could.
Good analysis
Why does the Lancaster's performance drop so much in the tropics, please?
Agree, but 8AF made the contribution of destroying the LW by providing the bait for escorts. Though RAF escorted by P51s late war too.
Wellington raid on Berlin provoked Hitler to attack cities?
T-6 was used postwar for primary training; no need for PT's.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The entire idea from the onset, was to get Britain to negotiate for a peace - Hitler's ultimate goal nwas to quickly neutralize Europe so he could turn full force to the east.
Italy's idiocy in North Africa and Britain's resistance and eventual denial of Germany's offensive derailed that plan.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
It's not just about sinking the uboats.
It's also about spotting an varning convos so they make take another course. it's about slowing the uboats down when they either has to crash dive, or do not dare to run on the surface. it's about mission kills.
I frankly admit I cannot back this up with operational details, but I'm sure somebody here can. Even if a kill also get more attention in the sources, whereas a crash diving uboat may not even have been noticed.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Except for the many nations who were not American and were otherwise engaged in 1939, 1940 and 1941 (read from 1932 for China). For example the Soviet Union which became quite busy in 1941.
The RN experienced a number of problems introducing Hedgehog to the escort fleet which lasted into 1944 and meant it wasn't a very popular weapon until then.
To quote the Admiralty April 1942 Monthly Anti-submarine Report, Hedgehog was "a weapon of precision which requires for success a skill that can only be obtained with adequate training and practice." Unfortunately it was rushed into service without provision for training anyone other than the anti-submarine officer on each ship. His job in training the Hedgehog crew (who in the early days in the River class frigates at least were also responsible for manning the forward gun) was made more difficult by a lack of adequate manuals and standardised procedures.
Some of the early ships fitted, went without proper fire control.
Actual operation of Hedgehog was complicated. There were safety switches, as well as safety pins and fuse caps on each of the 24 bombs to be dealt with before the weapon was ready to fire. And it had a lot of electrical connections that did not like getting wet.
Ammunition was initially unreliable. In one incident in March 1942 on the destroyer Keppel, 5 bombs misfired (one landing on the forecastle) while the others entered the water irregularly and no explosions were heard. This was put down to damp having penetrated the firing circuits.
The bombs each weighed 63lb and proved difficult to handle and load accurately onto the spigots in the bad North Atlantic weather, with the crew exposed on a forecastle that was often pitching and rolling heavily with heavy spray being thrown over them. The USN tended to operate in the generally calmer waters of the Central Atlantic and Pacific so would have less of a problem in this regard. To give that some context a shell for an RN destroyer weighed about 50-62lb depending on calibre, and was being placed into a loading tray along with its separate charge before being rammed home.
There were weather limitations affecting its use.
Because the Hedgehog bombs only exploded if they hit something, there was no positive morale effect of big underwater explosions on the crews of escorts and merchantmen and no negative morale effect on the crew of the U-boat being attacked.
While you noted its first success in Nov 1942, it is worthy of note that only 16 Hedgehog salvoes had been fired against confirmed U-boat targets up to that point. Wiki says 100 ships had been equipped by the end of 1942. That would have included 12 River class frigates, which was the first class designed for it (although it was a late addition during the design process).
As the war went on improved ASDIC sets were fitted which made the use of Hedgehog easier. For example the Q fittings on Type 144 and the later Type 147 that was retrofitted to some escort vessels.
It was early 1944 before a detailed study of Hedgehog performance was undertaken at Londonderry in Northern Ireland, one of the big escort bases in the U.K. From that came better training, maintenance and procedures. The Admiralty Monthly Anti-submarine report for April 1944 noted "The results were remarkable. Within a very short time, the percentage of hits obtained at sea during exercises rose from ten per cent to fifty per cent." And that improvement flowed through into operational success. By the second half of 1944 a success rate in the RN was up to 37%, making it almost as successful as the double Squid on the Loch class frigates.
special ed
1st Lieutenant
- 7,089
- May 13, 2018
The T-6 "postwar" did not turn the tide of the war.
buffnut453
Captain
The problem with this thread is that there wasn't a single tide that turned. There were multiple.
In 1940, Hitler's western offensive stalled and ultimately failed after the fall of France. That was due, in no small part, to the success of RAF Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain.
Then we have North Africa where the tide turned in October 1942 after the second battle of El Alamein.
In the Pacific, there were multiple battles that could be said to have turned the tide. Guadalcanal and Midway spring immediately to mind but there's also the Battle of Kohima for Burma and probably others that I'm missing.
Then there's the Eastern Front where Stalingrad was a clear turning point.
I think each of these should be considered in isolation because, in many respects, they weren't really connected.
In 1940, Hitler's western offensive stalled and ultimately failed after the fall of France. That was due, in no small part, to the success of RAF Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain.
Then we have North Africa where the tide turned in October 1942 after the second battle of El Alamein.
In the Pacific, there were multiple battles that could be said to have turned the tide. Guadalcanal and Midway spring immediately to mind but there's also the Battle of Kohima for Burma and probably others that I'm missing.
Then there's the Eastern Front where Stalingrad was a clear turning point.
I think each of these should be considered in isolation because, in many respects, they weren't really connected.
Exactly. There were too many events in too many disparate locations / times for any particular one to be the most important.
There was no aircraft that participated in all these events.
Warspite63
Staff Sergeant
- 1,119
- Dec 8, 2022
Further to the previous couple of posts, I think we need to agree on a definition of 'turning the tide'. To me, it means:
1. War is going generally against the Allies
2. The aircraft is deployed
3. War is henceforth going generally for the Allies
This excludes aircraft that might have had a major impact in prosecuting (or even hastening the end of) the war, such as the B29. It also excludes aircraft that performed a specific, important mission (shooting down Yamamoto, ferrying Japanese surrender delegations to their surrender ceremonies. This is not to say that these aircraft weren't important - but they did not turn the tide - the tide was inexorably rolling in already
From my (admittedly Atlantic-centric) perspective, I'm thinking of the Hurricane (BoB) and/or the B24 (closing the Atlantic Gap). The B24 also has the bonus of performing vital functions in other theatres
My 2 cents.....
1. War is going generally against the Allies
2. The aircraft is deployed
3. War is henceforth going generally for the Allies
This excludes aircraft that might have had a major impact in prosecuting (or even hastening the end of) the war, such as the B29. It also excludes aircraft that performed a specific, important mission (shooting down Yamamoto, ferrying Japanese surrender delegations to their surrender ceremonies. This is not to say that these aircraft weren't important - but they did not turn the tide - the tide was inexorably rolling in already
From my (admittedly Atlantic-centric) perspective, I'm thinking of the Hurricane (BoB) and/or the B24 (closing the Atlantic Gap). The B24 also has the bonus of performing vital functions in other theatres
My 2 cents.....
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Well the 7th of June French Air Force Farman NC223.4 air raid on Berlin did not.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F7qz_osKC-w
Greetings Warspite63,
I appreciate the sensibility of this. The argument I've made previously is that the aircraft that did the most to change the course of the war was not actually on the winning side, but was essential to a strategy and course of action that ultimately did determine the outcome of the war, the A6M Zero. My logic is this:
- The Zero was designed with sufficient range so as to be able to strike the enemy without fear of counterstrike due to the opponent's lack of range, especially enemy fighters. The Zero's range was a fundamental planning factor in the attack on Pearl Harbor. As a side note, it was the range of the Kate torpedo bomber that was most limiting and necessitated the Japanese fleet launching the attack from around 200 miles NW of Oahu. It is highly unlikely that the Japanese would have attacked Pearl Harbor directly without having the tactical advantage that the A6M represented.
- Pre-Pearl Harbor, Soviet intelligence had become aware of Japanese intentions and recognizing that war with Japan unlikely relocated sufficient forces from the Siberian front to mount a winter counteroffensive, stopping the German advance and regaining critical territories. This is Germany's first major setback on the ground and ensures that the USSR will not collapse and surrender.
- The Attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized the United States in a way that an attack on the Philippines could not. This is the true tide turn of the war as it fully mobilizes US industry to the war effort. Not only does this bring the US in as a combatant, but its material capacity as well.
Warspite63
Staff Sergeant
- 1,119
- Dec 8, 2022
...all valid. You're looking at the question from a more 'macro' perspective - which is pretty interesting. Well played
